Voluntary recruitment in Scotland, 1914-1916 by Young, Derek Rutherford
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Young, Derek Rutherford (2001) Voluntary recruitment in Scotland, 1914-
1916. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/8202/  
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten:Theses 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
VOLUNTARY RECRUITMENT IN SCOTLAND, 1914-1916
DEREK RUTHERFORD YOUNG
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
2001
SUMMARY
The belief that Scotland showed undue patriotism by providing a high
proportion of volunteers in 1914-16 needs to be looked at in a new light.
While the New Armies of 1914-16 may have been volunteer in concept, they
were not volunteer in actuality, and, while there was no doubt a proportion of
men in Scotland, as elsewhere in the British Empire, who were prepared to
come forward for purely altruistic or 'patriotic' ideals, the majority enlisted for
more practical or realistic reasons. External forces either pushed or pulled
those men and enticed or forced them to enlist. Previous analyses have been
primarily top down. We know how many men served, and with what units, but
not why. This thesis is an investigation of Scottish recruitment from the
bottom up, to determine whether or not those who enlisted came from any
particular section of Scottish society. This investigates and explains the
driving forces behind voluntary recruitment in Scotland, August 1914 -
December 1915, its methods, course taken, and its impact on the country as
a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Great War historians in Britain have strived, often at
great length, to define those factors which create such evocative memories in
a population, the vast majority of which was born after the event. Of all the
facets of the First World War which have been discussed and poured over, it
is still the raising of the mass volunteer armies which prompts the deepest
emotions. Almost a century later it is hard to identify with those factors which
meant so much to the 'generation of 1914'. J. Winter, in The Great War and
the British People, writes that 'Thousands joined up in a holiday spirit and with
an entirely unfounded conviction that the war would end by Christmas'. 1 In the
twenty-first century such a response is abhorrent to generations raised in the
aftermath of two world wars, Korea, and Vietnam: witnesses to the ease with
which such conflicts become drawn-out and totally destructive. The idea that
war could excite a nation and be viewed as a form of desirable adventure is
anathema to a generation raised in the shelter of the 'nanny state'.
The mantra that Scotland produced a disproportionate number of recruits
during the Great War has, over the last few years, taken on a cult status of its
own: often quoted but never qualified. Many historians are quick to point out
that Scotland provided a high number of recruits for the New Armies, with I.
G. C. Hutchinson, in his paper 'The Nobility and Politics in Scotland 1880 -
1939', stating that 'The Scots, it must be remembered, volunteered in
1 j • Winter, The Great War and the British People. p. 29.
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disproportionately large numbers from the very start of the war.' 2 Niall
Ferguson claims that the Scots 'were the keenest to volunteer for war'.3
Many, like J. Winter, 'The Army and Society: The Demographic Content',
attributed this to patriotism, the desire to serve king and country, 4
 or, equally
vague, Scotland's natural military attributes: once a warrior nation etc. To
assume that those who volunteered in 1914 and 1915 left everything behind
and enlisted solely out of devotion to their country is as absurd as it is
outdated. That is not to say that some, a proportion of the total, did not do so,
but to assume that all were driven by such altruistic motives is a belief which
is at best ill-judged or at worse deliberately contentious.
Many excellent regimental records detail in great depth the military
contribution made by the Scottish soldier. These records range from histories
of whole regiments, such as the unattributed Historical records of the Queen's
Own Cameron Highianders, Story's History of the Cameronians (Scottish
Rifles), 1910-1933, and Wauchope's three volume History of the Black Watch
(Royal Highianders) in the Great War, 19 14-1918, down to those of individual
battalions, examples of which are A Border Battalion: The History of the 7/8!!?
(Service) Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, MacLeod's War History of
the 8!" (Service) Battalion Queen's Own Cameron Highianders, and The
Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce
Battalion): Record of War Service, 1914-1918 written by Arthur and Munro.
2 C. C. Hutchison, 'The Nobility and Politics in ScotTand, ci 880— 1939'. in T. M. Devine,
Scottish Elites. p. 144.
N. Ferguson, The Pity Of War. p.199.
J. Winter, The Army and Society: The Demographic Content', in I. Beckett and K. Simpson,
eds, A Nation in Arms. p. 195.
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These records are quite naturally dedicated to the 'military' aspect of the war
and they tend to focus partly on training, but mostly on the combat record of
the battalion, regiment or brigade. In consequence, very little is known about
those who came forward: the individuals, their background, status, or culture,
and more importantly the motivating factors behind their decision to enlist.
In 'The Scottish Economy' Clive Lee concludes that by the end of the war
some 690,235 Scots, both voluntarily enlisted and conscripted, had served in
the various branches of the military and 'As a result, the percentage of Scots
serving, as a proportion of males aged 15-49, reached 41.4%, compared to
46.2% for England and Wales'. 5 Far from being disproportionately high,
Scotland's total contribution was in reality disproportionately low: 4.8 per cent
lower than England and Wales. Clive Lee also afirms that 'The conscription
rate was much lower for Scotland - 14.6% as compared to 22.1%'. This
shows that the introduction of conscription in January 1916 served to slow
down the number of Scots entering the services as industrial jobs were now
protected, and the drain from Scotland's industry, while not at an end, was at
least reduced to a manageable trickle. 6 Scotland's industrial workers were
now, at last, seen as of equal importance at home, providing the machinery of
war.
Perhaps of greater importance is Scotland's contribution in the early months
C.H. Lee, 'The Scottish Economy', in C. Macdonald, and E.W. McFarland, eds, Scotland
and the Great War. p. 20.
E. Spiers, 'The Scottish Soldier at war' in H. Cecil and P. Liddle, Facing Armageddon: The
First World War Experienced. p. 315
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of the conflict, the period when military expansion was dependent upon the
volunteer ethos, the period prior to the introduction of conscription in January
1916 and the period which is perhaps the true reflection of Scotland's military
effort. Here there is also a disparity between the various home countries, with
Lee writing that 'Volunteers comprised 26.9% of Scottish men aged 15-49 in
1911, slightly higher than the rate for England and Wales at 24.6%'. Edward
Spiers, in 'The Scottish Soldier at War', states that 'Martial
enthusiasm.. .gripped just over one in four Scottish males aged between 15
and 49 in the period up to December 1915.8 While there is certainly a
difference, at only 2.3 per cent it does not justify the mythology which has,
over the years, built up around it. However, there is no doubt that the initial
voluntary period was Scotland's time and, whatever the reasons, the nation
was in a position to provide substantial numbers of volunteers for both the
New Armies and the Territorial Force.
Conscription was not introduced until January 1916 and in his book, The Pity
of War, Niall Ferguson, among others, would have it that 'All those who joined
the army before that date therefore did so voluntarily'. 9 Professor Ferguson
continues on this theme by asserting that 'Until the Battle of the Somme the
British mostly fought because they wanted to, not because they had to'.1°
Ferguson then causes some confusion by attributing voluntary recruitment to
five factors or motives: successful recruiting techniques, female pressure,
C.H. Lee, 'The Scottish Economy', in MacDonald and McFarland, eds. p. 20.8 E. Spiers, The Scottish Soldier', in Cecil and Liddle, eds. p. 315.
N. Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 198.
10 N. Ferguson, The Pity of War. p. 198-9.
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peer-group pressure, economic motives, and impulse. 11 With the first four of
these motives involving 'outside agencies' this, in essence, removes the
'voluntary' component from the equation. Enlistment in the army in 1914 and
1915 was on a voluntary basis but only in the sense that there was no form of
legal compulsion. Ferguson's 'five motives' constitute, in their own way and
with every bit as much weight as legally introduced means, a form of
irresistible social or economic compulsion and thereby remove the absolute
freedom of choice which symbolises the true 'volunteer'.
Unfortunately there has also been a tendency to overstate Scotland's
contribution or to accept inflated figures at face value. This, while
unintentionally giving a false impression, also detracts from the real
achievements and helps to perpetuate the myth. Trevor Royle, in the book In
Flanders Fields: Scottish Poetty and Prose of the First World War, claims that
Glasgow's Gallowgate recruiting office enlisted some 20,000 men in the first
month of the war. 12 Similarly the claim in Bill Kenefick's, War Resistors and
Anti-Conscription in Scotland: an ILP Perspective', that Glasgow produced
6,000 recruits in the first week of the war is also wide of the mark.' 3 While the
Scottish press, in the necessity of the time, could view such exaggerated
figures as justified, they should, some 80 years after the event, be seen as
N. Ferguson, The Pity of War. p. 204-6.
12 T. Royle, ed. In Flanders Fields - Scottish Poetry and Prose of the First World War. p. 12.
13 w Kenefick, War Resisters and Anti-Conscription in Scotland: an ILP Perspective', in
Macdonald and McFarland, eds. p. 61.
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just another means to stimulate recruitment and be viewed, in the light of that
necessity, as suspect.
Voluntary recruitment has not been neglected in recent research. John
Morton Osborne's thesis The Voluntaiy Recruiting Movement in Britain, 19 14-
1916, with its emphasis on Bristol, Clive Hughes' Army Recruitment in
Gwynedd, 1914-19 16, and Patrick Callan's Voluntary Recruitment for the
British Army in Ireland During the First World War, are the three most relevant
theses and are important studies in their own right, focusing as they do on
recruitment in three specific areas of the United Kingdom. However, while
Osborne focuses on the central mechanics of voluntary recruitment, Hughes
and CaHan focus on the political connotations involved in recruitment in Wales
and Ireland. Similarly, while B. C. Croucher's thesis British Working Class
Attitudes to War and National Defence 1902-14 is an exceptionally detailed
study, it also focuses, in the main, on the political aspects of recruitment. This
has been the prevailing trend when studying voluntary recruitment, with the
resulting 'top down' studies concentrating on the mechanism of recruitment
rather than on the recruits themselves.
This thesis focuses on the manpower enlisting in the Army and Territorial
Force in Scotland and aims to show that economics played a primary role in
promoting recruitment, in particular supporting the hypothesis that
unemployment, while not the sole motivating factor, was the principal
motivation for recruitment among the working classes. Of equal importance
are the origins of the manpower and the forces acting upon them. The
18
inclusion of the commercial classes in this study is intended to confirm that
economic factors governed recruitment, at least in the first year of the war,
and will show that Scotland's working classes played a disproportionate role
in the provision of military manpower. In order to present as comprehensive a
viewpoint as possible, within the limits of this thesis, other, secondary,
motives will also be investigated.
The study steers away from several points which others have already
investigated in great depth. It makes no attempt to investigate any form of
university, cadet force or officer recruitment. Neither is it intended to look at
any political aspect of recruitment or the central mechanism of recruitment as
this too has been covered in great detail. This study is intended to be from the
bottom up - a study of Shakespeare's 'everyman' or Lennon's 'working class
hero'.
From the outset Scotland was in a unique position in her ability to provide
large numbers of recruits at short notice. Within the country at large there was
immediate access to a 'pool' of manpower which, if not willing, was at least
resigned to enlisting. This pool contained the annual, natural peacetime
wastage of Scottish manpower, mainly those who emigrated or migrated, and
also those whose livelihoods were immediately affected by the outbreak of
war.
This is a study of that all-important volunteer period, and is an examination of
Scotland's military effort based in part on official recruitment statistics and in
19
part on an analysis of the local press. It looks beyond the mythology
surrounding Scottish recruitment and, using regional daily, weekly, and
monthly recruitment figures, gives a realistic rather than a romantic view of
Scotland's voluntary recruitment contribution.
The thesis focuses on several key points:
1. Why did Scotland produce this high number of recruits in the
voluntary period?
2. What were the motivating factors behind Scottish recruitment
figures?
3. Where did this recruitment take place? Regional patterns.
4. How were these men recruited?
Chapter One gives an overview of pre-war Scotland and tries to determine
the feeling in the country at large and the various groups influencing those
ideals.
The pre-war relationship between the army and the civilian population is
examined in Chapter Two which looks at the changing perception of the
military in the light of the Boer War and the consequent reforms in the army.
In Gerard DeG root's Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, and
Hew Strachan's The Politics of the British Army we find that the generally
accepted view of the low social standard of the pre-war recruit prevails.
However, with regards to Scotland, this 'standardised' concept needs to be
reappraised. The pre-war contribution to the army by the individual home
20
countries is compared. It looks at pre-war demographic patterns of
recruitment to determine whether initial wartime recruitment was a
continuation of the pre-war system or a separate entity in its own right.
The direct relationship between economics and recruitment in the early
months of the war (Ferguson's economic motives) is investigated in Chapter
Three. It examines the claim by J. Winter that 'popular sentiment rather than
pecuniary considerations lay behind enlistment in the first phase of the 1914-
18 war'. 14 In the light of Peter Dewey's investigation into the link between
recruitment and industrial wage levels, 'Military Recruiting and the British
Labour Force During the First World War', it studies the initial reaction of
Scottish industry in 1914, the economic collapse as it affected Scotland, and
the part it played in the stimulation of Scottish recruitment. It studies the
reality behind Peter Dewey's claims that economic factors played only 'a
subordinate role in determining enlistment rates' and that 'neither activity
levels nor wages' could explain recruiting differences between industries, and
shows that these conclusions do not apply to Scotland. It investigates, in
relation to Scotland, the claims in Gerard DeGroot's The First World War that
'At least initially, war's disruption did cause unemployment to rise', and, as
Professor DeGroot continues, 'male unemployment explains in part the
enthusiasm for military enlistment'. 15 We investigate the link between the
upswing of Scottish industry and the fall in recruitment numbers. This
supports Peter Simkins' assertion that 'the opportunity to escape from
14 • Winter, The Great War. p. 33.
15G. DeGroot, The First World War. p. 137.
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poverty, dreary surroundings or a tedious job played their part in drawing men
to the recruiting offices'.16
In Tom Devine's The Scottish Nation the search by Irish immigrants, in
Scotland, for a sense of national identity is seen as a factor in the recruitment
of large numbers of Scots-lrish. This is a theme which Devine follows in his
Irish Immigrants and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries. Devine is not alone in highlighting this search for identity. Roger
Swift's The Irish in Britain 1815 —1914: Perspectives and Sources, and Roger
Swift's and Sheridan Gilley's The Irish in the Victorian City give an insight into
the need for Irish immigrants to take advantage of every opportunity to blend
into mainstream Scottish society. Jeanette Brock holds the view that both
immigration and emigration played important roles in creating, within a section
of Scottish society, a readiness, if not a willingness, to enlist, and that, up until
now, they have been under-emphasised. The fourth chapter probes these
factors which, although secondary in importance, nevertheless played an
important role in promoting recruitment in Scotland.
Chapter Four takes a direct look at recruitment for the New Armies in
Scotland. It shows how, contrary to Haldane's original concept, the New
Armies were to be the means by which the British Expeditionary Force was to
be strengthened and increased. It investigates the various aspects of the
recruiting campaign and the terms and conditions available to recruits. It looks
at the regional variations in recruitment and how those recruits were raised for
16 P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army; The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16. p. 185.
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the various regiments. The support of the Scottish church, peer pressure and
financial pressure are also examined, and also, importantly, the onset of
conscription.
The perceived 'boom and bust' theory of the recruitment surge in August and
September 1914 is challenged in Chapter Five which takes a fresh look at
army recruitment in Scotland. The chapter puts this 'phenomenon' into a
simple perspective relative to the recruitment process at the time and the
increasing, and, more importantly, fluctuating, manpower requirements of the
New Armies.
Of all the myths which have grown up around the mass armies of 1914-15
that of the Civic or Pals battalions generates most interest and, in Scotland,
has been subjected to the greatest, unintentional, abuse. In Chapter Six the
role of the Pals battalions in Scottish recruitment is presented within the
context of Scottish recruitment as a whole. The chapter looks at the influence
of public figures involved in civic recruitment and tries to unravel the myths
surrounding civic recruitment in Scotland. T. Chalmers in An Epic of Glasgow:
History of the	 Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry, M. Lynch in Scotland,
A new History, A.J. Smithers in The Fighting Nation: Lord Kitchener and his
Armies, and Niall Ferguson in the Pity of War are just a small cross section of
those who have perpetuated the myth that Scotland's Pals battalions were
raised within a short period of time: wild claims of 16 hours in some cases.
This chapter shows that the concept of Pals battalions was not applicable to
23
Scotland in any major form and played a minor role in stimulating Scottish
recruitment.
Jeanette Brock's 'The Militia: An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration
1871-1907' views pre-war territorial enlistment as a core aspect of Scottish
society. If this is the case then enlistment for the Territorial Force during the
First World War should be a reflection of pre-war commitment. Chapter Seven
looks at recruitment in Scotland for the Territorial Force and shows that, in
certain areas of the country, the Territorial concept was Scotland's answer to
the 'Pals phenomenon'.
Chapter Eight looks at recruiting in Scotland for the Royal Navy and shows
that while the manpower requirements differed from those of the army, those
who did enlist were serving in an infantry role. The need for men to serve in a
primarily maritime role was low due to the pie-war strength carried forward
into the early months of the war.
The section on recruitment is rounded off in chapter Nine which combines
Army and Territorial Force recruitment and presents it in a single context to
give a general overview of Scotland's manpower contribution.
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CHAPTER 1
PRE-WAR SCOTLAND
When the First World War broke out in August 1914 it came to me, as
to most of my contemporaries, as a complete shock.17
William Marwick writes that he was not the only one to be taken unawares by
the turn of events. In August 1914 the mainstream Scottish press, as well as
the people of Scotland, was caught out by the speed of events in Europe. The
Scotsman, on 1 July gave three columns on the movement of the bodies of
Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and his wife from Sarajevo to Vienna on the
battleship Viribus Unitis on 30 June, but at the same time devoted as much
column space to the prospects of the coming grouse season in the various
estates and regions of Scotland. On 3 July the paper gave greater
prominence to the Henley Regatta than to the introduction of martial law in
Bosnia and the escalation of the Balkan crisis. The popular belief that this
was just another 'little Balkans squabble' shows that little attention was paid to
the rising power struggle between those nations who desired to control the
direction of Slav development. Serbia was the aggressive Slav state, Russia
was desperate to regain her position as the leader of the burgeoning Pan-
Slav movement in the Balkans, and Austria-Hungary needed to control any
rising Slav nationalism.
17 W. H. Marwick, in I. Macoougall, ed, Voices From WarAnd Some Labour Struggles:
Personal Recollections of War by Scottish Men and Women. p. 48.
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There were two theories circulating in the press at this time. The first tried to
put 'spin' on the issue by implying that the crisis was in reality a plot aimed at
isolating Britain and ensuring German domination in Europe. This was a
blatant attempt to whip up national fervour against Germany and justify British
intervention. The second theory was that the failure of the British government
to take a decisive hand in Ireland and the constant threat of a civil war in
Ulster had reduced the status of Britain in the eyes of the other powers and
the government was therefore directly contributing to the escalation of the
conflict. This was the line taken by The Scotsman in a vitriolic attack on the
government on 27 July 1914. On 24 July The Scotsman had described the
conflict as a purely Pan-Slav struggle and saw no reason for a European war.
The newspaper could envisage no gain for any power and stated that Europe
had become accustomed to the idea of a conflict along the Danube.18
From 28 July The Scotsman pursued a twin track approach, giving its support
for the British attempts at mediation while continuing to attack the government
in alternate articles: the paper continually reiterated that there was no reason
for Britain to become involved in any European conflict. In this the paper was
only following the line taken by the British government, outlined by Sir Edward
Grey in his statement to the House of Commons, that as long as the dispute
was between the two countries (Serbia, Austria-Hungary) no one had the right
to interfere. It was only if relations between Russia and Austria-Hungary
became strained that the other powers should intervene, not to support
Serbia but to prevent any conflict between Russia and Austha-Hungary, as
18 The Scotsman, 26 July 1914.
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this, it was felt, would be a threat to the peace of Europe. Grey stressed that
'the moment the dispute ceased to be local and became one in which another
Great Power was involved, it could but end in the greatest catastrophe that
had ever befallen Eu rope'.19
The prevalent attitude of the British government was mediation in order to
prevent any escalation of the crisis. It was not aimed at preventing the war but
purely at limiting the consequences. The Scotsman closely followed this line
by declaring that 'it is unnecessary to assume that we must become actively
involved in a European struggle from whatever course it may arise or to
whatever end it may be directed'.2°
After the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, The Scotsman
editorial supported the government line. This was the start of a policy in the
paper of attacking Socialists and any who advocated 'peace at any price'. The
paper declared that 'while French Socialists discuss the situation rationally,
and while German Socialists seem ready to put their pacifist principles aside
at the call of their country, British Socialists and the group of Radicals in
alliance with them, cut by contrast a sorry figure'.21
On 3 August there was the indication of a more pragmatic policy at The
Scotsman when it proposed that the invasion of Luxembourg did not directly
affect Britain's interests and therefore warranted no direct intervention. It did,
19 The Scotsman, 28 July 1914.
20 The Scotsman, 29 July 1914.
21 The Scotsman, 1 August 1914.
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however, accept that 'our interests' in Belgium did warrant intervention and
proposed that 'violation of Belgium territory was cause enough for war'. 22 This
shows that from the outset the intervention was not seen, by sections of the
Scottish press at least, as in the defence of 'little Belgium' but purely in
defence of British interests abroad - this is in contrast to the claim that Britain
had no axe to grind and 'no selfish interests to serve'.23
The feeling among the provincial papers was that Britain should use its naval
power to contain the German navy and control the trade lanes but that any
fighting on land should be left to her continental allies with their large-scale
conscript armies. The Dundee Advertiser stated in its first editorial on 29 July
1914 that if there was a direct threat to British interests then 'Britain should
not be an onlooker', but the paper continued, just as firmly, that as yet there
was no threat to British interests. 24
 The paper produced no other editorial on
the crisis until 7 August but there were plenty of items about 'little Serbia' and
daily photographs showing the conditions of the Serbian soldiers in
comparison to those of Austria-Hungary, all aimed at building public support
for Serbia. On 7 August an editorial appeared in The Dundee Advertiser
supporting the government and Sir Edward Grey, launching a scathing attack
on what it saw as Liberal and Socialist pacifists, and supporting Asquith's
desire to play a strong part in the war.
22 The Scotsman, 3 August 1914.
23 The Times, 29 July 1914.
24 Dundee Advertiser, 29 July 1914.
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On the industrial west coast of Scotland The Glasgow Herald disapproved of
the action taken by Austria-Hungary but adopted a decidedly non-
interventionist stance. However, once again, when war had been declared the
policy changed to one of support for the government and attacks on the
radicals who advocated peace or compromise. The Glasgow Herald had
given over much of its coverage in July to other items closer to home. The
deaths of Lord Wemyss and Joseph Chamberlain occupied the first few days
of the month while the visit to Scotland by the King and Queen occupied
much of the reporting in the second week. In tandem with this was the
constant reporting of the situation in Ireland. With upwards of 100,000 Irish
living in Glasgow the question of Irish Home Rule was, in that region at least,
a very emotive subject, and The Glasgow Herald anticipated that the risk of
war in Ulster was more immediate, and more important to its readers, than
war in Europe. It was not until 24 July that the paper took a stance on the
Balkan issue with an editorial backing the alliance system and taking the
Serbian point of view.25
 However, four days later this changed to an attack on
Serbia in a strong anti-Serbian editorial placing Serbia as the aggressor in
Europe. This was a supportive move to bolster the British attempt at
mediation. The soft, almost pacifist, line taken by The Glasgow Herald
continued into August with the declaration on the third of that month that it
was our duty to do nothing impetuously 'there is no dishonour in refusing to
go further than reason commands, no cowardice in hesitating when the voice
of duty does not speak in urgent tones'.26
25 The Glasgow Herald, 24 July 1914.
26 The Glasgow Herald, 3 August 1914.
29
The editorial also advocated taking the middle road between 'peace at any
price' and 'action now', and stressed that Britain should not get involved in
what was essentially a European dispute. In line with the majority of the
Scottish press this outlook changed when Britain entered the war. The
editorial on 5 August strove to justify Britain's entry into the conflict by saying
that, although Britain wanted to mediate, she was forced by a deceitful
Germany and Austria-Hungary to join in the defence of Belgium and France.
By 8 August The Glasgow Herald was staking out the high moral ground
against Germany, comparing German aggression to 'Napoleonism' and
announcing a voluntary code of censorship, suppressing articles which it did
not deem to be in the best interest of the country. 27 The Scotsman had earlier
initiated its own self regulating code of censorship when it announced on I
August that
we have again received reports from correspondents at home and
abroad relating to British naval and military movements. These
movements, as stated in the official communications which have been
issued from the War Office are in the nature of precautionary and
defensive measures, and in view of the very critical nature of the
situation we consider it advisable not to give the reports publicly.28
One point of note is that by 8 August, the press was already reporting high
figures in relation to casualties. The report that Germany had suffered 25,000
27 The Glasgow Herald, 8 August 1914.
28 The Scotsman, 1 August 1914.
30
dead in the first few days' conflict in Belgium should at least have prepared
the Scothsh public for the high casualty figures to come.
Another indication of the public and press interest in the outhreak of war can
be seen in the priority given to the announcement of Britain's entry into the
conflict. The Scottish press continued to leave the front page for advertising
while placing the declaration of war on pages seven or eight. Many papers did
not even bother to highlight the event, discussing Britain's entry as if the
public were merely spectators at some sporting occasion. Space was given
over however to discussions on how the war would affect the various sectors
of Scottish society: the cancellation of Perth races, the effect on the grouse
season and the cancellation of Hunt Balls. Of much greater importance to the
general public was the immediate increase in food prices in the major Scottish
towns. These rises quickly prompted the government to introduce official price
levels: butter at Is 6d per lb., bacon at Is 3d, and sugar at 4 1/2d per lb. Also of
more immediate concern was the creation of large numbers of temporary
hospitals as schools, county houses, asylums and town halls were
commandeered and made ready to receive large numbers of casualties.
These factors served to highlight the closeness of the conflict, not in some
distant part of the empire but only a few miles from Britain's shores. If war
was to come it would be fought in the full view of the British public.
For some, the surge of war novels in the early years of the twentieth century
has long been seen as a factor in the growth of anti-German feeling in Britain.
Novels like The Riddle of the Sands and The Invasion of 1910 were popular
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and are perceived as having heightened the fears of German invasion.29
Others take a more pragmatic approach and, while acknowledging that this
genre of literature was extremely popular, they assert that the contents never
gained any credibility among the public. In pre-war Britain they were read
purely as exciting novels and did not shape public perceptions of Germany.3°
In Scotland at least, large sections of the population were not in a position,
nor inclined, to buy novels. Although some had access to free municipal
libraries, such as in Glasgow, they were used by the majority of visitors to
read papers and periodicals. The working classes, those who could read,
would have had a greater interest in reading the local paper than a novel, not
least because of the cost which would be of prime concern to those on low
wages. However most provincial newspapers serialised popular novels which
meant that the Scottish working classes were not unaware of the genre. This
does not imply that the public was impervious to the growing competition
between Britain and Germany; it just means that they perceived it in a
different light with a different set of priorities and for different reasons.
Germany was an industrial competitor and it was in that guise that she was
viewed by the working classes as a direct threat.
There was no objective reason for the population of Scotland to carry as great
a fear of invasion as in England. This threat of invasion may have been actual
or imaginary, fuelled by the popular press and a new genre of inflammatory
invasion novels, but in the early years of the twentieth century this was not
29 B. Harding, On Flows the Tay. p. 39.
30 De Groat, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War. p. 12.
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enough to cause any apprehension within the Scottish community. Certainly
in England the threat of invasion had been a recurring theme, in parliament, in
public and in the press (the Northcliffe press mainly), although in part this was
a recruiting theme for organisations such as the National Service League and
as a means to put forward their ideals of compulsory military service. 31
 The
only direct threat to Scotland was seen as a strike or raid on the east coast
but even this was deemed unlikely due to the construction of the new naval
bases at Cromarty and Rosyth which guaranteed a permanent heavy naval
presence in Scothsh waters. The designation of Scapa Flow as a wartime
anchorage further heightened the feeling of security in Scotland. The high
levels of naval development and construction were seen as part of the new
demand for a strong home fleet, able to deter the expanding German navy,
and as such these changes did not cause any alarm as they were seen as a
natural function of maintaining British naval supremacy. The navy, the bastion
of the nation's defence, would protect Scotland.
The working classes in Scotland were not unaware of the so called 'naval
race' between Germany and Britain but to the great majority it was seen as
just that, a race, with no political implications. There was however, a pride in
the nation's industrial ability to maintain its lead in any field; a display of
imperial supremacy. The naval race was seen by the working classes not as
a direct military race leading to inevitable conflict, but as part of the race for
empire: size meant power. Germany's imperial ambitions were seen as the
real threat not her ambition in Europe. Germany had, until her desire for
31 D. Hayes, Conscription Conflict. p. 51-61.
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imperial power, rarely been viewed as a competitor: she was a land power not
a naval one. The naval race with Germany was conducted mainly at a political
level and as such, while it may have caused concern to the government of the
day, for that very reason it did not hold the political interest of the man in the
street.
What constituted crisis to those in command was often beyond the 'ken' of the
man in the street who saw things in a more practical and pragmatic way.
What was of more interest to the Scottish worker was the amount of cheap
German steel being imported for use in the Clyde shipyards and the need to
maintain the high level of coal exports to Germany from the east coast coal
fields. The use of German steel had helped to create a shipbuilding boom on
the Clyde in 1913 while the export of coal to fuel Germany's expanding
industrial might had encouraged the rapid growth of the east coast coal
industry. It is somehow ironic that cheap German steel was being used to
build British warships in the naval race against Germany. Any enmity felt
towards pre-war Germany by those Scottish working classes which were the
first to enlist was created as the result of pre-war economic developments
and not ideology. Cheap German armour-plate imported to the Clyde and
used in the construction of British warships created a pre-war slump in the
Scottish steel industry, bringing with it ill feeling towards Germany, while
those working in the shipyards were left to believe that if we were building
ships to match the German navy then Germany must be viewed as an
enemy. The British naval policy of the two-power standard was, to all intents
and purposes, unknown to them. Of greater importance was the increase in
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warship building on the Clyde in the pre-war years. This helped to create the
pre-war boom and in turn propagated the myth of a naval race.
FIG 1:1 Clyde's Share of Admiralty Warshipbuilding 19001914.32
Year	 Number	 Clydeside	 Percentage
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The middle class in pre-war Scotland had developed an interest in the British
Empire, its expansion and development, and most importantly as an area of
personal advancement. Scotland's middle classes had developed a history of
service in India and a 'tradition of imperial service'. 33
 They identified closely
with the empire, considering themselves to be Imperial: that is, within that
section of society entrusted with the safe running and expansion of the
empire. They were the administrators and protectors of the empire, taking
pride in the power and political status as the largest empire. There was a
certain degree of pride within Scotland at being part of the British Empire,
32 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbullding on the Clyde: Naval orders and the Prosperity of the Clyde
Shipbuilding Industry, 1889-1939. p. 169.
B. Lenman. An Economic History of Modern Scotland 1660-1976. p. 207.
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although, within the working classes, the identity was that of being part of the
empire, not imperial. For the Scottish masses, imperialism and imperial
expansion meant continuing employment. The concept of national pride
gained from imperial rule would be part of the natural desire to feel a part of
all that was seen as being 'the best' of society. For the working classes the
pride that was felt in being a part of the British empire came from the
knowledge that it was their skills that helped to maintain Britain's industrial
and economic dominance. Angus Calder asserts that 'the idea that Scotland's
destiny lay within the English speaking "Commonwealth of Nations" . . .was not
confined to people obviously hitched to the imperial estabIishment'. For the
upper classes, the landed and the new industrialists, the idea of being part of
the empire was that of a partnership with England: equality in the rule of the
empire and equality in the profit from the empire. 35
 G. Walker states that,
Before the First World War, therefore, Scotland's overall world-view
was, in general, empire-orientated. It fed on notions of international
prestige in industry, science and education; it was proud of its
regiments and missionaries; it liked the idea of "partnership" with
England and it shared with its partner a broad cultural affinity.36
Class structure within Scotland was as clearly defined as it was south of the
border. The upper class of Scottish society had, over a period of time and
C. Barn bery, Scotland, Class and Nation. p. 140.
T. Devine, The Scottish Nation. p. 289-90.
36 G. Wa!ker, 'Protestantism and Political Culture 1890-1 990'. in G. Walker, & T. Gallagher,
'Protestantism and Scothsh Politics', in G. Walker & 1. Gallagher.(eds) Sermons and Battle
Hymns. p. 88.
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with judicious intermarrying, become almost indistinguishable from its
southern counterparts. This was not confined to the pre-war era but continued
into the war years; the marriage in April 1915 between Lady Victoria Stanley,
the daughter of Lord Derby, and the Hon. Neil Primrose, son of Lord
Rosebery, was a case in question. Lord Derby was made Director General of
Recruitment in 1915 and was arguably the single person who did more to
promote recruitment in England than anyone else, while Lord Rosebery, as
we shall see, as well as lending his name to a Scottish Pals Battalion, played
a major role in the promotion of recruitment in Scotland.37
By 1914 it had become the practice for the Scottish upper class to live the
greater part of the year in London while using their Scottish property as a
base for the summer months for the shooting season, mirroring their English
counterparts. Those Anglo-Scots who had gained social acceptance within
English society, the upper social classes in Scotland, had styled themselves
on English society, its mannerisms and its culture. This included their
automatic response to threats against the Empire. They had developed an
attitude which conveniently ignored the reality that Scotland was of the empire
but not itself imperial. Typical of this was the Strathmore family who by the
beginning of the twentieth century had four houses, of which only one, Glamis
Castle, was in Scotland. With the anglicising of the name to Bowes-Lyon and
the policy of the family to have its children born in their London house, the
family was symptomatic of the culture in Scotland at that time for the upper
classes to embrace 'Englishness' in all its myriad ways. The Earl of Wemyss,
Chapter 5, Army Recruitment. Chapter 6, Civil Recruitment.
37
despite having 55,000 acres and two houses, Gosford and Amisfield, in
Scotland, chose to retain as his main residence Stanway, a 5,000 acre estate
in Gloucestershire. The Earl, while displaying his patriotism by forcing his
employees to enlist, was 1 horrified' when, only a few days after the outbreak
of war, his wife suggested that Stanway be turned into a hospital. 38 The war
was costly for the Wemyss family. The eldest son Ego died in Egypt while
serving with the Gloucestershire Yeomanry, while Yvo the youngest was
killed in France serving with the Grenadier Guards. The family, despite their
extensive Scothsh ties and heritage, had made a conscious decision to
identify with its English connection.
Through their embracing of the English public school education system the
Scottish upper class had absorbed those attitudes and concepts which the
English upper class had adopted as representing their elevated position in
society; duty, honour, honesty, self sacrifice, and the self-proclaimed
knowledge that they were the guardians of empire. By the absorption of these
values the response of the Scottish upper class to the war was an automatic,
pre-programmed reaction, rallying to the defence of England and empire.
Having set themselves up as the guardians of morality and all that was good
in imperial Britain they could do no less than their inclusion in English society
had preordained.
Those representing Scotland were not necessarily representative of Scotland.
Those in positions of local or regional authority were more often the product
C. Dakers. The Countryside at War 1914-1918. p. 37.
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of an English educational background. Family influence, whether political or
financial, had, in many cases, been instrumental in acquiring public position. It
should be no surprise that old names such as Rosebery, Buccleuch, Atholl,
Roxburgh, Lovat and Weymss always acquired local dominance along with
new names such as Tennant, Coats and Beardmore; people who had profited
out of the empire through trade and commerce. As argued by T.M. Devine 'all
in all, the Scottish MPs of this period were undoubtedly committed members
of the imperial British establishment'. 39 He concludes that not only the social
elite of Scotland's landed class but also prominent business and financial
families were keen to be identified with English imperialism, 'even taking the
step of serving in elite English regiments like the Life Guards and Coldstream
Guards'.4° With the possible exception of the Scots Guards this would help to
promote a more anglisised ethos from that to be found in a Scottish regiment.
The English method was seen by those controlling Scotlands wealth and
industry as the way forward and the sacrifice of national identity was seen, by
those few, as a small but acceptable price to pay.
Youth organisations such as the Boys' Brigade and the Boy Scouts served to
promote militarism in sections of Scotland's youth. There are two views as to
the intentions of the Boy Scout movement. Some, like J. 0. Springhall,
propose the view that the movement was, from its conception, an out and out
militarist organisation, masquerading under the guise of religion. 41 Others, M.
T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation 1700-2000. p. 286.
4° T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation. p. 286.
41 
j • • Springhall, 'The Boy Scouts, Class and Militarism in Relation to British Youth
Movements 1908-1930', in International Review of Social History, 16/2 (1971). p. 125-153.
39
J. Dedman in particular, see no militarist principles in the Scout movement
and argue that the refusal by Baden-Powell to commit his organisation to a
national youth brigade, controlled by the War Office, show that it was anti-
militarist in doctrine and in principle. 42
 The Boys' Brigade on the other hand
was designed as a religious movement with the secondary objective of using
sport and social contact as a means of personal improvement. Drill was an
important part of these youth organisations, marching and counter-marching
with shouldered arms, rifle drill and firing practice. The implementation of a
company system, military rank and titles, parade ground inspections and
uniformed church parades, all served to instil a military ethos, intentional or
not. The question to be asked of the boys' organisations is not whether they
were created with the intention of promoting militarism but whether or not,
consciously or unconsciously, they did.
The Boy Scout movement with its emphasis on woodcraft and scouting, was
growing in popularity in Scotland as well as England. In 1910, with a British
membership of 107,986, Scotland with 14,815 members constituted 13.7 per
cent of the total while England with 87,504 members contributed 81 per
cent.43 Although by 1914 the scouting movement had spread to fifty-Iwo other
countries, including France, Germany, Austria and Russia, it was viewed by
some, in Scotland at least, as an instrument of the English middle classes.
Scotland had its own home grown youth organisation in the shape of the
Boys' Brigade. Begun in Hillhead, Glasgow, in October 1883 by William
42 M. J. Dedman, 'Baden-Powell, Militarism, and the 'Invisible Contributors' to the Boy Scout
Scheme, 1904-1920', Twentieth Century British History, 4/3 (1993) p 201-23.
Scout Association Archives. Second Annual Report of the Boy Scouts, 23 January 1911.
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Alexander Smith and the brothers J. R. and J. B. Hill, the movement had
spread throughout the country by 1914, with a United Kingdom membership
of 6,503 officers and 60,224 boys operating in 1,360 companies. In that year
Glasgow, with 158 companies, had a membership of 889 officers and 8,610
NCOs and boys, centred on local drill halls. 45 The members were subjected to
a strict military code, with Mr Smith as Captain and the Hill brothers acting as
Lieutenants. The constitution of the brigade stated that 'strict discipline shall
be enforced, and all members must submit to the authority of the officers and
Non-Commissioned Officers placed over them It went on to say that the
object of the brigade was 'the promotion of habits of reverence, discipline,
self-respect, and all that tends towards a true Christian manliness'.47
In sharp contrast to this promotion of Christian values, the third annual Drill
Inspection and Review, held in Glasgow in 1898, contained a display by ten
companies on how to take up a position to receive and fend off a cavalry
charge and also how to deliver volley fire at an enemy. These annual reviews
were usually attended by units of the regular and territorial forces, serving to
establish a link between the brigade and the pre-war army. William Smith
himself appeared at times to be confused as to the direction that the Boys'
Brigade should take as regards its connection with militarism. Between 1909
and 1911 he had firmly resisted all attempts by the government to incorporate
the Boys' Brigade into a National Cadet Force, as intended by the Secretary
J. Springhall, B. Fraser, M. Hoare, Sure and Steadfast, A Histotyof the Boy's Brigade
1883-1983. p. 258.
J. B. Shaw, Glasgow's Battalion The Boys' Brigade 1883-1983. p. 6.
46 j • B. Shaw, Glasgow's Battalion. p. 3.
' J. B. Shaw, Glasgow's Battalion. p. 3.
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of State for War, R. B. Haldane, who had, as part of his army reforms,
planned to link all youth movements with local Territorial Associations. This
contrasts sharply with the practice of the majority of Boys' Brigade officers,
who also held commissions in the Volunteers, and, after 1908, in the
Territorial Force.
FIG 1:2 The pre-war Dundee battalion Boys' Brigade showing the
eight company system and the carrying of dummy rifles.
The Boys' Brigade was organised along similar lines to the Territorial Force
with battalions divided into eight companies with a similar command structure.
Smith saw no conflict of interest in this practice despite the possibility that the
brigade members were being taught to look up to and follow the orders of
serving military officers. These officers were viewed by the boys as father-
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figures and role models, influencing the views of the boys towards the
military. Indeed they would have been neglecting their duty to the military if
they had not pursued this as a prime source for future recruits. Smith himself
at varying times made reference to the military nature of the association. In
1907, in a speech to the United Boys' Brigade of America, he stressed that 'if
ever the boys are called on to take a stand for the defence of the country, the
State would have good cause to thank the Brigade for the military training the
boys had obtained' 48
On 16 December 1913, during negotiations aimed at amalgamating the Boys'
Brigade and the Boys' Life Brigade, Smith, in a letter to F. P. Gibbon, wrote
that 'we frankly accept military organisation and drill as the basis of our
training'. The Boys' Life Brigade broke off negotiations, viewing the Boys'
Brigade as a military organisation unwilling to forego or temper its military
beliefs. Smith went on to declare that 'The Boys' Brigade consenting to give
up its "military training", is equivalent to suggesting that the Boy's Brigade
should cease to be the Boys' Brigade'. 49 J. Springhall points out that Smith
was even caught up in the fashionable concept of the early twentieth century,
that of Social Darwinism. In his notes written for a Bible Class Smith stated
that 'there can be no progress without stress and conflict', later going further
by saying that 'no nation ever yet attained to true greatness or influence in the
world without going through the training and discipline of war'.5°
J. Springhall, et al, Sure and Steadfast. p. 98.
49 w. A. Smith to F. P. Gibbon in J. Spnnghall, et al, Sure and Steadfast. p. 104.
5° W. A. Smith, holograph notes, Archives of 1st Glasgow Company, in J. Springhall, et al,
Sure and Steadfast. p. 107.
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These beliefs helped change the ideals and attitudes of a large number of
youths and young boys at a susceptible age and helped 'pave the way' for
mass recruitment. However, even the Boys' Brigade excluded sections of
society, not by the promotion of exclusivity but by the cost of uniforms. The
section of Scottish youth attracted to the movement were those from skilled
working class or middle class homes. Thus a large proportion of Scottish
youth were not under the influence of youth groups or the organised
promotion of militarism. They felt no debt or duty to society. The youth
movements served to break down the existing barriers between society and
militarism only within their membership. Their use of drill and discipline made
their members more open to the concept of military service in time of need.
Outside their membership the youth movements were viewed with distrust
and disdain. While not actively promoting militarism the youth movements
created an atmosphere and a philosophy which could be exploited, but only
within their limited membership.
There were those within Britain who advocated the introduction of some form
of conscriptive service, especially after the fiasco of the Boer War and the
increasing dominance of other major powers such as Germany and America,
economically, industrially and, most importantly to those advocating
conscription, militarily. Although only founded in 1902 the National Service
League claimed to have over 91,000 members by 1914, and, although the
Army Council gave support to the concept of conscription in 1913, this military
support failed to manifest itself in any widespread public adoption. Even
advocacy from Lord Roberts, President of the league from 1905, failed to
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stimulate general public interest. The National Service League promoted the
idea of 'short-service' conscription, four months spent on initial training
followed by fifteen days annually. This was not enough to compete with
European conscription of one or two years' duration. A part-trained force was
the best that could reasonably be expected under this scheme: unable to be
fully incorporated into the army in time of need and no better than the existing
Territorial Force. In order to promote change in both the British army and the
British public, both army and society would have to be incorporated, and both
would have to experience change. Compulsory service was seen as the
answer. As ever increasing numbers were put through the military 'machine',
then both parties would have to adapt and compromise. Military service would
have a positive effect on the morality and physique of the young, while mass
contact with the public would temper the elitism of the army establishment
and make the army more a representation of society rather than merely
representing society.
When placed in direct competition with the newly developing industrial might
of Germany and America, Britain's ageing industrial infrastructure could not
hope to compete. Those who advocated conscription felt that Britain with her
small army could not retain her world status in the face of the other European
powers with their conscript armies of millions. They failed to see that military
might alone could not maintain an empire: industrial might was the new
power. It was also felt that the high rejection rate of volunteers for the Boer
War was a sign of the increasing degeneration of British society. Standards
had to be raised and the introduction of a regime based upon strong militarist
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principles was viewed as the way forward. In the growing era of Social
Darwinism the idea that the 'imperial race' could be anything other than
physically superior was anathema to Britain's social elite. It was feared that
the decline in physical standards would bring with it, hand in hand, a
corresponding decline in national morality. This is not to say that the high
failure rate did not promote in some a genuine concern for the health of the
population. It just meant that housing and diet were not seen as the solution.
In the culture of the time a physical failure demanded a physical solution.
Professor Devine states that in the immediate pre-war years the Irish
communities in Scotland were becoming more and more isolated as the
prominence of Irish nationalism grew and the number of mixed religion
marriages, at the prompting of the Catholic church, was reduced. 51 J. A.
Jackson states that 'more potent than the fact that the immigrant lived in a
strange and simple way was the fact that he belonged to a foreign church.'52
Assimilation into mainstream society had already been achieved to a greater
extent in England, where the Irish were 'less and less distinguished in the
literature from the native workers'. 53 Jackson expands this view and sees
religious differences as one of the main pre-war areas of conflict between the
Irish immigrant and the indigenous Scot. He concludes that 'The fact that the
Irishman was a Catholic led, especially in Scotland, to violent antagonism on
the part of the native pop uIation'.
51 Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 494.
52 
j • A. Jackson, The Irish in Britain. p. 154.
J. A. Jackson, The Irish in Britain. p. 94.
J. A. Jackson, The Irish in Britain. p. 154.
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In 1901 there were 205,000 Irish-born living in Scotland, a figure which was
declining annually but which still stood at 174,715 in 1911, some 3.7 per cent
of the total Scottish population. 55
 These immigrants were concentrated in
three main areas of Scotland: Glasgow and the surrounding district, Dundee,
and the Lothians. Dundee had a high number of Irish women employed in the
jute mills but there was very little opportunity for employment in the city for
Irish males: not through any great religious prejudice but primarily due to the
lack of male employment in a female dominated industry. Jobs, when
available, were given to skilled local men. The unskilled male Irish immigrants
stood a better chance of employment elsewhere. 'In Scotland both poor law
legislation and practice were more rigorous, and 7,000 paupers were
removed to Ireland between 1875 and 1910'.
In the Lothians the Irish found employment in the coal fields, usually in
unskilled positions but in large enough numbers to dominate the local miners'
unions in West Lothian. 57
 Swift points out that 'in Edinburgh, a city of legal,
literary and ecclesiastical institutions, the Irish were confined to such menial
occupations as general Iabouring in building, domestic service, portering,
street-cleaning and street-lighting'. 58
 He continues by pointing out that 'the
great majority of Irish, largely illiterate and unskilled, entered the lowliest and
least healthy of urban occupations'.59
R. Swift, The Irish in Britain 1815-1914, Perspectives and Sources. p. 12.
R. Swift, The Irish in Britain. p. 21-2.
G. Walker, 'The Protestant Irish in Scotland' in T. M. Devine, Irish Immigrants. p. 61.
58 R. Swift, The Irish in Britain. p. 16.
R. Swift, The Irish in Britain. p. 16.
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Hard work for low wages was the traditional lot of the Irish immigrant and in
the early years of the twentieth century this was nowhere more apparent in
Scotland than in Glasgow and the surrounding district, where for generation
after generation the Irish became the labouring class. Gallagher states that 'in
a city whose prosperity was based on heavy engineering and manufacturing,
the sons and grandsons of Irish immigrants were excluded from entering the
areas of the local economy which conveyed prestige and acceptability'.60
In a Protestant-dominated industrial heartland it was virtually impossible for
Catholics to serve an apprenticeship or to attain any managerial position in
engineering, shipbuilding, or any major Scottish industry. The majority of Irish
Catholics in Scotland were employed as casual labour, especially in the
chemical and engineering industries: 'although the Glasgow Irish were able to
find employment in mills and mines they were excluded from engineering by
virtue of their lack of skill, from shipbuilding by the Orange Order and from
skilled trades by the craft unions'.61
With Scotland's industrial might focused on the central belt and the west coast
this was the area which attracted the majority of Scotland's Irish community.
There the Irish found employment but, again, mainly in low paid unskilled jobs
within the chemical, engineering and shipbuilding industries, as those with no
skills found themselves concentrated in manufacturing trades. In 1911 the
census gave as 90,000 males and 15,000 females the number of Irish
60 T. Gallagher, 'The Catholic Irish', in T. M. Devine, Irish Immigrants. p. 22.
61 R. Swift, The Irish in Britain. p. 16.
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employed in Scotland. These were categorised as - manufacturing of iron and
metals 24,813, mining 11,909, general labourers 6,019, building 4,963, road
transport 3,492, agriculture 3,232, railway transport 3,071, docks 2,985, local
government service 2,924. 62 These categories do not include the thousands
of Irish who were employed on a casual basis and therefore were not
recorded.
In the first decade of the twentieth century (1901-1911), 188,014 males
emigrated from Scotland, 8.2 per cent of the total Scots-born male population.
D. Baines explained that
by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.., an increasing
percentage of the emigrants had not only decided before they left
Europe to return but had also decided to do so after only a few years.
Stays of three and four years were common, which is about the
shortest period it would take an unskilled worker to save enough to
make the trip worthwhile.63
62 Census Report 1911, Vol 3, vi-vili & tables iii and iv. p. 23-42.
63 D. Baines, Emigration from Europe 1815-1930. p. 40.
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FIG 1:3 Male migration and emigration from Scothsh counties
1891 - 1911. (Expressed as a percentage of male population)
Mate Migration	 Male Emigration
County	 1891-1901	 1901-1911	 1891-1901	 1901-1911
Aberdeen
Argyll
Ayr
Banif
Berwick
Bute
Caithness
Clackmannan
Dumfries
Dumbarton
Edinburgh
Elgin
Fife
Forfar
Haddington
Inverness
Kincardine
Kin ross
Kirkcudbnght
Lanark & Renfrew
Linlithgow
Nairn
Orkney
Peebles
Perth
Ross & Cromarty
Roxburgh
Selkirk
Shetlan d
Stirling
Sutherland
Wigtown
7.42
10.84
9.32
15.04
15.21
12.37
13.81
19.80
13.67
13.67
6.79
12.58
7.56
8.43
17.39
9.41
17.66
23.12
13.28
3.22
14.64
12.84
9.33
22.11
9.17
7.79
6.78
24.32
5.75
6.14
8.94
15.65
4.2
7.55
7.04
4.31
8.92
9.91
1.62
14.42
8.66
8.64
6.56
9.11
3.41
5.60
10.1
6.64
21.72
10.81
11.81
3.8
10.08
13.28
2.55
10.21
6.60
3.70
7.97
8.39
0.83
8.05
2.96
9.06
Figure 1:3 shows the levels of migration and emigration from the various
Scottish counties and shows clearly the levels of population movement in the
country. Population movement was caused by a variety of reasons but mainly
contained three groups; those about to emigrate, those engaged in seasonal
work, and an itinerant workforce which for one reason or another was unable,
or unwilling, to settle down and maintain a steady home life. Those three
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641
516
608
418
725
477
559
345
554
567
253
176
5839
220
188
89
154
229
239
217
248
139
158
309
135
2325
102
87
156
127
189
161
141
154
149
131
148
79
1624
64
70
67
54
57
54
44
72
178
287
134
98
1179
443
1485
4934
6447
9012
5572
2677
3000
3043
1655
916
292
39861
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
December
Total
496
880
1466
2117
2174
1442
1172
1452
1795
1795
825
332
15946
groups should be taken into consideration when trying to understand the
initial period of Scottish recruitment. The itinerant group was made up mainly
of migratory workers, Irish immigrants and internal migrants, mostly from the
Highlands, who gravitated to the industrial central belt during lean spells in
their local communities. Brock concludes that 'Between 1861 and 1911 the
proportion of the Scottish population resident in the Highlands declined from
over 18 per cent to little more than 10 per cent'. Those engaged in seasonal
work had become a fixed part of Scottish industrial and agricultural life but
with increasing industrialisation in the central belt their numbers had reached
a significant level. In the year prior to the war (1913) Scotland's annual rate of
emigration stood at 1.43 per cent of population.65
FIG 1:4 Foreign countries of choice of Scottish emigrants 1913.
1913
	 Canada Australia	 New	 South India United
Zealand	 Africa	 States
J. M. Brock, The Importance of Emigration in Scottish Regional Population Movement,
1861-1911.
65 HMSO, Cd 6615. Cd 6701.
HMSO, Cd 6615. Cd 6701.
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Figure 1:4 shows that a total number of 68,117 Scots emigrated to foreign
countries in 1913 with 23.4 per cent choosing the United States as their final
destination. While 82 per cent of those leaving Scotland for a new life abroad
were choosing North America as the destination of choice, 73.4 per cent,
51,357 chose a final destination within the British Empire. Of this number 58.5
per cent chose Canada, 8.5 per cent Australia, 3.4 per cent New Zealand, 2.4
per cent South Africa, and 1.7 per cent India,
For ten years prior to the outbreak of war there was a steady stream of
migration to the colonies, particularly Canada, and to other countries.
The figures for the three years, 1909, 1910, and 1911, were 33,366,
53,384, and 61,321 respectively. Not all these were farm workers, but
a very large proportion of the emigrants were drawn from workers on
the land.67
With the majority of the Scottish population living in the industrial central belt,
it is no surprise that emigration from this area was correspondingly high. This
is not to say that the emigrants originated in that area. Many had previously
migrated from other regions within Scotland. With the high level of internal
migration, emigration, especially of the male population, helped to maintain a
low level of unemployment in Scotland. In 1913 the level of unemployment in
Scotland stood at 1.8 per cent, in comparison to the 8.7 per cent level of
London.
67 Jones, et al, Rural Scotland, p. 198.
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Scotland's pie-war population of 4,760,904 was divided among thirty-three
counties while the country itself could be sub-divided east-west and north-
south, not only in terms of population density but also in terms of industrial
growth. 68 The east coast was predominantly fishing, coal, textiles and
brewing, and, although it could be seen as an industrial region, with one or
two exceptions the east coast industrialisation was primarily light industry.
The west coast was the industrial heartland, not only of Scotland but
increasingly of Britain as a whole. The term 'Clyde built' was seen to
represent imperial Britain at its best. Scotland's heavy industry was centred
on the Clyde, with its shipbuilding and heavy engineering sectors. To support
these industries there had evolved an infrastructure of coalfields, iron and
steel industries, chemical industries, and, as industry expanded and labour
migrated to the region in search of work, peripheral and unrelated industries
were attracted to the region by the plentiful supply of available manpower.
Consequently the western central belt of Scotland was the most densely
populated section of the country.
Census 1911.
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FIG 1:5 Male Population for Scotlands Counties 1911.69
Total	 % of	 Male	 % of	 Total	 % of Single % of
	
population total population male
	 males	 total	 males	 total
__________________ ___________ _____ ___________ total 15-34 ______ 15-34 ______
Scotland	 4760904 _____	 2308839 _____ 787436 _____ 578213 _____
Aberdeen	 312177 6.55	 147357 6.38
	 46297 5.87	 34279 5.92
Argyll	 70902 1.48	 35426	 1.53	 12056	 1.53	 10247	 1.77
Ayr	 268337 5.63	 130196 5.64	 43765 5.55
	
31950 5.52
Banif	 61402 1.29
	 29755	 1.29	 9201	 1.16	 7065	 1.22
Berwick	 29643 0.62	 14192 0.61	 4618 0.58	 3560 0.61
Bute	 18186 0.38
	 8009	 0.35	 2424	 0.3	 1927	 0.33
Caithness	 32010 0.67
	 15156 0.66	 4324 0.55
	
3504	 0.6
Clackmannan	 31121 0.65	 14657 0.63	 4957 0.62	 3681	 0.63
Dumbarton	 139831 2.94	 69718	 3	 24761	 3.14	 18146	 3.13
Dumfries	 72825 1.52	 35024	 1.51	 11243	 1.42	 8553	 1.48
Edinburgh	 507666 10.6	 235427	 10.2	 81487	 10.3	 59351	 10.2
Elgin	 43427 0.91	 20493	 0.89	 6393	 0.81	 5060	 0.87
Fife	 267739 5.62
	
132133 5.72
	 45893 5.82	 31724 5A8
Forfar	 281417 5.91	 126638	 5.48	 41059	 5.2	 29723	 5.14
Haddington	 43254	 0.9	 21463 0.93
	 7274 0.92	 5364 0.92
Inverness	 87272 1.83
	 42440	 1.84	 13547	 1.72	 11794	 2
Kincardine	 41008 0.86
	
19760 0.85
	 5922 0.75	 4536 0.78
Kinross	 7527 0.16
	 3617	 0.15	 1190	 0.15	 873	 0.15
Kirkcudbright	 38367	 0.8	 18069 0.78	 5712	 0.72	 4445 0.77
Lanark	 1447034 30.4	 721369 31.2 256567 32.6	 183279 31.7
LinlitIgow	 80155 1.68	 42727	 1.85	 15475	 1.96	 11039	 1.9
Naim	 9319	 0.2	 4330	 0.19	 1324	 0.17	 1083	 0.18
Orkney	 25897 0.54	 12251	 0.53	 3477 0.44	 2777 0.48
Peebles	 15258 0.32
	 7066	 0.3	 2339	 0.3	 1767	 0.3
Perth	 124342 2.61	 58364 2.53
	 18691	 2.37	 14555	 2.5
Renfrew	 314552	 6.6	 151661	 6.57	 53314 6.77	 38610 6.67
Ross&Cromarty	 77364 1.62
	 38763 1.68	 13531	 1.7	 11537	 2
Roxburgh	 47192 0.99	 21583 0.93
	 7052	 0.9	 5403 0.93
Selkirk	 24601 0.51
	 11332	 0.5	 3951	 0.5	 3018	 0.52
Shetland	 27911 0.59
	
12589 0.54
	 3672 0.46	 2800 0.48
Stirling	 160991 3.38	 82335	 3.56	 28293	 3.6	 20412	 3.53
Sutherland	 20179 0.42	 9861	 0.43	 2863	 0.36	 2510 0.43
Wigtown	 31998 0.67	 15078 0.65	 4767	 0.6	 3641	 0.62
Figure 1:5 gives an overview of population distribution in Scotland. It shows,
for example, that industrial Lanark had the highest figure with 30.4 per cent of
the population and 31.7 per cent of the single male 15- 34 population. The
table shows the future available manpower.
69 Census 1911.
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While many were politically or ideologically opposed to the outbreak of war,
and in the days leading up to the conflict expressed the opinion that a
European war should not involve Scotland, once war had been declared they
felt that they had no choice but to support their country.
55
CHAPTER 2
PRE - WAR SCOTTISH RECRUITING
ordinary soldiers tended to be vagabonds who could find no better
occupation: recruits from the bars and brothels of urban slums or the
human detritus thrown up by the shrinkage of agricultural Britain. 70
Gerard DeGroot paints a grim picture of the pre - 1914 Edwardian army;
professional in concept if not in content, ignored and detested by those it was
intended to represent, led by officers who saw militarism as something that no
gentleman would subscribe to, and the ranks filled by the people whom
society knew existed but did not wish to acknowledge. 71 There are others who
follow the same train of thought. Hew Strachan asserts that 'Before 1914 the
army recruited from a small segment of the total population, predominantly
the urban unskilled worker paid by the day and vulnerable to cyclical
unemployment'. 72 Edward Spiers states that 'small in number, the regular
army was also unrepresentative of society as a whole' 73 , while John Pimlott,
following this avenue of thought, agrees that the pre-war regular army was
'ignorant of the country which it was employed to defend'.74
The Royal Commission on Physical Training in Scotland, which sat between
70 G. DeGroot, Blighty. p. 14.
71 G. DeGroot, Blighty. This comes from a general interpretation of his second chapter.
72 H. F. A. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army. p. 208.
' E. M. Spiers, The Regular Army in 1914' in I. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation in Arms.
39.
J. Pimlott, The Guiness History of the British Army. p. 98.
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29 April and 3 October 1902, was intended to promote physical training in
Scotland's schools but was from the outset used as an indicator of the
physical and moral conditions of the nation's youth, touching in passing on
the standard of army recruits. J. Winter states that 'The assertion that the
army [in contrast to the navy] contained only the outcasts of British society
was never seriously challenged in these enquiries'.75
White this may have been the picture of the nineteenth century Victorian
army, in the new twentieth century changes were taking place. True, the army
was still professional mainly by virtue of its voluntary nature. The reluctance
of the officer class to adopt what it saw as a 'Junker'-like attitude to military
service led to many treating that service as an amateur adventure, and, short
of a government-initiated policy of conscription, there would be no change
there. Viscount Montgomery, himself a junior officer at this time, points out
that 'it was not fashionable to study war and we were not allowed to talk about
our profession in the officers mess'. 76 That said, there were, however,
important changes in the public perception of the army, the relationship
between the civil and military, and in the standard and make-up of recruits.
The humiliation inflicted on the British army in the opening weeks of the Boer
War, at Spion Kop and Colenso, struck at the very heart of imperial Britain.
The savagery and tenacity of 'a handful of farmers' destroyed the nation's
faith in the capability of the Victorian army to protect the interests of Britain.
J. Winter, The Great War and the British People. p. 16.76 Viscount Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.
p. 80.
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Suffering over 22,000 deaths and fielding an army of over 450,000 British and
imperial troops, it took the British almost three years to defeat an irregular
Boer army which never contained more than 50,000 men and boys. This
showed that, while the army could deal with native revolts and insurrection
along the Indian frontier, it could do very little when faced with an enemy of
European stock. The empire had been stripped of its military protection in
order to achieve victory, an event which the government was afraid might be
exploited if it ever occurred again. The fear was that Russia would use any
future British crisis to try to achieve territorial gains on the Indian continent.
Since the end of the Crimean War the Victorian army had been seen, and
used primarily as a colonial police forceJ It fought small scale actions in the
various far flung parts of the empire against inferior native forces, while
leaving the defence of the homeland in the hands of the navy, It was perhaps
natural for a maritime nation, especially an island, to see its navy as its
principal defensive arm but this served to place the army in a secondary role,
in terms of resources as well as popular opinion. The twentieth century
brought changes, not only to the army, in the shape of the Haldane reforms,
but also to the relationship between the public and the army, or perhaps more
importantly the way that the public viewed the army.
The Boer War showed the army for what it really was; undersized, under-
trained, and under-equipped to protect the world's biggest empire. More
J. Bourne, The British Working Man in Arms', in Cecil and Liddle, eds. p. 337. J. Pimlott,
The Guiness Histoty of the British Army. p. 98.
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importantly, the Boer War also brought about the phenomenon of voluntary
large-scale civilian involvement, with the call for short-term volunteers and the
use of Militia and Yeomanry forces abroad, for the first time in large numbers,
to supplement the regular and imperial troops in South Africa. Those
volunteers, while technically not civilian when on military service,
nevertheless still considered themselves as such, serving in time of crisis
only. With large numbers of Scottish Volunteers or Yeomanry undertaking a
short-term period of service in South Africa, public interest in Scotland in
matters military was heightened.78
 The advent of the telegraph and the
increased number of 'war correspondents' ensured that reporting of the war
and the actions of local regiments was swiftly published and just as quickly
absorbed by an interested nation.
The raising of 35,000 volunteers 79
 for the Imperial Yeomanry had several
effects, It alerted the public and the government to the deficiencies of the
army. At the same time it alerted the establishment to the state of its working
class citizens when so many of them failed the rather basic army medical.
The failure rate of recruits showed that, contrary to previous belief, the army
was not prepared to accept just any standard of recruit. True, the army, faced
for the first time with such large numbers of volunteers, could afford to be
selective but if, as we have been led to believe, the army was a haven for
78 Field Marshal Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book of The Boer War. p. 53. p.
252.
Field Marshal Lord Carver, The National Army Museum Book of The Boer War. p. 53. p.
252.
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'thieves and rogues' then the rejection rate would have had to be considerably
lower to reflect this.
The change which carried with it the greatest consequences for the future
defence of the nation was the increase in contact between the army and the
civilian population. Adams and Poirier put forward the premise that 'War in the
Victorian era had become more Bismarckian and less Napoleonic: that is, it
had come to be thought of as brief, glorious and cheap.' 8° This description,
although of the Victorian era, could equally be applied to the civilian
perception of involvement in the new Edwardian army; brief, short-term
service in crisis only; glorious, the feeling of riding to the defence of their
homeland would appeal to many; and cheap - the price, not only in financial
terms but also in the number of combat casualties, was always low, although
not so to Britain's native adversaries.
The call for foreign service volunteers from the Militia and the Yeomanry
brought civilians into contact with a war which, although demanding in
manpower, did not produce a significantly high number of combat casualties -
certainly not among the Yeomanry. While there was a high number of men
who died as the result of disease, the number who died in combat or from
wounds was relatively small, thus giving short—term military service the
perception of being relatively risk free. It also established in the civilian mind
the concept of 'short-term' or 'duration only' service. The Yeomanry
80 • • Adams, & P. P. Porier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain 1900-18. p. 51-
2.
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volunteered only for one year's service, in many instances serving
considerably less, and in most cases were used in support roles, far from
combat. It implanted the idea that voluntary service in time of the country's
need was socially acceptable - military service was becoming a responsibility
of the citizens. W J Reader states that
The raising of non-regular troops for South Africa, though an
inadequate foretaste of the events of 1914, represented a major
change in British attitudes, at home and in the colonies, to military
service overseas. It was no longer eccentric for a civilian, in time of
war, to become a temporary soldier. On the contrary, it was admirable.
Formerly it had been entirely respectable for an able bodied man to
stay at home while the regulars fought overseas. Nothing else indeed,
was expected of him. After the Boer War, that was no longer true.81
The responsibility for imperial security was falling on the civilian population.
Citizenship was seen to bring with it new responsibilities. The precedent was
set that Volunteers, later the Territorial Force, were prepared to undertake
temporary foreign service. This, in part, helped pave the way for the ready
acceptance of foreign service in 1914, although not all were equally keen to
sign up. While the Boer War created a new link between the army and the
81 w• J. Reader, At Duty's Call: A Study in Obsolete Patriotism, p. 15.
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civilian it also had its down side in that such temporary service was expected
to be of a short-term nature.
REGULAR ARMY
The shortages of manpower and the changing view in the perceived areas of
future conflicts prompted R. B. Haldane, War Minister 1905-1912, to initiate
changes in both the size and structure of the army, within the limit of his £28
million budget. The army was deemed to be in need of change if it was to be
of any value against a European foe and also to re-establish public
confidence. Reforms came in three steps. The General Staff was created, but
in its final form was mainly an administrative body: although it did participate
to some extent in planning it fell short of the original proposals put forward by
Lord Esher in 1904, as head of the reform committee. The second step was a
direct result of the Boer War. The deployment of so many Imperial troops
focused on the need for standardisation of equipment and training. The
creation of an Imperial General Staff was intended to harmonise the various
military components of the empire in the 'unlikely' event of a recurrence. The
third reform was the formation of a British Expeditionary Force and the
creation of a National Reserve. The regular army was reorganised into seven
'big' divisions, along continental lines, one cavalry and six infantry, 120,000
men in all. These divisions were designed to 'take account of a strong current
of opinion already existing within the War Office to the effect that Britain
needed an efficient striking force which might be used anywhere' 82
 The
82 j • Gooch, 'Haldane and the National Army', in I. Beckett, and J. Gooch, eds, Politicians and
Defence: Studies in the Formation of British Defence Policy 1845-1970. p. 75-9.
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reserve consisted of the Yeomanry and Volunteers renamed the Territorial
Force, part-time soldiers recruited for home service only. Haldane's original
intention that they would be used as a 'top-up' force for the regular army was
watered down. Individuals would not be sent overseas without giving their
permission and signing the Imperial Service forms.
The reformed army was prepared for rapid mobilisation and deployment in the
defence of British interests world-wide, while the Territorial Force would be
mobilised to take over the defence of the homeland. Consolidation was
designed to improve the efficiency of the army and at the same time limit
expenditure. The reforms were intended to remove the 'amateur' ethos within
the officer corps and proper training would produce a truly 'professional'
force.83
Figure 2:1 shows the Scottish Command at the beginning of August 1914,
totalling 5,231 officers and men scattered in twenty-five stations, ranging in
size from Glasgow, the largest with 1,056 men, to Crieff, the smallest with a
complement of two members of the Army Service Corps.
83 DeGroot, Blighty, p. 24-8.
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Strength
140
125
492
111
41
11
2
45
143
935
690
1056
126
317
119
178
8
5
2
196
34
147
194
5
109
5231
Fig 2:1 Scottish Command August 1914. Regular and Reserve Forces.M
Scottish Depot
Aberdeen
Ayr
Barry Buddon
Berwick
Blackness
Broughty Ferry
Crieff
Dumfries
Dunbar
Edinburgh
Fort George
Glasgow
Glencorse
Hamilton
Inverness
Invergordon
Irvine
Ki Icreg gan
Lanark
Montrose
Paisley
Perth
Stirling
Stobs
Various Stations
TOTAL
Recruiting in pre-war Scotland was under the supervision of the General
Officer Commanding the Scothsh Command. The Scothsh Command, for
recruiting purposes, was divided into two separate districts, #1 District
(Highland), and #2 District (Lowland). In all there were twelve recruiting
districts covering the United Kingdom, two in Scotland, two in Ireland, and
eight in England and Wales. The two Scottish districts were further divided
into regimental recruiting areas, five in each district, plus the three major
Scottish cities which were designated as recruiting areas in their own right.
The first (Highland) district contained Perth, Fort George, Inverness,
Aberdeen, and Stirling, while the second (Lowland) district consisted of
° General Annual report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1914.
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Glencorse, Ayr, Berwick, and Hamilton (Hamilton having two regimental
recruiting areas). Of the three major cities, Dundee was in #1 district with
Glasgow and Edinburgh in #2 district. This gave Scotland a total of thirteen
recruiting areas. 85
 The concept of regimental recruiting areas was intended to
create an image of local ties between a particular regiment and a specific
geographical area, for example - Perth and the Black Watch, Aberdeen and
the Gordon Highlanders. Over a period of time, as more of the local males
enlisted, it was hoped that the regiments would eventually become
representative of the recruiting areas. While the regimental areas were
designed to stimulate recruits for the local infantry regiments, the three city
recruiting areas were intended to provide recruits for those military units
which did not have a regional recruiting base; engineers, artillery, etc.
This concept appears to have worked quite well, with only one or two minor
exceptions. By 1911, Fort George, Inverness, Aberdeen, Glencorse, Ayr, and
Berwick were producing over 70 per cent of their recruits for the regiment
assigned to the local recruiting area, while Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh
were enlisting between 80 and 90 per cent of their recruits for other units.
These cities provided a higher proportion of skilled recruits who were more
willing to enter the technical branches of the army, at a higher rate of pay.
The exceptions to this policy were Perth, Stirling and Hamilton which provided
a lower number of recruits for the local units, between 40 and 60 per cent.86
85 J.M. Osbourne, The Voluntary Recruiting Movement in Britain, 1914-1916, p 3-10.86 General Annual report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1911.
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This can be explained by the composition of the towns, which, while not
totally industrial, still carried a fair number of skilled men for the local textile
and engineering industries.
The pre-war Scottish recruiting records show not only Scotland's position
within the United Kingdom but also the position of the various recruiting
districts within the country. Within the United Kingdom, Scotland maintained
second position in the number of recruits raised annually for the regular army.
This said, the trend had been downward in the run-up to 1914, with the
numbers fluctuating between 11.5 per cent and 9.3 per cent of the United
Kingdom total in the period 1905 to 1911. This downward trend was also
mirrored in the levels of Irish, Welsh, and English recruiting during the same
period. The slack created by the drop in recruiting figures was more than
covered by the reduction in the strength of the regular army over the same
period, so much so that the percentage of English recruitment increased from
75.7 per cent in 1905 to 79.7 per cent in 1911 87
Fig 2:2 Number of recruits per country for the British army 1905 - 191l.
Shown as number of men raised in each region.
English districts
Welsh districts
Scottish districts
Irish districts
Total
1905	 1906	 1907	 1908
25993 27622 25853 27662
1321	 1125	 841	 744
3842	 3781	 3873	 4207
3166	 2739	 2949	 3265
34322 35267 33516 35878
1909	 1910	 1911
25878 20275 22956
603	 444	 600
3241	 2723	 2686
2727	 2069	 2549
	
32449 25511
	 28791
Genera/Annual Report, 1911.
88 Genera/Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.
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Fig 2:3 Percentage of recruits per country for the British army 1905- 1911.89
English districts
Welsh districts
Scottish districts
Irish districts
1905	 1906	 1907	 1908	 1909	 1910	 1911
75.73	 78.32	 77.13	 77.10	 79.74	 79.47	 79.73
3.84	 3.18	 2.50	 2.07	 1.85	 1.74	 2.08
11.19	 10.72	 11.55	 11.72	 9.98	 10.67	 9.32
9.22	 7.76	 8.79	 9.10	 8.40	 8.11	 8.85
As could be expected the figures showing the various nationalities within the
British army in the pre-war years reflect the change in recruitment figures. As
recruitment in Scotland had fallen so too had the level of Scothsh
representation within the British army. The same applied for Ireland and
Wales. English representation however was rising despite the falling
recruitment numbers in England. This was also due to the reduction in the
strength of the regular army. The British army was becoming less
representative of Britain and more representative of England. Between 1905
and 1911 the Scottish component fell from 8 per cent (20,388) to 7.8 per cent
(18,581), the Irish from 10.9 per cent (27,785) to 9.19 per cent (21,860), while
the Welsh contingent fell from 1.78 per cent (4,553) to 1.29 per cent (3,075).
In the same period total army strength fell from 254,748 to 237,722.°
General Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.
9° General Annual Report, 1905- 1911.
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Fig 2:4 Number and percentage of nationalities in the British army 1905- 1911.91
English	 Welsh	 Scottish	 Irish	 Total
#	 %	 #	 %
	
%	 #
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78.10
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254748
245978
232154
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237205
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The composition of the various Scothsh infantry regiments reflected the
change in the composition of the British Army . If we take the census year of
1891 as an example, in eight regiments - Royal Scots, Highland Light
Infantry, Cameron Highianders, Gordon Highianders, Cameronians, Seaforth
Highlanders, Black Watch, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - the
proportion of Scots rank and file was only 61.5 per cent, with 32.9 per cent
English and 4.3 per cent Irish.92
Within Scotland a steady pattern of recruitment emerged. As could be
expected, the two major cities, Glasgow and Edinburgh, topped the league
table of recruits for the years 1905- 1911 (fig 2:5). The inclusion of Perth, a
predominantly agricultural town, in constant third position can be explained by
the presence of the regimental headquarters of the Black Watch, and the
prominent position of the regimental barracks, centrally located and next to
the local market place. There was also a high proportion of agricultural labour
enlisting in the pre-war years, all the more important since agricultural
91 Genera/Annual Report, 1905- 1911.
92 A. R. Skelley, The Victorian Army At Home. p. 333.
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311
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187
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0.69
0.11
0.53
0.2
0.23
0.06
0.12
0.25
0.07
employment in Scotland had reduced to only 10 per cent of the population by
1911. Fort George and Inverness were at the other end of the scale, in terms
of recruitment numbers, but this could reasonably be expected for two
reasons. The first is the scarcity and widespread distribution of the highland
population. The agricultural nature of employment and subsistence crofting
meant that there was no discernible surplus of labour available, or willing, to
join the regular army. The second reason could be explained by population
movement. By the start of the twentieth century it had become the custom in
the highlands that any surplus manpower which did emerge would migrate or
emigrate in search of employment.93
If we use the 1911 census as a reference point we can see that a straight
comparison of the recruitment figures alone gives us a false impression as to
which areas of Scotland were producing recruits, whereas, a comparison with
the population figures shows quite a different picture.
Fig 2:5 Scottish recruiting areas listed by male population.
Regular recruits in relation to regional male population.
1911
Berwick
Inverness
Perth
Stirling
Dundee (Forfar)
Ayr
Aberdeen
Edinburgh
Glasgow (Lanark)
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population
14192
42440
58364
82335
126638
130196
147357
235427
721369
J. M. B rock, The Mobile Scot: A Study of Emigration and Migration 1861-1911. p. 23-38.Genera/Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911.
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If we compare the number of recruits against male population we see that
those areas with a high numerical figure gave a low proportional figure.
Inverness, with 48 recruits actually gave a higher proportion of its male
population than Glasgow (Lanark) with 575 recruits. Proportionately,
Inverness was producing more recruits than the major cities.
As we have already seen there is a popular belief that those who enlisted in
the regular army were beyond regard. This was however not the case in
reality. The recruiting returns for Scotland in the years immediately prior to
1914 show that, while a fair proportion of new recruits were 'undesirables',
they were by no means in the majority. By 1910 some 58 per cent of those
recruits being accepted in Scotland were skilled or professional in some
capacity, with another 18.5 per cent being classed as industrial or agricultural
labourers. The 23 per cent classed by the army as 'general casuals' were
without doubt what were seen as the dregs of society, unable even to obtain a
labourer's position.95 In comparison with these figures The numbers for the
United Kingdom were, 25 per cent skilled or professional, 24 per cent
industrial or agricultural labourers, and 24.6 per cent general casuals. The
figures for Ireland were, 13.6 per cent skilled or professional, 36 per cent
industrial or agricultural labourers, and 26 per cent general casuals. The
figures for England and Wales were, 25.7 per cent skilled or professional,
22.5 per cent industrial or agricultural labourers, and 24.4 per cent general
casuals.96 These figures clearly show the high percentage of skilled or
General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.
General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.
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professional recruits enlisting in Scotland - more than twice that of the other
parts of the United Kingdom.
With such a high percentage of professional, skilled, and semi-skilled recruits,
it would seem that, in Scotland at least, the popular image of the British army
as the last refuge of the Victorian under-classes was perceived rather than
actual. Who then in Scotland were those enlisting in the new post-Haldane
army? Figure 2:6 shows that the highest proportion of recruits came from the
skilled workforce. Edward Spiers touches on this point in his article 'The
regular Army in 1914' which is, in part, an examination of the 1st battalion,
Black Watch, in the period post Boer War and pre-1914, finding that the
largest proportion of recruits came from 'the ranks of skilled labour'. 97
 Miners,
who were perhaps among the highest wage earners, the social elite of the
working class, were surprisingly the highest group of skilled recruits. In 1911
they accounted for over 12 per cent of the total number of Scottish recruits,
while agricultural and industrial labourers in the same year accounted for 9.94
per cent and 12.82 per cent respectively.98
One reasonable assumption for the higher numbers of skilled and
professional recruits is that they, by virtue of lengthy training periods and
apprenticeships, were used to looking at life in the long term while those who
lived day to day, the 'casuals', looked upon life only in the short term.
Consequently, while needing the stability and relief that the army could
E. M. Spiers, 'The RegularArmy in 1914' in I. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation in Arms.
53.
8 Genera/Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.
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provide in times of hardship the 'casuals' were unwilling to commit themselves
to a minimum of seven years service with the colours.
Fig 2:6 Employment numbers and percentages of Scottish
recruits for the British army 1909— l9ll.
1909	 1910	 1911
#	 %	 #	 #	 %
Skilled &
Professional
Industrial
Labourers
Agricultural
Labourers
Casuals
Miners
Textile
Total
1805 56.67 1591 58.32 1591 55.90
	
315	 9.89	 216	 7.91	 365 12.82
	
266	 8.35	 290 10.63	 283	 9.94
	
799 25.08	 631 23.13	 607 21.32
	
277	 9.01	 264	 9.67	 349 12.26
	
117	 3.67	 121	 4.43	 225	 7.9
	
3185	 2728	 2846
The skilled trades were broken down by the army into the following
categories. Bricklayers, carpenters, plasterers, plumbers, painters, polishers,
masons, slaters, barbers, bakers, butchers, coopers, cabinet makers,
coachbuilders, mechanics, printers, sawyers, saddle and harness makers,
shoemakers, smiths, riveters and fitters, upholsterers, watchmakers, tailors,
engineers, engine drivers, and coal miners. 100 The list of professions was -
actors, chemists, dentists, draughtsmen, electricians, engineers, farmers,
musicians, photographers, policemen, schoolmasters, students, law, medical,
surveyors, seamen, and telegraphists.10'
99 Genera/Annual Report, 1909. 1910. 1911.
100 General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.
101 General Annual Report of the British Army for the year ending 30 September 1910.
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Another high source of recruits was the textile industry, a traditionally female
dominated industry which, at first sight, should not have produced a surplus of
manpower. In his study of the Dundee jute industry G Oliver states that 'In
1905, about 51 per cent of the persons employed in the Dundee jute industry
were women above 20 years of age, 22 per cent were girls under 20, 11 per
cent boys under 20, and only 16 per cent were men'.102
It was quite common in Dundee, at that time, for the women and children of
the house to be the providers while the husbands stayed at home, and this
led to the westward migration of young males from the region to find
employment in industrial areas such as Lanark. Oliver further asserts that
'Youths of 17 and 18 were thrown out of work and their places given to
younger persons. Many of those displaced.. .found themselves unable to
obtain other employment, and had to leave Dundee or develop into loafers'.103
The production of this unexpected pool of manpower was a deliberate by-
product of the Scottish textile industry. It was normal industry practice for
young male employees to be laid off when reaching the age of 18 or 19, an
age of considerable wage increase. There was always a plentiful supply of
younger, cheaper males eager to take their place, ensuring that Dundee had
a higher than average pre-war recruitment level. B Lenman supports this idea
asserting that
102 G. Oliver, The Dundee Jute Industry 1828 - 1928, p 33-4.103 G. Oliver, The Dundee Jute Industry, p 112-3
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In August 1914 Dundee was a city which even by British standards
sent an exceptional number of ex-regular reservists to the colours. It
was a glowing tribute to the recruiting effect of heavy unemployment
and grinding poverty, the more so because the Boer War period had
seen a higher percentage of Dundee volunteers rejected on grounds of
physical unfitness than was the case in even the worst districts of
industrial Lancashire.104
A. R. Skelley argues that the age of those enlisting for the army in Scotland
had dramatically changed throughout the second half of the nineteenth
century. In 1851, although not all were Scottish, some 65.1 per cent of
soldiers in Scotland were between the age of seventeen and twenty-five. By
1891 that figure had risen to 85.3 per cent. In 1851 over 47 per cent were in
the twenty to twenty-five age group, a figure which dropped to 40.4 per cent in
1891, while the figure of 17.8 per cent for those in the seventeen to nineteen
group rose dramatically to 44.9 per cent in 1891.105 This supports the idea
that as industrialisation increased and young males were exploited and
displaced in the pursuit of profit, the army was in a position to benefit from this
surplus of youth.
The Boer War had shown a high rejection rate among the volunteers. The
1911 rejection rate for Scottish recruits shows that 22.24 per cent were still
unfit to serve in the British army. Among the Scottish volunteers, 814 of the
104 B. Leriman, An Economic History. p. 201.
105 A. R. Skelley, The Victorian Army At Home, p . 324-8.
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3,658 who presented themselves for enlistment were rejected. Among the
skilled and professional the rejection rate was 21.7 per cent, while among the
labourers the rejection rate was 22.9 per cent. The casuals had a rate of 29.9
per cent but this could be broken down into two separate groups; the town
casuals had a rate of 30.24 per cent while the country casuals had a slightly
lower rate of 24.5 per cent. Miners had a rejection rate of 18.8 per cent, rather
high considering the strenuous nature of their occupation. Bakers, who if
nothing else would be able to maintain a reasonable diet, had a rate of 23.9
per cent, and higher still were the blacksmiths who had a rate of 26.1 per
cent. Both the bakers and the blacksmiths had a rate higher than that of
labourers. More important still is the figure of 13.1 per cent for the agricultural
labourers, a relatively low level of rejection and a reflection of the healthier
work environment.106
TERRITORIAL FORCE
Alongside the changes to the regular army, possibly the most severe and far
reaching changes in the Haldane reforms involved the creation of the
Territorial Force. Created from the existing Volunteer and Yeomanry units, it
caused some concern at local association level. From its introduction in 1908
the Territorial Army had great difficulty in maintaining sufficient numbers to
fulfil its intended primary role of home defence and its secondary role of
'topping up' the regular battalions in time of conflict.
lO6 General Annual Report 1909. 1910. 1911.
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fig 2:7 Scothsh Territorial Force Battalions 191 3107
Territorial
Regiment	 battalions
Royal Scots
	 7
Highland Light Infantry	 5
Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders	 5
Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	 4
Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	 4
Gordon Highlanders 	 4
Seaforth Highlanders 	 3
Royal Scots Fusiliers 	 2
King's Own Scottish Borderers 	 2
Cameron Highianders	 I
As we have seen in Chapter One emigration was rising in pre-war years. Of
those leaving the Lovat Scouts between May 1911 and July 1914, over 60 per
cent gave the reason for leaving as emigration. 108 The Lovat Scouts were not
alone in losing men in this fashion. At the same time over 75 per cent of those
leaving the Territorial battalions of the Gordon Highlanders were doing so to
emigrate. 109 In 1911 the Territorial Force in Scotland had an establishment of
54,619 but was at a strength of only 45,065, a shortfall of 9,554 or 17.5 per
cent. The United Kingdom as a whole had an establishment of some 290,161
but was only able to provide a strength of 245,065, a shortfall of some 45,096
men or 15.55 per cent. Scotland with 18.8 per cent of the United Kingdom
establishment met only 18.3 per cent of the United Kingdom strength. By
1913 the shortfall in Scotland had increased. With an establishment of 54,707
and a strength of only 41,746 Scotland had a shortfall of 12,961 or 23.7 per
107 The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)
108 Records of Inverness, Ross & Cromarty, Sutherland County Association Joint Committee,
Lovat Scouts, March 1911 —July 1914. Scottish Record Office MD 8/38.
109 Records of the Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Aberdeen.
November 1913— October 1917. Scottish Record Office. MD 4/63.
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cent, a 26 per cent decrease overall. To illustrate this point, the 5th, 6th and
7th battalions, Gordon Highlanders gained 301 recruits between November
1912 and July 1913, but lost 573 members in the same period, a reduction of
272. This, when added to their previous shortfall, produced a total shortfall of
671. Although this shortfall was gradually reduced over the next year, by 10
August 1914, six days after the outbreak of hostilities, there was still a deficit
of 337 within the combined battalions.1'0
Between 1901 and 1911, there were aproximately 127,000 male emigrants
from Scotland, 5.5 per cent of the male population. 111 This migration was
seen as preferable to enlistment. With the speed of passage and the low cost
of steerage fares many emigrants were leaving for only two or three years
before returning. This short-term 'foreign service' in time of economic
hardship was preferable to seven years army service. Any apparent
reluctance in Scotland for military service was only displayed towards the
regular army since those areas with the lowest recruitment numbers for the
regular army had the highest percentage of male population in the Territorial
Army. A comparison of figures 2:5 and 2:8 shows that those areas which
boasted the highest recruitment numbers for the regular army also had
among the lowest percentage rates for the Territorial Army.
110 Scothsh Record Office, MD 4/63.
J.Brock. The Mobile Scot. p. 328. M. Flinn et al, Scottish Population History from the
Seventeenth Century to the 1930s. p. 441.
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Fig 2:8 Territorial strength in relation to regional male population.112
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Figure 2:8 gives a total figure for Scotland of 1.3 per cent of the male
population serving in the Territorial force, 30,414 men. The figure for England
and Wales was 1.1 per cent of the male population, 199,020 men.113
When we look at Scottish membership of the Territorial Army, figure 2:8
shows that Inverness, with 3.86 per cent of its population in the Territorial
Force has a higher rate of recruits than the major Scottish cities: Aberdeen
had 2.81 per cent of its population in the Territorial Force, Dundee had 2.04
per cent, Edinburgh had 2.25 per cent and Glasgow had the low figure of 1.67•
per cent membership. Jeanette Brock argues that by the later part of the
nineteenth century in some highland areas part-time military service was seen
as a convenient method of seasonal employment which provided a
supplementary income. 1 ' 4 While this refers to the Militia in the period up to
1907, there is no reason to think that, to some extent at least, it would not
also apply to service in the new Territorial Force. The thrifty highlander was
112 Genera/Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911. C. Lee, British Regional Employment
Statistics 1841-1971.
113 General Annual Report, 1911. Census 1911
114 M. Brock, 'The Militia: An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration 1871 - 1907', in
Northern Scotland, The journal of the Centre for Scottish Studies, University of Aberdeen.
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never slow to spot an opportunity to supplement income. The changes put in
place by Haldane, designed to placate county associations and stimulate
recruitment to the new Territorial Force, had little or no effect in Scotland.
Scotland had a natural level of enlistment and, out-with the fluctuations of
employment and population, no great change took place.
By 1914, at the outbreak of war, Scotland had a Territorial Force which
included thirty-seven infantry battalions, affiliated to the ten Scottish infantry
regiments, and numerous engineer, medical, field artillery, and garrison units.
Not every regiment was able to give the same contribution to the Territorial
Force but this was, in the main, due to the lack of available local manpower.
Those regiments whose recruiting area fell within an urban, or industrial, area
provided, individually, a greater number of Territorial battalions. However,
Territorial recruitment in Scotland was not simply a matter of available
numbers as by far the greater proportion of Territorial battalions came from
rural areas. Almost 45 per cent of the Territorial infantry battalions came from
rural or agricultural areas, some seventeen battalions out of a total of thirty
seven, while twenty battalions recruited in industrial areas. 115 It would appear
that Territorial Army recruitment, in Scotland at least, was not solely
dependent on population density and distribution but also retied on cultural
and social ties still firmly rooted in the old volunteer ethos.
Figure 2:9 shows the shortfall in strength of Scottish Territorial Force units in
1913. It gives the establishment and strength of each county. Scotland with
115 The Annual Return of the Terntonal Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)
79
an establishment of 54,707 and a strength of 41,746 was suffering a shortfall
of 23.7 per cent or 12,961 men.
Fig 2:9 Territorial Force establishment and strength of each county in October 1913.116
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These figures can be broken down by region. Highland Counties - (Argyll,
Caithness, Inverness, Perth, Orkney, Ross & Cromarty, Sutherland) had an
establishment of 8,528, a strength of 6,501 and a shortfall of 2,028 (23.8 per
cent). Northeast - (Aberdeen, Banif, Elgin, Kincardine, Nairn) had an
establishment of 7,308, a strength of 5,074 and a shortfall of 2234 (30.5 per
cent). West Lowlands - (Ayr, Bute, Dumbarton, Lanark, Renfrew) had an
establishment of 20,743, a strength of 16,490 and a shortfall of 4,253 (20.5
per cent). East Lowlands - (Forfar (Angus), Clackmannan, Haddington, Fife,
Kinross, Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow) had an establishment of 15,292, a
strength of 11,526 and a shortfall of 3,766 (24.6 per cent). Southern Counties
- (Berwick, Dumfries, Kirkcudbright, Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown)
had an establishment of 2,836, a strength of 2,155 and a shortfall of 681 (24
per cent).117
117 The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)
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FIG 2:10 Scottish Pre-WarTerritonal Battalions.118
Royal Scots
4th (Queen's Edinburgh Rifles) Bn
5th (Queen's Edinburgh Rifles) Bn6th Bn
7th Bn
Royal Scots Fusiliers
4th Bn
5th Bn
Highland Light Infantry
5th (City of Glasgow) Bn
61h (City of Glasgow) Bn
7th (Blythswood) Bn
Cameron Highlanders
4th Bn
10th (Lovat Scouts) Bn
Seaforth Highlanders
8th (Pioneer) Bn
9th (Highlanders) Bn
10th (Cyclists) Bn
11th Garrison Bn
12th (Ayr and Lanark Yeomanry) Bn
8th (Lanark) Bn
9th (Glasgow Highland) Bn
4th (Ross Highland) Bn
5th (Sutherland and Caithness Highland) Bn
6th (Morayshire) Bn
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
5th (Renfrewshire) Bn
61h (Renfrewshire) Bn7th Bn
The Gordon High landers
4th (City of Aberdeen) Bn
5th (Buchan and Formartin) Bn
6th (Banif and Donside) Bn
Cameron ians
5th Bn
6th (Lanarkshire) Bn Pioneer
King's Own Scothsh Borderers
4th Bn
The Black Watch
4th (City of Dundee) Bn
5th (Angus and Dundee) Bn
8th (The Argyllshire) Bn
9th (The Dumbartonshire) Bn
7th (Deeside Highland) Bn
The Shetland Companies Lerwick and
Scalloway
7th Bn
th8 Bn
5th Bn
6th (Perthshire) Bn
7 (Fife) Bn
118 The Annual Return of the Territorial Force for the year 1913. Cd 7254. (1914)
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The Royal Scots, with their recruiting centred on Edinburgh and The Lothians,
provided seven Territorial battalions; the highest number for a Scottish
regiment. However, the Royal Scots battalions demonstrate that there were
clear divisions within the Scottish Territorial system. Four of those battalions
were centred in Edinburgh itself, the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 9th, and were seen
very much as middle class bastions. The fourth battalion contained
companies reflecting the occupations of those in its ranks; civil servants,
clerks, teachers, students, post office employees and 'gentlemen of leisure'.
The 5th battalion was recognised as the domain of the former pupils of
George Heriot's, an independent school, while those former pupils of the
school's arch rival, George Watson's, enlisted in the 9th battalion, the only
Royal Scots battalion to wear the kilt and earning for itself in the process the
nickname 'the dandy ninth'. While Edinburgh had its fair share of working
class, particularly in the large scale brewing and printing industries, Ian Wood
states that in Edinburgh 'there was a far higher proportion of the population
employed in professional, financial and legal services', and that 'territorial
recruitment was, in a real sense, an extension of this social structure'. 119
 He
goes on to explain that
Many of these young enthusiasts were lawyers, accountants or
employed in banks and insurance companies and eligible for
commissions through their education and often service in their school
119 Wood, 'The Royal Scots Territorial Battalions', in Macdonald and McFarland. eds. p.
107.
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cadet forces. However, there was a limit to the number of officers
needed, thus many of them served happily in the ranks or as NCOs.12°
The seventh battalion was more industrialised, coming as it did from Leith and
containing several hundred dock and shipyard workers, as well as a large
number of miners from the East Lothian coalfield. The remaining two
battalions were raised from the rural Lothians, the tenth based in Linlithgow,
and the eighth, based in Haddington, recruiting from East and Mid Lothian.
Thus the city battalions were seen as middle class, while the rural, or county,
battalions were more representative of the Scottish population as a whole.
The Highland Light Infantry on the other hand provided five territorial
battalions, four of which were recruited in Glasgow and based on middle class
city professions and one of which was based in industrial Lanark. The four
Cameronian territorial battalions were similar in makeup to those of the
Highland Light Infantry and recruited in exactly the same places; three in
Glasgow and one in Lanark. There were six other Territorial battalions in
Scotland which could be defined as industrial or urban-based. The 4th and
5th battalions of the Royal Scots Fusiliers, based in Ayr, and the 4th battalion
Black Watch, based in Dundee. The remaining three were the 5th, 6th, and
9th battalions, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The Argylls, while
ostensibly a highland regiment, recruited in the industrialised central belt. The
fifth and sixth battalions recruited in Renfrew, while the ninth battalion
recruited in Dumbarton.
120 Wood, 'The Royal Scots'. in Macdonald and McFarland. eds. p. 108.
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This gives the total number of Territorial battalions in Scotland which could
reasonably be classified as industrial or urban related or having industrial or
urban roots as twenty, or 55 per cent of a total of thirty seven. The industrial
areas from which these battalions recruited contained approximately 46 per
cent of the Scottish male population. The remaining seventeen battalions, 45
per cent of the total, were based mainly in rural or agricultural areas
containing approximately 54 per cent of the Scottish male population.
Fig 2:11 The Territorial Strength for Counties 1912 in numerical order.121
1912
Fife	 1796
Aberdeen	 2241
Renfrew	 2342
Ayr	 2454
Lanark	 2880
Edinburgh	 4832
Glasgow	 8701
The number of men in Fife who were in the Territorial Army had increased
over the previous years while the numbers for Glasgow, Renfrew, Edinburgh,
and Aberdeen had declined. Of the thirty-seven county associations, Fife was
in the top seven along with arguably at least five of the most industrialised
counties in Scotland.122
John Baynes gives valuable reasons why there was a discrepancy between
rural and urban rates of recruitment for the Territorial Force and for the
121 The Annual Return of the Territorial Army for the year 1912. HMSO, Cmd 6657.122 The Annual Report of the Territorial Army forthe year 1910,1911,1912. HMSO, Cmd
5482, Cmd 6066, Cmd 6657.
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Yeomanry in particular. He states that while the Yeomanry was perceived by
some as
a comic body: it was also regarded with admiration by those in rural
areas who looked up to its members because of their social standing,
and with fear and hatred in radical, urban circles where it was
remembered for its record in the suppression of political assemblies
and riots.123
FIG 2:12 Scottish Pre-War Yeomanry.
Ayrshire (Earl of Carrick's Own) Yeomanry
Fife and Forfar Yeomanry
Lanarkshire Yeomanry
Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry
Lothian and Border Horse
Lovat Scouts
Scothsh Horse
Scotland's seven Yeomanry regiments saw action in, or were raised as a
direct consequence of, the Boer War. During the Boer War the 17th company
of the 16th Imperial Yeomanry was comprised of volunteers from both the
Ayrshire and Lanarkshire Yeomanry, while the Lothians and Border Horse
contingent formed the 19th company of the Imperial Scottish Yeomanry.
While not providing enough volunteers on their own to form a complete
company, the Queen's Own Royal Glasgow Yeomanry and the Fife and
123 j • Baynes, p. 131.
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Forfar Yeomanry nevertheless both provided men for the Imperial Scottish
Yeomanry.
The Lovat Scouts, along with the Scottish Horse, were created expressly for
service in the Boer War. The regiment was originally formed in 1900 as
Lovat's Scouts and consisted primarily of stalkers and gamekeepers in an
effort to neutralise the field-craft skills of the Boers. The Scottish Horse was
raised in 1900 during the Boer War in South Africa by the Marquis of
Tullibardine who, at the request of Lord Kitchener, had agreed to raise the
original regiment of Scottish Horse comprised from ex-patriate Scots living in
Africa. Tullibardine followed this up by raising a second regiment in 1901,
comprised this time of volunteers from the Highland Society of London and
the Caledonian Society of Melbourne. At the conclusion of the Boer War the
two regiments of Scottish Horse were left in South Africa as local yeomanry,
its members being given parcels of land as a reward for their service. In 1903
Tullibardine was asked to raise the Scottish Horse afresh in Scotland and in
that year the first regiment was raised in Perthshire, while the following year,
1904, the second regiment was raised from Aberdeenshire, Elgin, Nairn and
Argyllshire.
In pre-war Scotland there were several clearly defined reasons for
membership of the Territorial Force. In the mainly industrial regions it was
seen as a break from a squalid and unhealthy lifestyle; the summer camp was
looked upon as a holiday for groups of friends or family members. In the far
north it was seen as a subsidiary wage, part of an annual income derived
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from a variety of sources. 124 To many, the Territorial Army was seen, as were
its predecessors, as a break from the tedium of Edwardian life and a chance
for a paid holiday in the summer.
B. C. Croucher, in his thesis, states that once the Territorial Force was
established
thousands of workers enlisted, thereby continuing the tradition of part-
time soldiering which had helped to sustain the old Volunteer Force.
Evidently, these men had no political objection to service in the new
home defence army, but it is significant that the motives for enlistment
of working class Territorials show that many were inspired not by
patriotism but by a desire for recreation, the offer of financial and other
rewards and the prospect of a paid holiday in camp.125
Some like Hugh McIntyre, a ships caulker at Brown's of Clydebank, 'joined
the Terriers simply to get a holiday down at Campbeltown'. 126
 Bill Hanlan, a
miner from Dalkeith who joined the 8th battalion Royal Scots, explained in
greater detail, stating
Well, we joined the Territorials because we never had a holiday, we
never could afford a holiday very well, acordin' to the wages at that
124 J Brock, 'The Militia: An Aspect of Highland Temporary Migration 1871-1 907' in Northern
Scotland. Vol 17, 1997.
125 B.C. Croucher. British Working Class Attitudes to War and National Defence 1902-14.
Unpublished PhD. University of Swansea, 1992. p 1151.
126 MacDougall, Voices From War. p. 99.
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time. Aye, men joined the Territorials for that purpose. That was the
idea. It wis always in July, when the pit holidays wis on, that we went.
We went for two weeks. And if ye had tae stay over and above the two
weeks ye got yer pay that ye had at yer work. Ye always got paid full
up, ye never lost anything.127
In the lowland farming belt such part-time military service was seen as part of
rural life. The volunteer associations, forerunners to the Territorial Force, had
been raised and led by the local gentry, landowners, or industrialists and
consisted to a large extent of their employees. The Territorial Force simply
carried on the tradition. Some joined, then as now, because the idea of
martial behaviour held an appeal or fascination for them, but they neither
wished nor could afford to adopt such a lifestyle permanently. Some joined
the Territorial Force in order to experience some elements of the military
lifestyle before enlisting in the regular army, white some joined because to do
so might be an advantage in their civilian life. But no matter what the reason,
they all served to promote a regional loyalty to a particular unit.
The nature of the Territorial Force unconsciously assisted in the development
of a localised loyalty in as much as the loyalty of an individual might not be
primarily to a regional battalion or regiment but to a local company within a
larger unit. The fact that the Territorial Force retained the eight company
system, discarded by the regular army in the wake of the Haldane reforms,
allowed individual companies to be recruited from smaller villages and areas
1271 MacDougall, Voices From War. p. 13
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with a low population. Peter Simkins states that 'Many first-line Territorial
units and, before them, Volunteer battalions had contained whole companies
of men drawn from the same community or work place. Indeed, it can be
argued that the Volunteer and Territorial Forces had been built on that very
foundation'.128
The expanse of Territorial influence in Scotland can be seen in the number of
Yeomanry and Territorial stations and drill halls scattered throughout the
country (appendix 1). The Yeomanry regiments had 229 drill stations across
Scotland: Ayrshire Yeomanry - 4; Fife and Forfar Yeomanry - 17; Lanarkshire
Yeomanry - 21; Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry - 3;
Lothian and Borders - 41; Lovat Scouts - 70; Scottish Horse - 73. The Infantry
regiments were represented by 491 drill halls and drill stations. The Royal
Scots had 49 drill stations; The Royal Scots Fusiliers 30 drill stations; The
King's Own Scottish Borderers 42 stations; The Scottish Rifles (Cameronians)
11 stations The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) 56 stations; The Highland
Light Infantry 24 drill stations; The Seaforth Highlanders 71 stations; The
Gordon Highlanders 2 stations; plus 2 independent companies. The Queen's
Own Cameron Highlanders had only one territorial battalion with 37 drill
stations; The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had 81 stations; The
Highland Cyclist Battalion 8 drill stations. With a total of 720 potential contact
points throughout the country there was hardly a village in Scotland that did
not have some form of territorial connection. To confirm what has already
128 P. Simkins. Kitchener's Army. p. 82-3.
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been discussed in this chapter we can see that those territorial battalions
which are classed as rural had the greater number of drill stations.
FIG 2:13 Territorial Drill Stations129
Regiment	 Rural	 Drill	 Urban	 Drill
_______________________ Battalions	 Stations Battalions Stations
Royal Scots	 8' Battalion	 23 4th Battalion	 1
______________________ iom Battalion	 20 51fl Battalion	 I
________________________ ____________ __________ 6 Battalion	 1
________________________ ____________ __________ 71fl Battalion 	 2
________________________ ____________ __________ 9 Battalion	 1
Royal Scots Fusiliers	 ___________ _________ 4tfl Battalion	 15
______________________ ___________ _________ 5ifl Battalion
	 15
Black Watch	 5tfl Battalion	 13 41fl Battalion	 1
_______________________ 6th Battalion 	 24 ___________ _________
_____________________ 7th Battalion
	
18 __________ ________
Highland Light Infantry	 ____________ _________ 5th Battalion	 1
_______________________ ____________ _________ 6 th Battalion	 1
_______________________ ____________ _________ 7th battalion
	
1
_______________________ ____________ _________ 8 th Battalion	 20
________________________ ____________ __________ gin battalion	 1
Scottish Rifles	 ____________ __________ 5tfl Battalion	 1
_______________________ ____________ _________ 6th Battalion	 8
_______________________ ____________ _________ 7th Battalion
	 1
_______________________ ____________ _________ 8th Battalion	 1
Argyll & Sutherland	 7tfl Battalion	 18 5th battalion	 4
Hightanders____________ _________ ___________ _________
________________________ 
8mn Battalion	 41 6mn battalion	 6
_______________________ ____________ _________ gin battalion
	
12
King's Own Scottish	 4tfl Battalion	 19
Borderers___________ _________ ___________ ________
________________________ 5ifl battalion	 23 ____________ _________
Seaforth Highlanders	 4th battalion	 29 ____________ _________
________________________ 5ifl battalion
	 24 ____________ _________
______________________ 6' Battalion 	 18 ___________ ________
Gordon Highianders	 41fl Battalion	 1 ___________ _________
_______________________ 5ifl Battalion
	
26 ___________ _________
________________________ 6mn battalion	 28 ____________ _________
________________________ 7th Battalion
	
25 ____________ _________
Queen's Own Cameron	 4 battalion	 37
Highlanders___________ _________ ___________ ________
HighlandCyclist Brigade ___________	 8 ___________ ________
______________________ ___________ 	 394 ___________	 94
129 Appendix I
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With the rural population scattered the need was for large numbers of small
drill stations, capable of dealing with half a company or less. Those urban
battalions were able to utilise one large drill hall due to the denser
concentration of population. It is fair to say that, in pre-war Scotland, urban
dwellers had less contact with the Territorial Force than rural dwellers.
Loyalty and rivalry were created between and within the various localised
companies; companies who would never meet as a whole battalion except at
the annual camp. By this method localisation was able to percolate down to
grassroots level, cementing regional loyalty. By this method, intentional or
otherwise, the Territorial Force was able to feed off itself, to be self-recruiting.
While the regular army, in August and September 1914, struggled to cope
with the increase in manpower, the Territorial Associations in Scotland calmly
went about the business of raising recruits through local affiliation.
THE ROYAL NAVY
The army was not alone in experiencing far-reaching change in the immediate
pre-war years. With the appointment, on 21 October 1904, of Admiral Fisher
as First Sea Lord, the Royal Navy underwent overhaul as its focus changed
and Fisher introduced reforms designed to counter the threat of German
naval expansion. While changes were already taking place prior to Fisher's
appointment, notably the decision in 1903 to establish a new naval base at
Rosyth, it was Fisher's ruthlessness in carrying forward reform which is most
remembered. Fisher consolidated the various British naval fleets, in the
process abandoning naval dominance in the far east and the pacific to Japan
and America, and by changing fleet dispositions created five new fleets
92
designed to provide naval protection for the homeland.'3°
The existing Channel Fleet was reformed and renamed the Atlantic Fleet and
in its stead the existing Home Fleet was then renamed the Channel Fleet.
This paved the way for the creation of a new Home Fleet based on the most
modern ships as they were completed and became available. Thus Fisher
hoped to create a powerful Home Fleet capable of countering any German
threat. Fisher reduced the Royal Navy's imperial commitments by scrapping
some 154 obsolete and outdated cruisers and gunboats which he viewed as a
liability whose purpose was to show the flag in the most inhospitable and
inaccessible parts of the empire.131
Fisher was now able to use those crews made redundant by the cropping of
the small ships navy to create 'nucleus crews' for those ships which the navy
held in reserve. The Fleet Reserve thus became The Reserve Fleet, ships
which held a nucleus crew of specialists and officers, two-fifths of the full
complement, which would be reinforced by shore-based personnel on
mobilisation. Initially at any rate this reserve fleet was to be the basis of the
new Home Fleet.' 32 In pre-war Scotland the Royal Navy was represented on
130 P. Padfield, The Great Naval Race. The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914. P.1 16-
7.
131 P. Padfield, The Great Naval Race. P. 116-7.
132 P. Padfield, The Great Naval Race. P. 116-7.
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the east coast by the stationing of a submarine squadron on the river Tay, at
Dundee, and by the rapidly evolving bases at Rosyth and Invergordon.
Between December 1912 and December 1913 the total strength of the Royal
Fleet Reserve rose from 25,788 to 27,762, an increase of 7.6 per cent. At the
same time the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve stood at 17,519 while the
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve stood at 4,417, with the Clyde division
standing at 1,243, some 86.6 per cent of its establishment: low when
compared to Bristol with 91.2 per cent of establishment and Tyneside with
99.3 per cent. The overall United Kingdom average was 89.9 per cent.133
In an effort to increase the strength of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve in
Scotland, it was decided, in 1913, to form three new companies based on the
Firth of Forth. The strength of these companies had only reached 129 by
January 1914, however this was put down to the lack of a drill ship and it was
envisaged that once a suitable vessel could be found there would be no
shortage of recruits.
It is clear that, in Scotland at least, the standard of recruit for the British Army
was far removed from what the perceived wisdom of the twentieth century
historian would have us believe. What is apparent is that the preconditioned
ideas concerning the physical, social, and educational standard of recruits
had little bearing in Scotland. Those ideas were part of the very baggage that
the Haldane reforms were intended to leave behind. The changes initiated by
133 Navy Estimates 1914-1 91 5. HMSO Cd 7302.
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Cardwell and continued by Haldane had served to alter public opinion
towards the army. By August 1914, while military service was still not seen as
a career option of choice, it had lost a great deal of its social stigma. Service
in the military was no longer seen as an evil born of necessity but as a social
service to be performed in time of need. Ian Wood suggests that service in
the Volunteers 'accustomed many working-class Scots to an acceptable form
of military service outside of the corrupting influence of the regular army'.1
Scotland, on the eve of war, was as ready to play her part as any other
country in the United Kingdom, or indeed within the Empire, but only within
the known context of warfare; short, cheap, low risk, and small scale.
134 s• Wood, 'Protestantism and Scottish Military Tradition', in G. Walker & T. Gallagher
(eds) Sermons and Battle Hymns. p. 122.
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CHAPTER 3
SCOTTISH MANPOWER
INDUSTRIAL
In the months immediately following the declaration of war,
employment fell off in almost all industries except in those then
regularly engaged in the manufacture of military material. The curve of
unemployment rose with remarkable abruptness, and only declined
with the gradual restoration of public confidence.122
If the recruitment rush of August and September 1914 caused the immediate
short-term slump in Scottish industry this would presuppose that recruitment
was led by 'patriotic' ideals. If, on the other hand, recruitment was driven by
the demands of industry, then economic needs, not patriotism, would be the
main driving force behind the initial high Scottish recruiting figures.
In his article, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First
World War', Peter Dewey investigates the relationship between voluntary
recruitment and industrial wage levels. However, Dr Dewey follows the
mainstream of thought; he believes that recruitment impacted upon industry,
and by doing so dismisses the effect that industry had upon recruitment. After
an examination of wages and activity rates within various industries Dr Dewey
concludes that 'the evidence is such that economic factors played a
122 The War Cabinet Report for the year 1917. HMSO. Cd 9005. p. 81.
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subordinate role in determining enlistment rates' , 123 He goes on to explain
that 'neither activity levels nor wages serve to explain enlistment differences
[between industries] to any great extent'.124
Dr Dewey's conclusions are based upon Great Britain as a whole and
therefore do not accurately reflect the position in Scotland specifically. The
numerical advantage held by England ensured that such an investigation
would have a bias towards the effect on English industry. Moreover, Dr
Dewey's figures are based upon employment levels and not on the more
important issue of unemployment.
The Scothsh recruitment figures for August and September 1914 have to be
viewed within the context of the social and economic conditions prevalent, or
imposed, at that time. As well as those conditions at the outbreak of war there
were also, more importantly, those created by the outbreak of war itself. This
is noted by Gerard DeGroot within the context of Britain as a whole but should
be equally applied to Scotland with her disproportionately high dependence
on heavy industry. 'Industries, frightened by economic uncertainty, reacted by
cuffing jobs; nearly 500,000 men were made redundant by the end of August,
and many more were forced onto part-time status. These men would not have
had any idea how temporary their jobless state would be'. 125
 R. Pope agrees
123 P.E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting and the British Labour Force During the First World War',
in The Historical Journal. 27. 1. 1984. p. 209.
124 P.E. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting'. p. 218.
125 G.J. DeGroot, Blighty. p. 47
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with this view concluding that 'the late summer of 1914 saw a sharp increase
in unemployment, even among male skilled engineers, which helped provide
the initial volunteers for Kitchener's armies'.126
Many of those skilled workers who came forward to enlist would have
experienced, directly or indirectly, the 1907-8 unemployment crisis in
Scotland, when in Glasgow alone upwards of 7,000 people had been
dependent on special relief funds set up to relieve mass poverty. Tom devine
writes that unemployment among clydeside engineers in this period rose to
nearly 20 per cent with unemployment among shipyard workers even
higher. 127
 In 1914, with long periods of unemployment becoming more
frequent as employers introduced new machinery or production varied in the
face of foreign, often European, competition, the memories of 1907 would, in
some cases, be enough to encourage enlistment: anything would be seen as
better than the uncertainty of welfare relief. It is not unreasonable to conclude
that those affected by the reaction in 1914 would instinctively act quickly to
prevent a recurrence of the hardships of 1907 or that the slump of 1907 left
bitter feelings with many, who would this time look out for themselves and
quickly do what was necessary to provide for their dependants.
By October 1914, of the thirty major industries surveyed for a Board of Trade
Report on the State of Employment in Britain, twenty were shown to have
126 R. Pope, War and Society in Britain 1899-1948. p. 21.
127 T. Devine, The Scottish Nation. p. 263.
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produced a higher percentage of recruits in Scotland. 128
 These included the
five main industries in Scotland: coal mining, engineering, shipbuilding, iron
and steel, and building. The report clearly indicates that the contraction in the
building trade was seen as no more than the seasonal norm: more important
for the building trade was the level of recovery after the traditional winter
slump. The five main industries in Scotland had a combined workforce of
496,300 males, which, by October 1914, had provided 69,308 recruits, 13.96
per cent of their workforce. They constituted over 59 per cent of Scottish
recruits for the army and Territorial Force at that time. The chemical, clothing,
and printing industries, while on a smaller scale, accounted for a further male
workforce of 69,000 which had produced 9,266 recruits, 13.42 per cent of
their workforce. The report shows that in the first three months of the war
Scottish industry alone had accounted for 109,714 recruits: 13.5 per cent of
the United Kingdom total and over 92 per cent of the 118,141 Scottish recruits
to this time. 129
 More importantly it shows that commerce and agriculture had
provided less than 8 per cent of Scotland's recruits in the initial period. They
had suffered no contraction in trade and therefore there was no economic
'push' to galvanise the workforce into action. The high initial recruiting record
in Scotland appeared to be mainly a grass roots reaction to prevent
unemployment and economic hardship. The Board of Trade Report on the
State of Employment for October 1914, although not directly linking
128 Board of Trade, Report of the Board of Trade on the State of Employment in the United
kingdom in October 1914. p 38. Cd 7703.
129 Report on the State of Employment...October 1914. p 38.
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enlistment to employment levels, confirmed that 'Scotland's good recruiting
record has prevented any degree of unemployment'.130
Christopher Harvie goes some way to explain the dilemma of Scottish
industry when he points out that there was something ominous about 'an
economy in which eight staple industries.., produced about 60 per cent of its
output'. 131
 That output itself was disproportionate since Scotland, having '10.5
per cent of the UK population.. .produced 12.5 per cent of UK output'. 132
 It
would therefore be reasonable to expect that a country with a high proportion
of industrial output would produce a high number of recruits from its industrial
base, if that industrial base suffered an immediate slump in production and a
correspondingly high surge of unemployment.
While Scotland played an important part in providing and expanding wartime
military production, the change-over from civilian to military production was
not instantaneous. There was a period of industrial limbo, after the sudden
stoppage of an industrial economy uncertain of the future and before the
introduction of a war economy fuelled by the needs of the military rather than
popular consumer demand. G D H Cole states that 'in many ... industries in
which shortage of labour was soon to become a pressing problem, the War at
first seemed likely to create widespread unemployment; and little attention
was directed to the necessity of maintaining output.' 133 It was in this period,
130 Report on the State of Employment.. .October 1914. p 21.
131 c• Harvie, No Gods and Precious Few Heroes. p. 1.
132 Harvie, No Gods. p. 1.
133 G.D.H. Cole, Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry (1914-1921). p. 16.
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when manpower, and more importantly manpower distribution, was left to its
own devices, that, proportionally, recruiting in Scotland outperformed the rest
of the United Kingdom.
Unemployment in Scotland's heavy industries was by the second week of the
war becoming a national problem. The Scottish worker, or employer, had no
precedent for the forthcoming industrial demands of the military and had no
conception as to the price of an industrialised defensive war. The Board of
Trade announced that on '14 August the percentage of unemployment among
workmen in the insured trades - i.e. building, engineering, shipbuilding,
vehicle making, etc. - was 5% as compared with 4% at the end of the
previous week and with 3% at the corresponding period of last year'. 135
 The
total number of insured workers in these industries was given as 2,250,000,
which meant that, with a figure of 112,500 for the second week of August
compared to 90,000 for the first week of the month, unemployment in British
industry had increased by 22,500 over the seven day period, and had
increased by some 45,000 over the figure of 67,500 for the same month in the
previous year. 136 While these figures are for Britain as a whole they are still
useful to give an overall perception of industrial reaction.
As early as 1970 Cornelli Barnett wrote 'Moved by patriotism, by desire for a
bit of adventure, by a desire to escape from poverty and unemployment, the
134 Discussed further in chapter 5, 'Boom and Bust'.
135 Dundee Advertiser, 20 August 1914.
136 Dundee Advertiser, 20 August 1914.
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crowds queued outside the recruiting offices' 137 .
 Clive Hughes tells us that
'among the earliest to volunteer were those seizing the chance to escape the
dull routine of a city office or the wearying labour of the mines and
factories'. 138
 Nevertheless, while poverty and unemployment are included as
viable reasons for enlistment, most historians have still treated them as
secondary to patriotism.
Those industries most immediately affected by the outbreak of war produced
a higher proportion of recruits in the initial months while those employed
elsewhere were more constant, producing recruits over a longer period. To
explain such economic pressures we must turn our attention to the reaction of
Scottish industry and the immediate consequences of that action. One
indication of the driving force behind recruitment in Scotland is the difference
between those out of work due to the contraction of Scottish industry and the
figures for those joining the armed forces from those industries in the same
period. The source used here for those figures is the Quarterly Survey of
Employers conducted by the Board of Trade from October 1914. This
information was collected in questionnaires sent out to a large number of
employers in the various industries in the United Kingdom and which asked,
amongst other things, for information as to the number of employees, the
reduction in employment and the number known to have joined the forces.
The information therefore is based on a sample and has some degree of
variance but for the purposes of this paper is still the best available and the
137 C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970; A Military, Political and Social Survey. p. 377.
138 c• Hughes, The New Armies', in I. F. W. Beckett and K. Simpson, A Nation in Arms: A
Social Study of the British Army in the First World War. p. 101.
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most accurate. 139 The base figure for these reports is the number employed in
each industry in July 1914. Therefore July 1914 = 100 per cent. If an industry
was suffering a 15 per cent reduction in manpower (contraction) in October
1914 this would mean that the industry in question was employing 15 per cent
less than in July 1914.
A comparison with the figures for Britain shows that, although Scotland had a
relatively small contraction in industry, due to the country's over-reliance on
heavy industry, the country provided a larger proportion of voluntary recruits
than most comparable regions and than Britain as a whole. Not only were
those who were directly threatened by unemployment enlisting but, more
importantly, those who perceived a future threat were also taking the
opportunity to enlist. In September 1914 Scottish industry had contracted by
9.0 per cent while at the same time the same industries provided 10.4 per
cent of their workforce as recruits. By October 1914 the figures were 10.9 per
cent and 13.2 per cent, while in December they stood at 11 per cent and 16
per cent respectively. The figures for the United Kingdom for the same period
were: September a contraction of 10.2 per cent with 8.8 per cent industrial
recruitment, October had 10.7 per cent and 10.6 per cent, while December
had 10.6 per cent and 13.3 per cent. In those three months only Scotland
showed a higher number of recruits than job losses every month.' 4° By
December 1914 the contraction of Scottish industry was slowing down,
although the fear of unemployment was still there. Within Scotland the figures
139 My thanks to Peter Dewey for locating these documents for me.
140 Report on the State of Employment...December 1914. p5. Cd 7755. Report on the State
of Employment.. .October 1914. p 21.
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show that, of the eight main industries, only one, engineering, failed to
produce more recruits than job losses. By October 1914 employment in the
engineering industry had contracted by 15.3 per cent but military recruitment
from that industry stood at 13.9 per cent. 141 The excess manpower released
by this industry was either in a position to weather the short term slump or
had obtained employment in those industries where recruitment had
outstripped contraction.
This disparity between the fall in jobs and the rise in enlistment did manifest
itself in an industrial manpower shortage by the end of 1914 as government
orders increased, but recruitment was still not driving industry. The
uncertainties created within Scottish industry by the cancellation of orders, the
loss of raw material sources, and the immediate collapse of overseas markets
prompted an industrial workforce already suffering from pre-war cutbacks to
opt for the relative security of short-time military service. Continuation of
employment was the prime mover to a skilled workforce ill-prepared to
withstand large scale unemployment. The labouring classes were used to the
fluctuations of employment but for the majority of the skilled artisans
unemployment was a new phenomenon.
The rush to enlist by the Scottish miners, especially those on the east coast,
has often been given as the reason for the marked reduction in coal
production figures and, by some, as the cause of industrial coal shortages,
The opposite is the case. It was the pre-war state of the coal industry and the
141 Report on the State of Employment.. .October 1914. p 38.
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immediate effect of the war which prompted thousands of miners to enlist
within the first few weeks of fighting. J. Winter, in his persistence that
patriotism was the main provider of voluntary manpower, asserts that the high
numbers of Scothsh miners who had enlisted by mid 1915, had done so
despite 'class consciousness' and a notorious reputation for militancy: all of
which he views as an example of how patriotism takes precedence over all.
Winter does however concede that 'we should never completely discount the
desire of some [Scottish] miners to do anything to get out of the mines'. 142
However, Winter seems compelled to counter this by continuing, 'sentiments
about nation and empire, rather than discontent, were behind mass
enlistment in this industry'. 143 While it is undoubtedly more romantic to believe
that patriotic sentiment rather than economic pragmatism came to the nation's
rescue, that concept has by now run its course and can be seen as naively
idealistic.
The Scottish coal fields had been suffering from a steady reduction in
manpower in the period immediately prior to the war. At the end of 1913 there
had been a workforce of 137,098 which by July 1914 had reduced to 133,505
a fall of 3,593 or 2.6 per cent. 	 In 1913 Scottish coal exports had risen to
10,437,000 tons, which was 24.5 per cent of Scotland's output, with the
majority of this work being done by the east coast coal ports which exported
8,253,000 tons as against the west coast total of 2,184,000 tons. In the years
142 j • Winter, The Great War. p. 35.
143 j Winter, The Great War. p. 35.
144 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing
in the Coal Mining lndusti'y Due to the War. HMSO 1915. Cd 7939. p. 29.
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immediately prior to 1914 there had been a reduction in the number of miners
employed in the west coast coal fields which were nearing exhaustion. As a
result there had developed a trend for those unemployed miners to move east
in search of work in the Fife or Lothian coalfields. Along with the steady influx
of immigrants from the Baltic states this led to an overabundance of men on
the east coast. This, coupled with the rapid expansion of the Fife coalfields,
regularly led to an overproduction of stock and short-time working, with the
result that although the east coast fields were working to a high capacity,
especially for export, there was a high percentage of unemployed miners in
the area prior to the First World War.
When war came the decline was relatively greater in the east coast coal fields
than the west. On 1 August 1914 it was announced that loading operations on
the steamer Ambient bound for Hamburg were stopped, the first cancellation
of supplies to the German market. 145 Two days later, on 3 August, it was
disclosed that, while in normal times 20-30 steamers were usually lying in
Methil docks loading with coal, on 1 August there had been only seven. At the
same time it was announced that the export of coal from Glasgow had also
been stopped. 146 By 4 August those collieries operated by the Wemyss Coal
Company in Fife had already laid off over 2,000 men due to the closure of the
Baltic and German markets, and the Edinburgh Collieries Co Ltd had lost
foreign contracts to the same markets with 2,500 men affected. Over 4,500
145 The Scotsman, 1 August 1914.
146 The Scotsman, 3 August 1914.
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miners were directly affected before war had become an actuality.147
In tandem with this, a large number of those in employment were in what can
only be termed as unreliable jobs, with some pits working only two or three
days per week as the export market demanded. Coal was produced as
required and not for stockpile. For the first two weeks of the war, shipment of
coal from the Fife ports was further hampered by the government requirement
of a cash security for double the value of the cargo, as a guarantee that the
cargo would not be supplied to a hostile power. 148 At the same time the
Admiralty took control of the Forth coal ports (Leith, Methil, Burntisland, etc.)
as the new naval base at Rosyth was still a long way from completion. This
ended any remaining hope of export from the east coast, forcing coal owners
to stop or limit production. The west coast fields had a local industrial and
domestic demand to tide them over in the short term. By October 1914 over
21 per cent of the Scottish coal industry, mostly the east coast fields, was
working short-time and 13.8 per cent or 18,441 men had enlisted. 149
 In
August 1914 it was the east coast coal fields which bore the brunt of the
production collapse and which produced the highest proportion of recruits.15°
At the outbreak of the war Scotland's miners were already involved in a
dispute with mine owners over wages and conditions. A meeting held in
Glasgow on 31 July between the employers and representatives of the
141 The Scotsman, 4 August 1914.
148 The Scotsman, 14 August 1914.
149 Report on the State of Employment...October 1914. p. 38.
150 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Conditions Prevailing
in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War. HMSO 1915. Cd 7939. p. 29.
107
Scottish Miners Federation considered the proposal by coal owners to reduce
the wages of miners by 1/- per day. 151 As could be expected no settlement
was reached but the proposal served to sow the seeds of discontent among
the Scottish mining communities.
The outbreak of war in August 1914 was immediately followed by a
widespread dislocation of trade and industry, both at home and
abroad. The demand for industrial coal fell off sharply, and the export
markets were largely thrown out of gear. Consequently, many miners
were thrown out of work, or found their opportunities for employment
restricted to considerably less than a full working week.152
The outbreak of war devastated the east coast coal fields almost immediately.
Large numbers of miners who were already in the Territorial Force were
called up at once, while those who had previously been unemployed enlisted
for what was seen as steady, if little, pay. More importantly there was no
apparent risk for those participating in this 'rush to the colours' as there were
to be months of training before the new recruits were committed to combat,
and for the Territorials only if they consented to foreign service. 153 Those who
were in employment fared no better as foreign markets were at once closed
to Scottish exports. Large numbers of miners saw this as the 'status quo' until
the war ended - it was meant to be a short war - and enlisted to provide for
their families. It was notable that a high percentage of those men were
151 Evening Times. 6 August 1914.
152 Cole, Labour in the Coal-Mining Industry p. 16.
153 Chapter 7. Territorial Recruitment.
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married with dependants with Cooney and Maxwell stating 'A curious fact
which one discovers over practically the whole of West Fife district is that the
greater portion of the whole men enlisted are married men who have left
behind them families of fairly large dimensions.'1
Single men could weather the fluctuating employment market more readily
than married men with greater commitments. Older, married miners, could
enlist and provide a steady income which could then be supplemented by the
younger, single members of the household. The enlistment of miners was
further encouraged by the practice of some coal companies in offering cash
bounties to any of their employees who enlisted. Some, like the Dysart Mining
Company, offered as much as a £10 bonus, free accommodation and coal for
their families, half wages, plus the guarantee of a job on their return. Others,
like the Fife Coal Company, did not pay a recruitment bonus but agreed that
reservists called back to the colours, and those miners enlisting, would be
granted free housing and coal for their dependants until their return. Even
here there was a social distinction as clerks with dependants had their service
pay augmented to bring it up to its pre-war level. The records for the Fife Coal
Company show that over 3,700 men, more than one quarter of its 14,880
workforce, had joined the forces by December 1915.155 The Alloa Coal
Company also, from the outbreak of the war, gave free rent and coal to
dependants of married men who enlisted. By the end of 1914 the company
154 L. Cooney, & A. Maxwell. (eds) No More Bings in Benarty :- An Account of the Rise and
Fall of Coal Mining in the Benarty Area of Fife, and Its Influence on the Lives of the People
Who Lived There. p.25.
155 A. Muir, The Fife Coal Company Limited; A Short Story. p. 25.
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announced that 'nearly 650 of its employees were serving; most of them had
worked underground.'156
Those Scottish coal companies which encouraged their employees to enlist
by such inducements were only following the policy of the government which
was keen that such companies gave their employees every incentive to enlist
for military service. 157
 At the outbreak of war the government, with no
precedent on which to base future needs, failed to anticipate the importance
that would, in a few short months, be placed upon coal production: the
demands of an industrial war. The immediate need was for men and the
government would take all steps necessary, short of conscription, to fill the
ranks. To this end in the early days of the conflict
leading members of the Miners Federation were taken to No. 10
Downing Street to be shown a specially prepared map of the German
penetration of the British Front, in order to secure their co-operation in
the removal of 50,000 young men from the pits for military service
abroad. The manoeuvre was completely successful.158
This solved two problems, it provided recruits and at the same time reduced
the number of unemployed created by economic uncertainty. As well as
156 J.L. Carvell, One Hundred Years In Coal; The History of the A/ba Coal Company, p. 104-
5.
157 J. L. Carvell, One Hundred Years. P. 105.
158 j • L.Carvell, One Hundred Years. P. 105.
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economic need there appears to have been, in the short term at least, an
orchestrated effort to encourage the enlistment of miners.
Dr Dewey wonders why highly paid miners enlisted in such large numbers
and uses this to demonstrate that economics did not determine recruitment in
the mining industry. He concludes that the fact that such large numbers of
miners were willing to leave a highly paid industry was evidence that other
factors, such as patriotism, were the prime movers. However, reality shows
us that, no matter how highly paid the industry was, in Scotland, if miners
were thrown out of work, then they clearly had no wages at all. Those who
were lucky enough to be placed on short time rather than total unemployment
were in reality no better off. Unemployed or on short-time, the miners still had
to pay rent and provide food for their families. By 12 August there were some
8,000 Fife miners who were affected by short-time working. It was reported
that 'even though the coal companies are giving two days a week, the men
can hardly earn more than pay the rents'. 159 Those on short-time and reduced
wages, although they were still earning, would end up penniless. As early as
18 August there were 'many cases of distress already reported in the district'
and reports of miners' families starving in Kirkcaldy through lack of work. At
the same time large numbers of miners from throughout Fife were 'travelling
159 The Scotsman, 12 August 1914.
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to Kirkcaldy and joining the army'.' 6° Enlistment, however distasteful, would
ensure that, in most cases, accommodation would be free and that wives and
families would at least receive the separation allowance. Mine closure
equalled unemployment which in turn equalled recruitment.
By early September there were reports from small subsidiary recruiting
stations of such recruits. 'Up till mid-day today 181 recruits have been
obtained at Dalkieth recruiting station, fully two-thirds of whom have been
employed at Midlothian Colliery', while in Musselburgh it was reported that
'over 300 recruits have enlisted in Lord Kitchener's new army at Musselburgh
during the past fortnight, the majority of whom are miners'. 161 At the same
time in the East Lothian village of Prestonpans over 200 men had enlisted
from the local Prestongrange Colliery alone. Scotland's coal industry lost
large numbers of men through enlistment but there was a greater loss in the
east coast coal fields due to the total collapse of the export market. The loss
of the German and Baltic markets was immediate: the German market alone
was worth over 2.9 million tons per year. 162 Scotish coal exports to foreign
countries in 1913 show the division between the east coast and the west
coast coal fields. Exports from the east coast fields in that year were
8,253,000 tons while the west coast exported only 2,184,000 tons.163
160 Dundee Advertiser, 19 & 20 August 1914.
161 Evening News, 4 September 1914.
162 Harvie, No Gods. p. 15.
l63	 R. Scott, & J. Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War. p. 26
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The rush to enlist by Scottish miners was clearly based upon economic
grounds. Those areas which suffered the most from the restrictions of war
provided the higher proportion of miners for the armed services. In the first
month of the war 6,032 or 4.48 per cent of Scottish miners enlisted but this
figure hides a great disparity in the regional variations. On the east coast, in
Fife and Kinross, 2,448 or 7.76 per cent of miners enlisted in August 1914. In
the Edinburgh district those figures were 622 and 5.95 per cent respectively.
The figures for Stirling, which, although it was more central, exported through
the east coast ports, were 680 and 6.73 per cent. In marked contrast to this
were those coal fields with direct access to the industrial central belt and the
protected west coast shipping ports. Lanark produced 1,108 or 2.04 per cent,
Ayr 540 or 3.8 per cent and Linlithgow 105 and 1.62 per cent.1
FIG 3:1 Number and percentage of miners enlisted by district.165
Figures are cumulative and given as a percentage of July 1914.
March 1915	 August 1915
Ayr
Edinburgh
Fife & Kin ross
Haddington
Lanark
Linlithgow
Stirling
Argyll & Renfrew
2381
2852
7797
1076
10070
1199
1930
987
168%
27.3%
24.7%
31.9%
18.6%
18.5%
19.1%
23.6%
2962
3581
10126
1231
12815
1437
2534
1200
20.9%
34.3%
32.1%
36.5%
23.7%
22.2%
25.1%
28.7%
Figure 3:1 details the number of recruits from the various Scottish districts in
164 Second General Report of the Departmental Committee on the Conditions Prevailing in
the Coal Mining lndustnj Due To The War, Cd 8147.
165 Second General Report. Cd 8147.
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March and August 1915 and shows that the disparity in regional recruiting
numbers continued throughout the entire voluntary period. By October 1914
the number of miners enlisting in Scotland had risen to 18,554 or 13.79 per
cent as the knock-on effects of economic uncertainty continued to take
hold. 166 At a meeting of the Executive committee of the Scottish Miners
Federation, held on 9 September 1914 in the Christian Institute, Glasgow, it
was agreed that 'immediate action should be taken by the Central Committee
of the Relief Fund to provide money to alleviate distress in mining districts
through unemployment caused by the war'.167
By February 1915, 29,290 Scottish miners, some 20.7 per cent of the
workforce had enlisted accounting for 15.3 per cent of the 191,170 British
miners who had enlisted at that time.' 68 The number rose to 21.8 per cent or
30,847 men by April 1915. This was an increase of 33 per cent since October
1914, while contraction within the Scottish coal industry had increased by 32
per cent to 16.1 per cent overall. 169 Although the number of recruits for the
three-month period, February to April 1915, had remained stagnant the Board
of Trade reported that that 1.2 per cent of miners were working short time in
Scotland. 17° By April 1915 recruiting had risen slightly to 21.8 per cent of the
industry's workforce, an increase from February of only 5 per cent, while
contraction of the industry had reduced by 3 per cent. 171 Employment for
those remaining Scottish miners had stabilised with coal now being shipped in
166 Second General Report. Cd 8147.
161 The Evening Times, 9 September 1914.
168 Report on the State of Employment...Februaiy 1915. p 29. Cd 7850.
169 Report on the State of Employment.. .April 1915. p 31.
170 Report on the State of Employment. . .April 1915. p 31.
171 Report on the State of Employment.. .April 1915. p 31.
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significant quantities by rail to the west coast. The enHstment figures for July
1915 stood at 31,938 or 23.9 per cent, 172 and by August of the same year the
number had increased to 26.7 per cent or 35,680, representing 14.2 per cent
of the 250,750 miners enlisted in the United Kingdom at the end of the first
twelve months of conflict.173
FIG 3:2 Enlistment figures for Scottish miners.
Given as a percentage of July 1914 workforce.
Dates	 % Miners Enlisted Number miners enlisted
October1914	 13.8%	 18441
February 1915
	
20.7%	 27662
April1915
	
21.8%	 29131
July 1915	 23.9%	 31938
August 1915
	
26.7%	 35680
FIG 3:3 Comparison of miners recruitment figures August
1914 to March 1915 for home countries
August 1914 to March 1915
Scotland	 28239
England	 126148
Wales	 28830
Ireland	 4
United Kingdom	 183274
21%
17.6%
18.3%
0.69%
18.1%
172 Report on the State of Employment.. .July 1915. p 9.l73	 R. Scott, & J. Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley During the War. p. 29.
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FIG 3:4 Comparison of miners recruitment figures August
1914 to August 1915 as a percentage of July 1914.
August 1914 to August 1915
Scotland	 35886	 26.7%
England	 164036	 22.9%
Wales	 35395	 22.5%
Ireland	 15	 2.6%
United Kingdom	 235332	 23.3%
The effect of such large numbers leaving the mines was felt later on when
industrial stability returned and the wartime economy kicked in. However, this
manpower deficiency in the coal industry was tempered by the influx of new
labour, although those entering the industry were unskilled and productivity
suffered initially. Britain as a whole lost 191,170 employees from the collieries
by February 1915 but there had been, at the same time, an influx of some
50,473 employees from other industries. This reduced the manpower loss in
the coal industry to only 14 per cent by February 1915. By August of the
same year, twelve months into the war, 250,750 men had left Britain's pits but
74,822 had entered the industry leaving the loss of labour at 16 per cent. By
April 1915 recruiting had risen slightly to 21.8 per cent of the industry's
workforce, an increase from February of only 5 per cent, while contraction
had reduced by 3 per cent. On 6 April 1915 Mr M. Lee, Assistant Secretary of
the Fife and Kinross Miners Association, gave evidence to the Departmental
Committee appointed to enquire into the Conditions Prevailing in the Coal
Mining Industry Due to the War. He stated in his evidence that up until that
time (6 April 1915) Lanark had produced 9,000 men; Fifeshire 8,000;
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Stirlingshire over 2,000; and the Lothians 3,000. He put the total figure for
Scotland at that time as approximately 26,000 miners in the army and
Territorial Force.174
At the onset of war shipbuilding followed the same pattern as mining, but,
although the industry was spread throughout Scotland, the vast majority was
centred on the Clyde and the Clyde Valley and consequently this was the
area worst hit by the short-term slump.
Figure 3:5 shows the distribution of Scottish shipbuilding. With over 50,000
employed in the industry, Scotland's west coast shipbuilding centres,
Dumbarton, Lanark and Renfrew, accounted for over 86 per cent.
FIG 3:5 Manpower and distribution of Scottish shipbuilding 1911.175
2.8
2.8
2.8
18.47
38.4
29.3
2.9
2.4
Aberdeen (City)
Aberdeen (County)
Dundee
Dumbarton
Lanark
Renfrew
Forfar
Edinburgh
1433
1457
1424
9396
19532
14897
1473
1235
In 1911 over 54,000 men from Lanark, Renfrew, and Dumbartonshire were
employed in the shipbuilding and marine engineering industries. In the
174 Report of the Departmental Committee appointed to enquire into the Conditions Prevailing
in the Coal Mining Industry Due to the War, Part II, Minutes of Evidence. HMSO 1915. Cd
8009.
175 Census 1911.
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summer of 1914 the Clyde had been under the threat of a shipbuilding
depression. Large numbers of men had joined the industry in the boom period
of 1913 but, in the months leading up to the war, production had declined and
nightshift working had ceased. Unemployment among shipyard workers was
already a reality, the economic reaction in August 1914 merely increasing the
pressure on those with dependants. The unemployment which had so quickly
devastated the east coast now started to affect the west. On Friday 14
August, at a conference in Glasgow between the representatives of the Clyde
Shipbuilders and Engineers and those of the workmen employed in all the
districts of the river, the discussion centred around the short-term working due
to the war. It was recognised by both management and workers alike that
'there must necessarily be a reduction of employment' and by this time some
yards were already experiencing short time. 176 The outbreak of war caused
the immediate cancellation of foreign orders and shipowners cancelled orders
or halted construction of those ships already on the blocks until they knew
what lay ahead.
The immediate short-term effect of this was unemployment, with the numbers
of men lost to the industry running so high that fear of depleting the industry
led the government to 'request shipbuilding firms as far as possible to refrain
from dismissing men.' Early plans to transfer men within the various
shipbuilding companies to stave off unemployment came to nought when
contraction within the industry became more widespread than originally
176 Daily Record. 15 August 1914.
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anticipated. 177 On Saturday 29 August it was reported that 'The smallest total
for August for a quarter of a century in Clyde Shipbuilding is reported. During
the month shipbuilders launched only twelve vessels'. 178 Elsewhere it was
also reported that 'not since 1886 has the Clyde turned out such small
tonnage during August'.179
The importance of the Shipbuilding industry was recognised from the outset
but private shipyards, although requested to do so by the Board of Trade as
early as 8 August 1914180, were unable, or unwilling, to keep men on the
books until stability returned in the shape of government orders, and the men,
left to their own devices, could not wait indefinitely for a return to employment.
This call was repeated on 19 August when employers were urged in the
regional press to 'keep industries going and diminish the field of
unemployment as much as possible'.181
At the start of the war there were three shipyards which were engaged solely
in warship construction; John Brown & Co at Clydebank were constructing the
Dreadnought Tiger and the battleship Barham, Beardmore & Co at Dalmuir
were building the battleships Benbow and Ramillies, and the Fairfield Co at
Govan had the battleships Valiant and Renown. Most of the smaller yards
were independent, each specialising in a particular type of vessel and,
although the civilian yards tried to hold on to their men as long as possible,
177 Glasgow Herald, 7 August 1914.
178 Daily Record, Saturday 29 August 1914.
179 The Evening Times, 28 August 1914.
180 Dundee Advertiser, 8 August 1914.
181 Dundee Advertiser, 19 August 1914.
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the uncertainty of war made enlistment the logical choice. The unemployment
blow was felt all the harder as many skilled workers had left jobs in
engineering for what was seen, in the shipbuilding boom of 1913, as the
greater financial security of the shipyards. Harry McShane states that
A large number of men were already prior to the war leaving Weir's,
because there was a feeling that unemployment was coming and they
wanted to get to places like Brown's, where they were building a big
battleship, and to other places where they thought there would be
some sort of permanency of employment.182
By October 1914 approximately 6,566 Scottish shipbuilding workers had
enlisted, accounting for 12.9 per cent of those working in large shipyards and
16.7 per cent for smaller companies. 1
 This higher figure for smaller
shipyards was to be expected as they were unable to retain staff at a loss
indefinitely. 1 On 10 September it was announced that 170 men from Bow
McLachlan & Co's shipyard in Paisley had joined the army. While not a
significant number on its own it shows that large groups were leaving the
smaller yards. By February 1915 approximately 8,144 men, 16 per cent of the
shipbuilding industry, had enlisted with this number increasing to 8,805 or
17.3 per cent by April of the same year. 1 Within the engineering sector
23,304 men enlisted by February 1915, 19.6 per cent of the engineering
152 H. McShane, in N. MacDougall, Voices from War and Some Labour Struggles: Personal
Recollections of War in our Century by Scottish Men and Women. p 33-4.
183 Report on the State of Employment.. .October 1914. p 38.
184 Scott & Cunnison, The Industries of the Clyde Valley. p. 85.
185 Report on the State of Employment.. February 1915. p 29. April 1915. p 31.
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workforce, while by April 1915 the number had increased to 24,969 or 21 per
cent.186
FIG 3:6 Clyde's Share of Admiralty Warshipbuilding 191418.187
Year	 Number	 Clydeside Percentage
ordered	 share	 of total
	
1914-15	 217	 82	 37.7
	
1915-16	 130	 66	 50.7
	
1916-17	 121	 37	 30.5
	
1917-18	 144	 70	 48.6
Warship building in 1914-15 was lower than the pre-war boom of 1913 and
with shipyards commandeered by the Admiralty there was not the luxury of
civilian shipbuilding to fall back on. On the Clyde, along with warship building,
there was also repair work to those ships damaged in action but such work
was also limited until German and Turkish minefields began to take their toll
in early 1915.
At the outbreak of war the three major Scottish shipyards engaged in warship
production, Clydebank, Fairfield and Dalmuir, were taken over and came
under Admiralty control, while the other three yards which had built warships
pre-war, Scoffs, Denny's and Yarrow, came under Admiralty control under the
1915 Munitions of War Act188 Hugh Peebles states that 'these six yards were
responsible for virtually all of the conventional warships built on the Clyde
during the war'. 189 Not until December 1914, five months after the outbreak of
186 Report on the State of Employment...February 1915. p 29. April 1915. p 31.
187 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbullding on the Clyde. p. 169.
186 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde. p. 89.
189 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde. p. 89.
121
war, were new ships being laid down on the Clyde, the cruiser Canterbury at
Clydebank and the monitor Raglan at Harland and Woiffs Govan yard.'9°
There was, within Scotland's shipbuilding industry, uncertainty until the
Admiralty was in a position to determine its future needs. Once Britain's
warship needs had been decided 'the entire shipbuilding industry Was
mobilised progressively from 1915 onwards to meet the insatiable demand'.191
From the beginning of 1915 the number employed at the three main yards
rose as Admiralty orders increased and, more importantly, as those yards
undertook munitions work not directly related to shipbuilding, aircraft, airships,
field guns, etc. At the same time the number of men employed at the other
Clydeside yards was considerably lower than pre-war levels. Those who had
not enlisted in the economic slump of 1914 were able to profit from the
increased demand in 1915 for warships. While some men continued to leave
the major yards, others, displaced from the smaller yards, were able to take
their place. In 1914-15 after the outbreak of war approximately eighty-two
warships were laid down on Clydeside. Twenty were river gunboats of the
type scrapped in Fisher's reforms, thirty-six were destroyers, eighteen
submarines, and the rest were a mixture of depot ships, monitors and
cruisers. In contrast to later years, when shipyard workers were protected, it
was not uncommon in the first few weeks of the war for recruiting rallies to be
held outside the shipyards as the workers were leaving at the end of the day,
or even on occasion in the works at meal breaks.
190 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbullding on the Clyde. p. 181.
191 H. B. Peebles, Warshipbullding on the Clyde. p. 88.
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The year 1913 had also been a boom year for the iron and steel industries
but, like shipbuilding, 1914 was the slump which followed. Once again it was
Scotland's west coast which was affected. With a total of 28,142 employed in
iron and steel manufacturing in Scotland, over 96 per cent was centred on
two counties: Ayr with 1782 employed in the industry had a 6.3 per cent
share, while Lanark, employing 25,414, had the lion's share of the industry
with 90 per cent. There was cut price competition from Germany and the
United States, and demand for Scottish products was falling. As early as
August 1914 there were reports of 'stagnation' in the iron and steel trades.192
By October, 16,527 men, accounting for 13.9 per cent of Scotland's
engineering workers, had enlisted. 193 In the four-day period between 29
August and 1 September over 400 recruits enlisted at Coatb ridge, while at the
same time over 500 enlisted at Motherwell, with the latter being 'drawn from
the ranks of steelworkers and skilled artisans.' In Kilmarnock over the same
period 250 men from 'local public works' enlisted, increasing the town's total
to over 500 since the war commenced. On 15 September Mr John Hill,
General Secretary of the Boilermakers Society, talked about the 'very sudden
and serious effects the war had already had' among his members and said
that the figure for those unemployed in August 1914 was 4,676, an increase
of 2,797 over the figure of 1,879 for the previous August, an increase he put
down solely to industrial reaction to the war. 	 The army was not the only
option for many of the Clydeside workers. Harry McShane, himself a shipyard
engineer in 1914, tells us that 'Some of Weirs engineers simply went to sea
192 Glasgow Herald, 8 August 1914.
193 Report on the State of Employment.. February 1915. p 38.194 Glasgow Citizen, 15 September 1914.
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and that was their war effort.' 195
 This practice was not confined solely to Weirs
and was commonplace among the engineering works along the Clyde. By
February 1915 engineering had lost 19.6 per cent of its workforce, an
increase from August 1914 of 41 per cent, while overall contraction of the
industry, due to the introduction of government orders, had reduced by 6 per
cent from the December figure. 196 Again short-time working had, at less than
one per cent, all but disappeared from the industry. By April 1915 the
percentage of engineering workers who had enlisted stood at 21 per cent
overall.197
The textile industry in Scotland suffered mixed fortunes. The fighting in
Belgium closed off the supplies of raw materials for the border linen and
woollen mills, forcing closures, while the east coast jute industry, centred on
Dundee and Forfar, continued, and in most cases increased, production. As
early as 4 August 1914 Inveresk Mills in Musselburgh reported that 650
workers were already affected by the crisis in Europe. 198 At the outbreak of
war the west of Scotland textile industry produced few, if any, products which
could be used for military purposes. The sudden collapse of the export market
and the lack of raw materials forced many mills to close, at least until they
could be altered to produce war material. The cotton industry held 5,000
workers, while the Paisley thread industry employed a further 10,000. By
October 1914 some 585 men had enlisted, accounting for 11.7 per cent of the
19 McShane & Smith, No Mean Fighter. P. 61-2.
i Report on the State of Employment.. .February 1915. p 29.
191 Report on the State of Employment.. .April 1915. p 31.
198 The Scotsman, 4 August 1914.
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male workforce.199 In Paisley the thread industry suffered immediate
cutbacks, with Coats Mills providing 270 recruits by the second week in
September and Paisley's total to that time standing at some 1,250. With the
mills dependent on imported raw material and the need to export the finished
product, the closures had no time limit and therefore those males who lost
their employment had no option other than to enlist, even if as nothing other
than a stop gap. As early as 4 August foreign contracts for the border tweed
mills were cancelled and it was expected that all mills would close within three
weeks. 20° The following day, 5 August, it was reported that the 'tweed mills
will only employ men day to day'. 201 The closure of woollen mills was not
confined to the borders. The Grandholm Woollen Mills, Aberdeen, closed at
the outset of war and by 14 August the Haddington mills of Messrs Adam
Paterson had closed. 202 This atmosphere of uncertainty helped to stimulate
recruitment, and by October 1914, of 10,100 males employed in the woollen
industry in Scotland 1,212 or 12 per cent
had enlisted.203
199 Report on the State of Employment.. .October 1914. p 38.
200 The Scotsman, 4 August 1914.
201 The Evening Times, 5 August 1914.
202 Glasgow Herald, 15 August 1914.
203 Report on the State of Employment...October 1914. p 38.
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FIG 3:7 As early as 5 August Morton of Daniel were warning of shorter working hours
and of the risk of panic. Six days later the factory went on short-time.204
lo Meet the New Conditions.
___________
employers, we shall keep things running as nearly us possible in
tht ir iii,rn.il way, though it will doubtless be necessary to shorten the hours
of labour.
N1a, 's e ads ise our Workers in the times be1ort us in keep cool and
h LL Irim an sort of puiiic. and se cail be of most service to our Country
i), i,b',ers lug a fes siniple rules at this juncture.
c should continue our life and habit as before, except that we
should try to LIVE ON LESS.
on no account should we withdraw any monies we may have in
flanks. \V should draw out us little	 can s#e do with,
We shinild not la y in large stores of food and other necessaries. This
only raises prices immediately against other people who cannot afford it, or
who have the courage not to accumulate against their neighbours.
To rush for money and lay in large stores is most unpatriotic and un-
iieighhourly at this time. What is wanted in the present crisis is a feeling
of "National Comradeship," where each will do all in his power to see
the other through.
A. MORTON & Co.
MORTON SUNDOUR FABRICS, LTD.
hUDSON SCOTT SONS, LTD.
The war was a godsend for the jute industry which was called on to produce
everything from horse-feed bags to haversacks, sugar bags to sand bags.
The jute industry had its own particular effect on recruitment which differed
204 Morton of Darvel Papers. SRO GD 326/24/1
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from the norm. The industry had always been a heavy employer of women,
with males being predominant only in a supervisory or engineering capacity.
This left a small hard core body of unemployed males in Dundee who,
knowing from experience that there was no prospect of employment, took the
opportunity to enlist. This is reflected in the experiences of William Linton
Andrews, News Editor of the Dundee Advertiser, as he tried to enlist at the
outbreak of war, only to be forced to the rear of the line by the unemployed
men who felt that they had a greater claim to accept government wages:
The war was a day or two old. The scene was the swarming street
outside the recruiting office at Dundee. I struggled in a mob of old
militiamen and unemployed to reach the recruiting sergeant. A gaunt
man in a muffler towered over me. He looked down, and said, not
without sympathy: 'Out o' work, chum?' I was a trifle huffy. Out of work
indeed. I was News Editor (and in the Fleet Street sense, Night Editor
too) of an important morning paper, the Dundee Advertiser. But I could
not go into that. I told the big man I had a goodish job. 'Then you make
way for us lads wi' out jobs' he said. And forthwith I was hustled to the
edge of the crowd. Funny (I thought to myself), I never knew it was so
hard to become a soldier.205
Those males who were lucky enough to be in employment were not inclined
to leave hard-won jobs to serve in what was still at that time seen as a short
war. This led to a low level of recruitment in Dundee, especially when
205 Andrews, The Haunting Years. p. 11.
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compared to a male-dominated, agricultural town such as Perth, which,
although smaller, produced a greater number of recruits. At one stage the
army recruiting targets for Dundee were greatly reduced in acknowledgement
of this phenomenon. The local recruiting officer, Major T.M.Cappon, in
December 1914 lowered the quota for the city from 3600 recruits for '1(2' to a
'more realistic' 2500.206 A look at the recruiting figures for Dundee at that time
shows that even that target was not achieved. Figure 3:8 is based on the
male population (census 1911) and is intended to show the low level of
recruitment in Dundee - an industrial town which did not follow the industrial
pattern - there was no collapse in the primary industry.
FIG 3:8 A comparison of the numbers and percentages of New Army recruits
for two different but neighbouring districts for the first five months of
the war. Perth, a predominately agricultural district, and Dundee, a
textile dominated district207
1914	 Perth and District	 Dundee and District (Forfar)
Male Population 58364 	 Male Population 126638
Number of
Recruits
August	 1461
September	 2749
October	 3191
November	 3673
December	 3953
% of Male
Population
2.50%
4.71%
5.46%
6.29%
6.77%
Number of
Recruits
493
1129
1323
1591
1848
% of Male
Population
0.38%
0.89%
1.04%
1.25%
1.45%
The jute industry provided 2,353 recruits by October 1914, 13 per cent of the
206 The Scotsman, December 3 1914.207 Ministry of National Service Papers, NATS 1/389. Census 1911.
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male workforce. 205 The remainder of the textile industry, Which employed
38,200 males, lost 4,736 or 12.4 per cent by October 1914.209 The one
exception to the continued prosperity of the east coast textile trade was the
Scothsh linoleum industry, based primarily in and around Kirkcaldy. The raw
materials, especially oil, became increasingly scarce and it was reported that
'Most of the factories and workshops in Kirkcaldy are conducting business
under a shorter hours system because of the lack of raw materials'. 2 ' 0
 The
major company in this localised industry, Nairns of Kirkcaldy, reported that
'Six hundred men were eventually in one or the other of the services, and the
firm made weekly payments both to them and their wives and families.'211
Recruitment from the textile industry continued to rise throughout 1915. In the
cotton sector the number had increased to 675 or 13.5 per cent by February
1915 and had increased further to 765 or 15.3 per cent by April 1915, while,
within the jute industry, the subject of strenuous recruiting campaigns, the
number had risen to 3,746 or 20.7 per cent by February 1915 and further still
to 4,416 or 24.4 per cent by April of the same year. The figures for the
woollen sector show a rise to 1,858 or 18.4 per cent by February 1915, and to
2,161 or 21.4 per cent by April 1915.212
While we have seen that Scotland's industrial reaction was the main
contributor to the recruitment numbers, the main surprise is the extent to
208 Report on the State of Employment.. .October 1914. p 38.
209 Report on the State of Employment...October 1914. p 38.
210 Dundee Advertiser, 24 August 1914.
211 A. Muir, Nairns of Kirkcaldy, p.106.
212 Report on the State of Employment...February 1915. p 29. April 1915. p 31.
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which Scotland's proportion of recruitment led the other industrial regions in
the all important opening months of the war. For the first three months of the
war there was a difference of 17.3 per cent. It was reported to the House of
Lords that 'from August 4 to November 4, the first three months of the war,
the southern district of Scotland furnished 237 recruits per 10,000 of the
population'.213 There followed a list detailing recruitment in the various
industrial districts of the United Kingdom with Warwickshire and the Midland
Counties producing 196 per 10,000 of the population; Lancashire 178 per
10,000; London and the Home Counties 170 pre 10,000; Yorkshire, Durham
and Northumberland, 150 per 10,000; Cheshire and part of Lancashire and
the neighbouring Welsh counties 135 per 10,000; the North of Ireland 127 per
10,00; and finally Noffs and Derby with 119 per 10,000 Of the population.214
Proportionally, Scotland's industrial regions were providing over 20 per cent
more relative to population numbers.
By the end of 1914 Scottish industry was in recovery and recruitment had
reached a relatively low if steady level. The introduction of government
contracts had served to stabilise the short term decline in industry and the
renewed need for labour to fulfil those contracts stemmed the flow of both
skilled and unskilled workers alike into the armed services. Military
recruitment was now competing directly with industry for manpower.
Unintentionally or not, Scottish industry had played its part in the raising of the
New Armies. The second year of the war 1915 was the time for those who
213 Parliamentary Debates - Official Reports 1066— 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914-
15 (Nov11 —May 19) 351-2.
214 Parliamentary Debates - Official Reports 1066— 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914-
15 (Nov 11—May 19) 351-2.
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had held back in the opening months to come forward and make their
commitment. As the contribution from industry declined, then the contribution
from commerce and the public sector increased as those in replaceable jobs
found themselves under mounting pressure to enlist.
Figure 3:9 shows how recruitment from industry reduced after the initial
months.
FIG 3:9 Recruitment from eight main Scothsh industries. Figures are
cumulative and given as a percentage of the July 1914 workforce.215
Industry	 October 1914	 February 1915	 April 1915
Mining
Engineering
Building
Iron & Steel
Shipbuilding
Printing
Clothing
Chemicals
18436
16527
16324
7563
6566
3497
3235
2534
13.8%
13.9%
15.2%
13.2%
12.9%
13.1%
13.1%
14.4%
27662
23304
20835
9855
8144
5340
3184
3256
20.7%
19.6%
19.4%
17.2%
16%
20%
12.9%
18.5%
29131
24969
22983
10887
8805
6167
3482
3696
21.8%
21%
21.4%
19%
17.3%
23.1%
14.1%
21%
The building trade had retreated into its annual slump, with contraction in
February 1915 standing at 23.2 per cent overall and, with a recruitment rate
of 19.5 per cent, an increase of 29 per cent over October 1914.216 The
contraction rate for the building trades was higher than the enlistment rate as
many of the workers, skilled or otherwise, were able to obtain employment
constructing the new naval base at Rosyth, the demand for which had
215 Report on the State of Employmenf...October 1914-April 1915.
216 Report on the State of Employment...October 1914 - April 1915.
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increased at the outbreak of war. March 1915 saw renewed efforts to recruit
labour for the construction of Rosyth naval base in direct competition with the
armed services. The contractors were able to offer long term work and
relatively high rates of pay for unskilled men, making civilian employment a
more benificial and tempting prospect than military service.
FIG 3:10 One of a series of advertisements for labour at Rosyth217
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By April 1915 the percentage of building trade employees who had enlisted
stood at 21.4 per cent, while contraction of the industry stood at 22.3 per
cent.218 The number of recruits from the iron and steel industry had, by
February 1915, risen to 17.2 per cent of the workforce while contraction
217 Forfar Herald. 5 March 1915.
218 Report on the State of Employmenf...Aprll 1915. p 31.
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remained at a low figure of 1.6 per cent. By April contraction had risen to 3.2
per cent while recruitment had risen to 19 per cent. Recruitment from
shipbuilding rose to 16 per cent in February, with contraction of the industry at
4.6 per cent, and in April stood at 17.3 per cent with an increase in industrial
capacity of 1.55 per cent. The figures for the printing industry stood at 20 per
cent recruitment and 18.5 per cent contraction for February, and 23.1 per cent
recruitment and 17.8 per cent contraction in April. Clothing in February stood
at 12.9 per cent recruitment and 10 per cent contraction, and in April 14.4 per
cent recruitment and 9.7 per cent contraction. The last of the eight major
industrial employers, the chemical industry, stood at 18.5 per cent recruitment
and an expansion of 9.8 per cent in February, with 21 per cent recruitment
and a 6 per cent expansion in capacity in April 1915.219
The figures above show that in seven of the eight major Scottish industries
recruitment slowed after October 1914 and that by April 1915 had all but
reduced to a trickle. Michael Carver makes the point that by early 1915, as
industry recovered and expanded to meet the demands of the military, 'there
was no longer a pool of unemployed on which to draw'. 22° The exception was
the printing trade, with a 65 per cent unemployment rise in the period from
October 1914 until February 1915. As an industry printing was affected by the
outbreak of war. Certainly the printing of books was reduced but newspapers
continued, with extra editions, and the printing of handbills and posters
increased. The printing industry recruitment figure of 13.1 per cent in October
219 Report on the State of Employment...February 1915. p 29. April1915. p 31.
220 M. Carver, Britain's Army in the 2O Centu,y. p. 40.
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1914 was comparable with the other industries. 221 The recruitment from the
printing trade was an example of recruitment i two stages but both stages
confirm the idea that recruitment was economically driven. There were two
periods of large scale contraction within the printing industry and at both of
these times recruitment increased correspondingly. Recruitment did not
cause the contraction of industry; the contraction prompted recruitment.
AGRICULTURE AND FISHING
FIG 3:11 Scottish counties with a recognisable fishing industry222
Number	 % industry
employed total
Aberdeen	 3558
	
12.7
Argyll
	 1399	 5
Banif
	 3876
	
14
Elgin	 1285
	
4.6
Fife	 1655
	
6
Inverness	 2052
	
7.3
Ki ncardine	 1167
	
4.1
Ross & Cromarty	 4651
	
16.6
Orkney	 601
	
2.1
Shetland
	 2226
	
8
Sutherland
	 981	 3.5
Caithness	 826
	
3
The Scottish fishing fleet, based almost entirely on the east coast, felt the
effects instantly, even before war had become an actuality. On 4 August it
was reported that in Aberdeen 'At a meeting of the trawl owners of the port
yesterday, it was decided to pay off the crews from skippers downwards. Not
only will fully twelve thousand workers be thrown out of employment, but all
221 Report on the State of Employment. ..October 1914. p 38.
222 Census 1911.
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classes of shopkeepers will also be hard hit.' 223
 D. T. Jones in his post-war
investigation into rural Scotland wrote that ' F ishing operations at once came
to a standstill and the large fleet of Scothsh steam drifters, motor vessels, and
sailing vessels was laid up and the whole fishing community thrown out of
employment.' 224
 The herring fleet in the middle of its seasonal peak tied up
immediately, while the inshore fleet was severely limited due to Admiralty
restrictions on sailings in the North Sea and the Firth of Forth. Many of the
fishermen were already in the Naval Reserve but their numbers had been in
decline over the previous few years, with the majority of those remaining in
the reserve coming from the islands: 2,000 from the island of Lewis alone.225
A number of the younger men did enlist in the army but this changed almost
immediately when the Admiralty started to requisition trawlers and fishing
vessels for mine sweeping and inshore transport. Figure 3:12 shows the
number of fishermen and shore-based workers on the east and west coasts
of Scotland, plus the Orkney and Shetland islands. Shore-based workers
included coopers, boxmakers, carters, basketmakers, fishmongers, and all
the other support industries associated with the fishing industry, most of
which could be incorporated into the Army Service Corps.
22 Daily Record. 4 August 1914.
224 D. T. Jones, et al, Rural Scotland During the War. p. 32.
226 Jones, et aI, Rural Scotland. p. 32.
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FIG 3:12 The numbers of fishermen and shore based workers in
Scotland 1914 and 191 5,226
East Coast Fishermen
East Coast Shore Based
West Coast Fishermen
West Coast Shore Based
Orkney & Shetland Fishermen
Orkney & Shetland Shore Based
Total
1914	 1915	 %Reduction
21812	 8620	 60.49
33958 13578
	
60.02
9401	 4341	 53.83
10457	 5513	 47.28
6381	 2283	 64.23
5110	 1126	 77.97
87119	 35461	 59.3
As could be expected the Orkney and Shetland fishing fleet suffered the
greatest drop in numbers, with the majority of the young male islanders
engaged with the fishing fleet. Not all those fishermen displaced by the war
enlisted in the armed forces: a large number went to work on the land, some
on their own crofts and some to replace those agricultural workers who
enlisted. This is all the more surprising when account is taken of the number
of men in the regional fishing industry thrown out of employment in the days
immediately prior to the war, It seems, however, that the bulk of these men
were able to withstand the economic hardship of the first two weeks of war,
and, by 17 August, when the devastation in the Aberdeen fishing industry had
levelled out, 250 trawlers and 550 drifters returned to sea. In the case of
those fishermen who, for one reason or another, were unable to return to their
normal work, many were able to find alternative employment on the land.227
226 Thirty-third Annual Report of the Fishery Board for Scotland for the year 1914, Cd 7976.
Thjy-fourth Annual Report of the Fishery Board for Scotland for the year 1915, Cd 8281.
221 Report on the State of Employment......July 1915. Part ii - Agriculture. p. 7.
Report on the State of Employment.......Apr11 1915. p. 13.
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Agriculture was yet another sector of Scottish society with its own peculiarities
which affected the recruitment of its workforce. Like the Fife miners,
agricultural workers, especially in the north of Scotland, were present in the
Territorial Force in large numbers and were called up immediately. Others
joined for a variety of reasons, to be with a group of friends, for a chance for
adventure (stories of the Boer War), or for an opportunity to break from an
industry which traditionally worked long hours for low wages. But, whatever
the reason, not all rushed to join at once. A peculiarity of the agricultural
industry was the twice-yearly hiring fairs in May and November, and
agricultural workers appear to have been held to this six monthly work
contract cycle, not only morally but in some cases in the legal sense. A case
in question was a farm servant in Errol, Perthshire, who was sued by his
employer for breach of contract when he left the farm in order to enlist.
Agricultural workers felt that they were not free to enlist until their present
work period was up. Indeed the workers were paid at the end of the contract
period and any who left before the contract period was up would not be paid.
Single men could lose up to six months wages while married men, employed
for a longer period, could lose up to twelve months pay. Married men were
further discouraged from enlisting by the tradition of tied housing. If a married
farmworker left to enlist, then his family would have to vacate the tied cottage
which would be required for his replacement. Unlike the coalowners, farmers
had no excess of housing stock for the families of serving employees.
Similarly, large numbers were held back by the needs of the autumn harvest.
The recruitment figures for November 1914 and May and November 1915
show an increase in the number of agricultural recruits for the army and
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Territorial force. The Scottish army recruitment numbers from agriculture
increased in November 1914 by 1,065 or 10.6 per cent on the figure for
October but this was low in comparison to the increase of 32,748 or 42.8 per
cent for the United Kingdom as a whole. 228 In the 1841 census over 25 per
cent of the Scottish workforce had been employed in agriculture but by 1911
the figure had fallen to just over 10 per cent and the recruiting figures were a
reflection of that reduction.229 Long term pre-war migration from the Highlands
and the Central Lowland farming belt had stripped the agricultural industry of
excess manpower.
In contrast to the numbers for the New Army, there was a greater increase in
recruitment for the Territorial Force during the three periods for which specific
figures exist: November 1914 and May and November 1915. November 1914
saw the recruitment figures for the Territorial Force in Scotland increase
weekly by as much as 180 per cent over the figure for the last week in
October. Numerically this was an increase from 1,429 for the week ending 28
October to 4,412 for the week ending 11 November, quite a significant
increase when the recruitment figure for the army for the week ending 11
November was 3,214, some 1,198 less than that for the Territorials. This
disparity between recruitment numbers for the army and the Territorial Force
is all the more important when we consider that the Territorial Force was
restricted in the number of recruits it could absorb: there was no provision to
create new battalions other than second-line units of existing battalions and
226 NIATS 1/398.
229 T. M. Devi ne, Exploring the Scottish Past: Themes in the History of Scottish Society. p.
23
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this limited the numbers required. The army, with its increasing number of
Service battalions, was the preferred method of expansion but it would
appear that those from rural backgrounds chose the Territorial Force as the
service of choice. 23° Far from rushing to the defence of the country through
patriotism, agricultural workers were able to see enlistment as nothing more
than a temporary occupation, a change in employers for a limited time only.
They saw enlistment not as joining the army but as agreeing to a specific task
for a specific time: war service only for the duration of the conflict.
In Scotland, with over 94 per cent of recruits coming from the industrial
sector, there appears to have been a low initial response from the agricultural
community. This contrasts sharply with J Winters belief that agriculture
produced a high number of recruits in the early stages of the war.231 In the
first three months of the war, up until October 1914, Scottish agriculture
produced only 3,000 recruits, 2.5 per cent of the Scottish total to that date.
This accounted for only 2.8 per cent of the Scottish agricultural workforce and
supports the argument that recruitment in Scotland was driven, initially at
least, by economic pressures. With no contraction of the agricultural industry
and no reduction in output there was therefore no enforced reduction in
agricultural employment and consequently no mass recruitment movement.
However, when viewed in a wider perspective the contribution from Scottish
agriculture in the initial period of the war compares very favourably with that
from other regions of the United Kingdom. In a speech to the House of Lords
230 This is further examined in Chapter 7, Territorial Recruitment.
231 J• M. Winter 'Britain's Lost Generation" of the First World War' in Population Studies. Vol
xxxi. 1977. p. 453.
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on Friday 8 January 1915, Viscount Middleton listed the ratio of recruits
against the population for the various agricultural regions of the United
Kingdom, for the first three months of the war:
In the North of Scotland the number of recruits was 93 per 10,000 of
the population; in the West of England, 88 per 10,000, in the East of
England, 80 per 10,000, and in the South and West of Ireland, 32 per
10,000 of the population.232
With Scotland's low agricultural recruitment level it is a further surprise when
Scotland once again led the field, although only with a difference of 5.38 per
cent. By April 1915 out of a male workforce in July 1914 of 119,000
permanently engaged in agriculture in Scotland, approximately 18,683 had
joined the various branches of the armed forces. This accounted for 15.7 per
cent of the male agricultural workforce. This is in comparison to a figure of
20.1 per cent enlistment from Scottish industry over the same period. 233 The
initially slow reaction from the agricultural workers, tied as they were to their
employers, declined after the November Feeing (hiring) Fairs. The result was
similar after the fairs in May 1915 when those contracted for a twelve month
period became available. 2 The enlistment figure for male agricultural
workers in England and Wales stood the same at 15.7 per cent, while the
232 Parliamentary Debates - Official Reports 1066— 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914-
15 (Nlov 11— May 19) 351-2.
233 Report on the State of Employment...April 1915. Part iiAgriculture. p 12-14.
234 This is further examined in Chapter 7, Territorial Recruitment.
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figure for industrial enlistment was only 17 per cent.235
By April 1915 the expansion of war industry in the lowlands and central belt
meant that there was competition for labour and consequently agricultural
labour was scarcer there than in the rural highlands. Scothsh farmers were
coping well at this time with no great crisis or labour shortage, other than
horsemen. But the main fear was that there would be a shortage of casual
Irish labour for the summer harvests. The shortfall in male agricultural labour
was only 9,000 as those from other affected industries, such as mining and
fishing, were finding temporary employment plentiful on the land. The
situation had not altered greatly by July 1915 when the number of agricultural
workers enlisted in the armed services stood at 19,278 or 16.2 per cent, an
increase over three months of 595 men. 236 The percentage of agricultural
workers enlisted in England and Wales had risen to 16.6 per cent over the
same period. Enlistment from industry in Scotland was considerably higher,
with an increase from 20.1 per cent in April 1915 to 24.2 per cent in July of
the same year, 4.1 per cent above the British average. 237 By October 1915,
however, there had been a significant increase in the number of agricultural
workers enlisting. 4,165 men had enlisted since the previous July, giving a
total of 23,443. This was an increase of 17.77 per cent over the three-month
period, giving an overall figure for the industry of 19.7 per cent of the male
workforce, corresponding favourably with the figure of 19 per cent for England
235 Report on the State of Employment ...Aprll 1915. Part II Agriculture. p 12-14.
236 Report on the State of Employment...July 1915. p 1-2.237 Report on the State of Employment.. .July 1915. p 4.
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and Wales. 238 This increase was once again the result of the half yearly
employment cycle for single men.239
While the enlistment percentage for industry was continually greater than that
for agriculture it should be noted that the proportion of men of military age
was greater in industry and therefore the percentage of those of military age
who enlisted was greater in agriculture than industry. By January 1916, 21.9
per cent of male agricultural workers in Scotland had enlisted, 26,061 men.
This accounted for 5.96 per cent of the Scottish total for the voluntary period
of 437,035.240 This contribution is, however, disproportionate when account is
taken of the relative age group of agricultural workers. As Dr Dewey has
already pointed out, a greater proportion of agricultural workers were out-with
military age. To achieve an enlistment figure of over 20 per cent meant that a
disproportionately high percentage of young men of military age had enlisted.
In this case the true sacrifice of the young is not reflected in the cold figures.
COMMERCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL WORKERS
In an effort to stimu'ate recruitment from the commercial or middle classes
Lord Curzon toured Scotland in early September 1914. While he was
addressing a meeting in St Andrews Hall, Glasgow, on 10 September,
accompanied by Mr Mckinnon-Wood, Secretary of State for Scotland, the
crowd of 5,000 demonstrated against the Lord Provost, Sir Daniel Stevenson,
who was chairing the meeting. The demonstration was against the lack of
238 Report on the State of Employment...October 1915. p 1-2.
239 Chapter 5. Chapter 9.
240 Report on the State of Employment...Januaiy 1916. p2.
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action being taken by the Lord Provost in support of the war, and in particular
the lack of action taken against the professional sector which was seen to be
holding back.241 That evening Lord Curzon addressed an audience in
Aberdeen and lambasted the low numbers coming forward in that city. The
following day on Friday 11 September there was to be a speech in Dundee by
Lord Curzon in support of recruitment. This was during the peak month of
Scottish voluntary recruitment but there was trepidation among the civic
dignitaries as to the context of Lord Curzon's speech. The fear in Dundee was
that he would feel compelled to criticise the city over the low recruitment
numbers for the New Armies and the poor response to the raising of a
Dundee 'pals' battalion.242 Excuses were put forward in the local press on the
afternoon prior to Lord Curzon's appearance and were direct in apportioning
blame regarding low local enlistment: 'the blame must lie with the young
professional element. This is the class which has not come up to the
expectation, and this is the class which tonight's meeting must touch. The
labouring and artisan community have done their share'.243
This apathy shown by the commercial classes, of which Dundee is only an
example and not an exception, was further highlighted in the city when, in
November, Major Cappon, recruiting officer for Dundee and district, was
forced to cancel, for the second week running, a recruitment meeting aimed
at the commercial classes in the city. 'Last night the amount of interest that is
taken by the shop-keeping classes in the greatest crisis through which the
241 Dundee Advertiser, 11 September 1914.
242 Discussed further in chapter 6.
243 Dundee Advertiser, 11 September 1914.
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country has ever passed was reflected in the fact that two men formed the
audienc&. 2 In Glasgow it was announced on 1 September that 'Clerks -
solicitors and stockbrokers clerks especially - have not shown the same
readiness to fight their country's bathes at this time of stress as others'.245
On Wednesday 30 December 1914 the figures for Scoffish bank clerks who
had enlisted were published: a total of 1,058. These were distributed amongst
the various banks as follows...Bank of Scotland 157, Union Bank 144,
National Bank 143, Commercial Bank 140, British Linen Bank 134, Royal
Bank of Scotland 130, North of Scotland and Town and County 125, and the
Clydesdale Bank 85. With approximately 5,942 bank clerks in Scotland this
amounted to some 17.8 per cent of the total figure. While not as high as that
for miners, the percentage of bank clerks enlisting compared favourably with
that of agricultural workers. Both groups of workers were under no financial
pressure to enlist with little or no contraction within their field of employment.
In truth the reluctance of bank employees to enlist in large numbers, with
employers giving enlistment bounties, subsidised wage levels for those who
enlisted, and future job security with their positions held open, only helps to
reinforce the point that mass recruitment was driven by direct economic
necessity. Even all the incentives given were not enough to shift the
entrenched middle classes. The recruitment figure for Scottish bank clerks
was low in comparison to other United Kingdom regions: in London, for
244 Dundee Advertiser, 26 November 1914.
245 Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
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example, between 20 and 25 per cent of bank clerks had enlisted by February
1915 246
By April 1915, 12.8 per cent of Scottish Local Authority male clerical staff had
enlisted, a figure of 1,248. This was a low percentage when compared with
the other local authority districts in the United Kingdom, with only Ireland
producing a lower figure of 8.5 per cent. As is shown by figure 3:13, London
and the South Eastern districts led the way with 20.8 per cent and 19.9 per
cent respectively.247
FIG 3:13 Local Authority recruitment figures.246
District	 Number employed % Enlisted % Enlisted	 % Enlisted
July 1914	 April 1915	 July 1915	 October 1915
London
South Eastern
South Western
West Midlands
East Midlands
Yorkshire
North Western
Northern
Wales
Scotland
Ireland
United Kingdom
5200
8600
4400
5400
2900
6600
11800
2400
3100
10600
1500
62500
20.8%
19.9%
14.3%
15.8%
12.2%
13.9%
14.7%
12.1%
12.8%
13.9%
8.5%
16.4%
28.4%
27.3%
20.5%
21.2%
21.5%
22.6%
19.0%
27.3%
18.6%
19.4%
11.7%
21.8%
29.9%
31.5%
22.2%
25.9%
24.8%
22%
22.5%
26.7%
20.4%
19.3%
17.2%
24.1%
The Scottish figure had increased by July 1915 to 19.4 per cent or 2,056 men,
still below the United Kingdom figure of 21.8 per cent, but not significantly so.
By October 1915 the number stood at 19.3 per cent or 2,045 recruits, virtually
unchanged from the previous July. With an enlistment rate for the first nine
246 fleport on the State of Employment.. February 1915. Cd 7850.
247 Report on the State of Employment.. .April 1915. p 2.
24S Report on the State of Employment...August 1914- October 1915.
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months of the war of only 12.8 per cent, a comparison with the industrial
figure of 24.2 per cent for the same period shows that at least one section of
Scotland's commercial and professional classes was in no hurry to enlist,
more so when compared with other groups of Scottish Local Authority
employees. As in the case of agricultural workers, the clerical employees had
no financial or economic reason to enlist; they were in secure employment.
Within other Scottish Local Authority departments there were varying degrees
of enlistment rates. By April 1915 the Glasgow Tramways Department had
provided 1,958 recruits, 33.1 per cent of its workforce; Aberdeen Tramways
had provided 99 recruits, 35 per cent of the workforce; Edinburgh Electricity
Department had provided 69 men, 30 per cent of the employees; and Dundee
Electricity Department had contributed 62 men, 28.4 per cent of the male
employees. However, on the opposite side of the coin Arbroath Burgh
Engineers Department lost 21 per cent of its workforce, but only 3 per cent
enlisted, the others finding more lucrative employment, while it was also
noted that Glasgow Corporation Art Gallery made no contribution to Scottish
recruitment. 249 By July 1915 some 2,348 Glasgow Tramways staff had
enlisted, with the number rising to 2,480 or 42 per cent by October of the
same year. Edinburgh Tramways had produced 392 recruits by October
1915, 33.6 per cent of its male workforce. In the same period, August 1914 to
October 1915 some 108 male teachers employed by Edinburgh Education
Authority, 30 per cent, had enlisted.250
249 Report on the State of Employment.. Apr11 1915. Part iii. p 2-4.
250 Report on the State of Employment. ..August 1914- October 1915.
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The idea that clerical workers were quick to enlist, served longer, and as a
consequence were at greater risk than the working class or industrial recruit
does not appear to hold true in Scotland. The claim by J. Winter, that 'The
highest enlistment rates among employees in the early months of the conflict
were registered by men in commercial and clerical occupations', 251
 does not
apply to Scotland. The figure used by Winter includes 35 per cent of those
employed as stock exchange clerks which inflates the figure and gives a bias
towards English totals. The notion that, 'men engaged in commercial or
distributive trades were in uniform and at risk for longer periods and in
relatively larger numbers than were industrial workers, transport workers or
agricultural workers', 252 similarly does not apply to Scotland. As we have
seen, Scotland's heavy industry bore the initial burden of national recruitment.
In Scotland it appears that those in 'economically safe' employment were
reluctant to come forward and it was to them that the policy of coercion was
directed in 1915. There was a policy of denigrating certain jobs as being fit
only for women, with the inference that young men in those positions were
shirking their duties by hiding behind the skirts of women. Chief among those
to be attacked in this manner were shop assistants and those in the
commercial sector, positions which could easily be filled by women with little
training. In another attempt to stimulate recruitment from the commercial
sector, it was argued that it was a woman's duty to do what she could to help
recruiting and she could do this by collecting her own supplies from the
251 J.M. Winter, 'Britain's Lost Generation of the First World War', in Population Studies, Vol.
xxxi, 1977, p. 454.
252 J.M. Winter, 'Britain's Lost Generation' p. 454.
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grocers thereby freeing the shop delivery staff for military service. 253 At a
meeting of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association on 4 May 1915 the Earl
of Errol, commanding the Second Line of the Lowland Brigade, announced
that 'there were many young men in shops such as drapers, handing out bits
of ribbon - work which was really for women. Those men would be better
employed serving their country.'2
The alternative, that of replacing skilled men, would require a longer training
period and, more importantly, could provoke industrial unrest at a time when
maximum output was required. Indeed when women were gradually
introduced to sectors of Scottish industry, they were fiercely resisted as they
meant dilution of traditional skills and were seen by many as a direct attack
on the trade union movement itself. There seems to be no basis, in Scotland
at least, for the claim by J. Winter that 'No sombre thoughts of trenches and
gas masks troubled the clerks and greengrocers, teachers and farmers,
manufacturers and publicans who joined up by the thousand in the first
months of the war'.255
REGIONAL VARIATIONS
Within Scotland there were regional variations in recruitment, variations
between east and west, industrial regions and agricultural counties. The
returns from those counties which had a high proportion of agricultural
workers reflected the low recruitment from agriculture. The county of
253 The Evening Citizen, 31 August 1914.
254 The Scotsman, 5 May 1915,
255 j Winter, 'Army and Society'. p. 198.
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Aberdeen, with a male population of 147,357 of which 21,394 or 14.51 per
cent were employed in agriculture, produced in August 1914 only 885 recruits
or 3.2 per cent of the Scottish total of 27,398 for that month. 256 This amounted
to 0.6 per cent of the 1911 male population of the county. By the end of
September the recruitment figure had increased to 1,440 but had fallen to
only 2 per cent of the Scottish total to that date. The percentage of the male
population of the county was still low, standing at 0.97 per cent. Forfar, with a
male population of 54,590, employed 7,995 or 14.64 per cent in agriculture.
August 1914 produced 56 recruits for the regular army, 0.2 per cent of the
Scottish monthly total and only 0.1 per cent of the male population of the
county. 257 While the figures had increased by the end of September they were
still among the lowest in the country: 196 recruits representing 0.27 per cent
of the Scottish total and only 0.35 per cent of the males in the county.
Inverness, with a male population of 42,440 and an agricultural workforce of
8,936 or 21.05 per cent, produced, in August, only 138 recruits. While this
was considerably better than Forfar, it was only 0.5 per cent of the Scottish
total and only 0.32 of the male population. By the end of September 0.66 per
cent of the local male population had enlisted, 282 men, accounting for 0.39
per cent of the Scottish total. By the end of September 1914 the three main
agricultural regions in Scotland had produced less than 1 per cent of their
male population as recruits. With a combined male population of 244,387,
which was 10.58 per cent of the national total, they had contributed only
256 Census 1911. NATS 1/398.
251 Census 1911. NATS 1/398.
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1,918 men to the new armies, 0.78 per cent of their male population, or 2.7
per cent of the Scothsh recruitment total for the first two months of the war.258
In sharp contrast to the low recruitment rate of the agricultural regions those
areas which were predominantly industrial provided a higher percentage of
recruits and contributed a higher percentage of their male population. Michael
Carver informs us that 'Recruiting varied considerably across the country
[Britain] , the bulk coming from the industrial north. Lancashire, Yorkshire and
Scotland produced over a third of the 250 battalions in the first three New
Armies'.259 The industrial counties of Lanark and Ayr produced, in the initial
months, over 50 per cent of Scotland's recruits for the New Armies. The two
counties, with a combined male population of 851,565 provided, in August,
14,375 recruits, 1.6 per cent of their male population and 52.46 per cent of
the Scottish monthly recruiting total. By 30 September the number of recruits
had risen to 39,977 or 4.69 per cent of their male population accounting for
56.54 per cent of the Scottish total to that date. 26° This is shown in figure
3:14. Figures 3:14 and 3:15 are intended primarily as a visual indication
showing that the three most agricultural counties in Scotland (Aberdeen,
Forfar, Inverness) provided only 2 7 per cent of the recruits in the September
1914 'surge' while the two most industrial counties (Lanark, Ayr) provided
56.5 per cent.
258 Census 1911. NATS 1/398.
259 M. Carver, Britain's Army in the 20th Century. p. 40.
260 Census 1911. NATS 1/398.
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If we compare the total male population of Scotland with the recruitment
figures for the same two periods, August and September 1914, we can clearly
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see that recruitment figures for the agricultural regions were well below
average while the figures for industrial Scotland were well above average
(figure 3:15). By 31 August Scotland had contributed 1.18 per cent of her
male population to the new armies. The three agricultural counties in question
had contributed only 0.04 per cent of their combined male population, while
the industrial counties produced 1.6 per cent of their male population.
September presented a similar picture. With Scotland having contributed 3.06
per cent of her male population, the contribution from Aberdeen, Forfar and
Inverness had increased to 0.78 per cent of their male population, and Lanark
and Ayr contributed 4.69 per cent of their male population. The industrial
counties of Lanark and Ayr, with over 36 per cent of Scotland's male
population, were contributing a disproportionally high number of recruits, over
56 per cent, due mainly to the contraction of industry and the economic needs
of its workforce.
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FIG 3:16 August 1914 to April 1915.261
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Figure 3:16 shows the number of recruits per Scottish county enlisted for the
armed forces by 30 April 1915. It also shows the percentage of the male
population of those counties enlisted in the period 4 August 1914 to 30 April
1915. This gives a combined figure for the New Armies and the Territorial
Force. Of the twelve counties which provided more than the national
percentage of 11.54 per cent of the male population, only two, Lanark and
261 Census 1911. PRO 1/398.	 153
Midlothian, could be termed industrial. The other ten were agricultural
counties, ranging from Peebles and Selkirk in the borders to Caithness in the
north. The main industrial counties, Lanark, with 90,874 recruits or 12.59 per
cent of the male population, and Midlothian, with 38,359 or 16.36 per cent of
the male population, provided 48.56 per cent of Scottish recruits in that
period, a total of 129,413 men. Indeed, 77.4 per cent of the Scottish total was
raised by only eight counties; Aberdeen, Ayr, Fife, Forfar, Lanark, Midlothian,
Perth, and Renfrew. What was significant was the difference between the
number from each county in all arms of the services and the number raised
for the army. As we shall see in later chapters, while the industrial counties
provided the majority of the recruits for the New Armies the agricultural
counties provided a correspondingly high figure for the Territorial Force.
These figures can be broken down by region. Highland Counties - (Argyll,
Caithness, Inverness, Perth, Orkney, Ross & Cromarty, Shetland, Sutherland)
had male population of 224,850 and a recruitment figure of 29,157 (13 per
cent of the male population). Northeast - (Aberdeen, Banif, Elgin, Kincardine,
Nairn) had a male population of 221,695 and a recruitment figure of 22,181
(10 per cent of the male population). West Lowlands - (Ayr, Bute, Dumbarton,
Lanark, Renfrew) had a male population of 1,080,953 with 120,774 recruits
(11 per cent of the male population). East Lowlands - (Forfar (Angus),
Clackmannan, Haddington, Fife, Kinross, Edinburgh, Stirling, Linlithgow) with
a male population of 658,997 provided 82,070 recruits (12.5 per cent of the
male population). Southern Counties - (Berwick, Dumfries, Kirkcudbright,
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Peebles, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Wigtown) with a male POlultion of 122,344
provided 12,303 recruits (10 per cent of the male population).262
Conclusion
In this chapter we have looked at individual sectors containing Scotland's
manpower resources, but of equal interest is how they relate to each other in
terms of recruitment. Perhaps the most logical approach is to view
contributions over time. By October 1914 Scotland had provided 118,141
recruits with 90.8 per cent, 107,276, coming from industry. In the same period
Scottish agriculture provided 3,000 recruits, 2.5 per cent of the total, while the
commercial sector provided 7865 recruits, 6.65 per cent. The total for Scottish
recruitment had increased to 210,409 recruits by April 1915, an increase of 78
per cent from the previous October. Although industry still provided the
highest contribution, 163,352 recruits or 77.6 per cent of the total, this was
only a 52 per cent increase from October, and proportionally the industrial
contribution was in decline. The contribution from agriculture had increased
by over 450 per cent, to 16,799 recruits or 8 per cent of the Scottish total,
while the number of recruits from the commercial sector had increased to
14.3 per cent of the total, a rise of 284 per cent, or 30,258 recruits.263
The total for Scottish recruitment had risen to over a quarter of a million men
by July 1915. Twelve months of war had produced 251,534 recruits in
Scotland. However, the proportion of industrial recruitment had fallen to 70
262 Census 1911. PRO 1/398.
263 Report on the State of Employment.. .various Dates. NATS 1/398. 1/399.
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per cent, 176,970 men. Agriculture, while providing 17,334 recruits, a
numerical increase over April, also suffered a reduction in proportional
representation; down to 6.9 per cent. The largest change was in the
commercial sector which saw its contribution increase to 57,250 recruits, 22.7
per cent of the total.2
FIG 3:17 Recruitment comparison.265
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Figure 3:17 clearly shows the pattern of recruitment for the three sections of
Scottish manpower. It shows that recruitment from industry increased sharply
until April 1915 and thereafter maintained a steady but much reduced level of
increase. Agriculture on the other hand began with a relatively low increase
and then levelled off after April 1915. Both industry and agriculture provided
264 Report on the State of Employment. ..Various Dates. NATS 1/399.
265 NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
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the bulk of their recruits in the first nine months of the war but to vastly
different degrees. Commerce maintained a low steady rise throughout,
without peaks or troughs, a steady sustained level of recruitment with the
same level of rise after twelve months of war as at the start.
This should be seen as further evidence of the part played by economics in
stimulating recruitment. The sector of the Scottish workforce which suffered
the greatest economic hardship, the industrial sector, was the sector which
provided the greatest initial response. That response tapered off once
industry began to recover and the threat of economic hardship within industry
began to diminish. Agriculture, with no economic push, provided a low
recruitment response. Commerce provided a low initial response, despite
popular belief to the contrary, but maintained a steady, if uninspiring, rise
fuelled by pressure and in some cases financial inducement.
The thousands of workers who enlisted in the early period in an effort to avoid
economic hardship paid a heavy and unseen price in support of their families.
The repeated calls by the Secretary of State for War, Kitchener, for 100,000
men, for the duration only, with the promise of a long training period, was a
godsend to those facing financial hardship. The initial willingness of
employers to see their men enlist and the promise that jobs would, in some
cases, be held open, encouraged others in menial, dirty, and low-paid
employment to take the opportunity of a break. Patriotic ideals had little pull
on the middle or working classes and even less on those struggling to survive
on the fringes of society.
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Each sector of Scottish society reacted in a different manner to the manpower
needs of Britain. We have seen that Scotland's industrial working classes
provided the majority of the initial recruits, and, although recruitment levels
from industry reduced over time, contributions throughout the voluntary period
continued to be high. Scotland's agricultural workforce, in contrast, provided a
more measured response to the crisis, enlisting only when current
employment contracts ended. 'Patriotism' or 'war fever' was not enough to
compensate for the loss of accrued income or to overcome the threat of
hardship for families. Industrial workers enlisted to relieve hardship, while
agricultural workers rejected enlistment for the same reasons. Scotland's
commercial, or middle, classes were slow in coming forward to enlist, and
were the group which needed prompting the most. They provided a steady, if
low, level of recruitment as economic stability had to be overcome by outside
pressure and appeals to individual conscience. This chapter has shown the
validity of Ferguson's economic factors, at least as applied to Scotland, and
that in Scotland Peter Dewey's economic theories on recruitment do not
apply.
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CHAPTER 4
RECRUITMENT CAMPAIGN
The announcement in August 1914 of the formation of a New Army, or 'K1' as
it became known, brought forth the initial flood of recruits, which in Scotland
at least tended to be those who were readily available. In Dundee, on 5
August, the Nethergate recruiting office was 'throughout the day practically
invaded by men of all classes offering their services.2M While on 8 August it
was reported that 'the rush at the Glasgow recruiting office continued, and the
police had difficulty in getting hundreds of intending soldiers to wait in the
queues till their turn came'.255
These statements have to be looked at in the spirit in which they were written,
to promote recruitment and at the same time raise public morale. While there
may have been large crowds 'outside' the recruiting office in Dundee, only 42
men were tempted to enter the office and enlist in the New Armies in the first
five days of the war. 2 In all fairness to Dundee, the city had provided high
numbers of pre-war recruits for the British army which had, over time, created
within the city a high number of reservists. It was these men who constituted
the 'throng' outside the recruiting office as they awaited news of their call up.
This phenomenon was not confined to Dundee. Large numbers of reservists
reported to recruiting offices nation-wide, creating, in Scotland at least, the
254 Dundee Advertiser, 6 August 1914.
255 Dundee Advertiser, 8 August 1914.
256 NATS 1/398.
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false impression of a patriotic recruitment rush. In sharp contrast to the
numbers of recruits coming forward for the New Armies was the large number
of French, German and Austrian nationals, reservists mostly, trying to register
at their respective embassies for military service.
The call for a Second New Army came at the end of August and a Third New
Army in the second week of September. Both of these New Armies coincided
with the increase in recruitment numbers, and the ready availability of
industrial manpower ensured that many, but not all, of the new service
battalions quickly reached their full complement. In Glasgow and Edinburgh
recruits were still needed in November to complete service battalions created
in September 1914.
From the outset the recruiting offices were inundated with enquires but
enlistment rates did not match enquiry rates. It was a gradual process to
increase enlistment numbers in the initial few days. The recruiting office in
Edinburgh's Cockburn Street opened both day and night in an effort to
encourage recruits. Recruitment in Edinburgh seems to have been very
select, with a number of the Faculty of Advocates in that city offering to enlist
in the opening days of the war, but only for 'clerical duties'. 257 Perhaps this is
an example of the lack of reality felt among some recruits in the initial period:
the false idea that temporary volunteers would be used only in support roles
with the actual fighting being left to the Regular Army.
257 The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
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RECRUITING CAMPAIGN
The recruitment campaign, took many forms. Leaflets, billboards, posters,
films, route marches, bands and rallies were all part of the machinery of
recruitment. On 4 September 1914, Shand's Picture Palace, Forfar, was
showing 'two great military films' and running an extended promotional
campaign for The Two Sergeants and also The Test, billed as 'a thrilling story
of the Boer War' 258
 Other cinemas across Scotland were showing such films
as The Battle of Gettysburg and The Great Naval Mystery. In George Square,
Glasgow, James ljalrymple erected an outdoor cinema with the sole aim of
promoting recruitment in the city. Another use of cinema in the propaganda
campaign was the showing of cinematographic views of Belgium, in particular
Antwerp and its forts, in conjunction with speeches by prominent citizens such
as the Marquis of Graham and P. Collins MP urging support for 'little
Belgium'. Cinema was also used to show films of local battalions training in
an effort to stimulate recruitment: friends and relatives would queue to see
well known faces and, it was hoped, feel a duty to enlist.
By November 1914 recruiting posters were being produced as lantern slides
and being shown in the picture houses during intervals in the main
programme. Within the programe there were patriotic songs, military tableaux
and public appeals by local dignitaries in an attempt to stimulate recruitment.
258 The Forfar Dispatch, 3 September 1914.
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FIG 4:1 Kitchener was depicted on many different posters.
Example of early recruiting poster September/October 1914
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Robert Irvine recalls that it was at this time when he was swept up in the
feeling of war enthusiasm, often mistaken for patriotism.
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When Lord Kitchener's pointing finger was on every hoarding
throughout the country - "Your King and Country Needs You" - I was
one of the innocents who was enmeshed in the web of patriotism at the
First World War. I was only a shop assistant at the time, and on
reflection I think it was more that I wanted to escape from the humdrum
life behind a grocer's counter and see a bit of the country.259
There is no doubt that the psychological effect of Lord Kitchener's personal
appeal as portrayed in Alfred Leete's famous poster, depicting Kitchener's
face and pointing finger, had a direct effect on some recruits. However, the
picture was not published until 5 September, as a front Cover for London
Opinion. The design was then issued in postcard format for sale at is 4d per
hundred, and the poster, as it became known, was not issued until late
September 1914, after the initial numerically high recruiting period was
over.260 Therefore its prime function was to exert pressure on those who
remained after the first rush. Prior to this the recruiting posters had consisted
of the banner headline, 'YOUR KING AND COUNTRY NEED YOU', and told
prospective recruits that 'Full information can be obtained at any Post Office
in the Kingdom or at any Military depot'. 261 The initial posters were dull and
drab and did little to stimulate recruitment, being mostly of an informative
nature rather than attempting to make any social or moral statement.
R. irvine in MacDougall, Voices from War and some Labour Struggles. p . 28.
260 p • Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 122-3.
261 Dundee Advertiser, 8 August 1914.
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FIG 4:2 One of the earliest posters depicting Scottish soldiers - 1914.
LINE UP, BOYS!
ENLIST TO-DAY.
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FIG 4:3 One of the earliest posters depicting a kilted soldier standing in a Belgian village - 1914
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The Parliamentary Recruiting Committee came into being on 27 August 1914
and, as the military recruiting mechanism could not cope, from the start,
through its General Purposes Committee, attempted to co-ordinate a national
recruiting campaign. 262 In Scotland this was directed from joint offices in
Glasgow and Edinburgh, and included the co-ordination of a programme of
political rallies throughout Scotland. A sub-department dealing with
publications was quickly set up on 31 August which as part of its duties
arranged for recruiting posters to be printed locally bearing messages aimed
at specific districts and specific groups. The poster campaign initiated by the
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee was given a distinctly personalised
flavour by the use of local printers producing posters with local place names
and connotations. Thus a poster which in one part of the country might say
'MEN OF EDINBURGH ENLIST NOW' would be changed to 'MEN OF
AYRSH1RE' or whatever name fitted at the time.
Figures 4:2 and 4:3 depict the only two posters issued on a grand scale by
the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee which depicted overtly Scottish
scenes, but there was no call to rally round Scotland - only a bland statement
for 'King and Country' or a call to support the 'British Empire'. However, both
of these posters were available in other parts of Britain with the figures clad
differently. In all other instances the figures were presented in the same
format but wearing normal khaki issue uniforms. It was evidently felt that
recruiting in Scotland needed the impetus which could be provided by a play
262 R. Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment in the First World War and the Work of the
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee', in Journal of Modern History. 1976. p. 566.
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on nationa' identity. The committee published nation-wide over two million
posters and some twenty million leaflets by March 1915.263 They co-ordinated
speaking tours for local MPs and other local dignitaries as well as placing
thousands of recruiting advertisements in local and national newspapers.
Recruiting posters with a direct appeal were not limited to the famous
Kitchener poster. There were others: 'Your comrades at the front are looking
out for you. Do not disappoint them' and 'Why leave all the honour to others?
Do your part and claim your share.' 2 Recruiting posters and pamphlets were
to be found everywhere - taxis, buses, billboards, pillar boxes, every spare
piece of brickwork or hoarding.
Another innovation was recruiting vans touring the outlying districts of rural
Scotland in an attempt to enlist those men who had been unable to walk the
long distance to regional recruiting offices. For the first time in the history of
the Glasgow Tramways Department, James Dairymple, General Manager,
allowed its tramcars to carry advertisements. On the passenger-carrying cars
these took the shape of posters or banners, exhorting the young men of
G'asgow to join the Highland Light Infantry and promoting the recruiting office
set up by Dairymple at the tramways offices within 46 Bath Street. On the
maintenance tramcars however, where there was no need to leave the
windows uncovered, huge murals were painted on the sides depicting
patriotic or military scenes to promote the war effort. As a more subtle
technique of recruitment Dalrymple sent illuminated tramcars on tours of the
263 R. Douglas, 'Voluntary Enlistment'. p. 568.
264 Evening Citizen, 12 November, 1915.
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streets of Glasgow, with bands concealed inside in an effort to stir the
suburbs into action. This may have provided entertainment for the population
of Glasgow but must have been torture for those bandsmen trapped in the
rising heat of a tramcar, wrapped in tarpaulin and festooned with hundreds of
lights, each adding to the heat and discomfort. As a means of raising recruits
there is no record of how effective this was, but it was stopped after a short
period. As well as advertisements for the 15th battalion Highland Light
Infantry the tramcars also carried advertisements for the Cameron
H ig hI anders.
FIG 4:4 Bayonet charge depicted on the side of tramways maintenance cars.
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Glasgow, at this time, was not alone in using its tramcars to promote
recruitment. Not to be outdone, Edinburgh took this concept one stage further
by converting one of its tramcars into a mobile recruiting station, complete
with recruiting sergeant, doctor, and justice of the peace.
A new method of attracting recruits was put into operation yesterday
through the Edinburgh and District Tramway Company. A car,
decorated by Sir Robert Maule with the flags of the 'Allies' - Great
Britain, France, Russia, Belgium and Japan - and pictures of the King
and Queen, was run over different routes of the system. In the front of
the car were the words conspicuously placed 'To Berlin via France',
and at the back 'Take your seats for Berlin'. A piper - one of the
company's employees - played music on the top of the car, and inside
or on the footboard was the recruiting sergeant who was ready to
attend to all who were willing to give their services. A justice of the
peace was also in attendance.265
This tramcar travelled the various routes of the city and suburbs, stopping at
all key points to drum up trade, the objects here being to catch the
spontaneous recruits before they had time to reconsider, and to reduce the
period between a volunteer announcing his willingness to enlist and his
eventual, if ever, arrival at a recruitment office.
265 The Scotsman, 1 October 1914.
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Route marches by local units or those units in training were used as a means
of raising public awareness and advertised well in advance to enable the
population to come out and see the local battalion. Such marches could last
for several days, even weeks, with the men staying in the local drill halls and
fed by the communities that they were visiting. Local children were employed
to walk the streets ahead of the troops, carrying placards announcing the
number of recruits required for the various units engaged in the route march.
Regimental musicians were used at mass public gatherings to drum up trade
for the recruiters. Football matches were prime targets. At some there were
such histrionic scenes as the burning of a 'fiery cross' in a blatant attempt to
arouse Celtic nationalism. Route marches and recruiting meetings were
designed to be entertainment events, to attract an audience and hold its
attention long enough to get the main message across.
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FIG 4:5 Details of a route march in July 191 5268
3rd 5th BLACK WATCH.
ProBout Headquarters at Forfar.
Recruiting March
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Poetry, in its popular form, was used as jingoistic symbolism to promote or
stimulate recruitment and was much loved by the popular press. Poems in the
popular press were intended to create or shape mass public opinion, to
embarrass those who were hanging back and to work on the psyche of the
undecided.
266 Forfar Herald, 9 July 1915.
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SCOTS WHA HAE'
The Shirkers Version
We're Scots wha ne'er for Britain bled,
Scots wham French has never led,
An' care mair for oor cosy bed,
Than ony victory.
This is no the day nor hour;
Wait till winters storms are owre,
We'll aiblins then smash Wilhelm's power,
And show our bravery.
It's graund to read o' foemen brave,
An' glorious fechtin' by the lave,
But lists o' wounded mak' us grave,
An sweer to cross the sea.
We're unco prood o' King and law
But nothing moves us like fitba',
Sae ither men the sword may draw,
And keep us safe and free.
Lay the Prussian Junkers low,
An' we'll see'd a' in a picter show,
Hoo oor brave billies struck their blow,
An' dared to do or die.
Sae let puir Belgium thole her pains,
An' mourn for murdered wives and weans,
We dinna care to risk oor banes,
Or fecht to set her free.267
Others were aimed at the middle, or commercial, classes which were seen to
be slow in coming forward for military service.
Your King and Country Need You
Fall In, Scotsmen.
Buck up, business men, rally to the call.
Merchants, bankers, tea-room swankers, lawyers' clerks, and all.
You must fall in, or fall under.
Do it now, or you will blunder.
Plug a notice on the door,
Will be back when war is o'er.
And join Kitchener's brave little army.
"Scotland for ever!" it's a dandy battle cry.
"Scotland for ever," our colonial sons reply.
Our old flag and freedom,
The tyrant ne'er will sever.
We'll fight to the finish,
boys, Scotland for ever.2
261 Dundee Advertiser, 26 November 1914.
260 Evening Citizen, 7 September 1914.
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The majority of poems printed in the newspapers were aimed directly at those
who had held back from enlisting, contained no finesse, and were designed to
promote embarrassment and a personal sense of shame in an attempt to
coerce recruitment. As well as poems there were other literary attempts at
encouraging recruitment.
FIG 4:6 As early as 3 September 1914 these vignettes were use to stimulate
recruitment.269
•	 A
cn4ttIrxo ó:
THE RINc-
(Socuo—!orfar Oroee)-
JAIIBS "Well, Andy, It seems the pct 'of
honour f'Op to .a all to-dsy."
AnDREW: "is.; *n4 my 1rI say tha&Z
danger of IsgNos U I delft' any
J.ME5 "&h you may be sure of uth
id wlsd wben !Mary psks. 3eeldes,
even Alec is at the front—and he La a
socialist I"
ANrntEw: "Aje, U ever a fight wee just
nd right, Britain's Is to-d&y 1"
J&MEs: That pIflt being elear. hs.I1 we
follow David to the ArtIUer, William to the
D.v&ry, CharUe to the Gordon,, or Robert to
the Black Watch I"
Awuw: "I have not decided; bat the
Recruiting Sergeant will advis, us regarding
-the Regiment which our qualifications suit
best."
J&iixs (Joined by chorus of fifty more):" All
right! We will meet after tea, and call on
COL.-SEEor. Ii. OSLER,
(Black Watch),
REORUTING SERGEANT,
DRILL HALL,
FORFAR.
GOD SAVE THE KING
269 Forfar Dispatch, 3 September 1914.
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Another facet of the orchestrated recruitment campaign was the publishing in
the local press of letters purporting to be from those at the front to relatives
and calling for those single men left at home to enlist. In a letter published in
The Scotsman and headlined 'Leith Soldier's Appeal For Recruits', Private W.
Keenan, 2nd Royal Scots, managed to fulfil two roles with the one letter. In
the first part he attacked those still to come forward, 'The longer they hang
back the longer it will last, but if they had one or two of those shells to burst
over their homes which burst over us in dozens every day it would bring them
to their senses'.27°
Not only are they accused of hanging back but they are told that they are
responsible for prolonging the war. The burden of guilt is being passed to
them in an appeal to their conscience. In the second part of the letter Private
Keenan changed target. He attacked those who were taking industrial action
to obtain war bonuses, wage increases, a change in work practices, etc.
'Instead of going on strike and trying to bring the country down, as they are
doing, for these men who are making these strikes are only pure Germans
and nothing else, they should be out in the trenches'.271
The implication here was that all who were on strike were traitors (Germans)
and only by enlisting would these men be of any service to their country:
supporting it instead of bringing it down. Private Keenan seems to have used
his letter home to pursue a political agenda rather than converse with his
270 The Scotsman, 6 April 1915.
271 The Scotsman, 6 April 1915.
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family. The letter ends with a stirring call 'they cannot send enough men out to
the trenches. All are needed'. This type of letter was churned out for public
consumption in an attempt at moral pressure and, in the case of the strikers,
social control.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
There was from the outset confusion in the clamour to attract recruits. Terms
and conditions were often contradictory, causing confusion among those
intending to enlist, On 5 August there appeared in The Scotsman an
advertisement for motor cyclists to enlist for the sum of 35/- per week, with an
enlistment bonus of £10, service to be for one year or the duration, and a
discharge bounty of £5.272 A similar appeal appeared in the Dundee
Advertiser on 6 August with the added news that 'The Dundee Police were
yesterday delivering notices to likely recruits'. 273
 However, the efforts of the
Dundee police were wasted when it was announced that despite the
inundation of motor cyclists at the main recruiting offices, Scotland was not a
recruiting centre for that branch of the service and that all offers would be
declined. 274
 Similarly, on 6 August the terms for new recruits 'desirous of
serving their country in the present crisis' were no different than before the
war: seven years with the colours and five in the reserve. Prospective recruits
were directed to the three Scottish recruiting offices at 29 Nethergate,
272 The Scotsman, 5 August 1914.
273 Dundee Advertiser, 6 August 1914.
274 The Scotsman, 6 August 1914.
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Dundee; 63 Cockburn Street, Edinburgh; 16 Gallowgate, Glasgow, or to any
military barracks. The age limit was surprisingly set at 18-25 years.275
Army orders, issued on 5 August, and containing the regulations for the
enlistment of civilian volunteers for temporary service during the war, were
published in the local press to ensure widespread distribution. The order
stated that men who were serving in the Territorial Force would not be eligible
to enlist in the New Armies for the short-term service period of one year.276
However, on 10 August 1914 there appeared a circular from Lord Kitchener to
the effect that 'Members of the Territorial Force may be enlisted [for the New
Army] provided they fulfilled the prescribed conditions as to age and physical
fitness' 277
On 7 August 1914 there was a call in the Glasgow Herald for 100,000
volunteers 'for a period of three years or until the war is over'. 278
 However
there was confusion over another part of the appeal which said that those
enlisting in the 100,000 were 'to take the place of such part of the army as
may have to go abroad'. 279
 The implication was clear. Enlistment was to be
for home service only: a form of service comparable with the Territorial Force.
This encouraged enlistment but also brought about ill feeling among those
who enlisted in this belief only to find that they were doing so for general
service.
275 The Scotsman, 6 August 1914.
276 The Scotsman, 5 August 1914.
271 The Scotsman, 10 August 1914.
278 Herald, 7 August 1914.
279 Herald, 7 August 1914.
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FIG 4:7 August/September 1914. Poster depicting terms of service.
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Confusion was not limited to the conditions in different recruiting offices. It
was apparent within the individual locations as recruits were being enrolled
within the same office and by the same recruiting personnel for either seven
years service or one year short-term. Recruiting officers in Edinburgh
reported on 8 August that 'Many of the applicants are being enlisted for the
ordinary period of seven years with the colours and five with the reserve, but
the majority are being taken on for one year or the duration of the war'.28°
The Army Council announced, on 15 August 1914, that the term of service
was three years and that 'Should the war last over three years, the man's
continuance of service will be optional'. 281
 In an effort to allay public fears of
deception, clarification was rapidly published in the national press on 16
August spelling out clearly the terms of military service. Recruits for
Kitchener's New Armies would be returned home as soon as possible if the
war lasted for less than three years. However, the statement went on to
compound this confusion by announcing that at the end of three years
continuation of service 'will be optional'. 282
 This set the limit for service at
three years or less. The following day, 17 August, a statement was issued
refuting the various claims which had appeared in the press over the previous
few days that New Army recruitment was for home defence only283
 and
reiterating that 'It has been freely stated in the press during the last few days
280 The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
281 Glasgow Herald, 15 August 1914.
282 Daily Record, 16 August 1914.
28 Daily Record, 17 August 1914.
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that Lord Kitchener's new army of 100,000 men is to be trained as a regular
army for home defence. This is totally incorrect.2M
There was further change on 20 August when it was announced that 'General
Service (is) for a period of three years or until the war is over'. 285 On 26
August there was an appeal for recruits by Lochiel, for the Cameron
Highlanders, which once again put the length of service at 'the duration of the
war, with a maximum engagement of three years'. 286 On the same date, in a
further attempt at clearing up the confusion over recruitment terms, Captain J.
C. Scott, Assistant-Inspector of Recruiting, Scottish Command, announced
that 'recruits are only required to serve for three years, or the duration of the
war, or less if the war terminates earlier'. 287 This coincided with the publication
of a quotation from Lord Kitchener, which said that 'after three years of war
there will be others fresh and ready to take over'. 288 However this served only
to fuel the atmosphere of confusion since it implied that those enlisting would
be replaced at the end of a three year period. This changed again on 28
August when all reference to a numerical time span was removed and service
was 'for the period of the war only. Any men enlisting will be discharged with
all convenient speed as soon as the war is over'. 289 Such confusion did little to
stimulate recruitment. Those who were enlisting were keen to know what they
were signing up for.
284 Glasgow Herald, 17 August 1914.
285 Evening Times, 20 August 1914.
286 Glasgow Herald, 26 August 1914.
281 Dundee Advertiser, 26 August 1914.
285 Dundee Advertiser, 26 August 1914.
289 Evening Times, 28 August 1914.
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FIG 4:8 August/September 1914. Locally printed poster, in this case Kirriemuir,
designed to clear up some of the confusion over conditions and length of service. 290
.	 I
AlT ONE IYRO IS OYII (SAIl
NOT OVER L!J CAN EJLIT.
CaN aLL ZOLDIER UP T i5.
Men will naturally ask:
1. '• For how long shall I have to serve?"
Answ(r: Till the end of the War and no longer.
The men of the Second Army will be ftrst
to be discharged when Peace comes.
2. "What will happen to my Wife and Children?"
Inswer: Your wife will get is id a day separation
allowance for herself and 2d for each child.If that is not anough to keep the home
together, she can look wilth perfect con-fidence to the Village or the Town, theCounty, and the Nation to do what Ia
needfuL
3. "What pay shall I get for myself?"
1nsrr: You will get, to begin with, is 3d a day
and all found r'd well found.
4. "What will happen t
	 if I am maimed by thebee of a limb?
Answer: You will receive a pension! as every
regular soldier does in mmilar circum-
stances.
A trained soldier is what Britain wants, and you
will be well traine(I before you are sent abroad.
Apply at the nearest Recruiting Office or any
Post Office,
P,4.td by J. Noai,,	 P. - UC ixriu.fr.
290 Air1ie Muniments, SRO GD 16/52/60.
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Similar uncertainty was apparent over the physical standards required for
enlistment. The decrease in recruitment experienced in the second half of
September 1914 was partly attributable to the increase in height on 11
September from 5' 3" to 5'6" and in chest measurements from 34" to 35%". It
was reported that, in Glasgow 'there has been a considerable drop in the
average experienced during the past few weeks, and this is no doubt the
effect derived from increasing the standard of height and chest
measurements'.291
However, as enlistment numbers fell a series of recruiting meetings was held
in early October to coincide with the reduction in height and chest
requirements to stimulate recruitment. On 14 October the height was once
again reduced from 5' 6" to 5' 5" in an effort to stimulate a response, with a
return to the normal limit of 5' 4" on 23 October once the backlog, created by
the initial high number of recruits, had dissipated and recruiting depots were
once again in a position to process large numbers of recruits. The height
requirement was further reduced on 5 November to 5' 3".
Age limits were also confusing and varied between regiment and recruiting
office. As early as 8 August 1914 the prevailing age of recruits in Edinburgh
was twenty years. 292 On 29 August the Cameronians were looking for recruits
between the ages of 17 and 35, while at the same time the Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders were restricting recruits to the age span 19 to 30.293
291 Evening Times, 21 September 1914.
292 The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
293 Glasgow Herald, 29 August 1914.
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On 2 September 1914 it was announced in the Evening Citizen that 'the
advancement in the age limit has given a decided fillip to recruiting'. The
article went on to say that 'Up until last night [1 September] between 8,000
and 9,000 men had been secured for the army through the political offices'.2
On 23 October the age limit was set at 19-38 years, with chest measurements
of 34" for those under 22 years of age and half an inch greater for those
above that age. On 11 August it was reported that the percentages of those
unfit who were being rejected for service had fallen from 'about 30 per cent to
well under 20 per cent'. 295
 By 11 November 1914, when the call came for
another 100,000 for the fourth New Army, the age limit was set at 19-38, with
ex-soldiers eligible up to 45, and the chest measurement was fixed at 34Y2".
There was no mention of time limit: service was now for the duration only and
separation allowances were issuable immediately.2
In the early days of recruitment many held back, not from a reluctance to
serve but from an unwillingness to subject their families to hardship in the
name of national pride. On 11 September the Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir
Advertiser announced that as to 'the reasons of men who were willing to join
the army but who were holding back.. .the chief deterrent was the uncertainty
as to the provision for their wives and families'. 297
 Reports in the press about
delays in separation payments and about families existing on the welfare of
religious organisations slowed recruitment and forced the government to
294 Evening Citizen, 2 September 1914.
295 Dundee Advertiser, II August 1914,
296 Dundee Advertiser, 11 November 1914.
297 Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser, 11 September 1914.
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initiate changes in the payment system. Many who planned to enlist for
economic reasons then held back in the face of insecure financial relief. The
separation allowance payable at the outset of war in 1914 was set at 7s 7d
per week for the wife of an infantry private and an additional 7d for each child,
plus the soldier was expected to contribute another 3s 6d per week to his
wife. His wife would also receive an additional allowance of is 2d for each girl
under sixteen and each boy under fourteen. The most worrying factor for the
working class was the monthly payment system, anathema to a population
used to the weekly wage. Recruits were concerned as to how their
dependants were expected to survive for the first month. Recruitment suffered
setbacks when the local press ran large-scale articles on the non-payment of
soldiers allowances and the destitution of some of the families of local men
who had already enlisted. 298 Regimental relief funds sprang up almost from
the outset to provide support and food for those families caught up in the
bureaucracy of the army payment system. This image would deter those who
were in employment as it implied future hardship for their families, while on
the other hand it would encourage those in dire need, with the implication that
their families would at least receive the basic necessities from the regimental
association. In an effort to allay fears, new rates of army separation allowance
were announced on 1 October 1914. They were 9s per week for the wife of a
private, plus is lid per child. 299
As early as 5 August there was a national call for skilled tradesmen. The
298 Dundee Advertiser, 24 August 1914.
299 The Scotsman, 2 October 1914.
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Glasgow Herald reported that 'In view of a general mobilisation having been
proclaimed a certain number of men of the following trades are required
immediately for service in His Majesty's Army'. 30° There was then printed a
list of jobs and wage scales: 'Foremen Artificers, 70s. Coppersmiths,
electricians, patternmakers, 52s 6d. Blacksmiths, dispensers, drivers of motor
lorries, farriers, fitters, moulders, painters, saddlers, turners, wheelers, 42s.
Bakers, butchers, clerks, cooks, hospital subordinates, tailors, 28s. Labourers
and loaders (packers) 21s'.301
The Scotsman, on the same day, carried a similar advertisement but with the
age limits for clerks, labourers and drivers set at 20-45 and for all others at
2040 . 302
 This was all the encouragement that those faced with
unemployment, or at the very least uncertain employment, required. The
wages offered were comparable with the average wages at the time. J
Benson, in the Working Class in Britain 1850-1939, tells us that in 1914 'the
normal full-time income of the average working person' was only 28s per
week. 303
 With a single labourer being offered 21s plus food and board, for
many there was little financial hardship: a married labourer with the
separation allowance could earn the national average wage while other
skilled tradesmen could earn more than when working in industry.
°° Herald, 5 August 1914.
301 Herald, 5 August 1914.
302 The Scotsman. 5 August 1914.
J. Benson, The Working Class in Britain 1850-1939. p. 52-3.
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In Glasgow there was disappointment for those who sought to take this route.
For the first three weeks of the war, until the political offices were utilised as
recruiting stations, there were signs at the Gallowgate recruiting offices
turning away all tradesmen, or to be more accurate they were turning those
away who were trying to enlist as tradesmen, following their own profession in
the armed forces and earning higher rates of pay. Harry McShane states that,
in the confusion and rush to fulfil the needs of the army, many who enlisted
for technical units such as the Royal Engineers found that they had in fact
been signed up for the infantry by the recruiting officer and were not informed
until they reached the barracks: a shock introduction to army life. 304 The initial
high demand was for infantry and only those who were prepared to enlist for
the basic wage and commit themselves to active service were being signed
up. The Evening Citizen of 10 August 1914 reported that 'The recruiting
offices in the Gallowgate were open all day yesterday enlisting men for the
regular army. Today, notices are posted in the windows that tradesmen are
meanwhile not required and that only recruits for the army can now be
accepted'.305 The following day, on 11 August, the Evening Citizen reported
that 'Those offering themselves now are men willing to go to the front for
active service.'306 This restriction in recruitment was not confined to August
and September 1914. Early 1915 saw restrictions reintroduced to limit
individual choice and direct recruits to Scottish infantry regiments. Thomas
Williamson was confronted with this when enlisting in March 1915.
H. McShane, & J. Smith, Hany McShane; No Mean Fighter. p. 67-8. T. Williamson, This is
War. P. 10.
Evening Citizen, 8 August 1914.
306 Evening Citizen, 11 August 1914.
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The first man to greet us when we went further into the recruiting office
was a burly sergeant. 'Well,! He said, in a deep bass voice, "Are you
two chaps going to join up?" We replied, "Yes." I began to ply him with
questions such as, could we join the Army Service Corps, or the Royal
Field Artillery, or the Royal Engineers? The sergeant said with a smile,
"no lads, what we are requiring urgently is infantrymen."307
By 14 August there appeared an interesting letter showing this selective
recruiting policy in a different light.
There is no encouragement to offer one's services under the treatment
given. Hours and hours unnecessarily wasted which surely, by a more
suitable arrangement, could in some measure, be saved. Is this, the
usual War Office red tape, permitted to rule even in a time like the
present? These are my impressions after a six hour stand in the rain
and sun.308
The disgusted correspondent signed himself off with the signature 'Off The
Notion' and was not alone in his views. In the same issue there was another
letter from a potential recruit from Airdrie who, after presenting himself at five
recruiting offices in one week and still unable to enlist, signed himself as 'Fed
T. Williamson, This is War. P. 10.
308 Evening Citizen, 14 August 1914.
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Up'. This in some way accounts for the upturn in Glasgow recruiting numbers
as those turned away in the early days were able to enlist in September once
the pre-war inflexible military attitude towards recruitment had changed.
However, there was another boost to recruitment from the outset when it was
announced that,
A bounty of £5 will be paid to each man approved, and a further £5 on
discharge for any reason other than misconduct in addition to any war
gratuity issued to the troops. Such men as are discharged except for
misconduct within a year of the date of enlistment will also receive two
months pay in lieu of notice, provided this would not involve their
drawing more than twelve months pay in all. Men will be required to
enlist for one year or for as long as war continues. In the event of war
being over in less than one year they may be discharged at once.309
As we have already seen this was not the only mention of one-year
enlistment. The Scotsman carried a slightly different advertisement which
nevertheless conveyed the same meaning: 'Enlistments will be for one year,
or if the war lasts longer, for the duration of the war'. 31 ° The paper continues
that 'All men will be enlisted as privates'. With the popular thought that the
war would not last very long,311 the promise of steady wages, a signing-on
bonus, and the possibility of leaving the army to return to civilian employment
Glasgow Herald, 5 August 1914.
310 The Scotsman, 5 August 1914.
C. DeGroot, The First World War. p. 135.
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with two months wages plus discharge bonus, was too much to resist. In the
sudden climate of economic uncertainty there was no shortage of takers.
LOYALTY
A large number of volunteers, especially the young and disenchanted,
enlisted in search of adventure or excitement. Stories of temporary service in
the Boer War were still fresh enough in recent memory to stimulate interest
among the young. Duty was a motive for some, or a misplaced motive for
those who thought that duty necessitated enlistment - a sense of duty to one's
country or friends or a sense of regional loyalty. From the very beginning the
War Office, through the direct intervention of Kitchener, appealed to those in
positions of responsibility, authority, and localised power for assistance in
raising the new battalions. Lord Rosebery's call of 'Lothian men for Lothian
regiments' was one such call to regional loyalty.312
At a recruiting meeting held in Stonehaven Town Hall, Sir Alexander Baird,
Lord-Lieutenant of Kincardineshire, read out a letter from Lord Kitchener
which was a direct appeal for Scottish recruits:
My Dear Baird - I am glad to know that you are going up to Scotland to
do your best to raise recruits for the army in Kincardineshire. I feel
certain that Scotsmen have only to know that the country urgently
needs their services to offer them with the same splendid patriotism as
they have always shown in the past. Tell them from me please, that
312 Dundee Advertiser, 7 January 1915.
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their services were never more needed than they are today, and that I
rely confidently on a splendid response to the national appeal.
Yours Sincerely.
Kitchener.3'3
Although this was an appeal for Scotsmen to support their country there was
no direct mention of Scotland or any other country. It was left to the individual
to fill in the blank spaces. At a recruiting meeting in Inverness on 1
September 1914, addressed by Lord Lovat and The Mackintosh, Lochiel
remarked that 'just as in the old days... Highlanders responded to the call of
their chiefs.'314 Residual loyalty to a clan chieftain was a major factor in
recruiting for highland regiments. Such feelings of loyalty to perceived social
superiors were in fact nothing more than a misplaced sense of duty dating
from an age when clansmen were expected to fight for their clan in return for
the protection and patronage of their chief.
In the early winter of 1914 reservists were joining one of the Highland
regiments. The men trickled in at most of the stations in Caithness, and
they became more numerous as the train entered Sutherlandshire. As
the short winter day closed in, snow began to fall; and, as the train
wound through the valleys, all the houses were lit up, and the people
stood at the doors waving torches and chanting a high-pitched battle
song. Except for the railway, nothing was changed. It was thus all
313 The Scotsman, 12 August 1914.
314 Dundee Advertiser, 2 September 1914.
189
through the ages that the clans had mustered, and it was thus that the
women, the grandfathers, and the children had sent their men to
war.315
Cameron of Lochiel, asked by Kitchener to raise new battalions for the
Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, swiftly started a recruiting campaign,
placing advertisements in the Scottish press.
I give my personal guarantee that at the end of the war the battalion
will be brought back to Inverness, where it will be disbanded with all
convenient dispatch. Companies and platoons will be organised
according to local districts, so that men from each district of the
highlands will always be kept together in their own section, platoon, or
company. 316
To counter manpower depletion in the Highlands Lochiel expanded his search
world wide and began advertising in the press for recruits of highland descent
to come forward from every part of the empire to defend their country in its
hour of need.
I want to raise a thousand Highlanders for my own battalion and I have
no doubt I shall have little difficulty in doing so; but, having regard to
the fact that Highlanders are now scattered all over the face of the
earth, I must specially appeal to the officials and committees of the
315 D.T. Jones, Rural Scotland During the War. p. 20.
190
different Highland county and clan societies in Glasgow, Edinburgh
and elsewhere to assist me in my endeavours by becoming my
recruiting agents.317
Lochiel was aiming his campaign not only country-wide but world-wide,
emphasising the inability of the Highlands to provide manpower in any large
numbers. After the depletion of the previous decades and the mass
migrations there was, for the first time, no surplus manpower to rally to the
call of the chief. The first service battalion to be raised for the Queen's Own
Cameron Highlanders, the 5th, serves as an early example of the shortage of
men in the traditional recruiting area of the regiment. "'A" was the Gaelic-
speaking company, formed of men from North Uist, Harris, Lochaber, and
Strathspey; "B" was made up of men from Inverness and the North, Skye,
South Uist, and Benbecula; "C" company consisted of Highlanders from the
rest of Scotland; and "D" . . .was the Glasgow Stock Exchange Company.'318
Two companies of the Fifth Battalion, some fifty per cent, were from outside
the traditional recruiting area.
The Cameron Highlanders, with their recruiting area in the North of Scotland,
the Orkney Islands, and the Western Isles, suffered most when it came to
recruitment. The 'natural' recruiting area of the regiment had, over the
316 Glasgow Herald. 26 August 1914.
317 Oban Times. 5 December 1914.
318 Historical Records of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders. vol. iv. p. 47.
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previous decades, suffered more than any other part of Scotland in terms of
the out-migration of its males. The available manpower had been depleted to
a level that allowed for no surplus or excess. This is seen in the poor
recruiting in the regimental recruiting area. Inverness produced low numbers
in the first few crucial months of the war. In August 1914, only 138 men were
recruited in Inverness, 0.5 per cent of the national total. In September the
figures were 144 or 0.33 per cent. This was followed by October with 21 or
0.2 per cent of the total, November with 23 or 0.2 per cent, and December
with 85 or I per cent of the Scottish total.319
Glasgow was, by 1914, seen as the unofficial capital of the highlands due to
the number of highlanders who had migrated to the industrial central belt.
Almost immediately a recruiting office was opened in the old Victoria Hotel at
19 West George Street in Glasgow, solely for the purpose of enlisting men for
the new battalions of the Camerons. This office was opened and run by
Colonel Macleod and Major Gow, President of the Glasgow Inverness-shire
Association.
A constant flow of recruits went on from ten in the morning to ten at
night. There were generally two and sometimes three doctors in the old
billiard room, hard at it putting them through the medical examination.
Each night the men who had been passed the day before were
319 NATS 1/398.
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marched up to the train for Inverness, headed by a piper, amidst great
enthusiasm.32°
The regimental records tell us that 'none but the very best men were passed
for the Camerons, and those only who could show some Highland descent'.
By 22 September 1914 the Cameron recruiting office was also enlisting
recruits directly for the Fourth Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, a territorial
battalion based in Dingwall. In view of the recruitment standard claims made
by the Camerons and the lack of recruits in Dingwall, it appears that those
unable to meet Lochiel's high standard were sent to the Seaforths. The
advertising campaign for the Camerons was constant. Lochiel persuaded
Glasgow Corporation to bedeck the front of its trams with banners extolling
the young men of Glasgow to 'join Lochiel's Camerons'. In November the
regiment marched through Glasgow and raised approximately one hundred
recruits after it was paraded at Ibrox, as the home team, Rangers, played
Queen's Park. 321
 However, it seems that the excitement and spontaneity of
enlisting at a football match soon wore off all but a few. Despite the best
efforts of his recruiters, by the end of 1914 even Lochiel could not overcome
the recruiting difficulties experienced throughout the country and the 8th
battalion, the fourth service battalion to be raised by the Camerons, was,
through lack of recruits, designated a 'reserve' battalion: a feeder battalion for
the rest of the regiment. While it must be said that a high proportion of those
320 Q.O.C.H. vol. iv. p.46 & 271.
321 E.A. Cameron, and I.J.M. Robertson, 'Fighting and Bleeding for the Land'. in Macdonald
and McFarland. p. 84-5.
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recruited for the service battalions of the Camerons were not from the
traditional regimental recruiting area and a fair number were Highland, or
indeed Scottish, by name only, this should not detract from the achievement
of Lochiel in raising four battalions before the end of 1914.
Lochiel was not alone in using the ties of heritage and clan loyalty in an effort
to raise recruits. He was joined in this by Lord Lovat who was requested by
the War Office to use his position of influence to raise recruits, especially for
the Lovat Scouts. 322 In January 1915 Lord Rosebery headed an appeal to the
men of the Lothjans on behalf of 'their noble and historic regiment, the Royal
Scots'. He pointed out that lowlanders should be as proud of their regiments
as highlanders. 323 Two days later, while addressing a recruiting rally in the
Corn Exchange, Dalkeith, Lord Rosebery announced that 'Scotland had not
done badly in recruiting. The Southern Counties of Scotland had contributed
237 men per 1,000 of the population. The only doubt he had was whether
their patriotism had always taken the right direction, which was towards the
Royal Scots'. 324 Rosebery was implying that recruits in the Lothians should
enlist in their local infantry regiment rather than other branches of the army.
He was calling for regional rather than national loyalty. Lothian men for
Lothian regiments.
322 piscussed in chapter 7, Territorial Recruitment.
323 Dundee Advertiser, 7 January 1915.
324 DundeeAdvertiser, 11 January1915.
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POPULATION MOVEMENT
Emigration and migration were major factors in providing an excess of
manpower, a pool of spare bodies, mobile and in a position to enlist
immediately, and served to create mobility within a sector of the population: a
willingness for change. Scottish emigration figures had been increasing
rapidly from the turn of the century, culminating in the period 1910-14 when
the country lost 331,353 people to emigration. 325
 Michael Flinn calculated that
with approximately 50 per cent of those emigrating being male, and 26 per
cent under the age of eighteen, this gave a figure of roughly 127,000 males of
military age leaving Scotland in the four years immediately prior to the war.326
This annual exodus produced in August and September 1914 a number of
men who were on the point of leaving Scotland but instead were immediately
available for military service. All ties having been severed, they were seeking
the kind of excitement that the war offered; a few months in the army before
going to a new life overseas. Those who were contemplating emigration in the
next few years also saw this as an opportunity and brought their plans
forward, seeing in war-time military service a chance for adventure in Europe
prior to settling in a strange land.
The delicate balance between emigration and unemployment in Scotland was
upset by the onset of war and provided an immediate excess of manpower. In
the first seven months of 1914, a total of 23,463 emigrants of all groups left
Scotland while for the same period in 1915 the figure fell to 6,044. In the first
325 M. Flynn, Scottish Population History: from the i7' Century to the 1930's. p. 447-453.
326 M. Flynn, Scottish Population History: from the l7 Century to the 1930's. p. 447.
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five months of the war, August-December 1914, the number of emigrants
leaving Scotland was 10,870 while in the corresponding period for 1913 the
number had been 20,450. Allowing that the number wishing to emigrate
remained reasonably static this represented a shortfall of approximately
10,000, most of whom, it is reasonable to assume, would be in an ideal
position to enlist immediately. As we can see from fig 4:1, August 1914
produced a reduction of 35 per cent over August 1913, down from 5,089 to
3,320. The figure for September 1914 was down by 56.5 per cent over the
previous September, from 6,865 to 2,987, while for October the reduction was
54.5 per cent, a figure of 5,389 dropping to 2,450.327
FIG 4:9 Emigration from Scotland 19131915.328
All categories and ages of emigrants.
1913
	
1914	 1915
January	 2086	 1704	 654
February	 3336	 1841	 694
March
	
7400
	
3448
	
822
April	 9021	 4659	 1043
May	 9801
	
5418
	
932
June	 8115
	
3552
	
951
July	 5222	 2842	 948
August	 5089	 3320	 730
September	 6865	 2987	 1114
October	 5389	 2450	 1087
November	 3613
	
1159
	
779
December	 2180
	
954	 415
Total
	
68117
	
34333
	
10169
Along with those who had intended to emigrate in the Autumn of 1914 there
327 Passenger Movement From And To The United Kingdom, 1913, Cd 6615. 1914, 1915, Cd
7808.
328 Cd 6615. Cd 7808.
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was also, within Scotland, another large group which the war placed in an
untenable position. The first seven months of 1914 produced a dramatic drop
in emigrants compared to 1913, a drop of 50 per cent, a reduction, in
numerical terms, from 47,658 to 23,463 (fig 4:9). The industrial and
engineering boom of 1913 had served to slow the flow of Scottish emigration.
For the first time since the start of the twentieth century there was now
enough opportunity at home for those who had previously seen emigration as
the only way forward. But after August 1914 those who had taken the
opportunity to remain in Scotland to take advantage of the economic upswing
found that they were worse off than before. They now found themselves
caught up in economic collapse without the safety net of emigration. The
presence of such a large number of available workers allowed any shortfall in
the workforce caused by recruiting to be filled quickly, thus, while some
embraced short-term enlistment as the means of economic survival others
were able to take advantage of the large numbers enlisting and gain
employment in those sectors of Scpttish industry still active. Employers were
able actively to encourage their workers to enlist, secure in the knowledge
that they could swiftly get replacements, often at a lower cost. The men
recruited from the Glasgow Tramways Department by James Dalrymple, for
the 15th Highland Light Infantry, were replaced within a month by the
unemployed, the old, the young, and others who had not previously met the
requirements.
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FIG 4:10 Immigration to Scotland 191 3-1 91 5329
All categories and ages of emigrants.
1913	 1914	 1915
January	 461	 643	 773
February	 495	 655	 851
March	 782	 852	 988
April	 1063	 1512	 1241
May	 1445	 2002	 1516
June	 1588	 2027	 1267
July	 1286	 1523	 1359
August	 1155	 1351	 1759
September	 1221	 935	 881
October	 1372	 1506	 1255
November	 1587	 1846	 1281
December	 1557	 1640	 1002
Total	 14030	 16492	 14173
Fig 4:10 also shows that allied to this there was, in the same seven-month
period, January-July 1914, a rise in the number of immigrants arriving in
Scotland, of 29 per cent over the same period in the previous year. The
increase in immigration was partly in response to the change in economic
climate, the collapse of the building trades in Canada and the United States,
causing the return of earlier emigrants. The main point to be taken from fig
4:10 is that contrary to expectation there was no significant rise in immigration
to Scotland after the outbreak of war. Popular opinion would have it that large
numbers returned in order to enlist. On the contrary it would appear that only
limited numbers returned to Scotland to enlist. Numbers as low as eight were
high enough to attract attention in the press. The Glasgow Citizen prominently
announcing on 10 November 1914 that 'among those enlisting today were
eight British subjects who had just arrived in the Clyde from New York'.33°
329 Cd 6615. Cd 7808.
Evening Citizen, 10 November 1914.
198
Those arriving in Scotland to do so would, it is reasonable to assume, have to
declare Scotland as their future country of residence and would therefore be
included within the monthly passenger movement figures.
SOCIAL PRESSURES
The desire for integration was one reason for minority groups, particularly
Catholics and Irish, to enlist, thereby gaining social acceptance at the end of
the war. For the Irish to gain acceptability in Scotland they had to disappear
into the background, become invisible by joining in the mainstream of Scottish
society. The war presented an ideal opportunity.
The declaration of support given by John Redmond, the Irish Nationalist
leader, in early August 1914 was a major contributing factor in recruiting the
Irish in Scotland. Redmond linked support for Britain to the passage of the
Home Rule Bill. Thus many an Irish Nationalist in Scotland would be all the
more willing to enlist in the belief that in so doing he was furthering the cause
of Irish Nationalism. The Home Rule Bill became an act of parliament in
September 1914 but was immediately suspended with no steps to be taken to
implement the bill until after the war.331
Pre-war Scotland, especially the industrial central belt, had been a hotbed of
Irish paramilitary groups. These groups, some numbering thousands, would
meet at night on a deserted stretch of road and practise military drill and
tactics. This 'drilling' was seen by many Irishmen as preparation for the
331 J.E. Handley, The Modem Irish in Scotland. p. 295.
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forthcoming struggle to gain Ireland's independence. Large numbers of men
would be only too willing to comply with Redmond. This was demonstrated at
a mass meeting in Glasgow organised in November 1914 by the Scottish
branches of the United Irish League when those present passed a vote of
confidence in, and support for, the policy of supporting the war. For an
Irishman, recruiting in Scotland would also lessen the religious divides
prevalent in recruiting in Ireland. Political friction and religious bigotry between
the 16th (Irish) Division and the 36th (Ulster) Division was rife. The 16th (Irish)
Division was particularly renowned for the obstacles placed in the path of
Catholics applying for officer status; very few Catholics were commissioned.
In Scotland, while there were still some religious divides within regiments,
they were, more often than not, a reference to the regiment's earlier formation
as Protestant volunteers rather than a reference to contemporary bigotry.
With the Catholic church and press firmly behind Redmond, the Irish enlisted
in large numbers. Some, like I. G. C. Hutchison, conclude that with the Irish
Nationalists supporting the war effort 'enlistments were as high as among
native Scots', 332 while J. Winter assures us that 'many Irishmen living and
working in Britain were probably incorporated in English, Welsh and Scottish
enlistment statistics'
A meeting was held on 8 November in St Andrew's Hall, Glasgow, for the
purpose of 'furthering recruiting for the Irish Brigade', at which figures were
presented showing that in the first two months of the war some 7,271
332 I. G. C. Hutchison, 'The Impact of the First World War on Scottish PoIitics' in Macdonald
and McFarland. eds. p. 45.
J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British People. p. 27.
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Irishmen had enlisted in Glasgow alone. Edinburgh, with a smaller number of
resident Irish had provided 780 in the same period. A survey of thirty-one
districts in Scotland had given a figure of 13,654 Irishmen enlisting in
Scotland and it was estimated that, if the other 151 districts provided the
same quantity of recruits, there would be approximately 30,000 Irishmen
enlisted in Scotland. 3 In a speech to the House of Lords on 6 January 1915,
Lord Macdonnell of Swinford set out figures detailing the number of Irish
enlisted in Britain. Although the figures were being used in a political context
- gaining support for the Irish question - they are still reliable enough to give
a general overview of the level of support for recruitment among the Catholic
Irish in Britain and Scotland. In round figures he announced that the total
number of Irishmen enlisted in Great Britain stood at 115,000; Scotland
having provided 25,000; Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales with 45,000;
Yorkshire with 20,000; North of England with 15,000; South Wales and
Midlands with 5,000, and London with 5,000. By 20 January 1915 The
Morning Post was claiming that 8,041 Irishmen had enlisted in Glasgow;
1,648 in Edinburgh; 2,000 from Coatbridge, and 681 from Paisley.3
Alongside this figures were also give for some of the smaller towns:
Port Glasgow, 250; Duntocher and Old Kilpatrick, 125; Blantyre, 405;
Croy, 47; Hamilton, 400; Dumbarton, 300; Kilsyth, 163; Uddingston,
87; Grangemouth, 20; Rothesay, 50; Tarbrax, 16; Irvine, 37;
331 Evening Times, 9 November 1914.
Parliamentary Debates - Official Reports 1066— 1918. House of Lords Vol XVIII, 1914-
15 (Nov 11—May 19) 383.
336 Morning Post, 20 January 1915.
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Shieldmuir, 80; Cadzow, 73; Larkhall, 67; Greenock, 700; Vale of
Leven, 200; Dumfries, 281; Largs, Skelmorlie and Millport, 17; East
Calder, 10; Shotts, 70; Penicuik, 16; Lennoxtown, 69; Tranent, 84;
Musselburgh, 120; Kelty, 72; Methil and Leven, 84; Linhithgow, 56;
Stirling and district, 300; Kirkcaldy and district, 130; Dunfermline and
district, 300; Neilston, 71; Galston, 27; Renfrew, 92; Helensburgh, 90;
Barrhead and Nitshill, 152; Falkirk and Camelon, 219; Perth, 140;
Motherwell, 304; Cardowan and Stepps, 36; Leith, 450; Burnbank, 130;
Kilmarnock, 150; Wishaw,
Further information came from a statement issued on 15 February 1915 by Mr
J. O'D. Derrick, United Irish League Organiser for Scotland, which was the
result of an investigation by the one hundred branches of the league in
Scotland and was a list of Irishmen who had gone to serve in the Navy, Army
and Territorial Force since the outbreak of war. The returns showed that, by
February 1915, some 25,747 Irishmen had enlisted in Scotland, 'not counting
the thousands of Scottish Catholics, who have been equally patriotic'.338
That such a large number of Irishmen had enlisted was a reflection of the
position that the Irish held in Scottish society. This inability of the Irish to
achieve any form of stable social base in Scotland, working in low paid,
dangerous, dirty, and unsecured jobs, left them vulnerable to the
opportunities seemingly offered by temporary enlistment. Recruitment offered
Morning Post, 20 January 1915.
Dundee Advertiser, 15 February 1915.
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them a period of stability, with a long training period and the prospect of the
war being over before they were ready for active service, It also offered them
the opportunity to merge into part of Scottish society. They hoped that when
the war ended their sacrifice would adhere them to the Scothsh population
and that at least they would be accepted as a contributing part of that society.
Whether the sacrifice of Scotland's Irish immigrant population achieved all
that was hoped for is a matter for wider debate, but the 1918 Education
(Scotland) Act brought Scotland's Catholic schools into the mainstream state
system. This reduced the financial burden of school support on the immigrant
community and began a process of closer integration within Scotland. The
Catholic church in Scotland was keen to publicise the recruitment of Catholics
into the New Armies, with the Catholic newspaper, the Glasgow Observer,
prominent in publishing stories about Catholic soldiers in action and
publishing lists of recruits from congregations. The Glasgow Observer was
not the only paper to publish congregation lists, from any denomination. The
Dundee Advertiser announced that 'St Mary's Roman Catholic Church,
Lochee, has... no fewer than 261 of its members.., at present on active
service, including 127 with the Black Watch'.339
Tom Devine states that 'large numbers of Scots Irish enlisted even before
conscription in 1916, and six members of the community were decorated with
the Victoria Cross'. ° As a result of the willingness of the Irish to enlist in
Dundee Advertiser, 11Apr11 1915.
° Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 496.
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Scofland Devine concludes that 'Any doubts about the loyalty of the Irish in
Scotland to the British state were conclusively removed'. 1
 Tom Gallagher
also states that
Even before the introduction of conscription in 1916, the immigrant
community had yielded up a disproportionately large number of
recruits. Shared war comradeship held out the promise that religious
barriers would be far less relevant in a post-war world where ordinary
citizens were encouraged to think that the stress would be on
reconstruction and the banishment of old injustices.2
When the number of Irish recruits is taken into consideration the Scothsh
contribution, in the first crucial period at least, must be viewed in a different
light. With an estimated 25,000 Irishmen enlisting in Scotland up until
December 1914, out of a total recruitment figure for Scotland in that period of
161,882, that figure represents some 15.4 per cent of recruits in Scotland. If
that figure is extrapolated for the entire voluntary period then it is not
inconceivable that anything up to 46,500 Irishmen enlisted in Scotland,
representing 15.4 per cent of the total recruitment figure of 301,754 for the
voluntary period. Certainly the contribution from 'Scotland the country'
remains the same, because, whatever else, they did enlist in Scotland. The
change comes in the contribution from 'Scotland the nation', and in the
341 Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 496.
342 T. Gallagher, 'The Catholic Irish', in T. M. Devine, Irish Immigrants. p. 29.
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perception of Scothsh recruitment: whether it loses any of its 'Scottishness' as
a result of such large numbers of Irish recruits. In truth when these figures are
expanded for the whole voluntary period, then it is concevable that Scotland's
contribution was considerably less than previously believed and her claim to
disproportionately high representation undermined, although such an
extrapolation should be seen as a guideline and not a definitive conclusion.
CHURCH SUPPORT
At a recruiting rally in Pollokshaws town hall, Mr William Hutchison, Unionist
candidate for Bridgeton, told the audience that 'all the people of Germany, not
only the war lords, entertained the idea that might was right, It was to kill that
idea that we had entered the struggle. The war was, therefore, a holy war,
waged in the sacred cause of freedom.'3
There were two different periods in the relationship between the church and
voluntary recruiting in Scotland and differing ideals within those times. For
some the outbreak of war meant a dilution of the power of the church and the
moral corruption of the nation's youth. While for others there was the belief
that the war could provide an expansion of the church as the population
turned towards it for guidance and spiritual support. The war was, from the
outset, given widespread support from all sides of Scotland's religious
community with both the Catholic and Protestant churches enthusiastic in
promoting the concept of a 'just' war from the pulpit or altar. Dr R. T.
Drummond, minister of Lothian Road United Free Church in Edinburgh, was
Evening Citizen, 15 October, 1914.
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one such who saw the war as such a cause, declaring 'our cause is a
righteous one, the cause of international truth and honesty, the cause of the
weak and oppressed' 311
Drummond sought to justify his support of the war by going on to say that 'I
hope this war will be the death blow of militarism'. 5
 Eugene Annesley points
out that there were many in the Scottish clergy who viewed the war as an
opportunity for 'national purification'. As early as September 1914 the
magazine of the Church of Scotland, Life and Work, took the view that 'This is
a solemn crisis which could lead to purify the nation. The nation could return
the people to simplicity of life with the discipline, honour and courage'. 7
 At
the same time the United Free Church magazine, The Record, stressed that
the war was for 'the ultimate good of humanity'.
In contrast to this unequivocal support for conflict, there were others within
the Scottish churches who were keen to promote a balanced view and
attempted to restore calm to those suffering from 'war fever'. Congregations
were reminded that Germany shared Scotland's Protestant heritage and that
the reports of atrocities in Belgium were untrue. The Rev' A. J. Gossip went
on a tour of hospitals checking out the rumours of Belgian children, the
victims of atrocities, which he determined were unfounded. 9
 In tandem with
The Record. January 1915.
The Record. January 1915.
346 E. Annesley The Response of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church of
Scotland to the First World War. Unpublished M Th. thesis. University of Glasgow. 1991. p.
38.
Life and Work. September 1914. p. 257-8.
348 The Record. September 1914.
Glasgow Herald. 8 October 1914.
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this was the statement by Christopher Sands, lawyer and Procurator of the
Church of Scotland, that the war 'was not so much a great thing of national
honour as had often been reported'. It was, he said, 'more a matter of
trade'
To some within the church the war was an opportunity for religious revival,
with large numbers of recruits coming forward to take communion prior to
departure and many families taking a last opportunity to attend church as a
group. The Life and Work took the opportunity to affirm that 'one was cheered
by the thought that so many took advantage of the opportunity given to them
of pledging themselves anew to be soldiers of Christ'.351
Battalion church parades prior to departure overseas also served to convey to
churchmen that religion was undergoing a revival. However, such church
parades owed more to military regulation than to large scale religious
conversion. When the 2/9th battalion Royal Scots attended a private service
in the New North Church in Edinburgh some nineteen officers and 217 men
took communion with some 600 adherents in attendance. Eugene Annesley
puts this in perspective when telling us that 'all were in uniform, and... all the
elders were officers'. Annesley saw such military involvement as a reflection
'on the leadership of the Scottish churches at that time'. 352 Interestingly
Annesley equates this with 'the old Covenanter tradition, indeed a custom
° Glasgow Herald. 12 October 1914.
351 Life and Work. December 1914. p. 363.
352 E. Aflnesey, The Response of the Church. p. 41-2.
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which went back to Bannockburn, of soldiers of Scotland worshipping before
battle'
For the first months of the war the clergy in Scotland took a major role in
promoting recruitment but as casualties mounted attitudes within the church
changed as the role of the clergy adapted to a new demand: the consolation
of grieving relatives. At the 1915 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland
Dr Wallace Williamson pronounced that 'we have entered into the war fully
conscious as a nation that if we did not enter into it we would stand as
criminals before God'. 3
 At the same time the Rev J. D. Robertson of Leith,
at the 1915 General Assembly of the United Free Church reported to the
assembly that 'we are witnessing a great spiritual revival in Scotland. It has
not come yet: war has not brought it so far. But our confidence is, that as a
result of this tide of sorrow and tears and blood, there shall be greater
consecration of the people of God'.355
With the rising casualties the church had to find greater justification for the
suffering and death. The answer was to portray the war as a 'crusade' or a
religious calling. Annesley tells us that 'those who lost their lives were seen as
continuing their work after death and their death in action was a form of
E. Annesley, The Response of the Church. p. 42.
T. M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 385.
Papers of the General Assembly of the United Free Church of Scotland. 1915 p. 204.
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purification'. 356 The response of the church to the casualty figures was that
the war was the fault of man and God could not be held responsible.
There were many who saw the war as a holy conflict but this is not new: God
always fights on both sides. The promotion of war from the pulpit, the pointed
accusation of slackness in coming forward, the unnecessary sense of
personal shame in front of a congregation, the use of the pulpit for matters
other that religion, are all reminiscent of the Protestant zeal of John Knox.
Unfortunately there was, within the Scottish clergy, a radical fringe who lost
no opportunity to lay the blame for the war firmly at the feet of the Catholic
church. The Reverend John Mackay of Inverness was one of the more radical
examples who published a pamphlet in 1914, priced at 3d, in which he viewed
the war as heavenly retribution for the rise of Catholicism, saying 'I cannot but
think that the true and direct objective of the wrath of heaven is the Papacy
and the powers that give it their strength'. 357
 He argued that the war was
mankind's opportunity to return to the true Protestant faith and called on the
Church of England to 'join against Papacy and return true Protestant
principles'. 358 Thankfully such radical opinions were few and far between.
HANGING BACK
By 1 September 1914 it was being reported that of the 150,000 men of the
right age in Glasgow only 7,666 had enlisted 'Our "splendid" contribution,
356 E. Annesley, The Response of the Church, p. 46.
J. R. Mackay, Armageddon - Two Discourses on the Great European War. p. 30.
J. R. Mackay, Armageddon. p. 37.
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therefore ,
 means that only I in 20 of these men have been moved to come
forward' . 359
 On 11 September there was a letter berating Aberdeen and
Dundee over the level of recruitment in those cities. Although each of the two
cities had one fifth the population of Glasgow neither had produced recruits in
the same proportion. It is important, however, to put these in context: until that
time recruitment in Glasgow had been proportionally two and a half times
better than London.36°
There was now a growing feeling that football teams and individual players
were not doing enough towards recruitment. There was soon a proposal that
football games be stopped in the meantime in face of mounting criticism.
There was a call for professional footballers to enlist and show an example to
the community 'Let Rangers and Celtic directors forget all about their
dividends at present, stop their football playing, and encourage their players
to enlist, thus ensuring a spontaneous rush of football enthusiasts to join the
colours'.1
On 12 September it was argued that, although recruiting had started at
football matches the results were poor due to the 'inadequacy of the
arrangements made'. Pledges of recruitment made at such large gatherings
were often given in the heat of the moment, often under the influence of
alcohol and often in the spirit of bravado, the intended recruits failing to turn
up at the recruiting office to honour their pledge. In October 1914 it was
Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
° Evening Citizen, 11 September 1914.
361 Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
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reported that 'recruiting efforts at city football matches have met with little
success.' It was common practice for those giving their names and addresses
at such recruiting rallies to ignore the postcards sent notifying them of the
time and place of recruitment and for only a small percentage to follow
through with their initial promise. 362 This was quickly followed by the proposal
that a football company be raised and attached to one of the Glasgow
battalions. 3 However, when Major Cappon, recruiting officer in Dundee,
enquired as to the possibility of addressing the professional footballers in that
city he was denied the opportunity and informed that there was already one
football player in the army. By mid-December 1914 the committee
appointed to stimulate recruitment among Scottish professional footballers
tried to initiate a scheme to promote recruitment among the various clubs but
this fell by the wayside, in part due to the hostility of the clubs and in part due
to the endless bureaucracy of committees and sub-committees raised to deal
with the matter.365
PEER PRESSURE
Peer pressure played an important role, especially within the workplace,
where direct contact promoted compliance. The psychological pressure which
could be brought to bear, intentionally or otherwise, by family, workmates and
others within a social grouping was enough to tip the balance in many
instances of indecision. It is not surprising therefore that peer pressure
362 Glasgow Citizen, 5 October 1914.
363 Evening Times, 12 September 1914.
364 Dundee Advertiser, 14 November 1914.
365 Dundee Advertiser, 15 December 1914.
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became a factor in raising recruits for the New Armies. Such pressure took on
a variety of forms ranging from direct physical pressure to a sense of personal
obligation. The sight of colleagues, workmates, friends, and family being
mobilised for the Special Reserve and Territorial Force created, in some, a
feeling of being left out, a sense of social exclusion. Colleagues and friends
would return with stories and shared adventures while those who remained
behind would resent a lost opportunity. The Boer War had shown that
temporary military service could be adventurous but relatively safe.
Casualties from combat in South Africa had been deceptively low while
disease, which had claimed the vast majority of casualties, was viewed as an
ever present but acceptable risk. Colleagues deciding to enlist as a group
could always persuade others to come with them. The motivating factor in
peer pressure was the need for group approval or social inclusion. For those
who were confident in their own abilities or were not seeking peer approval
the concept of peer pressure did not serve to promote recruitment. In the
initial months of the war peer pressure played a minor role in stimulating
recruitment as large numbers of men were readily available. However, in the
later stages of the voluntary period peer pressure filled an ever increasing
role in the provision of recruits.
As the war progressed and the numbers of available men reduced, renewed
calls were made for recruits with young men facing ever more public
pressure. Women handing out white feathers to those who had not enlisted
were not confined to England: such sights were commonplace in Scotland,
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McShane's 'daft middle-class women'. 366 Many took a more direct approach,
accosting young men on the street and on public transport and asking why
they had not enlisted, why they were not in uniform, and why they were not
defending their homeland.367 Women and children were targeted as a means
of exerting pressure on the individual to recruit. Posters were distributed
asking women if they could bring themselves to love a man who was not in
uniform, encouraging them to exert pressure on loved ones to enlist. Such
posters were not only aimed at girlfriends but were also aimed at wives and,
more disturbingly, mothers: the need of the country was promoted as being of
greater importance than the need of the family.
Pressure within families came in two different ways. Those with one or two
family members in the Regular Army or the Territorial Force enlisted in the
spirit of shared adventure, the instinct to share the hardship of a brother,
father, or son. In some cases this produced a snowball effect. It was not
uncommon that, once two or three close family members had enlisted, it
became a matter of perverse family pride that all brothers should join.
Instances of four or five brothers enlisting in this fashion were not unusual at
a time where large families were the norm. 8
 A family with a few of its
members in the armed services, each receiving the separation allowance
due, would be, in an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, sure of survival.
Unfortunately the second form of family pressure would come as a direct
result of the first. Family members would feel duty bound to enlist in order to
366 McShane, H. & Smith, J. No Mean Fighter. p. 62. B. Harding. On Flows the Tay. p. 58.
B. Harding. On Flows the Tay. p. 58.
B. Harding. On Flows the Tay. p. 57.
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avenge those who had been wounded or killed. The high casualty rate
suffered by those Scottish battalions in the British Expeditionary Force would
prompt many to enlist in the early months in a misplaced desire to seek
redress. Family anguish and pride, coupled with the desire for revenge,
should not be overlooked as a forceful push to recruitment.
On a larger scale the pressure to enlist as part of a nation-wide social or age
group held no pull for the youth of Scotland. Culturally and socially Scotland
was a segmented nation. The recruitment of specific age-related groups was
dictated by the requirements of the military, changing as age limits were
extended, and not by any conscious social group tie. Military necessity,
economics, and employment played the major roles in age and group
selection, not a desire for nation-wide social inclusion. The age limits imposed
on recruitment determined, to an extent, the composition of the army. As the
age limits were extended the composition of the group changed and recruits
came from a wider age base. The group itself did not determine the age of
recruitment. While the majority of recruits were between the ages of eighteen
and thirty-five it is wrong to say that this age group was any more
predisposed to enlist than any other: at least on a national basis. Older age
groups, while not entirely prevented from enlisting by circumventing the age
limits as many would give artificially low ages in order to enlist, would take
from the age limits the false impression that only the young were required.
Thus the age group which fought the war was an artificial creation, based on
the needs of the military machine. Indeed, in Scotland the most vociferous
recruiters, men such as James Dalrymple and Lord Rosebery, were beyond
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the age of military service, while the most enthusiastic sabre rattlers were
usually women whose sex precluded them from active military service.
FIG 4: 11 Anti-war poster by Robins MilIar.369
RNLLST I.
'Working men are being hounded on to sacrifice their lives by men who have no
intention of doing any such thing themselves. Meanwhile, owing to the miserable
pittance they are offered, the spectre of Famine menaces the families they leave
behind.'
University of Dundee Archive, RU 2891S4.
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FINANCIAL PRESSURE
For some there was the extra financial pressure brought about by bounty
payments. As we have seen, the War Office was willing to pay enlistment
bonuses from the outset in order to acquire those men that it needed most.
This aside, the concept of an enlistment bonus was taken up mostly by
employers but was occasionally offered by individuals. At the end of August
1914 a notice was posted at the offices of the Wemyss Coal Company in Fife
announcing that 'a gentleman had given £1,000 to be distributed in £5 notes
among the first 200 men from Wemyss who joined the colours'. 370 There was
also the concept that individuals, too old to fight and rich enough to afford it,
could fight by proxy, employing others to take their place. One such example
was the proposal by Mr Wilkinson of Broughty Ferry, who urged that 'men of
substance' should provide £52 per year to those men who were earning £2
per week and who could not afford to enlist due to the difference between
their wages and the separation allowances. As a further incentive he
proposed to invest £200 for such a volunteers family should that volunteer be
killed or disabled in action. He was looking for a further forty-nine men willing
to sponsor a recruit after his example. The financial responsibility was
clinically expressed, 'assuming that a soldier served two years in the army
and was killed or permanently disabled, the total liability would be about £300
or less according to circumstances.' 371
 Mr Wilkinson went further by stating
that 'many men who cannot join themselves and have no sons to send to the
army would be willing to undertake this special form of service'.372
° Dundee Advertiser, 29 August 1914.
371 DundeeAdvertiser, 12 March 1915.
372 Dundee Advertiser, 12 March 1915.
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While this may have been one of the more outlandish ideas put forward, it
shows the extremes to which some people were prepared to go. Pressure
was applied by both companies and individuals, directly and indirectly. It took
the form of coercion, persuasion and outright threats. It promised immediate
reward or rewards to come, immediate sanctions or future retribution. It also
worked both ways, with companies which had lost a high percentage of their
workforce to the army actively encouraging their remaining employees not to
enlist or using enlistment to their advantage.
Messrs R McAlpine & Sons offered £5 to each of their employees who were
willing to enlist for 'active service', and 5/- per week to the wives and 1/- 6d
for each child, with no limit being placed on the number of employees that
they were willing to sponsor in this way. 373
 At the same time, September
1914, the directors of the Sheepbridge Coal and Iron Company offered a
slightly lower bonus of £2 to every man in their employ enlisting within a
week. Even with this low bonus the response was excellent. 374 The majority of
employers were not in a position to offer a bonus to those enlisting but many,
like the Clyde Trust, were able to hold open jobs for all who enlisted and
make up the wages of those employees who enlisted. Some, like Arbroath
Town Council, were willing to continue paying their employees on 'active
service' but deducted the standard infantry rate of 1/- per day, while others,
like Dundee Council, which had agreed at the outset to continue the wages of
any of their employees who enlisted, soon reneged from the agreement
East of Fife Record, 4 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 1 September 1915.
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when the numbers, and consequently the financial burden, increased. Others,
like the Great Central Railway, announced that all single men joining the
colours would be treated as being on leave without pay. However the
company did agree to pay the employee contributions to the superannuation
fund. As we have seen in Chapter Three the funding of recruitment bonuses
was a prime mover in the contracting coal industry, with both companies and
wealthy individuals puthng forward thousands of pounds to promote
recruiting. The concept of retaining employment for those employees who
enlisted was confined to the commercial sector, service industries, and local
government. Heavy industry, Scotland's economic heart, made no such
promises. With jobs gone due to economic collapse there was nothing to hold
open. The majority of Scotland's working class, recruiting in such large
numbers, did so without the need for enticement or the benefit of a safety-net.
The exception to this was the coal industry which was quick to make
promises which, although providing some relief to miners' families (in the case
of free coal and rent free housing), was not an economic drain on the
industry.
After the initial outpouring of corporate enthusiasm companies began to
restrict the recruitment of their work force, more so once industry began to
recover, government contracts were issued, and war production commenced.
There were claims in July 1915 that textile workers in Forfar and Dundee
were being prevented from enlisting by employers with government contracts.
This contrasts greatly with the initial reaction of the textile industry in the
opening months of the war, especially in Dundee where a recruitment office
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had been installed in the town's largest mill. Railway companies, once the
demand on rail transport grew, made every effort to retain their employees in
the face of increasing demands for renewed recruiting efforts. 375 As early 10
September 1914 The Dundee Advertiser published a statement, issued on 8
September by the Central Recruiting Office for widespread distribution,
stating that 'men employed on the railways, in the manufacture of armaments,
or with food-producing companies are not to be accepted unless they have
certificates from their employers that they can be spared'.376
As the war-time economy strengthened there was increasing competition for
manpower. By 1915 industry, especially any connected with government
contracts, could offer higher wages than the military. As early as 18
November 1914, Robert Thornburn & Sons, Ardeer Works, Stevenston, were
advertising for navvies at the rate of over 7d per hour: an opportunity to earn
more in a day than an infantryman could earn in a week. 3 By March 1915
there was indirect competition for the diminishing manpower reserves
between the navy and the army. The army needed recruits for military service
while the navy, in the shape of Easton Gibb and Son Ltd, were desperate for
navvies and labourers to speed up the construction of the Rosyth Naval Base.
Gibb's were offering 7 1Ad per hour with guaranteed 'Steady employment at
the same rate for two years'.378
P. Dewey, 'Military Recruiting'. p. 213.
376 The Dundee Advertiser, 10 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 18 November 1914.
Forfar Herald, 5 March 1915.
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With the excess manpower already in uniform, the numbers coming forward
to enlist were not enough to compensate for the high number of casualties
suffered in the first few months of static warfare. To combat this competition
and increase recruitment numbers a more direct and personal approach had
to be taken to stimulate recruitment. Those willing to enlist would do so of
their own volition: therefore, pressure had to be brought to bear on those who
were seen to be hanging back. March 1915 brought a renewed appeal
directed at those with easily replaceable jobs under the heading '4 Questions
to Clerks and Shop Assistants'. The questions were purely a means of
bringing pressure to bear upon one particular group which had been seen to
hold back.
1. If you are between 19 and 38 years of age are you really satisfied
with what you are doing to-day?
2. Do you feel happy as you walk along the streets and see brave men
in khaki who are going to fight for the Empire while you stay at home in
comfort?
3. Do you realise that our gallant soldiers are risking everything on
the Continent to save you, your children, and your womenfolk?
4. Will you tell your employer to-day that you are going to enlist? Ask
him to keep your position open for you - tell him that you are going to
fight for the Empire. He'll do the right thing by you - all the
patriotic employers are helping their men to join.379
Dundee Advertiser, 24 March 1915.
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This continual battle to stimulate recruitment was to be the dominating feature
of 1915. That year was to be one of endless recruitment drives in the struggle
to maintain the number of recruits at a realistic level. As economic stability
returned to Scothsh industry and the flow of workers enlisting dried up, the
focus moved to those in employment other than industry or agriculture: those
in easily replaceable or dispensable employment, workers who could easily
be replaced by those ineligible for military service, the young, the elderly, and,
more importantly, women.
On 2 September 1915 recruiting for the technical units was expanded and
there were advertisements for whee!wrights for the Army Ordnance Corps to
be paid at the rate of 5/- per day all found, while later in the same month there
was a call for clerks and shorthand typists for the Army Service Corps.° This
was closely followed on 2 October with one last effort to stimulate recruitment
by holding a National Recruiting Rally throughout the United Kingdom. At the
same time, on 6 October recruiting authorities announced that the Mechanical
Transport was open for 'drivers, fitters, turners, and blacksmiths at 61- a
day'. 381 However this last minute attempt to stimulate recruitment failed. On
17 October 1915 it was announced that,
The last of the Rosebery recruiting meetings at Leith for the present
was held on Saturday afternoon. Keenly as Provost Smith, the
° Dundee Advertiser, 28 September 1915.
381 Dundee Advertiser, 6 October 1915.
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Convenor of the (Rosebery Recruiting) Committee, felt the need of
filling up the ranks, he realised that the meetings had, at least for the
present, done all the service they were capable of doing. The
committee had held fully 170 meetings.382
This was the beginning of the end for voluntary recruitment in Scotland.
COMPULSION
There were other methods used to exert pressure on individuals. As already
mentioned the Scottish upper class was the group with the greatest
ideological tie with imperial defence. Unfortunately, since they were in a
position of influence, this tended to manifest itself in the sacrifice of others as
well as themselves. As emphasised by T. M. Devine, while the upper class
and aristocracy of Scot'and did, no doubt, suffer large scale personal loss,
'the majority of the sons of landowners survived the conflict'. 383 Devine places
the number of the Scottish aristocracy who died in the war at forty-two. Taken
from a total number of 225 relatives of Scottish peers who served in the war
this is a high percentage, some 18.6 per cent. Sir Ralph Anstruther arrived
at the recruiting office in Cupar with his chauffeur, four of his gardeners, and
one of his footmen. The six unfortunates were then enlisted in the Black
Watch. There was no choice; failure to enlist would be taken as termination of
employment whereas military service would guarantee the recruit's future
employment within the Anstruther household. Captain Stewart, the recruiting
382 Dundee Advertiser, 17 October 1915.
T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 455.
T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, p. 455.
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officer for Cupar, remarked that 'if all the landed proprietors would follow the
lead of Sir Ralph, Lord Kitchener's second army would soon be full'. 385 The
opinions of Captain Stewart were not shared by all recruiting officers. Major
Ross, another Fife-based recruiting officer remarked that 'It did not do to use
coercion in joining the ranks. The man who came in willingly was three times
better than the other who was forced to come'.3
Sir Ralph was not alone in his desire to encourage recruitment from his
domestic employees. The new Earl of Weymss went so far as to threaten to
dismiss any of his estate workers, between the ages of eighteen and thirty,
who did not take the opportunity to enlist. Those who did would have their
places kept open for them and would be paid half wages while 'away with the
colours', while those who did not enlist would be 'compelled' to leave their
empIoyment. 7 Lord Rosebery drove round his estates collecting his young
employees for recruitment. In all cases the future livelihood of the men
involved and the welfare of their families were at stake and they, in all reality,
had no choice but to enlist. By no stretch of the imagination could these men
be called volunteers. Meanwhile it was reported that, in Glasgow, the owners
of motor cars were patrolling the streets advertising for recruits, 'shanghaiing'
those that they found lounging around and transporting them to the nearest
recruiting office. 388 It was announced in the Daily Record that, 'The Duke of
Atholl and the Earl of Haddington have been interesting themselves in the
East of Fife Record, 4 September 1914.
386 Dundee Advertiser, 15 December 1914.
C. Dakers, The Countryside at War 19 14-1918. p. 26. T. Royle, In Flanders Fields. p. 12.
388 Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
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raising of Lord Kitchener's army'. 389
 Whether the syntax of the article was
intentional or not, and at this early stage of the war it would probably be not,
the impression given was that the aristocracy viewed the raising of the New
Armies as nothing more than a pleasant past-time, an interlude in their dull
existence.
In Perthshire, as in other areas of Scotland, the entire police force had been
authorised to act as recruiting agents. This in itself restricted individual
freedom of choice since to most people the police represented the
recognisable face of authority and it would be in the nature of many to follow
the 'advice' given by the local police officer. Faced with this pressure many
who were undecided or wavering would succumb and enlist. At the sheriff
court in Forfar the local Chief Constable, as early as 20 August 1914,
suggested that those brought before the court on charges such as
drunkenness be 'persuaded' to enlist. One such luckless individual was
Robert McIntosh, a drover who was charged with drunkenness, and whose
reply to the suggestion of the court was that 'at thirty one he was too old for
military service'.390
 The option of military service for those appearing before
the courts was not isolated to Forfar.
The number of convicted persons sent to prison in Scotland's four main cities
in September 1914 shows a marked drop over the figures for the same month
in 1913.
Daily Record, 1 September 1914.
° The Forfar and Kirriemuir Advertiser, 21 August 1914.
391 The Scotsman, 6 October, 1914.
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FIG 4:12 Number sent to prison from four main cities.392
Edinburgh Glasgow Dundee Aberdeen
1913	 308	 1946	 150	 184
1914	 202	 1497	 155	 115
# Change	 -106	 -449	 +5	 -69
% Change	 - 34.4	 - 23.1	 + 3.2	 - 37.5
The exception to this was Dundee which showed an increase in the number
of men imprisoned. The apparent reluctance of Dundonians to enlist was
endemic, with prison seemingly preferred over military service. As we have
seen already, with economic stability in Dundee there was no need to enlist.
A short term in prison would be followed by a return to employment.
The looming spectre of conscription was used as a stick to encourage
recruitment, not only in 1915 but right from the start; politically as well as
morally. As early as 1 September 1914, in an article addressed to 'The young
men', Mr Neil Morrison of the National Reserve, declared that 'a choice must
be made between voluntary and compulsory military service'. 393
 He
concluded his appeal to the youth of Scotland by calling on them to take up
arms in defence of their country. 'Do not be a shirker, but pick up one of our
rifles and prove yourself a man'.3
392 The Scotsman, 6 October 1914.
Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
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On 9 January 1915, at a recruiting rally in the Corn Exchange, Dalkeith, Lord
Rosebery, in his capacity as Lord Lieutenant of Mid-Lothian, praised
Scotland's response to the recruitment question. He went on however to say
I think that if sufficient recruits are not got by the voluntary system you
will very soon see some system of compulsion inaugurated. I think that
that would not be unwelcome to a great many of my fellow-
countrymen, who would be willing to go under some Imperial mandate
of that kind, but who do not think that it is fair that they should be
singled out for active service while others remain at home.395
This method of compulsion was followed immediately by a different form of
economic pressure for enlistment than that experienced so far: intensified
pressure on the individual rather than on the group. No enlistment in the war -
no jobs after it. One such attempt at economic pressure came from the
National Patriotic Association, which urged employers to issue a statement to
the effect that 'when filling up positions after the war we intend to give
preference to those who have served their country under arms or in making
munitions of war.' 3 This was a proposal endorsed by The King, Lord
Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, and Lloyd George, and was an overt threat
based on future employment.
Dundee Advertiser, 11 January 1915.
Dundee Advertiser, 23Apr11 1915.
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There were also threats based on present employment prospects. On 10
December 1914, at a meeting of the Eastern District Committee of
Stirlingshire County Council at Falkirk, held to discuss relief work for the
unemployed, it was suggested by Mr Andrew Hunter that 'if some men got
work they would, perhaps, shirk their duty to their country. It was agreed to
instruct the Road Surveyor that men able to join the army should not be
employed.' 397
 This practice was not confined solely to Stirlingshire but was
quite commonplace throughout Scotland. Lord Hamilton of DaIzell took a
similar view early in August 1914, when he suggested that no relief should be
given to unmarried men of suitable age, thereby forcing them to enlist. He
went on to say that 'This is so clearly the right course, both from an economic
and a patriotic point of view'. 398
 His rather oblique concept of patriotism was
to force those less fortunate into military service. In Dundee the local
tramways department took the decision not to take on any replacement staff
unless they were certified unfit for military service.399
By early October 1914 the Glasgow Night Asylum was reported empty of
those young unemployed men who were normally resident there: These had
all disappeared; they had gone to serve their country'. 40° Those young men
who were now left in residence were unfit for military service. The number of
vagrants in the city was also greatly reduced. By the end of December 1914
Dundee Advertiser, 11 December 1914.
398 Evening Times, 19 August 1914.
Dundee Advertiser, 29 October 1914,
°° Annual Meeting of the Glasgow Night Asylum, reported in The Scotsman, 6 October,
1914.
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they had reduced to less than 50 per cent of the figure for June 1914, and 51
per cent of December the previous year.401
In mid-December 1914 the work began of sending out the circulars for the
Householders Survey, issued in Edinburgh by the Scottish Section of the
Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, which invited all men between the ages
of 19 and 38 who were willing to serve in the army to register their names.
Within Scotland, Dundee, Glasgow and Edinburgh, by virtue of their status as
the three main Scottish cities, were set apart as special areas for the purpose
of estimating the remaining Scottish recruitment potential. In December 1914
Dundee Trades Council refused to help in, or support, the recruiting
campaign. They had taken the decision that 'while their members preserve
perfect freedom of action, the council, as a corporate body, should not assist
in the recruiting campaign in the city'. 402
 The Trades Council viewed the low
rates of pay awarded to soldiers as slave labour and could not condone any
form of support. Once again this can be seen as psychological pressure
aimed at reducing personal choice.
On 17 December Dundee began issuing the circulars and immediately
received a reply from one man marked 'see Luke 14-23' which reads 'Go out
into the highways and hedges and compel them to come in'.403
401 The Scotsman, I January 1915.
402 Dundee Advertiser, 10 December 1914.
403 Dundee Advertiser, 18 December 1914.
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By mid-1915 there was, in the face of competition from a recovered and
buoyant industry, a serious shorifall in the monthly numbers of recruits
coming forward. In the second half of 1915 two different schemes were
initiated to stimulate voluntary recruitment. The first was the National Register
under which every British subject between the ages of 16 and 65 was
required to register with the government. The National Register Act came into
force on 15 July. Drafted by Walter Long, it was designed to provide a record
of the number of men in the country and so make it easier to calculate the
available manpower. A register was compiled of all men and women between
fifteen and sixty-five, The register recorded details of occupation, family and
birth. This register was intended to be used to sharpen the focus of the
recruitment campaigns.404 On 1 September the Dundee Advertiser reported
that there was a return of 37,622 men in the city for the National Register.405
Later, in a memorandum on 29 September 1915, Walter Long put the number
of men still available in Scotland for military service as 100,000 'allowing for
men reserved for essential war, domestic and export industries'.406
On 5 October Lord Derby, who had proved invaluable in promoting voluntary
recruitment in England, was appointed Director of Recruitment. Although an
advocate of conscription as the means to alleviate Britain's manpower
shortage, he was willing to undertake one further effort to stimulate
recruitment on a purely voluntary basis. However, he had extracted from
P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 144-5.
'° Dundee Advertiser, 1 September 1915.
406 PRO. CAB 37/134/32.
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Asquith agreement that, if this effort failed to produce the required number of
recruits to maintain the manpower level required by the army, then
compulsion would immediately be introduced. The result was the Derby
Scheme, by which men between the ages of 18 and 41 were to be
encouraged to attest their willingness, or otherwise, to volunteer. This would
be done on the understanding that all single men would be called before any
married men would be taken. This could only work if all single men attested a
willingness to serve. However, it was implicit that if not enough single men
volunteered, then conscription would quickly follow, It was portrayed as the
last chance to serve by choice rather than face the stigma of compulsion.
Nationally (Britain), of the 2.2 million single men who it was believed were still
available for service, only some 840,000 were prepared to attest. Of this
figure 300,000 were rejected for a variety of medical reasons.407
In Great Britain approximately 1.35 million married men attested, trusting the
government to hold to its pledge that all single men would be called first.
Unfortunately this was now unfeasible, with a higher number of married men
attesting than single. Over one million single men had, for whatever reason,
failed to attest and the Derby Scheme was deemed to have fallen short of its
objective, although it was not adjudged to have been a failure since it did
prompt a last surge in voluntary recruitment. Conscription was to be the next
step. Scotland was no exception to this pattern. The Derby scheme was yet
another example of civilians taking control of the recruiting campaign.
De Groot, Blighty. p. 94-7.
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FIG 4:13 Poster depicting the group system. October/November 1915.
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The canvass of homes was organised and conducted by local recruiting
committees, utilising the local political offices and political agents: local
knowledge to promote local recruitment. Malcolm MacFarlane was one
political worker who undertook to work on the scheme in Paisley, through the
organisation of the West Renfrewshire Central Committee of the Liberal Club.
His notes show that 50 per cent of those canvassed were unwilling to enlist or
felt that they were unfit for military service, while 4 per cent stated that they
were not prepared to join as there were 'too many slackers', and a further 4
per cent had no confidence in the government. Of those who declared
themselves unwilling or unfit 50 per cent were single and 50 per cent
married 408
There does however appear to have been some misinterpretation of the
design of the Derby Scheme and ambiguity as to the original intention. On 5
December 1915 Lord Richard-Frederick Cavendish, Supervisor and
Organiser of Recruiting in Lancashire, explained to the Blackburn Recruiting
Committee that 'married men will not be called up for service until the single
men have gone. If compulsion should not be brought into force for single
men, married men who have been attested will be released from their
pledge'.409
This was given as an official explanation and appears to indicate that
compulsion was intended from the outset. If married men were only to be
408 Scottish National Library Acc 9736 No 55.
409 Dundee Advertiser, 6 December 1915.
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called up after all single men had gone, then in order to enlist all single men,
attested or not, compulsion would be necessary. Since those initiating, and
those administering, the Derby Scheme went to the trouble of attesting
married men it would appear that compulsion, of the single men at least, was
the aim of the scheme from its inception, and not, as has been thought, the
continuance of voluntary recruitment. There were other indicators that the
voluntary pretext of the Derby Scheme was nothing other than a sophism for
publlc consumption. Appeal tribunals were convened in order that men could
appeal against the category or group to which they had been allocated.
Individuals were allocated to these groups depending on age, marital status,
dependants, employment, etc. If the Derby Scheme was a serious attempt to
continue the voluntary ethos, then there would be no reason to institute a
tribunal system which was only necessary in a conscriptive society. Only the
first eight groups at any time were able to appeal against their category.
Those were the groups which contained the single men under the age of
twenty six. As groups were called up then the tribunal would deal with the
next eight in line.
At the very least it must be said that Derby and Asquith followed a twin track
approach towards recruitment which casts a shadow on the commitment, or
lack of it, to the continuation of the voluntary system of recruitment. By mid-
December the mechanism for the tribunals was in place and appeal forms
had been distributed: form R 9 if an employer was appealing on behalf of an
individual and form R 11 if the individual was appealing on his own behalf.
Both forms were to be returned within seven days. Those attesting under the
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Derby Scheme were issued with khaki armbands and by January 1916 those
who had been rejected on medical grounds were also to be issued armbands
to signify their willingness, but inability, to enlist. The tribunals were also
charged with reviewing the status of those who were in 'starred' occupations,
exempt from military service, deciding whether an individual should retain or
lose this status. Such powers were only required in a compulsory system. To
put such safeguards in place before the Derby Scheme had been completed
shows that the scheme was never considered to be a viable prospect. That
these measures were put in place while the scheme was being conducted
shows the true direction of government policy. The use of Lord Derby, and his
scheme, assured that Asquith was seen to be one step removed from the
policy of compulsion. Peter Simkins states that
The choice of Derby demonstrated Asquith's political adroitness, for
Derby was a well known supporter of conscription, and if the scheme
failed to produce the necessary number of recruits Asquith could justly
claim that voluntary recruiting had failed and thereby provide himself
with a sort line of tactical withdrawal.4'°
There was an advertisement in the Glasgow Herald on 15 November 1915,
'enlist before 30 November. If you do not, the Prime Minister has pledged
himself and his Government that compulsory means will be taken'. 411 The
original intention was to complete the canvass by 30 November 1915 but the
410 P Simkins, Kitchener's Army, p. 150.
411 Glasgow Herald, 15 November 1915.
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last minute rush forced the register to remain open until 4 December, later
extended further to 11 December, and finally closing on 15 December.
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CHAPTER 5
ARMY RECRUITMENT.
Although the army was aware of the crisis in Europe and the potential
consequences, it, like the government and the population, was overwhelmed
by the speed and escalation of events. On 6 August 1914, the newly
appointed Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, gained parliamentary
approval to raise 500,000 men for what was seen as, initially at any rate, a
'new expeditionary force'. On the following day, 7 August 1914, he issued his
initial appeal in the national and regional press for the first hundred thousand
recruits for his New Army, a temporary addition to the regular army and
recruited for the duration only. Lord Kitchener had decided that, instead of
utilising the existing Town and County Associations of the Territorial Force as
a recruiting organisation, as envisaged by Haldane as the natural expansion
of the army, he would create new 'service' battalions within the existing
regimental system. Each regiment would raise men for a series of battalions
which would be numbered in succession after the existing regular, territorial,
and reserve battalions. Each of these service battalions would have an
extended period of training, envisaged at nine months, before being
committed to the front line.
Much has been written about the reasons for Kitchener's decision to bypass
the territorial recruiting system, ranging from his experiences with poorly
trained militia while serving with the French Army to his dislike for a 'town
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clerks army'. It was more likely that he was merely planning on the long term.
Gerard DeGroot states that he 'preferred to start from scratch with a new
army unencumbered by tradition, trained according to the demands of this
war, enlisted for the duration, and able to be sent wherever necessity
dictated'.406
This New Army would be recruited for service overseas, unlike the Territorial
Force whose members had to agree to service abroad. It was better to start
with a clean slate than to have an army whose soldiers were at varying
degrees of competence and ability. The New Army at least offered a
consolidated training period and set a common training standard for all.
However, as we shall see in the following chapters, Kitchener did not totally
disregard the Territorial system. On 10 August 1914 he called on the
chairmen of the Territorial Force County Associations to co-operate in 'raising
the additional number of recruits required at once for the army'. 407 On the
following day Lord Inverclyde, the Lord-Lieutenant of Dumbartonshire, issued
an appeal for support to Lord Kitchener's effort to augment the strength of the
Regular Army.
Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, has written to me to do
all I can by myself, and through the Territorial Force Association of the
County, to raise an additional 100,000 men to the regular army. I
appeal with confidence to the men of the county, to respond to the
406 oJ• DeGroot, Blighty. p. 43.
401 Daily Record, 10 August 1914.
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invitation, which is not an ordinary appeal for recruits, but the formation
of a Second Army.408
Kitchener was not alone in his belief that the war would be a long protracted
affair consuming millions of men. He was supported in this by Douglas Haig
and Sir Henry Rawlinson. In the 1906 army reforms Major-General Haig,
Director of Military Training, had championed a scheme which, using the
Territorial Force, was 'aimed at placing an army of 900,000 in the field after
twelve months and keeping it there for five years'. 409 Peter Simkins points out
that 'Where Kitchener differed from most of his political and military
colleagues was in his estimate that the war would last at least three years and
that British military strength could not be fully deployed until 1917.4b0 John
Pollock states that at his first cabinet meeting Kitchener announced that the
war would last three years. 411 In his book Proud Heritage L B Oatts is also
keen to point out that Kitchener was convinced that the war would involve
millions of men and that fighting would continue for several years.412 Clive
Hughes also puts forward the point that Kitchener 'anticipated' a three year
conflict.413
Kitchener was relying on France to withhold the German onslaught until
Britain had time to raise and train a new army capable of defeating a depleted
408 The Evening Citizen, Ii August 1914.
J. Coach, 'Haldane and the National Army'. in Beckett & Coach. Politicians and Defence.
0. 79.
P. Simkins. Kitchener and the Expansion of the Army'. in Beckett & Gooch, Politicians and
Defence. p. 96.
411 j Pollock, Kitchener. p. 384.
412 L. B. Oatts, Proud Heritage; the Story of the Highland Light Infantry. Vol 3. p. 146.
413 C. Hughes, 'The New Armies', in Beckett and Simpson. p. 100.
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enemy. Britain's initial contribution was to be the strength of her navy and the
sacrifice of her regular soldiers; the new armies were not intended to be ready
or committed until 1917. Kitchener's intention was to create a series of
complete new armies, envisaging initially a total of thirty divisions. This
number rose rapidly and by mid-1915 stood at a target of seventy divisions.414
As we have described in Chapter Three, the response to this call for
volunteers was widespread and varied, and depended firmly on regional
employment and population conditions.
However, the formation of New Army battalions was not left to the dictates of
local recruiting but was directed, initially at least, by the War Office. Each
Scottish regiment was directed to raise a battalion for each of the First,
Second and Third New Armies in August and September. The exceptions to
this were the Royal Scots and the Highland Light Infantry, which were
required to provide an extra battalion for the First New Army. 4 ' 5 These were
the only two Scottish regiments to raise two battalions for KI, and was a
reflection of the size of their pre-war contribution to the army and of the
regional population. By the end of October 1914 Scotland had thirty-two
battalions complete or nearing completion. There were a further five
battalions, in various stages of recruitment, being raised by individuals or
local civil bodies.416
414 j • Gooch, 'Kitchener', in Beckett & Gooch Politicians and Defence. p. 97.
415 Oatts, Proud Heritage. p. 147.
416 Chapter 6.
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The outbreak of war found Britain with a recruiting system totally inadequate
for the situation and unable, or unwilling, to adapt. Chaotic scenes were
played out throughout the country as men attempted to enlist. Streets were
filled with eager volunteers while recruiting staff, ignoring the urgency of the
moment, went through the slow regulation process of enlistment. In London,
crowds thronged the streets outside the recruiting office at Great Scotland
Yard, while in Glasgow smaller but no less enthusiastic groups gathered
outside the Gallowgate recruiting office. On 8 August it was reported that 'The
rush at the Glasgow recruiting office continued, and the police had difficulty in
getting hundreds of intending soldiers to wait in the queues till their turn
came' 417
Some men, faced with the bureaucracy and delay, left in disgust, no doubt
lost to the army until conscription in 1916. Those who did manage to enlist
were to find that the chaos was not limited to the recruiting system but was
present in all aspects of army life. The pre-war recruiting system was geared
towards an annual recruitment rate of 30,000 men, 'less than 100 per day
over the entire United Kingdom'. 4 ' 8 The rush of recruits in August and
September 1914 found this peacetime system unable to cope. The army
could not feed, clothe, arm, or train its new recruits.
417 Dundee Advertiser, 8 August 1914.
418 P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 52.
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As we have seen in Chapter Two, Scotland was divided into two military
districts, the First or Highland district with six recruiting areas and the Second
or Lowland District, with seven.
Fig 5:1 Scottish recruiting districts.
First or Highland Division
Regiment and Recruiting Area
	 Counties Included
Dundee Recruiting area.
Black Watch.	 City of Dundee.
42 regimental recruiting area, Perth.
Black Watch	 Perth, Forfar, Fife.
72° Regimental recruiting area, Fort George.
	 Orkney, Shetland, Caithness, Sutherland,
Seaforth Highianders	 Ross and Cromarty, Naim and Elgin.
79' Regimental recruiting area, Inverness.
Cameron Highianders 	 Inverness.
75 Regimental recruiting area, Aberdeen.
Gordon Highlanders	 Aberdeen, Banif and Kincardine.
91st Regimental Recruiting area, Stirling.
	 Stirling,	 Clackmannan,	 Kinross,
Argyll and Sutherland Highianders 	 Dumbarton, Renfrew, Argyll and Bute.
Second or Lowland Division
Regiment and Recruiting Area	 Counties Included
15t Regimental Recruiting area, Glencorse.	 Edinburgh,	 (County)	 Linlithgow,
Royal Scots	 Haddington and Peebles.
21 Regimental Recruiting area, Ayr.
Royal Scots Fusiliers	 Ayr and \Nigtown.
25 Regimental Recruiting area, Berwick.
	 Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Dumfries and
Kings Own Scottish Borderers
	 Kirkcudbright.
26tn
 and 71st Regimental Recruiting area,
Hamilton. Cam eronians LScoUish Rifles)
	 Lanark.
Glasgow Recruiting area.
Highland Light Infantry	 Glasgow, Govan and Partick.
Edinburgh recruiting area.
Royal Scots
	 City of Edinburgh, Leith.
With the outbreak of war recruiting for the army was no longer centred solely
on the twelve regimental depots and their attached recruiting offices. For
recruiting purposes the United Kingdom was divided into areas which
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corresponded roughly to the existing counties, with the large towns being
treated separately. Within each of these areas there was an organisation
which consisted of recruiting officers and recruiters, who were charged with
obtaining men for enlistment from within their area. The recruits were then
dispatched to the central recruiting depot for their area and from there
forwarded in groups to the regiment or corps of their choice. The rash of
recruiting offices which sprang up were varied but they were still regulated
from a central group of main recruiting centres. There were, initially at least,
thirty of these centres spread around Scotland, many of them the existing pre-
war recruiting offices and depots. These offices collected the recruiting data
for their area and nightly telephoned London with the daily recruitment
figures. In most cases the recruitment numbers for the outlying or auxiliary
offices were lost as they were included in the returns for the main centres but
there are enough of them to give an overall picture of Scottish recruitment for
the New Armies.
One example of this amalgamation of figures is the daily returns for Glasgow
which, in late August 1914, had as many as thirty recruiting offices, both
military and political, but whose figures were sent each evening as one
number attributed to the Gallowgate recruiting office. While this gives a
number for Glasgow as a whole it limits the availability of recruitment statistics
for the various districts within the city. However, as a counter to this negative
aspect of the official records, there are figures, limited in some areas,
available in the local press which, initially at any rate, took pride in
announcing to its readers the sacrifices made by the local populace in the
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name of recruitment; as recruitment slowed so did the enthusiasm of the
press to publish recruitment numbers. Much has been made of the high
numbers of recruits provided by the various areas but these numbers should
be viewed in the context that they were given; as an encouragement to
stimulate recruitment. Trevor Royle assures us that by the end of August
1914 '20,000 men had enlisted at the Glasgow recruiting office in the
Gallowgate.'419 On the other hand the official recruiting returns show that
Glasgow produced just 8,357 recruits in August 1914, and not all of them in
the Gallowgate recruiting office. Similarly expanded claims were made for
other areas, such as 900 from Clydebank - officially 123, and 940 from
Dumbarton - which was officially 437420
BOOM OR BUST
The rise in recruitment numbers from mid August to early September 1914
has been seen as a recruitment boom in its own right but, in Scotland at least,
it was only an escalation of the original recruiting surge, an increase in scale
as the numbers became available, or, if you like, a phase two. The initial rush
to enlist at the outbreak of war, phase one, was fuelled by a variety of factors.
It can be seen as a direct reaction to the onset of war by those people
enlisting: the immediate enthusiasm of the upper class, the euphoria of the
occasion, and the rush of the unemployed.
419 T. Royle, In Flanders Field, p. 12. NATS 1/398.
420 
• Royle, In Flanders Field. p. 12. NATS 1/398.
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The H.L.l. Depot at Hamilton, already worked off its feet dealing with
the reservists, was thrown into a complete state of chaos lasting four
days, by "a howling rabble arriving from Glasgow to enlist." These stout
hearts declined to leave, and the majority slept in the open in and
around the barracks until they could be dealt with-when two of them
were found to have only one leg apiece, one tried to get away with "a
wooden foot", and several others had glass eyes.421
One part of Scottish society was driven by emotion and social conditioning
while another was concerned with the immediate relief from poverty,
deprivation, and the stigma of poor relief. William Linton Andrews, a journalist
in Dundee, used his literary skills to explain the sight that greeted his arrival at
the local drill hail.
Men were pouring in, overwhelming the ordinary staffs. Men were
ready to sign anything, and say anything. They gave false names, false
addresses, false ages. They suppressed their previous military service,
or exaggerated it, just as seemed to promise them best. Recruits had
to sign as fast as they could. They did not trouble to read their papers.
Most of them were more eager in those early days about getting their
food than their commitments to King and country.4
This was not only a Scottish phenomenon; it could be seen in other parts of
421 Oatts. Proud Heritage. p. 146-7.
422 W. L. Andrews, The Haunting Years. p. 13.
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the United Kingdom, especially among those with a low standard of living and
low expectations. P Callan, in his thesis on recruiting in Ireland, states that
'The seductive quality of steady pay was more than many an unemployed
man with a family could bear'423
In the Scottish cities this recruitment surge in the first few days certainly
contained those often referred to as the detritus of society. Those who were
unemployed, unemployable or on poor relief were only too willing to take
advantage of the umbrella of short-term military service which, in time of
national crisis, would not carry the normal pre-war social stigma. Those who
enlisted later for the second and third New Armies, in late August and
September 1914, were acknowledged to be of a higher standard although
they were still mostly industrial workers, in this case skilled. Clive Hughes
asserts that 'many waited until they were convinced of the need to join, and
enlisted only after their affairs were properly settled'. 424
 Hughes fails to point
out that it was personal, or family, needs which governed their desire, not
national needs. However Hughes is correct in claiming that 'these skilled
artisans were responsible for September's boom figures: Germains' "superior
type of citizen" of the Second and Third New Armies'. 425
 The initial recruiting
period in Scotland is slightly more complex than the 'boom and bust' theorists
would have us believe. While recruitment did rise dramatically in early
September 1914, and did fall away just as quickly, the increase was not a
'spontaneous outpouring of emotion' but, as we have seen in chapter three,
423 P. CaIlan, Voluntaty Recruitment for the British Army in Ireland during the First World War.
Unpublished PhD, University College Dublin, 1984, p. 54.
424 C. Hughes, 'The New Armies', in Beckett and Simpson. p. 101.
425 c Hughes, The NewArmies, in Beckett and Simpson. p. 101.
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merely the result of human economic necessity coupled with the
inadequacies of the army recruiting mechanism.
For the first few days tradesmen were required but, following on the heels of
Lord Kitchener's first public appeal for his New Armies, recruiting offices
enrolled men for general service in the infantry only, turning away those who
sought to bring their skills into military service. The difference in pay was
enough to limit the initial recruiting response. While an infantry private earned
one shilling per day, a blacksmith or engineer could earn six times as much.
By Saturday 8 August Scotland had raised 920 recruits for the army,
representing 11 .23 per cent of the British total for the first week of the war.
These numbers increased when, on Monday 10 August, Scotland produced
872 recruits or 18 per cent of the British daily total of 4,831 men. By the
following day, when notices turning away skilled artisans were displayed at
recruiting stations, the British daily total had increased by 68.8 per cent to
7,020 while the Scothsh daily total had decreased by 24.1 per cent to 662.
For the first twelve days of the war recruiting in Scotland remained fairly
constant, higher proportionally than pre-war but lower than the available
levels of manpower - the result of rapid industrial collapse as described in
Chapter Three. In the second week Scotland contributed 5,663 recruits or
12.94 per cent of the British total of 43,764.426
426 NATS 1/398.
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The first major change in Scottish recruitment occurred on 15 August when it
was announced that 'The local Political Associations, Liberal and Unionist,
throughout Scotland, have constituted themselves collecting centres of
recruits, to aid in the enlistment of the 100,000 men called for by Lord
Kitchener.'427
 The effect was immediate, with Scotland's proportion of national
recruiting rising overnight to 33.59 per cent on 16 August: the highest
proportion recorded throughout the entire voluntary period. 428
 The rise in
recruitment came about because the political recruiting offices, as well as
bringing enlistment to the outlying industrial districts, were not restrictive in
terms of enlistment. Those recruits who had been unable to travel, sometimes
long distances, to the main recruiting offices could now enlist locally, and,
more importantly, for any branch of the service. Skilled men were not
restricted to the infantry and could enlist for the higher wages available in the
technical arms of the service. The importance of this could be seen in
Glasgow where, with a large, predominantly skilled, workforce, twenty-eight
new recruiting offices were available. In the third week of recruitment, which
was the first week of the political recruiting offices, 9,657 men enlisted in
Scotland, 19.32 per cent of the British total for the week of 49,982.429
The figures could have been higher but the political offices were closed for
recruitment on 22 August, seven days after opening. They were found to be
too effective. The local military depots were overrun and overcrowded with
new recruits. Steps had to be taken to relieve the strain on the regimental
427 Daily Record, 15 August 1914.
428 NATS 1/398.
429 NATS 1/398.
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depots. Kitchener was forced to rely on the Territorial Associations for help in
this area. Concentration camps (in 1914 there was as yet no stigma attached
to the name) were to be created to hold the excess recruits from the
regimental recruiting depots until the military machine could process them
and in this Lord Kitchener was obliged to seek help from the Territorial
Associations.
It is understood that with a view to relieving the congestion at a number
of recruiting depots a concentration camp is to be formed at
Dunfermline for the training of recruits. A letter has been received by
the Fife County Territorial Force Association from Lord Kitchener
intimating that they will be held responsible for the organisation of the
camp, and for accommodating, clothing, and feeding the men.43°
This was a long term solution. Measures had to be taken to relieve the
pressure in the short-term. In Glasgow as early 20 August 1914, General Sir
Spencer Ewart asked for the assistance of the Corporation of Glasgow in
dealing with the overflow of recruits and various public halls (St Andrews Hall,
City Hall, Parkhead Hall, Kingston Hall, Langside Hall, Dixon Hall,
Pollokshaws Hall, Whiteinch Hall, Springburn Hall, and the hail attached to
Whitevale Baths) were provided to accommodate 1,170 men. Not only was
shelter provided but the men were also fed by the Corporation.431 As a direct
result of instructions issued on 2 September 1914 to the General Officer
° Dundee Advertiser, 12 September 1914.
431 Glasgow Herald, 21 August 1914.
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Commanding Scothsh Command, concerning the transfer of surplus
manpower between regiments, on 4 September the War Office issued further
instructions to recruiting officers authorising them, in an effort to reduce
overcrowding, to recruit men for three years or the duration, with initially one
day only to be served with the colours and then in the Army Reserve until
called up. The recruits would be paid is 9d for their day's service with the
colours and then sent home on 6d per day or 3s 6d per week until required.
This produced hardship for those who had already left employment but
recruiting officers were allowed to 'exercise discretion as regards men who
have already left civil employment and may enlist them under old conditions
sending them at once to depots'.432
Those sent home were expected to be given ten days notice to resume
service with the colours. This was seen as a last resort and given a higher
priority on 6 September when the General Officer, Commanding Scottish
Command, was instructed by the War Office that
In filling up new service battalions and completing reserve battalions I
am relying on your diverting as far as you can within your own
command men who are surplus in one Infantry regiment to another
which is still deficient so as to complete all service and reserve
battalions of each regiment before instructions are issued to recruiting
PRO WO 162/24.
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officers to transfer recruits enlisted for that regiment temporarily to the
Army Reserve.433
Overcrowding at recruiting depots was proving hard to manage. By 8
September it was further announced that
Since the war commenced 803 recruits from Aberdeen, Banif, and
Kincardine, the regimental district of the Gordon Highianders have
joined the army at Castlehill Barracks, Aberdeen. At present there are
over 1,000 recruits at the Barracks, while a similar number, who have
arrived in Aberdeen from the West of Scotland, have been sent South
after having been provided with their equipment.4
Restriction of recruitment was used, for the first time, to remove the backlog.
Once again skilled men were prevented from enlisting and numbers dropped.
The reduction in recruits was immediate. On the day following the closure of
the Scottish political offices, recruitment in Scotland was down by over 40 per
cent on the previous day, a reduction of 510 men. In Glasgow the result was
more dramatic, with recruitment in the city dropping by over 78 per cent.435
Glasgow's displaced industrial labour was not only bearing the brunt of the
city's recruitment but also taking the lion's share nationally. Any restriction
placed upon them immediately manifested itself in the level of Scottish
recruitment. The recruiting setback meant that, due to the overcrowding in the
133 PRO. WO 162/24.
Dundee Advertiser, 8 September 1914.
NATS 1/398.
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military depots, some of those men who had just enlisted were sent home for
the weekend. This gave the wrong impression to those who were still
contemplating, and were undecided about, enlisting. The impression was
given, unintentionally, that the need for recruits was not as urgent as had
been previously stated and that the ranks of the army were now full.
The seven-day surge was over and recruiting had returned to the early levels
of the first few days of the war. The closure was short-lived however, and by
25 August the recruiting depots had cleared the backlog of recruits and the
political recruiting offices re-opened. The events of 16 August were quickly
repeated, when large numbers of recruits once more flocked to the political
offices. Numbers again rose sharply with 1,205 men or 11.75 per cent of the
British total enlisting on 26 August and 1,623 or 14.4 per cent on the following
day.4
 Recruitment was given a further boost on 28 August when the upper
age limit was increased from 30 to 35 years for those without previous military
experience. The combination of the relaxed recruitment policy in the political
offices and the new upper age limit created a second wave of recruitment in
Scotland. What has been seen up until now by Peter Simkins as a single
large scale recruitment boom was, in Scotland at least, not the case.437 Figure
5:2 shows that Scotland had two periods of increased recruitment in the first
two months of the war and clearly shows the effects when recruitment was
restricted on 22 August and 8 September.
436 PRO. NATS 1/398.
P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 49-75.
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Scottish Recruitment: 9 August 1914 to 3 October 1914
Scottish Weekly Total & Scottish Percent of British Recruitment
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The second recruitment rise lasted only slightly longer than the first and, as
we have seen, began with the re-opening of the political offices on 25 August
1914. This re-opening coincided with the first news reports of the Baffle of
Mons and up until now the upsurge of recruitment on this date has been
attributed, in part, by Simkins, to public reaction to such news. 439 However, as
we have seen, the upsurge was only the renewed enrolment of those who
had previously been prevented from recruiting. The number of recruits
increased in early September but Scotland's overall contribution declined as
British daily recruiting figures climbed to a peak of 33,204 on Thursday 3
September. The figure for Scotland on that day was 3,556 recruits or 10.71
PRO. NATS 1/398.
P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 58-9.
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per cent of the British total. While not yet at its peak this was still the second
highest daily number for Scotland.° Figure 5:2 demonstrates that, although
the recruitment figure for Scotland increased dramatically between 31 August
and 8 September, the higher recruitment elsewhere, especially in England,
reduced Scotland's proportional contribution.
Figure 5:3 demonstrates the sharp rise in recruitment in England and Wales
which reduced Scotland's proportional contribution and shows that while
Scotland had two distinct recruiting periods England and Wales had only one.
Even on 8 September Scotland's highest daily figure of 3,937 recruits only
produced a total of 13.06 per cent. While Scotland was producing high
numbers of recruits in September, the disparity between those and the
previous month was not so great as the rest of Britain. Therefore, although
the Scottish daily numbers increased, the percentage contribution reduced.
On 16 August Scotland raised 1,063 recruits, or 33 per cent, of the British
total of 3,215. By 3 September the British total daily figure had increased
tenfold to 33,204 while the Scottish figure had merely trebled to 3,556.1 The
proportion of British recruitment however had reduced to 10.71 per cent.
° NATS 1/398.
441 NATS 1/398.
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By 3 September it was being reported that 'The increased facilities for
recruiting afforded by the political parties have proved of the utmost
advantage in speeding up the process of enlistment'. 3 Between 15 August,
when the political offices in Glasgow first opened their doors to recruits, and 2
September, when a count was taken, 10,000 men had used these facilities to
enlist in the various branches of the army. Following the reopening of the
political offices over 33 000 men had come forward in the first seven days. On
2 September 1,001 men had enlisted in Glasgow. However, within this
number 412 had enrolled at the Gallowgate recruiting office, while 589 had
come forward at the political offices.
442 PRO. NATS 1/398.
Evening Citizen, 3 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 3 September 1914.
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While Scotland reached a numerical peak in the second week of September
her major contribution was in the weeks of August when she produced a
higher proportion of recruits. The most important week for Scottish
recruitment was in the third week of the war, 16 - 22 August, with 9,657
recruits or 19.32 per cent of the weekly British total of 49,982 (figure 5:2).
It would therefore appear that, as we have seen in Chapter Three, in Scotland
there was a higher proportion of the male population in a position, or
prepared, to enlist immediately. The numbers rose due to the change in age
limit but the end result was the same as the first recruiting surge. The military
depots and reception centres were again unable to cope with the influx of
recruits and restrictions were once again placed on recruitment.
Until now the view stated by Peter Simkins has been that the increase in
height and chest requirements brought in on 11 September 1914 was
responsible for the sudden decrease in recruitment numbers. 6 Certainly this
was the intention of the authorities and was in part the case but, in Scotland,
recruiting was already on the decline. The authorities in Scotland had several
days earlier, on 8 September, in an attempt to slow down the number of men
coming forward to en'ist, returned the recruiting restrictions to the level of the
first few days of the war. Scottish Military Headquarters had issued
instructions on that date to the Central Recruiting Committee of the Joint
NATS 1(398.
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Party Organisations to the effect that 'The political recruiting agencies have
been advised to attest only for the infantry of the New General Service
Army'. 7
 This instruction coincided with the highest daily recruitment figure for
Scotland and was the start of the decline in Scottish recruitment. The
changes brought in by the government three days later merely served to
accelerate the process (figure 5:4).
Scottish Recruitment: 9 August 1914 to 3 October 1914.
Thousands
	 Scottish Daily Total Recruitment & Scottish Percent of British Recruitment
Percent of British Total
August	 AugJst	 Septerrter	 Septent	 September	 September
Fig. 5:4
Figure 5:4 shows that Scotland produced both a high number of recruits and
a high percentage of the British total almost immediately. With the vagaries of
industry and the fluctuating recruiting standards, the country was unable to
maintain this high contribution. The numerical increase in September 1914,
phase two, can be viewed as the result of changes in recruitment restrictions
Daily Record, 8 September 1914.
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and also of indirect action, economic in nature, and was created not by the
recruits themselves but by the knee-jerk reaction of Scottish industry. It was
no coincidence that a high number of the men recruited in this period were
skilled workers. The period after the September high, or phase three, was a
levelling out of the recruiting numbers. Numbers were kept relatively constant
by the recruitment of those with easily replaceable jobs (bank clerks, shop
assistants, etc.) and those who succumbed to peer pressure or the pressure
of the ever increasing recruitment drives.
As early as the sixth week of the conflict Scotland was providing a
proportionally higher number of recruits than any of the other home countries:
over 14 per cent higher. For the first six weeks of the war, 4 August - 15
September, England provided 396,761 recruits or 2.4 per cent of the male
population, Scotland provided 64,444 men, or 2.8 per cent of the male
population, Ireland provided 20,419 men, 0.93 per cent, and Wales gave
19,966, or 1.94 per cent of the male population.9
Once the excess manpower had gone the country could only maintain
recruiting levels by applying an ever increasing pressure on the remaining
male population and by the coming of age of its young men. Once Scotlands
industry had been mobilised for war production, and the threat of
unemployment had receded, the economic pressure to enlist had gone. The
manpower shortage in industry which followed was a direct result of phase
two. Without the severe short-term reaction of Scottish industry the recruiting
Dundee Advertiser, 23 September, 1914.
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'boom' would have been over by late August. The increase in recruitment was
artificial. The boom was nothing more complex than economic need fuelled by
the short-term industrial collapse at the outbreak of war. The September
increase was not caused by a sudden desire to enlist, a spontaneous burst of
patriotism, but by a series of explicable events, It took more than an increase
in numbers to create a recruiting 'boom'. Those involved needed to have
been previously unavailable for recruitment, or not available but prevented. In
the main the Scottish increase was nothing more than a backlog created, in
part, by the inefficiency, inadequacy, and inflexibility of the military recruiting
system in the opening period of the war. The Scottish contribution in 1914
was not 'all or nothing' but a sustained effort over a period of some seven
weeks followed by a steady maintenance level as Scottish industry and
economy relaxed and adapted to war-time demands.
REGIMENTS
While there appears to have been an ample supply of manpower there
appears to have been a marked reluctance on the part of many to join the
infantry. An approximation of the number of men recruited into Scottish
regiments by the end of October 1914 would be 37,000. However, in this
same period Scotland produced some 81,278 recruits for the New Armies.
This would indicate that approximately 44,278 or 54 per cent of Scottish
recruits chose to join regiments that were not overtly Scothsh. 45° By the end
of December 1914 Scottish regiments contained approximately 47,000 men in
their various service and reserve battalions. Scotland had however produced
450 PRO, NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
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104,392 recruits in the same five month period; 55 per cent or 57,392 in
regiments without a direct Scottish link. 451 In Dundee for example, only 33 per
cent of council employees enlisting were doing so in Scottish regiments; 66
per cent were choosing to enlist in regiments without a direct Scottish
connection.452
 Recruits for the New Armies, at this time, were, in many
instances, able to stipulate the regiment or unit they wished to join and a
great many did so. Tradesmen and those with transferable skills applied for
engineering or technical units. When the transport companies in Leith had
their heavy horses requisitioned by the army, leaving 100 carters
unemployed, many simply enlisted in the army as carters 453. Similarly those
blacksmiths and saddlers whose livelihood was threatened by the
commandeering of horses found that they could continue their trade in the
army for five times the rate of an infantryman. Advertisements in the national
and regional press announced 'Tradesmen required. Saddlers and Smiths, 5s
per day and separation allowance.'
This pattern of going to the more technical arms is most evident in Glasgow
and Hamilton, the two most industrialised recruiting centres. The two
regiments within the recruiting areas, the Scottish Rifles and the Highland
Light Infantry, provided twelve service and reserve battalions by the end of
1914; approximately 13,000 men. In the same period there was raised 50311
recruits, providing a regional surplus of 37,311. It would appear therefore that
Glasgow and Hamilton alone provided enough men to fulfil the needs of
451 PRO, NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
452 Dundee Advertiser, 21 August 1914.
S. Mowat, The Port of Leith; its History and its People. p. 381.
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Scotland's contribution to the New Armies in 1914. As we have seen in
Chapter Three, a high proportion of those recruiting in this area were skilled
men taking temporary economic refuge in the army and using their skills to
enlist in higher paying technical units. Captain Ross, the recruiting officer at
the Gallowgate recruiting office, reported that 'In normal times our recruits are
chiefly from 18 to 20 years of age, but the men obtained during the rush
[September 19141 were older and of a better physique. They were for the
most part mature men, from 22 years of age upwards. Mechanics and clerks,
engineers and tradesmen of all kinds were among them.'4
Army recruitment in Scotland stood at 104,392 by 31 December 1914, rising
to 186,218 by December 1915, the end of the voluntary period. 455
 This was
some 61.7 per cent of all Scottish recruits raised in the voluntary period. In all
Scotland raised a total of sixty-three New Army battalions directly affiliated to
Scottish regiments, although not all were raised for active service and this
figure includes the various reserve, pioneer, labour, and garrison battalions
raised.
' Evening Citizen. 22 October 1914.
NATS 1/398. 1/399.
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9th (Reserve) Bn
10th (Works) Bn11th Bn
15th (Service) 1st Glasgow Bn
16th (Service) 2nd Glasgow Bn
17th (Service) 3 Glasgow Bn
18th (Service) 4th Glasgow Bantam Bn
8th (Reserve) Bn
9 (Labour) Bn
lit (Service) Bn
9 (Service) Bn (Pioneers)
FIG 5:5 Scottish New Army BattaIions6
ROYal Scots
11 (Service) Bn
12h (Service) Bn
13th (Service) Bn
14th (Reserve) Bn
15th (Service) Bn. 1st	 iflbUrgh
15th (Service) Bn - 2nd Edinburgh
Royal Scots Fusiliers
6th (Service) Bn
7th (Service) Bn
Sth (Service) Bn
Highland Light Infantry
loin (Service) Bnli (Service) Bn
12th (Service) Bn
(Reserve) Bn
14th (Service) Bantam Bn
Cameron Highlanders
5th (Service) Bn
61h (Service) Bn
7th (Service) Bn
Seaforth Highianders
7th (Service) Bn
8' (Service) Bn
l7 (Service) Rosebery (Bantam) Bn
18th (Reserve) Bn
19th (Labour) Bn
1St Garrison Bn
2 (Home Service) Garrison Bn
Arayll and Sutherland HighlanderS
	10m (Service) Bn	 11th (Service) Bn
	
(Service) Bn	 14th (Service)Bn
Gordon Highlanders
S (Service) Bn
9th (Service) Bn Pioneers
10th (Service) Bn
Cameron ians
9th (Service) Bn
10th (Service) Sn
1 l' (Service) Bn
12 (Reserve) Bn
13th (Service) Bn
King's Own Scothsh Borderers
6th (Service) Bn
7 (Service) Bn
8th (Service) Bn
The Black Watch
8th (Service) Bn
9th (Service) Sn
1QtIl (Service) Bn
1 1h (Service) Bn
14th (Labour) Bn
16th (Transport Workers) Bn
l7" (Transport Workers) Bn
18th (Service) Bn
9th (Reserve) Bn
lO (Reserve) Bn
l2 (Labour) Bn
13th (Scottish Horse) Sn
14th (Fife and Forfar Yeomanry) Sn
456 http:/!www-Saw.arts.ed.ac/army/reqiments.html. This site records the battalions for the
various Scotish regiments.
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In 1915, although Scotland provided 81,826 recruits for the army, there was a
low rate of enlistment in the local infantry regiments. While 75 per cent of
Scottish infantry recruits enlisted in Scotland only 35.7 per cent of Scottish
recruits enlisted in Scottish infantry regiments. Furthermore only 29 per cent
of Scottish infantry recruits enlisted in their local regiment, which meant that
only 10.46 per cent of all Scottish army recruits in 1915 were for the local
regiments.457
Figure 5:6 shows the number of recruits for the Scottish infantry regiments
recruited in Scotland and compares them with the number of recruits for the
same regiments recruited throughout the United Kingdom.
Fig 5:6 Recruits for Scottish infantry regiments January - October 1915.
% recruited in
Regiment	 Scotland
	
U .K.	 Scotland
Royal Scots
Royal Scots Fusiliers
King's Own Scottish Borderers
Royal Highianders (Black Watch)
Gordon Highlanders
Seaforth Highlanders
Cameron Highlanders
Argyll & Sutherland High landers
Highland Light infantry
Scottish Rifles (Cameronians)
TOTAL
3361
1809
1144
2011
2215
1818
2612
3186
5482
1361
24999
4100
2407
2905
2697
2912
3345
3058
3705
5990
2189
33308
82%
75%
39.40%
74. 50%
76%
54.30%
85.40%
86%
91.50%
62.20%
75%
Within each Scottish recruiting area recruiting varied for each individual
infantry regiment. lt would be expected that the Scottish infantry regiments
" NATS 1/399.
PRO. Nats 1/400. 1/401. Infantry recruitment returns, various dates.
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would, as a matter of course, draw their recruits from the local recruiting area.
However the amount of local recruitment varied greatly. The records available
allow us to view, in great detail, a nine month period in Scottish regimental
recruitment; the period 23 January 1915 to 23 October 1915. While the
figures for army recruitment in Scotland are available for the whole voluntary
period the period of greatest individual regimental detail falls on this nine
month period.
Fig 5:7 Number and percentage of recruits for each regiment enlisting in Scotland
and number and percentage of recruits enlisting in the local recruiting areas.9
Regiment
Highland Light Infantry
Royal Scots
Black Watch
Scottish Rifles
KOSB
Royal Scots Fusiliers
A&SH
Seaforth Highlanders
Gordon Highianders
Cameron Highianders
Total
5990
4100
2697
2169
2905
2407
3705
3345
2912
3058
Enlisting in Scotland
	
%	 #
	
91.5	 5480
	
82	 3361
	
74.5	 2011
	
62	 1361
	
39.5	 1144
	
75	 1809
	
86	 3186
	
54.3	 1818
	
76	 2215
	
85.4	 2612
Enlisting in Local Area
	
%	 #
	
58.4	 3498
	
41.5	 1701
	
32	 864
	
22.3	 489
	
12.5	 362
	
21.3	 512
	
19	 705
	
6	 197
	
6	 173
	
2.5	 78
Figure 5:7 shows that between 23 January and 23 October 1915, 5,990 men
enlisted in the Highland Light Infantry with 91.5 per cent, 5,480 enlisting in
Scotland and 3,498, or 58.4 per cent, in the regimental recruiting area. The
Royal Scots, with two recruiting areas centred on Glencorse and Edinburgh
NATS 1/400. 1/401.
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received 4,100 recruits in the period with 3,361 or 82 per cent enlisting in
Scotland and only 1,701 men, 415 per cent, coming from the regimental
recruiting areas. The Royal Highlanders (Black Watch) attracted 2,697
recruits with 74.5 per cent, 2,011 men, enlisting in Scotland and 32 per cent
864 enlisting in the regimental recruiting area. The Scottish Rifles
(Cameronians) enlisted 2,189 men with 1,361 or 62 per cent enlisting in
Scotland and 22.3 per cent, 489 en'isting in the local recruiting area. The
King's Own Scottish Borderers recruited 2,905 with 1,144 men, 39.4 per cent
enlisting in Scotland and 362 or 12.5 per cent enlisting in the local recruiting
area. The Royal Scots Fusiliers enlisted 2,407 men with 1,809 men, 75 per
cent enlisting in Scotland and 512 recruits, 21.3 percent, enlisting in the local
regimental recruiting area. Centred on Stirling the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders recruited 3,705 men with 3,186 or 86 per cent enlisting in
Scotland and 705 or 19 per cent enlisting in the local area. The Seaforth
Highlanders raised 3,345 recruits with 1,818 or 54.3 per cent enlisting in
Scotland and 197 or 6 per cent enlisting in the local recruiting area. The
Gordon Highianders enlisted 2,912 men with 2,215 or 76 per cent doing so in
Scotland and 173 or 6 per cent in the local recruiting area. The Cameron
Highlanders enlisted 3,058 men, 2,612 or 85.4 per cent in Scotland but only
78 men, 2.5 per cent, in the local recruiting area.46°
° NATS 1/400. 1/401.
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Total
5940
622
295
2146
5077
3154
2158
1904
6513
17783
11686
#
2261
264
133
324
2967
665
1178
900
4620
10630
3267
Area
Perth
Fort George
Inverness
Aberdeen
Stirling
Dundee
Ayr
Berwick
Hamilton
Glasgow
Edinburgh
Infantry
38
42.4
45
15
58.4
21
54.6
47.2
71
60
28
Local Regiment
	
13	 781
	
31.7	 197
	
26.4	 78
	
8	 173
	
14	 705
	
2	 65
	
0.3	 7
	
19	 362
	
7.5	 489
	
19.7	 3498
	
4	 466
Fig 5:8 Number and percentage of recruits for the infantry and the number
and percentage of recruits for the local infantry regiment.'1
If we look at the regimental recruiting areas for the period 23 January 1915 to
23 October 1915 the figures show the proportion of regional infantry
recruitment. Perth recruiting area provided 5,940 recruits for the army, with 38
per cent, 2,261 recruits for the infantry but only 13 per cent, 781 for the local
regiment. Fort George provided 622 men for the army but only 42.4 per cent,
264 recruits for the infantry, and 31.7 per cent, 197 for the local regiment.
Inverness, with 295 army recruits, raised 133 or 45 per cent for the infantry
but only 78 recruits, 26.4 per cent, for the local regiment. Aberdeen provided
2,146 recruits for the army but of these only 15 per cent, 324 recruits, enlisted
for the infantry with 8 per cent or 173 recruits for the local regiment, 53.4 per
cent. Stirling gave 5,077 recruits for the army with 2,967 or 58.4 per cent
461 NATS 1/400. 1/400.
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choosing the infantry, and 14 per cent, 705 recruits for the local regiment.
Dundee, with 3,154 men for the army, gave 665 recruits to the infantry, 21 per
cent, with 65 choosing the local regiment, 2 per cent. Ayr provided 2,158
recruits for the army with 54.6 per cent, 1,178 enlisting in the infantry and only
7 for the local regiment, 0.3 per cent. Berwick, with 1,904 army recruits,
provided 900 for the infantry, 47.2 per cent and 19 per cent, 362 recruits, for
the local regiment. Hamilton, with two recruiting areas, raised 6,513 men for
the army, providing 4,620 recruits, 71 per cent, for the infantry and 7.5 per
cent, 489 for the local regiment. Glasgow, with a figure of 17,783 army
recruits, provided 10,630 recruits for the infantry, 60 per cent and 3,498 for
the local regiment, 19.7 per cent. Edinburgh, while providing 11,686 recruits
for the army, enlisted 3,267 of those recruits for the infantry, 28 per cent, and
4 per cent, 466 recruits, for the local regiment.2
Of the 58,411 men enlisting in Scotland for the army in this period, 29,192 (50
per cent) chose to do so in the infantry with 24,999 (42.7 per cent) enlisting in
Scottish regiments. Only 14.6 per cent of all army recruits in Scotland for the
nine month period 23 January to 23 October 1915 went to local regiments.3
It would appear that after the initial increase in Scottish battalions, which
consumed the recruitment surge of August and September 1914, and once
Scottish recruitment fell to a maintenance level, a conscious decision was
462 NATS 1/400. 1/400.
463 NATS 1/400. 1/401.
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taken not to increase further the number of Scottish battalions but to disperse
Scottish recruits throughout the British Army. The year 1915 was a period of
consolidation and training for the Scottish regiments, not a period of mass
recruitment.
REGIONAL VARIATIONS
There were two overlapping areas of recruiting in Scotland. For administration
purposes thirty 'local' recruiting areas were created at the outbreak of war,
areas which roughly corresponded to pre-war Scottish counties. At the same
time, and operating in tandem with these local recruiting areas, there
remained the pre-war Regimental Recruiting Areas. In several cases the
areas were identical and in the past this has led to confusion in the
interpretation of recruitment figures. One area, which will serve as an
example, is Perth. The local recruiting returns give a figure of 1,324 recruits in
the month of August 1914: this is for the city of Perth and surrounding area.
The returns for the Perth Regimental Recruiting Area for August 1914 give a
figure of 2,737 recruits for the New Army, a difference of 1,413. Both figures
are correct as the Perth Regimental Recruiting Area was not confined to the
city of Perth but included Cupar, Dunbiane, Forfar and, more importantly, the
industrial areas of Dumfermline and Kirkcaldy, both of which supplied large
numbers of
161 NATS 1/398. 11399.
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Local Recruiting Centres
The four main Scottish cities, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee, and Aberdeen
had, by the end of August 1914, produced between them 13,017 recruits for
the New Armies which represented 47.5 per cent of the Scottish total to that
date. These figures hide the differences between the four cities and the
different priorities of the male population. As we have seen, Glasgow, once
the political recruiting offices had opened, was the scene of large scale
industrial recruitment raising 8,357 recruits in August or 30.5 per cent of the
Scottish total, while Edinburgh, which was industrialised to a lesser extent,
had no major engineering or textile industries raised only 3,338 recruits or
12.1 per cent in the same period.5
As we can see from Figure 5:9 below, over 90 per cent of Scottish New Army
recruits for August 1914 were attributable to only ten local recruiting centres;
Glasgow, Hamilton, Edinburgh, Stirling, Ayr, Perth, Kirkcaldy, Paisley,
Glencorse, and Aberdeen. Those ten recruiting centres provided 24,695
recruits out of the monthly Scottish total of 27,398. These were arguably the
ten most populated areas of Scotland but not all of them were industrial.
Glasgow, as would be expected, with its large industrial hinterland produced
8,357 recruits in August, which accounted for 30.5 per cent of the Scottish
NATS 1/398.
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total, while Aberdeen with its agricultural base produced only 885 or 3.23 per
cent of the total.4
Fig 5:9 Local Recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment
in Scotland August 1914.
Number of Percentage of Percentage of
Recruits	 Scottish Total British Total
August 1914
Britain
Scotland
Aberdeen
Alloa
Ayr
Berwick
Cupar
Clydebank
Du m barton
Dunbar
Dunblane
Dundee
Dunfermline
Edinburgh
Falkirk
Forfar
Fort George
Glasgow
Glencorse
Hamilton
Inverness
Kirkcaldy
Kirkintilloch
Leith
Oban
Paisley
Perth
Rothesay
Stirling
Dunoon
Inverary
Kilmartin
TOTAL
195851
27398
885
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1414
558
56
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437
1
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437
27
3338
266
56
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8357
899
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52
32
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1324
33
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0
0
0
27398
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In the first week of recruitment, 4-10 August 1914, Scotland provided 2,011
recruits. Of this number, Edinburgh raised 607 or 30.18 per cent, Glasgow
raised 548 or 27.25 per cent, while Hamilton raised 153 or 7.6 per cent. By 14
August, the day prior to the opening of the political recruiting offices, Scotland
had produced 5,656 recruits. Glasgow had contributed 1,295 or 22.89 per
cent, Edinburgh had raised 1,051 or 18.58 per cent, while Hamilton raised
663 or 11.72 per cent.468
For the first eight days of the war recruiting in Edinburgh kept pace with that
in Glasgow but, once both cities used up their readily available manpower
and the effects of the economic downturn began to be felt in industry,
recruiting in Glasgow trebled while in Edinburgh it stayed at a low level. On 11
August Edinburgh provided 132 recruits while Glasgow provided 128, but by
16 August, just five days later, Edinburgh raised only 23 recruits while
Glasgow had leapt ahead to 680. This was the day after the political offices in
Glasgow started to recruit those tradesmen affected by the war and shows
that only the recruiting restrictions imposed in Glasgow by the military
recruiting office in the Gallowgate had prevented a greater number of
tradesmen enlisting earlier for economic reasons. The other main industrial
recruiting centre at Hamilton showed the same pattern as Glasgow, with
recruitment increasing dramatically after the initial few days once the
contraction of industry had commenced. On the day that the political offices
NATS 1/398.
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opened their doors to recruits the daily figure for Hamilton trebled from 101
men on l4Augustto 304 on 15August.9
Stirling and Perth raised substantial numbers in August, since, although they
were perceived as agricultural towns, they both had a well established large
scale woollen industry, both spinning and weaving, which was hit immediately
by the loss of foreign markets and raw material. This was only part of the
reason. They were also quickly designated as War Stations' and troops were
deployed there in their thousands, in some cases tens of thousands, which
served to promote recruitment in the area. Local barracks were enlarged to
accommodate the influx and local parks were utilised as training grounds,
with trenches being dug on every spare piece of ground. In Perth the army
took over the local swimming baths and commandeered 'horses, horse
collars, furniture vans, motor cars, pit props, blankets, field glasses,
bloodhounds and Perth's only motor boat'. 47° The families of regular soldiers
quartered in the barracks at Perth had to find alternative accommodation as
the barracks were rapidly extended for the new recruits. 471 Only the three
main industrial centres raised more than Stirling, which was in fourth place
with 1,845, or 6.7 per cent of the Scottish total, while Perth lay in sixth place
with 1,324, or 4.8 per cent of the total.472
Kirkcaldy, in August 1914, with its linoleum factories and the surrounding coal
fields, produced 1,107 recruits or 4 per cent of the national total. However this
NATS 1/398.
470 B. Harding, On Flows the Tay. p. 42.
471 Dundee Advertiser, 25 September 1914.
472 NATS 1/398.
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is raised to the exceptionally high figure of 2.79 per cent of the local
population which can be explained when one takes into account the collapse
of the two main local industries, linoleum and coal. There was also in the first
week of the war a strike of over 400 pottery workers in the town, joining
others who had already been on strike for eight weeks, and a number took
the opportunity to enlist as a refuge for the winter months. At the same time
all the employees of the Kinghorn Leather Works were laid off and the
employees of Gibson and Co, the local golf club manufacturer, were placed
on short-time. The strike began on 10 August and the leather works closed on
the following day. The local press on 11 August reported that, 'Recruiting
offices in Kirkcaldy have been overwhelmed with volunteers. Throughout
yesterday the crowd in front of the principal recruiting station at High Street
was so large that tramway and other traffic was interrupted'.473
The smaller towns in Scotland provided varying numbers of recruits in the
early days. From 4 August up until 3 September 1914, Cowdenbeath
provided 1,000, Kilmarnock and Dumbarton 600 each, Cambuslang 531,
Clydebank, Falkirk and Inverkeithing 500 each, Selkirk 400, Renton 275,
Kirkintilloch 150, Shotts 100 and Dairy From 4 August to 11 September
Motherwell had provided 1,100 recruits, Dumbarton 960, Cambuslang 950,
Musselburgh 370, Barrhead 330, Johnstone 260, Kilsyth 250, Prestonpans
and Kelso 200 each, Castle Douglas 170, West Calder 140, Fauldhouse 100,
Tarbrax 90, and Langholm
Dundee Advertiser, 11 August 1914.
Evening Citizen, 3 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 11 September 1914.
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By September recruiting in Edinburgh had taken up the slack in the industrial
section and this was commented upon by the local recruiting officer, Captain
Robertson, V.C., who was reported as saying that 'the class of men who are
now joining are much better samples of the type of men wanted for the
Kitchener army than he passed in the earlier stages of special recruiting'.476
This contradicts the belief that those early recruits were a 'better class of
men', but highlights the point that those who did enlist in the early days were
of the lower classes who allegedly populated the pre-war Victorian army. In
early September some of the smaller towns in Scotland were providing large
numbers of recruits. At the same time it was reported that most of those
recruits from Clydebank were drawn largely from the shipyards and the
Singer Manufacturing Company.
In September 88.8 per cent of Scottish recruits, 38,456 men, enlisted in the
top ten recruiting areas. The one change from August was Aberdeen, which
was one of three main recruiting centres which reported a reduction in
numbers in September, even though recruits were imported from central
Scotland in large numbers. Recruitment in Aberdeen fell by 37 per cent, from
885 in August to 555 in September. Aberdeen's place went to Berwick, whose
figures increased in September from 558 to 1,032 or 2.03 per cent of the
national total. The other centres recording a reduction in recruits in
September were Perth and Stirling. While still producing large numbers of
recruits proportionally, there was a limit to the number of available men within
that section of the two towns which could be classified as industrial and from
476 Dundee Advertiser, 2 September 1914.
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which the majority of recruits were drawn.477 Figure 5:10 shows that while the
overall recruitment numbers increased in September, nine of the top ten
recruiting centres from August were still in the top ten.
FIG 5:10 Local Recruitment Figures for Army
Recruitment in Scotland September 1914. 478
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The main change from August was the increase in recruitment numbers due
to the September 'boom' period. Overall Scotland's contribution to the New
Armies rose 58 per cent from the previous month; from a figure of 27,398 in
August to 43,302 in September, an increase of 15,904 men. The increase
was not uniform. The ten most prolific recruiting centres in September
accounted for 88.8 per cent of the Scottish total, down 1.3 per cent from the
previous month. This small reduction in overall percentage of the top ten
areas can be accounted for by the increase in number, small though it was,
from the smaller rural recruiting areas. It is perhaps worthwhile looking at the
increase in recruitment numbers in September for the top areas as this will
give an appreciation of the 'boom' period in national recruitment. Glasgow
saw an increase of 6,160 men or 73.71 per cent over the previous month's
total, giving a figure for September of 14,517 or 33.52 per cent of the Scottish
total. Hamilton, with an increase of 2,533 or 55 per cent gave a total of 7,137
or 16A8 per cent, while Edinburgh showed an increase of 1,455 or 43.58 per
cent, a total of 4,793 or 11 per cent of the Scottish total. The largest increase
was in Glencorse which recorded an increase of 256.61 per cent or 2,307
men, giving a total of 3,206 or 7.4 per cent of the Scottish total. At the other
end of the scale Paisley, with an increase of 52 men or 5.63 per cent over
August, produced 974 men or 2.24 per cent of the national total.479
By 14 September 1914 Stirling Castle was seen as 'easily the best recruiting
centre in the Highland Division of the Scottish Command', with 'many of the
NATS 1/398.
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men joining having come from Canada.' 48° The week ending 12 September
1914 produced 677 recruits in Stirling, 23 for the regular army, 139 for the
special reserve, and 515 for general service. This was almost double the 344
raised in Perth over the same period, and over three and a half times the 189
raised by Dundee. On 8 October it was reported that 'Slackness is again
being experienced in some of the Stirlingshire colliery districts. Yesterday the
miners employed in three pits at Dumbreck, belonging to Messrs W Baird &
Co. Ltd, were all thrown idle. Several hundreds of men are involved in the
stoppage' 481
Although the highs of September were not to be repeated, the top ten areas
remained, with one or two exceptions, the same, their overall contribution
reduced with the percentage of the overall Scothsh number dropping from
slightly over 88 per cent (8,901) in October, and 86 per cent (9,533) in
November, to 84 per cent (7,061) in December.
October, with its monthly total of 10,016 recruits, set the trend for the
remainder of 1914. The excess manpower of the first few weeks had been
expended and the slack created by Scottish industry had been tightened up.
The figure would have been lower were it not for the inclusion of the Glasgow
'Pals' Battalions' in the figure of 2,860 for the eighteenth of the month.
480 Dundee Advertiser, 14 September 1914.
481 Dundee Advertiser, 8 October 1914.
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FIG 5:11 Local recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in
Scotland October 1914
Number of Percentage of Percentage of
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November had no artificially high or low daily figures and produced 11,081
recruits over the month. The first day of the month produced the lowest daily
figure, some 93 recruits, with a high of 749 on the 10th.
FIG 5:12 Local recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in
Scotland November 1914.
Number of Percentage of Percentage of
recruits	 Scottish Total British Total
November 1914
Britain
Scotland
Aberdeen
Alloa
Ayr
Berwick
Cupar
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Dunbar
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Edinburgh
Falkirk
Forfar
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As we have seen from the figures, recruitment in Scotland was not uniform
throughout the country. December showed an unsurprising reduction in
numbers towards the end of the month, with the lowest daily figure of 71 on
Christmas day itself. Once again the inclusion of a 'Pals' Battalion', this time
in Edinburgh, gave an inflated daily high of 1,572 on the twenty-third of the
month. The highest natural daily figure was on the first with 497 recruits, the
tail-end of the November agricultural recruitment. From then on the numbers
steadily declined, producing a total for the month of 8,405. It was natural that
December would provide a low number of recruits as many would hold off
from enlistment until after the national holiday. The choice of many would be
to enjoy Hogmanay with friends and family before leaving home for the
rigours of army life. By November and December 1914 reserve battalions in
some areas were struggling to recruit enough men to bring them up to
strength. All in all in 1914 Scotland provided some 104,392 recruits for Lord
Kitchener's New Armies. Recruitment in Scotland was never again to reach
the levels of 1914.482
482 NATS 1/398.
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FIG 5:13 Local Recruitment Figures for Army Recruitment in
Scotland December 1914.483
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In January 1915, the new year brought a renewed rise in recruiting levels as
those who had held back in December began to come forward. The high of
P.R.O. Nats 1/398.
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the month occurred on 5 January with some 598 recruits but was followed
closely by 6 January with 595 recruits and 7 January with 559, all of which
contributed greatly to the monthly figure of 11,062. The low point was, as
could reasonably be expected, New Year's Day, but 65 souls nevertheless
chose that day to enlist. The figures for the first few days reflect another
reason for enlistment. Alcohol and the euphoria that it brings were
contributing factors. The outbreak of war found Scotland in the throes of a
bank holiday weekend, with some areas in the middle of the annual local
summer holiday period. Also the Christmas celebrations and New Year
holiday affected recruitment numbers. As we have already seen both
Glasgow and Edinburgh utilised late night recruiting trams to capture the
unwary reveller at the point of least resistance. Only after the New Year
celebrations had subsided did recruitment return to pre-holiday levels,
although to be fair not everyone held back over the holiday period. On
Christmas day 1914 there were 71 recruits in Scotland, 62 per cent of the
British total of 113. On New Year's Day Scotland produced 65 recruits, only
0.47 per cent of the remarkable British total of 13,803, more so with 8,798
recruits coming from Newcastle alone: the Tyneside Pals' battalions coming
on the strength. By February numbers were indicative of the level that was
maintained until the introduction of conscription. On 14 February the
memorandum of October 1914, which had restricted the recruitment of
railway company employees and those employed in food or armament
production to those who could produce a certificate showing that their
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services could be spared, was rescinded. Recruitment rose slightly in March
but just as quickly dropped again.4
There was some concern within the War Office at the low rate of recruitment
in Dunfermline at the beginning of the war, so much so that they sent Major
C.W.L Ross to stimulate recruitment in the district. His recruiting district
included the whole of West Fife and, as recruitment in the area gathered
pace, predominant among his recruits were the miners of Cowdenbeath. At
the same time a renewed recruiting campaign started in Kinross-shire. The
Earl of Wemyss, in an address at a local recruiting rally, told the assembled
crowd that 'They were fighting, not for aggrandisement, but for the
maintenance of their empire and for the maintenance of the political privileges
and liberties which their ancestors had won for them'.5
As to the other recruiting centres, Dunbar is recorded as producing only one
recruit for the New Armies in the first four months of the war; those wishing to
join the infantry who had gravitated towards Dunbar were directed towards
Berwick, which maintained a disproportionately high recruitment number.
Dunbar, Scotland's only pre-war regular cavalry depot outside Edinburgh,
was used primarily as the main cavalry recruiting depot and for the rapidly
expanding Scothsh Horse. Not until December 1914 did Dunbar register
any more army recruits, although territorial recruitment was high. 487 Similarly
LIth with its strong ties to the Royal Scots, through the 7th Territorial
18A NATS 1/398.
485 Dundee Advertiser, 3 September 1914.
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Battalion, was seen as a prime recruiting area and by 22 August some 700
dockers had left to rejoin Reserve and Territorial battalions. Not all the
dockers were in the Territorial Force and some 300 left to engage in autumn
harvesting operations. However, Leith records thirty two recruits on 10 August
1914 and from then on the figures for Leith would appear, for official purposes
at least, to be included in those for Edinburgh. Of the truly rural areas
Inverness produced 138 recruits in August, 0.5 per cent of the Scottish total,
while Fort George produced 171 or 0.62 per cent. Forfar 56 or 0.2 per cent,
Dunblane 137 or 0.5 per cent, Alloa 179 or 0.65 per cent, Cupar 56 or 0.2 per
cent, Rothesay 33 or 0.12 per cent and Kirkintilloch 52 or 0.18 per cent of the
Scottish total. Oban, Dunoon, Inverary and Kilmartin produced no recruits in
August.488
The manpower surplus in Glasgow was such that various other regiments,
unable to complete battalions in their home area, sent recruiters to the city
and in some instances opened alternative recruiting offices. The Black Watch
held recruiting rallies, the Cameron Highlanders opened a recruiting office,
and even the Sportsman's Battalion sent Captain Westhead to recruit in
Glasgow and Edinburgh, successfully it would appear.9
Regimental Recruiting Areas
In some respects army recruitment in Scotland during the voluntary period,
when compared to the regional male population, reflected the pre-war pattern
488 NATS 1/398.
Evening Citizen. 28 October 1914.
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described in Chapter Two. Berwick recruiting area, which produced the
highest percentage of pre-war recruits in relation to regional male population,
provided 2,857 recruits, 20 per cent of her male population in 1914, the first
five months of the war, and 5,829 recruits, 41 per cent of the male population
for the army in the seventeen month voluntary recruiting period, maintaining
her leading role. Perth, which was second highest in pre-war years, continued
to be so in the voluntary period with 18.5 per cent of the male population,
10,823 men, in the first five months, with a seventeen month figure of 33 per
cent of the local male population, 19,319 men, enlisting in the army. Stirling,
another pre-war high achiever, continued with 9,789 recruits, 11.8 per cent in
1914 and a total figure of 17,398 recruits, 21 per cent of the male population
enlisting in the army. Edinburgh provided 13,623 recruits, 5.8 per cent of the
male population in 1914, with a final figure for the period of 29,119 recruits,
12.3 per cent of the local male population, while Glasgow contributed 4.86 per
cent of males, 35,130 in the first five months, and 59,288 recruits, 8.2 per
cent of the male population in the whole period. Ayr contributed 4,905 recruits
or 3.76 per cent in 1914, and with 8,072 recruits for the whole period gave 6.2
per cent of her male population; Dundee with 1.4 per cent or 1,764 men in
1914 raised 6,505 recruits, 5.1 per cent of the male population overall;
Aberdeen recruited 3,581 men, 2.4 per cent, in 1914 and provided 6,540
recruits, 4.4 per cent of the male population, in total. Inverness with 411
recruits, 1 per cent, in 1914 provided 821 recruits, 2 per cent of the regional
male population overall.490
490 NATS 1/399.
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By the end of 1914 52 per cent of those enlisting in the Perth recruiting area
had done so in the army, a number which by December 1915 had remained
relatively constant at 51 per cent of regional recruitment. Fort George had
raised 18.8 per cent of its volunteers for the army in 1914, a figure which rose
slightly to an overall figure of 19.5 per cent by December 1915. Inverness
produced 21 per cent of her 1914 recruits for the army, a number which had
fallen to 16.7 per cent by the end of the volunteer period. The Aberdeen
recruiting area provided 37 per cent of its 1914 recruits for the army, falling to
33.6 per cent by December 1915. Several recruiting areas showed
remarkable consistency, Stirling with 61.4 per cent in 1914 and 61 per cent in
1915; Ayr with 62 per cent in 1914 and 62 per cent in 1915; Hamilton with
85.5 in 1914 and 83.7 per cent in 1915; Edinburgh with 62.2 per cent in 1914
and 65.3 per cent in 1915; Glencorse with 82.8 per cent in 1914 and 78 per
cent in 1915. Glasgow with 78.3 per cent in 1914 suffered a slight drop
ending with a total for the voluntary period of 71 per cent; Berwick had a slight
increase, 58.8 per cent in 1914 to 64.2 per cent in 1915. Dundee had the
largest increase, from 36.7 per cent in 1914 to 49.3 per cent at the end of
1915 491
491 NATS 1/399.
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FIG 5:15 Cumulative monthly increase in army recruitment in Scotland
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Figures 5:13 and 5:14 show the slowdown in the rate of army recruitment
overtime. Figure 5:13 clearly demonstrates the initial high recruitment level in
Scotland and shows that after the high of September 1914 recruitment in
Scotland continued at a relatively low maintenance level with cumulative
recruitment reducing over time.
In figure 5:14 we can see that September 1914 showed an increase over
August 1914 of 156.8 per cent, while December 1915 showed only an
increase of 1.46 per cent over November 1915. This clearly shows the rate of
decline in the number of recruits coming forward monthly in Scotland.
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FIG 5:16 Monthly percentage increase in army recruitment in Scotland
August 1914 - December 1915.492
Cumulative Monthly
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27592
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14.69
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	 9.14
January	 116726
	 11.81
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4.67
March
	 130419
	
6.73
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	 137184
	
5.18
May	 145870
	
6.33
June	 153870
	
5.48
July	 159472
	 3.64
August
	
166205
	 4.22
September	 169837
	
2.18
October	 175137
	 3.12
November	 183536
	
4.79
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1.46
This chapter has shown that the perceived ideas of a 'boom and bust' period
have to be adjusted and that the period was only the result of an inadequate
recruiting mechanism. It has further shown that the peak period of Scotland's
recruitment was in the initial few months of the war, the five months of 1914.
Thereafter, although Scotland maintained a respectable level of recruitment in
1915, in relative terms in was only a fraction of what was achieved in 1914.
492 NATS 1/399.
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CHAPTER 6
CIVIC RECRUITMENT.
(PALS BATTALIONS)
There was nothing essentially new in the Pals concept as it emerged
in 1914...The chief difference in 1914 was that, with the appearance of
the Pals battalions, the concept was applied on a significant scale for
the first time to the raising of units for active service abroad rather than
home defence.483
The influence of public and industrial figures in the raising and recruiting of
volunteers, both through the normal methods and by the raising of civic
battalions (Pals battalions), is one facet of the voluntary recruiting system
which, although mainly English in concept, did take place in Scotland.
However in Scotland it did not produce the same results. As can be seen from
fig 6:1, the response to such locally raised battalions in Scotland was low,
with Scotland producing only 5.3 per cent of the infantry battalions and 4.5
per cent of the reserve battalions, a mere 5 per cent of the total number of
such battalions raised in Britain. Wales did better with 12.8 per cent, 13.6 per
cent, and 13 per cent respectively, but this performance can, to a certain
extent, be discounted as, with the formation of the Welsh Army Corps, all
battalions raised in Wales came under the umbrella heading of locally raised.
England on the other hand produced 81.8 per cent in all categories. In total
only 3.8 per cent of those men recruited in Scotland by the end of 1914 had
p . Simkins. Kitchener's Army. p. 82-3.
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joined a Pals battalion, while by the end of 1915 that figure had reduced to
3.1 per cent. If we include all Scottish locally raised units, artillery and
engineer, then the figure for the whole voluntary period sits at only 4.1 per
cent.
In Scotland there were seven Locally Raised Infantry Battalions raised in the
period 2 September 1914 - 26 February 1915, although in reality it took
longer since by February 1915 recruitment was in decline. Those infantry
battalions were raised in the two major Scottish cities, four in Glasgow and
three in Edinburgh.
Fig 6:1 Numbers of Locally Raised Infantry Battalions 1914-15.
SCOTLAND	 ENGLAND WALES
Infantry	 7
	
108
	
17
Reserve	 3
	
54
	
9
Total	 10
	 162
	 26
Kitchener Papers, PRO. 30/57/73.
Kitchener Papers, PRO. 30/57/73.
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Fig 6:2 Scottish Locally Raised Infantry Battalions 191415.6
Edinburgh
15th (s) Battalion, Royal Scots. (1st Edinburgh)
16th (s) Battalion, Royal Scots. (2hld Edinburgh)
17th (b) Battalion, Royal Scots. (Rosebery)
Glasgow
15th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (1 Glasgow)
16th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (2 Glasgow)
17th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (3' Glasgow)
18th (b) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry. (4th Glasgow)
As early as 5 August 1914 there was a call in the Glasgow Evening Citizen for
volunteers to join the Glasgow Squadron of The Legion of Frontiersmen. The
only requirements were the ability to sit astride a horse and use a rifle. The
recruiter was a Mr Alexander Shaughnessi of Hope Street, Glasgow, and,
since this was a call by an individual on behalf of a civilian organisation and
not a call by the War Office, it must be seen as one of the first recruiting calls
in Scotland, if not Britain, for a locally raised unit.7
By 1 September, in Glasgow, there was an increasing number of calls in the
local press for some form of local 'Glasgow' battalion, but, as elsewhere in
Scotland, those calls focused on the middle class content of any such
battalion: 'It is well known that a new battalion of the Scottish Rifles has to be
formed. For that, 1100 men will be wanted. Why not let all the clerks and
tennis and golf players come forward en bloc and form that battalion? 8
 At
the same time there was a call for the formation of a Glasgow Commercial
486 Kitchener Papers, PRO. 30/57/73.
487 Evening Citizen. 5 August 1914.
488 Evening Citizen. 1 September 1914.
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Unit: 'Glasgow's business men and clerks are only too eager to fall in for their
country's sake. From among those interested a small committee might be
formed for the purpose of making immediate representations in the right
quarter for the forming of a Glasgow commercial unit.' 489 There was also, in
the Evening Citizen, a rebuke aimed at the Lord Provost which criticised the
'small mindedness of our civil head' and affirmed that 'if he were a man and a
patriot he would be sending round the fiery cross to the youth of the city'.49°
At a meeting of the Glasgow Corporation on 3 September 1914 it was
decided that 'The Magistrates recommend.. .that steps be forthwith taken. .for
the raising of the necessary recruits to form at least two battalions and that
the expense of raising and equipping such battalions be borne by the
Corporation out of the Common Good.'491 The decision taken by the
magistrates was in reply to mounting criticism in the local press and the
numerous individual calls to recruit companies or battalions of like-minded
people. Only four days previously there had been a scathing attack in the
local press aimed at the corporation and its employees.
Sir - I am an employee in one of the Glasgow Corporation
departments, and although we have furnished not a few Territorials
and Reserve men, I confess that up until now I have not heard of a
single enlistment from our midst for Kitchener's first or second
Evening Citizen. 1 September 1914.
° Evening Citizen, 1 September 1914.
491 Glasgow Corporation Minutes, 3 September 1914.
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100,000. And I am afraid this is true of all Corporation departments.
There is a feeling abroad that any one enlisting will forfeit his job.492
This letter to the editor, signed only as 'Blue Flame', was one of many
criticising the corporation and in particular the Lord Provost for their singular
lack of action and their inability to take the lead in the recruitment of the
citizens of Glasgow. Another critic in the same issue asked whether the Lord
Provost was indeed a 'man and a patriot', and urged him to 'send round the
fiery cross to the youth of the city to join a regiment of Glasgow's own, such a
regiment as Birmingham has equipped.'
The following day there appeared an article announcing that enlistment was
being carried out at Glasgow University in one of the committee rooms at 20
Gibson Street in an effort to raise some seven hundred or so recruits to attach
to one of the Glasgow regiments. This effort to raise such a large number of
recruits from within the university was not an act of spontaneity or patriotism
but was in reply to adverse comments made by Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge
that university students were holding back. Sir Cyprian had made the claim
that 'the more well-to do sections of the community, particularly University
students, had not responded to Britain's appeal in a degree commensurate
with their social advantages and consequent obligations'.493
492 evening Citizen. 31 August 1914.
49 evening Citizen, 2 September 1914.
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In the same issue there was also a call for a 'battalion of clerks' or a
'corporation battalion'. 4 Colonel R. C. Mackenzie attempted to stimulate
recruiting for a proposed battalion created from former pupils of Glasgow's
secondary schools.495 In the face of such public demands there was little else
that the Corporation could do. The common factor about all these calls was
that they were aimed solidly at the middle class. This appeared to be the last
prompt needed to encourage the corporation to take the lead in Glasgow
recruitment.
In Glasgow the dominating figure of James Dalrymple, General Manager of
the Glasgow Corporation Tramways Department, reacted immediately. He
was in a position to exert great influence and pressure over a large number of
corporation employees and their families. If an employee was seen to be
reluctant to share Datrympl&s enthusiasm for military service, the loss of
favour, or patronage, could be disastrous for the future well-being of that
person's family; dismissal from the corporation would be a barrier to any
future employment. T Chalmers points out that 'He was probably the greatest
recruiting agent that Scotland produced in the war. For resource, energy,
enthusiasm, and organising ability, in the self-imposed task of raising recruits
he had no peer.'4
Evening Citizen, 2 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 3 September 1914.
T. Chalmers, An Epic of Glasgow: History of the 15 Battalion the Highland Light Infantry
(City of Glasgow Regiment).
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Dairymple was no stranger to the military or its needs. He had served for
twenty years in the 1st Lanark Rifle Volunteers, later to become the 5th
Scottish Rifles, and for a considerable time had acted on the headquarters
staff of the Volunteer camps at Gailes, which accounted for the speed at
which the Glasgow Pals battalions were given access to these training
camps.
The success of James Dalrymple's recruiting efforts can be seen in his
involvement with the raising of the 15th (s) Battalion, Highland Light Infantry,
(1st Glasgow), recruited predominantly from the staff of the Tramways
Department. After the Corporation meeting on 3 September Dalrymple
contacted his department that evening and had a list of 1,100 names by 9
a.m. the following morning, drawn entirely from among the conductors,
drivers, mechanics and labourers. Not all the recruits came from the
tramways department, some hailing from as far away as Forfar.497 By the end
of 1914 some 1,756 men had enlisted from the tramways department out of a
total staff of approximately 6,000, a figure of approximately 29 per cent.498
Chalmers tells us that when recruiting for the I 5th battalion started,
Hundreds of young men in their early twenties and older, moustached
men about the thirties or more, were gathered under the high iron-
girded roof. Some were in the bothies, some seated in the ranked
Forfar Herald. 25 December 1914.
Scott, The Industries of the Clyde Valley. p. 176-7.
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tramcars. Many of them formed jocular groups around the walls. The
building rang with bustle and laughter. At one end were a table and
weighing machine. Beside them stood the attesting officer, two
doctors, and a man who turned out to be a justice of the peace, a
presence necessary for proper enlistment.499
The employees of the Tramways Department did not limit their military service
to the Tramways Battalion. On 5 August some 600 Territorials and
Reservists within the department handed in their uniforms and reported for
duty. 50° The Tramways Battalion itself was used as an instrument of
recruitment when, along with the other local units, it was periodically paraded
in George Square, Glasgow and routinely sent on recruitment marches
throughout the surrounding district. The use of the local camp at Gailes was
also a boost for recruitment for the locally raised battalions. The close
proximity of the training ground meant that local men could get weekend
leave or their families could visit at the weekends. Other service battalions
were usually sent to training camps in England, giving no chance for such
frequent leave opportunities. Dalrymple's involvement with recruiting was not
solely confined to the 15th Highland Light Infantry. He was involved in raising
recruits for the various other locally raised units recruited by the Glasgow
Corporation. He arranged physical exercise classes for those men whose
chest measurements failed to come up to the requirement of the recruiting
medical and even went so far as to establish an open-air cinema to help
1. Chalmers, An Epic of Glasgow. P. 2. This was the scene when recruitment started on
Sunday 13 September at the Coplawhill tram depot.
Glasgow Herald, 6 August, 1914.
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promote the war effort. In all, Datrymple was seen to be the driving force
behind the creation of one brigade of artillery, two infantry battalions and five
companies of engineers.
Even Dalrymple, however, found it extremely hard to raise a 'Bantam'
battalion in Glasgow in February 1915. Recruiting for this battalion, the 18th
Highland Light Infantry, eventually got underway on 24 March 1915 but, as
can be seen from FIG 6:3, by Monday 5 April, of the 1,966 men who had
previously put their names on the list, only 192 had enlisted. Dalrymple was
able to vent his anger on the local Rotary Club which had undertaken to
procure the necessary manpower but he was not in a position to exert any
authority over the men required to fill the ranks. Recruitment drives had to be
extended over the entire country in order to raise the required number of men,
and his authority did not extend beyond the Tramways Department.
Fig 6:3 Status on 5 April 1915 of those men who had attested
to enlist in the 18th H.L.I.501
Names on list supplied by Rotary Club
	 1966
Men approved	 192
Men rejected	 317
Men failed to appear
	 1186
Men notfound	 71
Men enlisted elsewhere	 22
501 _i/asgow City Archives, D-TC 19.
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Even as late as August 1915, at a recruiting meeting in Forfar, there was a
call for recruits for the Bantam Battalion by Lieutenant McLean of the
Highland Light Infantry. 502 It is interesting to note that the military recruiters
were by this time involved in raising recruits to complete a civic battalion
whereas previously there had been definite lines of demarcation in
recruitment for such locally raised units.
There were two other civic battalions raised in Glasgow at that time, the 16th
and 17th Battalions Highland Light Infantry. The l6th(s) Battalion Highland
Light Infantry (2nd Glasgow), was the second of the two battalions raised by
the Corporation of Glasgow and was made up almost entirely from serving
and past officers and men of the Boys' Brigade with its recruiting office in St
Andrews Halls. There had been previous attempts to create a Boys' Brigade
Battalion early in August 1914. The Glasgow Evening Citizen, on the tenth of
that month, had reported that the Boys' Brigade Executive Committee had
offered the services of the Glasgow Battalion of the Boys' Brigade for military
service, stating that, although there was already a number serving with the
Territorial Force, there were still some four or five hundred officers available
and nearly nine thousand boys.503
 The l7th(s) Battalion Highland Light
Infantry (3rd Glasgow) was raised and funded by the Glasgow Chamber of
Commerce and contained within its four companies two from the commercial
sector, one from former pupils of the Glasgow Academy, and one from the
Royal Technical College. The company from the technical college was the
502 Forfar Herald and KirriemuirAdvertiser, 27 August, 1915.
Evening Citizen. 10 August, 1914.
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result of an earlier failed attempt by the college to raise its own battalion for
the Royal Scots or the Scottish Rifles. There had been an announcement in
the local press on 1 September for the recruiting of such a battalion:
The reported battalion in connection with the Glasgow Royal Technical
College is now open to receive recruits from the University, St Mungo's
College, Anderson's College, and other affiliated bodies. The ranks are
also open to chartered accountants, the Faculty of Procurators, and
students of these bodies. This part of Lord Kitchener's Army will afford
an opportunity for friends going out to the war keeping in touch and
working alongside each other.5°4
Like all Pals' battalions the incentive being touted was that groups of friends
enlisting together would be kept together and would serve with others of the
same social class.
By 7 September some 340 men had come forward for the Royal Technical
College Battalion but on 8 September it was announced that the battalion was
to become part of the commercial battalion being raised by the Chamber of
Commerce. In early September in Glasgow, with its established Jewish
community, there was the offer of a Jewish company to be included in one of
the City Battalions but this was refused given the perceived commissariat
difficulties.
Evening Citizen. 1 September, 1914.
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In Edinburgh recruiting for local battalions was also under way, but with
widely differing degrees of success. The 15th Battalion, Royal Scots was
raised and funded by the Lord Provost and City of Edinburgh and, although
recruiting commenced unofficially on 19 September 1914, the concept of a
'City Battalion' had been voiced as early as 6 August 1914 when, eighteen
days before Lord Derby is accredited with initiating the Pals movement and
six days before Sir Henry Rawlinson is alleged to have voiced the notion, the
Lord Provost of Edinburgh approached the General Officer Commanding in
Scotland, on behalf of the Corporation, with the offer that they should 'raise a
battalion for service in His Majesty's Forces'. 505
 In the early days of the war
the War Office was not anticipating the creation of any special battalions
being raised outwith the established military recruiting system and this offer to
recruit a local battalion was declined. The Corporation decided, however, to
take matters into its own hands and, on 14 August, ten days after the
outbreak of war, it was announced in the local press that,
THE CITY OF EDINBURGH'S OWN
A City of Edinburgh's Regiment, on the lines of the famous I.V.
regiment in the Boer War is here being organised. The sanction of the
War Office has not yet been received, but pending its reception very
complete preparations have been made in Parliament House for
recruiting purposes, and already a number of names have been taken.
When the War Office sanction arrives the Lord Provost will issue a
Town Council of Edinburgh. Minutes of meeting, 9 February, 1915. p. 128-1 30.
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proclamation to the young men of the city to rally to the new
regiment.506
The formation of an Edinburgh battalion took a further step forward when, on
2 September, in their offices at 95 Princes Street, a meeting of the General
Political Committee agreed to 'endeavour to form an Edinburgh Battalion,
composed chiefly of members of Rugby football, cricket, golf, bowling,
swimming, and other athletic clubs, such bodies as the Scottish Clerks
Association, those employed with legal firms, Chartered Accountants, and
others who may be classed as non-manual workers.'507
 This announcement
by the General Political Committee set the tone for recruitment to the Scottish
Pals' Battalions. The working classes were deliberately excluded from the
civic battalions, not just in Edinburgh but throughout Scotland.
Following the acceptance, by the War Office, of offers of locally raised
battalions from Glasgow, London, Birmingham and Liverpool, Edinburgh once
again offered to provide such a battalion but in this instance the Lord Provost
did not receive official consent until 17 September. On 24 September it was
publicly announced that the War Office had given its approval for the raising
of an Edinburgh battalion and that recruiting would now commence on 26
September. However recruiting for the 15th battalion Royal Scots was slow
and by early October the battalion began to accept large groups of recruits
from Manchester, where that city was unable to recruit enough men to create
506 Edinburgh Evening News. 14 August 1914.
Edinburgh Evening News. 3 September 1914.
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a Manchester Scottish battalion. On Saturday 3 October 1914, under the
headline 'Manchester Scots for Edinburgh Battalion', The Scotsman reported
that a detachment of 67 men had arrived from Manchester the previous
evening to join the 15th battalion, Royal Scots. 508 Another detachment of 54
was reported as arriving on 7 October. 509 The use of Manchester recruits
caused bitter acrimony, not only in Edinburgh but, more importantly, in
Manchester itself. There were reports that over five hundred Manchester
recruits had been tricked into joining the 15th battalion on the understanding
that they were joining a Manchester Scottish battalion; only finding out that
they had joined the 15th battalion Royal Scots after they had enlisted.510
Recruiting for the 15th battalion was, in this way, completed by 9 October,
officially fourteen days but unofficially almost two months in total. However,
reduced recruiting continued until 14 January 1915 to raise Depot and
Reserve Companies.
In stark contrast to this, Edinburgh's second Pals' battalion demonstrates how
individual popularity could stimulate recruitment. Sir George McCrae,
Edinburgh City Treasurer, announced on 26 November, that not only had he
volunteered for active service, but he had also decided to raise a new
battalion of Royal Scots to serve under his command. 511
 This was not
surprising considering McCrae's background. He had for eight years (1905-
1913) commanded the 6th battalion, Royal Scots, an Edinburgh Territorial
508 The Scotsman, 3 October 1914.
The Scotsman, 6 October 1914.
510 Edinburgh Evening News. 15 October 1914.
511 Edinburgh Evening News. 26 November 1914.
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battalion, and was an Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel in the regular army. He
also served as M.P. for East Edinburgh from 1899 until 1919 and had taken
an active and leading part in the debate leading to the passing of the
Territorial Forces Act 1907. At the outbreak of the war he was responsible, at
the request of the Admiralty, for the construction of a new town at the Rosyth
Naval Base to house the naval personnel and their families. With his political,
civic, and military ties, his call for recruits met with an unprecedented
response, in Scotland at least.
By Tuesday 2 December, five days recruiting had provided 700 men for the
new battalion and by 9 December the battalion was complete: a total of 1,550
men in twelve days. 512 McCrae did not stop there; he went on to raise a
further two reserve companies of 250 men each. The speed with which these
recruits came forward is all the more surprising since by November 1914
recruitment in Scotland in general was in decline. The recruiting for McCrae's
16th Battalion got off to a flying start when on 26 November 1914, after a
home match at Tynecastle, the entire Heart of Midlothian football team
enlisted at the Haymarket Recruitment Office. This prompted large numbers
of shareholders and supporters to join up. With the majority of the players
enlisting in the 16th battalion, they and a number of their followers formed 'C'
company. The presence of these players, their supporters, and a contingent
from Watsonians Rugby Club gained for the battalion, in some quarters, the
title Edinburgh Sportsmen's Battalion, although the battalion was always
known simply as McCrae's Battalion, Interestingly, despite the severe
512 Edinburgh Evening News. 10 December 1914.
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criticism of the Football League and its tardy record of recruitment, the Heart
of Midlothian team was the only football team in Britain to enlist en masse.
McCrae went on to lead his battalion in action, being twice mentioned in
dispatches and awarded the DSO.
Meanwhile, also in Edinburgh, Lord Rosebery was also encountering difficulty
in recruiting the l7th(s) battalion, Royal Scots (coincidentally the second of
Scotland's three bantam battalions). Although Lord Rosebery was unrelenting
in encouraging, in some instances forcing, his workers and servants to enlist
for military service, his role in the creation of the 17th battalion, Royal Scots
was, as Honorary Colonel, primarily that of a figurehead. While he did attend
recruitment rallies and meetings throughout Scotland, the bulk of the day to
day administration was conducted by the Rosebery Royal Scots Recruiting
Committee. Members of the Rosebery Recruiting Committee toured the east
coast towns in an effort to raise recruitment numbers using various methods
of persuasion. Speakers at these recruiting rallies focused on the positive
side of being a bantam. At a recruiting rally in Forfar on 16 April 1915, aimed
at stimulating recruitment for the 17th battalion, Royal Scots, the crowd was
addressed by Mr J. C. Haig, representing the Rosebery Recruiting
Committee. Mr Haig extolled the benefits of being a bantam by saying that
they made smaller targets for the enemy, did not have to dig such deep
trenches, and were following in the footsteps of such famous small men as
Napoleon and Lord Roberts, as well as implying that 'special advantages
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accrued to those joining this particular unit, for Lord Rosebery, who was
Honorary Colonel of the Battalion, had been taking a special interest'.513
This veiled promise of patronage by Lord Rosebery might have worked in the
Lothians, where Rosebery had influence, and was a major employer, but was
not enough to draw in recruits from further afield where local considerations
outweighed any promises made or implied on behalf of Lord Rosebery.
Glasgow and Edinburgh were not the only Scottish cities which aspired to
raise their own 'City Battalion'. Lord Provost Sir James Urquhart, Lord-
Lieutenant of the County and President of the Dundee Territorial Association
since its inception in 1908, was determined that whatever Edinburgh or
Glasgow could achieve Dundee, though considerably smaller, could also do.
On Thursday, 3 September a letter appeared in the Dundee Advertiser,
written under the pseudonym 'a potential recruit', and calling for the raising of
a local pals battalion, pointing out that 'there are many young men in the town
who, like myself, are ready to join the colours, but are at the same time
anxious to be placed in association with whom they can regard as real
comrades, and with whom they may live on terms of intellectual and moral
sympathy and equality.'514
In tandem with this letter, suspiciously so, Lord Provost Urquhart was
attending a meeting in London with the War Office discussing this very
513 Forfar Herald and KirriemuirAdvertiser, 16 April 1915.
514 Dundee Advertiser, 3 September 1914.
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possibility and offering to raise and equip a full battalion in Dundee. On 4
September the local Dundee press announced a letter from Mr H. J. Ten nant,
Under-Secretary of State for War, giving War Office approval, dated 2
September, to raise a Dundee City Battalion. The Lord Provost, in his
capacity as Lord Lieutenant, took the opportunity to issue a call for a 'special
battalion of businessmen and artisans'. 515 Recruiting for the City Battalion
was opened at the Town House but from the start recruiting was slow. So
sluggish was the response that recruitment efforts were increased on 8
September with a renewed campaign and calls for 'skilled artisans and young
men of the middle class'. By 11 September, some seven days after
recruitment had opened for the Dundee City Battalion, there were less than
two hundred names on the role. At a meeting in the city on the evening of 10
September, Lord Provost Urquhart addressed the Municipal Officers Guild
and 'passed some severe strictures on the tardiness of recruiting in Dundee'.
He asked Was Dundee in such a condition that we could not raise 1000 men
amongst all our merchant's employees, bankers, lawyers, shop assistants,
municipal workers, and artisans who had not yet given any indication that
they were to join the colours at all? 516 He went on to say, with regards to
recruiting for the city battalion, that 'They had not 200 names, though every
facility and every opportunity that they and others had asked for had now
been granted by the War Office'.517
515 Dundee Advertiser, 4 September 1914.516 Dundee Advertiser, 11 September 1914.517 Dundee Advertiser, 11 September 1914.
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Despite the best efforts of the Lord Provost and the battalion organiser Mr
(later Major) T. M. Cappon, recruitment remained slow and in an effort to
retain some semblance of local unity the War Office was asked if it was willing
to accept a half battalion from the city. This request met with refusal since it
was the stated policy of the War Office to accept only complete battalions,
raised and equipped. In the Dundee Advertiser of Monday 28 September
there was an acknowledgement of the unsuccessful attempt to raise a local
infantry battalion: an admission of defeat. There was a call for those who had
put forward their names as potential recruits to join instead the Naval Brigade
which was at that time attempting to raise a company of men in Dundee. The
men were told that if they joined in a significantly large number they would
form one company of 250 men which would train together and fight together.
Of the 404 names on the list thirty-eight had tired of waiting and had enlisted
in alternative units. Seventy-two were corporation employees; seventy-nine
were clerks, insurance agents, and professional assistants; thirty came from
the building trade and thirty-seven from engineering; while 'the remainder
represented almost every industry in the country'. At the meeting of the men,
in the local Masonic Temple, 150 joined the Naval Brigade.518
The Dundee Council's admission of early defeat in recruiting a City Battalion
would seem to have been not only premature but also ill advised. The
Dundee Battalion was, without doubt, the first of Scotland's 'Pals' battalions'
to be sanctioned by the War Office. True, as we have seen, the Corporation
of Glasgow had declared, at a meeting on 3 September, its intention to form
518 Dundee Advertiser, 28 September 1914.
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civic battalions, but official War Office sanction had already been given for the
Dundee Battalion the previous day, while the first of the Edinburgh battalions,
the 15th battalion, Royal Scots, was initiated on 19 September, seventeen
days after the Dundee battalion. As long as the Glasgow and Edinburgh
battalions were prepared to take up to three months to recruit, and, in the
case of Edinburgh, accept large numbers of men from Manchester, there
appeared to be no logical reason for Dundee to call such a halt.
Unfortunately, the council, and more importantly Lord Provost Urquhart, felt
that the low recruitment for the City Battalion, coupled with the low state of
recruitment for Dundee as a whole, meant that a considerable period of time
would be required and that with the sense of urgency coming from the War
Office completion would be too late. The Dundee City Battalion was not the
only attempt to fail. As we have seen in Glasgow, there were other calls for
'Pals' battalions', some of which never passed the planning stage while
others, like Dundee, fell by the wayside due to the lack of recruits.
To take the concept of the Pals battalion one step further, the War Office, in
May 1915, came up with a twist to the theme. Under the headline 'SCOTTISH
BATTALION FOR PROFESSIONAL MEN' new steps were detailed to
stimulate recruitment. 'An interesting War Office experiment is being made in
connection with the raising of the 14th Battalion of the Argyle and Sutherland
Highlanders. It has been decided that this new battalion shall be exclusively
recruited from the professional and commercial classes in Scotland.' 519 While
this did not fall into the original category of a Pals battalion in that the War
519 Dundee Advertiser. 24 May 1915.
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Office was raising and funding the unit, it still could be considered as such
since it was a call to a distinctive social group - the very same group at which
the original Scothsh Pals battalions were aimed.
The raising of local units was not confined solely to infantry battalions. Nine
other units were raised in Scotland by the Lord Provosts and Cities of
Aberdeen, Dundee, and Glasgow. There was a request by the Army Council
in late January 1915 for the raising of small local units of artillery or
engineers.520 In mid-March 1915 the War Office approached those who had
previously raised local battalions or who had attempted such but had failed to
attain the necessary numbers, and asked if they would raise support units for
an army which, it was envisaged, would be comprised solely of those Pals
battalions. In order to maintain the ethos of the Pals concept the supporting
engineer and artillery units should also be locally raised.
520 Dundee Advertiser, 22 January, 1915. p. 9.
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521Fig 6:4 Scottish locally Raised Support Units.
Aberdeen
157th (Aberdeen City) Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. 03-02-1915
Dundee
205th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Dundee) 02-02-1915
Glasgow
159th (Glasgow) Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. 04-02-1915
206th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. 04-02-1915
Headquarters, Divisional Royal Engineers. 05-04-1915
218th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915
219th (Field) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915
41st Divisional Signal Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 05-04-1915
217th (Army Troops) Company, Royal Engineers. (Glasgow) 	 05-04-1915
Glasgow raised a further seven units, six of those attributable to James
Dairymple, while Aberdeen and Dundee raised one each. The main difference
between these units and the infantry battalions raised earlier in Scotland was
their composition, and the background, of the men serving in them. The
recruits needed for these 'technical' units were skilled artisans, not the middle
class. 'The new company presents its demands to a wide variety of trades,
and offers to recruits rates of pay considerably higher than those of the
ordinary seMces.'5 Tradesmen were required for their skills, and were being
paid accordingly. 'Tradesmen specially appealed to are masons, bricklayers,
plumbers, electricians, blacksmiths, plasterers, slaters, carpenters, clerks,
coopers, architectural draughtsmen, engine drivers, fitters and turners,
harnessmakers, painters, shoemakers, surveyors, tailors, wheelwrights,
drivers, and batmen.'523
521 Kitchener Papers, PRO. 30/57/73.
522 Dundee Advertiser. 24 March, 1915.
5 DundeeAdvertiser. 24 March 1915.
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By the end of December 1914 approximately 8,000 men had enlisted in the
five Scottish Pals battalions formed at that time. With a total Scottish
recruitment figure for that date of 161,882 for the Regular Army and
Territorial Force the Scottish Pals battalions were providing only 4.9 per cent
of the manpower. When Territorial recruitment totals are excluded and the
figure is compared only to the Scottish recruits for the New Army the
percentage increases to 7.6 per cent. By the end of 1915, when the voluntary
period was coming to an end, locally raised units in Scotland, including
engineering and artillery companies and reserve battalions, amounted to
approximately 15,000 men or 5 per cent of the total Scottish recruitment and
8 per cent of the Scottish army recruitment total.524 With such a limited total
strength the value of such locally raised units in Scotland was not so much in
numbers as in the type of recruit. As we have seen in chapters three and four,
the greater majority of those who enlisted in Scotland in the first year of the
war came from the industrial or working class; the middle or professional
classes were underrepresented.
The men who joined such units may have enlisted individually in the New
Armies without the inducement of the 'Pals concept' but this would have been
over a longer period of time. The locally raised concept nudged them into
enlisting en masse at a time when large numbers were needed. More
importantly, in terms of recruitment numbers, it was imperative to be seen to
maintain the momentum of the September peak period. In many cases the
locally raised concept exposed the individual to pressure from peers or family.
524 PRO. Nats 1/398. Statistics of the Military Effort.
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In the case of the 15th Highland Light Infantry there was a large number of
tramways employees who would, in all probability, not have enlisted on that
particular day had there not been tacit encouragement for them to do so.
Those Pals battalions which were raised in Scotland served a specific
purpose. The 16th battalion Highland Light Infantry, with its officers and men
from the Boys Brigade, and the 17th battalion, with its recruits coming from
the commercial section, were aimed at the middle class of Glasgow society.
Those who may have looked upon the more traditionally formed local
battalions as beneath their station were willing to enlist in a battalion of their
peers. Unfortunately the idea that traditional social barriers were at once
removed was seen in its true light when the 17th battalion Highland Light
Infantry advertised in the Glasgow press for ex-soldiers to act as 'storemen
and batmen', positions which were obviously beneath the middle class
recruits. 525
 The 16th battalion, Royal Scots, although containing a large
number of football and rugby players and their supporters, also contained
large numbers of Heart of Midlothian shareholders, and former pupils of the
capital's two most prestigious public schools, which set the social level of the
battalion. The middle class in Scotland was perhaps the group which had the
most to lose and the greatest incentive to enlist but this loss was only in the
long term, unlike that of the working class who suffered an immediate
financial hardship. The formation of intentionally middle class battalions was
designed to ease their dilemma and provided a medium through which they
could defend their way of life. However, within Scotland those members of the
525 Glasgow Citizen, 5 October 1914.
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middle classes who were inclined to accept military service already had an
outlet in the middle class Territorial battalions scattered throughout
Scotland 526
The 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was an altogether different matter.
This was a working class battalion, raised by James Dalrymple from within his
domain, and, while showing the best of the men, at the same time it showed
the worst of the Pals concept: pressure. Whether intentional or not Dalrymple
was placing his employees in an impossible position.
Recent historians have considered the recruitment of these locally raised
battalions in the same way as have historians over the last eighty years. This
brings with it the danger that myth may, over time, be accepted as reality.
Niall Ferguson asserts that the 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was
raised 'in a matter of hours'. 527 Ferguson's source is Edward Spiers who in
turn claims that the battalion 'was raised in 16 hours'. 528 In turn Spiers's
reference is to T. Chalmers's 1934 publication, An Epic of Glasgow: History of
the 15th Battalion Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment) in which
Chalmers, writing from a partisan, and poetic, point of view, creates the myth.
Trevor Royle also followed Chalmers when he claims that 'it took just 16
hours to enlist the new battalion'. 529 M Lynch also concludes that 'Pals
526 Discussed further in chapter 7, Territorial recruitment.
527 N. Ferguson, The Pity of War. p. 207.
528 E. Spiers, The Scottish Soldier at War. p. 315.
529 T. Royle, In Flanders Fields. p. 14.
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battalions, such as those of the Highland Light Infantry which recruited mainly
from Glasgow's slums, were formed almost overnight from particular localities
or the workplace: another battalion in the same regiment was entirely made
up, in the space of sixteen hours, of the employees of Glasgow Corporation
Tramways.'53°
The Pals battalions of the Highland Light Infantry were never formed from the
slums of Glasgow and were never formed overnight, far less in sixteen hours.
The 16th and 17th battalions were predominantly middle class, while the 15th
was intended to consist of those employed by the corporation, itself a bastion
of working class elitism. Recruiting for the 16th and 17th battalions did not
close until 13 November, some seventy days after it started, while the 15th
battalion was still recruiting at this time. The ability to produce a list of names
within sixteen hours does not mean that the battalion was raised in that
period. Recruiting for the 15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry did not in fact
commence until 13 September 1914, nine days after Dalrymple received his
'list of names' and, instead of having enough men to produce a ready
battalion, recruitment was less than expected. By the end of September
James Dalrymple had to resort to the unusual step of issuing a call for friends
and relatives of tramways employees, and any other interested person, to
come forward and enlist in the battalion, while on 5 October the combined city
battalions still required 1,000 recruits to bring them up to strength. 531
 The 15th
battalion Highland Light Infantry, with a strength of 755, was 345 short of its
° M. Lynch, Scotland: A New History.
531 Glasgow Citizen, 21 September 1914.
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full complement, while the 16th battalion was at the same level, with the 17th
battalion nearing completion with 900 men, a shortfall of only 200.532
The belief that large numbers of volunteers rushed to enlist in the Scottish
Pals' battalions is not only confined to the Glasgow battalions, but also
extends to those raised in Edinburgh for the Royal Scots. We are assured by
A.J. Smithers that Scotland's capital city raised two battalions, the 15th and
16th Royal Scots, in twenty-four hours. 5
 However, as we have seen earlier
in this chapter, the 15th battalion, Royal Scots was still receiving large
numbers of recruits from Manchester in October, while the 16th battalion took
twelve days to come up to strength - a truly remarkable feat but still not
accomplished in twenty-four hours. Indeed, while the 15th battalion was
raised and funded by a public body, by accepting large contingents of men
from Manchester, it departed from the accepted definition of a 'Pals battalion'.
Those men had no direct local or social ties with the people of Edinburgh and
were not joining a band of 'like minded people', coming as they did from
another country. While some of them had family ties with Scotland, they had
primarily enlisted as the Manchester Scottish and were sent to the 15th
battalion, Royal Scots, when Manchester could not raise enough recruits for
its own battalion. They had come forward to enlist in their own 'English' pals
battalion and a large proportion of them had no connection at all with
Scotland, save the desire to serve in a regiment with a Scottish name and
532 Evening Citizen, 5 October 1914.
5 A.J. Smithers, The Fighting Nation: Lord Kitchener and his Armies.
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wear a uniform bearing Scothsh tartan. While the battalion strived to ensure
that those men arriving from Manchester had some form of Scottish
connection, however tenuous, this was ignored in most cases in an effort to
obtain recruits. As well as demonstrating the inability of a city like Manchester
to form a battalion of men with Scottish connections, the use of those
Manchester recruits shows that in Edinburgh itself there was a weak
response from the middle classes to recruiting for the 15th battalion.
There is a strong case for those service battalions raised by Lochiel for the
Cameron Highlanders to be viewed not as New Army but as locally raised or
Pals' battalions. 5
 While the recruits were drawn from a world-wide pool and
not from a clearly defined and socially mutual locality, and while the men did
not come from a common workplace, profession, or social class, the fact that
they were primarily raised in answer to the call of one man, relying on age-old
ties of clan loyalty, gives them as much credibility as any other Scottish 'Pals'
battalion. Certainly they were funded by the War Office and not by Lochiel,
but the recruitment was aimed at a residual loyalty to Lochiel, not the War
Office.
The concept of Pals Battalions was more a phenomenon of English
recruitment, where men came from a single work place or a group of
workplaces operated by a single employer. In Scotland, with the exception of
the Glasgow Tramways Department, those battalions which were raised
came from a wide variety of employers, professions, and districts. The only
Chapter 4.
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commonality was their middle class background. In Scotland this was not
enough to ensure the rapid formation of the civic battalions; middle class
recruitment in Scotland was tardy and patchy.
There were companies of men formed from the same professions, such as
students and clerical workers, but such links did not provide enough of a
draw; these men were colleagues in name only and had no links through a
common workplace. In the case of the 16th battalion, Highland Light Infantry
the linking factor of the Boys' Brigade was not sufficient to ensure enough
recruits and as we have seen it took almost two and a half months to raise
enough men to fill the battalion, and not all through connections with the Boys'
Brigade. This was in stark contrast to the claims of the Executive Committee
of the Boys' Brigade who, on 10 September 1914, offered the services of the
Glasgow Battalion of the Boys' Brigade and intimated that there were 'some
four or five hundred officers and close upon nine thousand boys' available for
service. 535 The use of past or present service in the Boys' Brigade served to
define the social standard of recruit required in the battalion, since, in
Glasgow at least, it was predominantly a middle class pastime, the cost of the
uniform and the weekly subscription excluding all but the better off.
Those battalions, usually territorial, which had an affiliation with a particular
area would appeal to a large section of those who enlisted almost
immediately for economic reasons. The unemployed, unemployable and the
unskilled would quickly fill the ranks. The security of six or nine months
Glasgow Citizen, 10 October 1914.
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employment, over the winter period, was a large incentive. These men,
because of their lack of skills, were infantry material. By the same standard
the Pals battalions formed in Scotland, with the exception of the 15th
Highland Light Infantry, fell into the same category, men whose lack of
transferable skills made them infantry material, men also in many instances
whose lack of dependence on army pay could be seen as a factor in
encouraging them to join an infantry battalion of their peers. Men with
transferable skills would, by choice, enlist within a unit in which their skills
would earn them extra pay and allowances. On the other hand in the case of
the 15th Highland Light Infantry, while it was certainly a working class unit
comprised mainly of men with some degree of transferable skills, the
domineering manner of James Dairymple ensured that, if for no other reason
than future employment, they joined the battalion representing his
department. While the army, in the early stages of the war, suffered from a
shortage of engineers, mechanics and drivers, those from the tramways
department stayed 'in house'.
Those in the regional or territorial battalions enlisted almost immediately while
those in the Pals battalions enlisted at a later date. Money and security were
motivating factors for both groups but in different ways. To the unemployed,
or low paid, the army offered relief and shelter and drew in those recruits for
whom this was a priority. The army was seen as long-term poor relief. In the
middle class Pals' battalions there was no direct financial pull but certainly a
delay, for some, until stability was guaranteed at home before enlisting. The
middle classes in Scotland in September 1914 had less reason to 'rush to the
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colours' when all that they had worked for, built up, etc., could not be
abandoned at a moment's notice, especially for a war which many thought
would be over before the training period was complete. This poses the idea
that with the promise of a short war and a long training period, enlistment, for
the middle classes in Scotland, was merely a gesture. With the raising and
training of the Pals battalions being the responsibility of a civilian authority or
individual, it was perfectly feasible that the war would be over before the
battalion could be handed over to the War Office, thus negating any need to
serve in the army. Until battalions were taken over by the War Office they
could still be viewed, by the individual, as civilian. Those with arguably the
greatest incentive to support the war, the responsibility of position, also had
the greatest incentive to remain at home. By mid-September when the
recruiting 'boom' was over the Pals battalions were starting to recruit. The
initial rush had failed to entice them and, as we have already seen, in some
instances the completion of the Pals battalions was a long drawn-out process.
As we have seen, it was one month into the war (3 September) before the
15th battalion, Highland Light Infantry was a proposition, and even longer
before recruitment got under way on 13 September. Those of the working
class with secure jobs had not rushed to enlist, at least not in this instance.
Similarly, recruits for the Pals battalions in Scotland did not rush to enlist; they
had to be prompted by a psychological boost or threat. As long as military
service remained voluntary it promoted a 'Pals' concept; groups of men could
always enlist together. The doctrine of locally raised units which emerged in
the first three months of the war was only taking this concept one step further.
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There appears to be a degree of national, or regional, pride at stake as to
where the first Pals battalion originated or who originally devised the concept.
Lord Derby is usually credited with initiating the movement, while others credit
Sir Henry Rawlinson with conceiving the idea as early as 19 August. In
Scotland, however, as we have seen, the idea of a 'City Battalion' had been
proposed in Edinburgh by Lord Provost Inches and the Council as early as 14
August, and recruiting announcements had been published in the press on
the same day. While it is true that other battalions were sanctioned by the
War Office earlier than the Scottish battalions, the fact still remains that
Scotland, or at least a section of Scottish society, was well to the fore in
originating those ideas. That Scotland's Pals battalions never achieved their
full potential, as those in England did, can be attributed in the main to the
lethargy displayed by the middle classes in Scotland and the insular
conception that such battalions were for the middle class only, thereby
shutting the door to the greater part of Scottish manpower.
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CHAPTER 7
TERRITORIAL RECRUITMENT.
For the present it is not deemed expedient to recruit Territorials.536
As part of the army reforms introduced by R. B. Haldane, and as a result of
his Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill of 1907, the Territorial Force came into
being on 1 April 1908. A volunteer force, it was to be raised and administered
by local county associations. Service in the new force was for an initial period
of four years with a fortnight's annual camp paid at regular army rates. Seen
as a direct replacement for the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers, the new
force was designed, in Haldane's eyes at least, to fulfil two functions. The
Territorial Force was intended to take over the defence of the homeland in
event of war - an anti-invasion force if you like, thus enabling the regular army
to be deployed abroad as an Expeditionary Force. However, Haldane
envisaged a wider role for the new force. He intended that the Territorial
Force should support and expand the regular army in time of crisis. Upon
mobilisation, and after six months training, the Territorial Force would be
ready to serve alongside the regular army on active service abroad. However,
those serving in the Territorial Force signed on for home service only and
agreement had to be reached on an individual basis before foreign service
could take place. The inadequacy of the system could be seen in the need for
a six month training period prior to active service to bring Territorials up to
536 Glasgow Herald, 10 August, 1914. Part of Lord Kitchener's appeal for men.
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strength and a standard which could be easily assimilated into the Regular
Army. The military mind still thought in terms of a slow build-up and singular
decisive action. Haldane's attempt to professionalise the irregular reserve
forces failed in the face of distrust, contempt and criticism from those in the
regular army and resistance from the local associations which saw such
attempts as anathema to their way of life.
Chapter Two showed that the Territorial Force, and its predecessor, was seen
as a lifestyle by many and any attempt to 'militarise' it would have had an
adverse affect on recruiting, and, more importantly, on the retention of those
already serving. On 1 July 1914 the Territorial Force stood at 268,777 officers
and other ranks UK wide, with some 18,683 or 6.95 per cent having signed up
for foreign service. 537 Much has been made of Kitchener's failure to utilise the
Territorial Force in the manner envisaged by Haldane, as a reserve of semi-
trained personnel. In truth Kitchener had no experience of the Territorial
Force and was unable to form any realistic opinion as to its proficiency and
ability. The need for a six-month training period reflected the mixed level of
ability that the Territorial Force was deemed to represent. He took what was
probably the only logical option open to him at the time and, thinking in the
long term, opted to start from scratch, to work with a known rather than an
unknown quantity.
Peter Simkins takes the view that any large scale influx of raw and untrained
recruits would have diluted the ability of the Territorial Force, even in its home
I. Becket, 'The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 130.
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defence role, and would have had a negative effect on the ability of that force
to reinforce the Expeditionary Force. Indeed, 'If they were swamped by
masses of raw recruits it was reasonable to assume that they might be
rendered temporarily incapable of carrying out any function at all'. 538
 By
ensuring that second-line units could only be raised once a front-line battalion
had volunteered for foreign service, Kitchener ensured that the dilution of
standards would be kept to a minimum for those units which were partially
trained. By 25 August 1914 over seventy Territorial battalions had
volunteered for foreign service.
In August 1914 the Territorial Force in Scotland was in the process of
completing its annual camp and was ideally positioned to respond to the
mobilisation.	 There was a feeling at large that the army would soon be in
action, although it was envisaged that Ireland, rather than Europe, would be
the battleground. To this extent the army was prepared for combat but only as
an extension to its normal imperial peacekeeping duties. As the reality of a
European conflict took hold the army began deploying throughout Scotland to
guard what were considered to be strategic positions. The army was aided in
this by detachments of the Territorial Force, which were dispatched to their
war stations to protect bridges, aqueducts, railway lines and reservoirs. Now,
for the first time, the general population, through its direct involvement with
the Territorial Force, became aware of the extent of the crisis in Europe and
53 p . Simkins. 'Kitchener'. in Beckett & Gooch. Politicians and Defence. p. 98.
5 The Scotsman, 7 July, 1914.
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how deeply it could involve the United Kingdom. The need to mobilise for
home defence was a shock to those who had been brought up to believe in
the invincibility of imperial Britain. For the mother country to be under direct
threat created within the population a sense of trepidation never felt before.
Max Beloff goes some way to explaining this when he tells us that When
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, it was the first time she
had fought against a European power since the end of the Crimean War in
1856, and the first time she had been involved in a war threatening the home
islands since the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815'.°
Although during the war Scotland boasted few locally raised or Pals
battalions, it is fair to say that, in its own peculiar way, the 'pals' concept was
a strong part of Scottish society. The need to create an artificial group loyalty
in order to stimulate recruitment was not necessary in a country which had its
own particular group and regional loyalties. J. Winter reminds us that 'There
were probably as many reasons for volunteering as there were volunteers.
But one of the most striking features of enlistment in the first year of the war
was the extent to which the recruiting drive tapped powerful sentiments of
loyalty felt by men, whatever their occupation, to town, county, or
community'.1
This could be seen in Scotland, as elsewhere, by the linking of regiments with
° M. Beloff, Wars and Welfare: Britain 1914-1939. p. 15.
541 J. Winter, The Great War. p. 30.
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geographical regions which gave clearly defined allegiances to specific
regiments. Scotland had a well defined social structure, with regiments clearly
labelled as east coast (Black Watch or Royal Scots), or west coast (Highland
Light Infantry or Cameronians). Within this context there was also a tendency
for individual counties, towns, or districts to align themselves with a particular
Territorial battalion within a regimental recruiting district. When war broke out
and those territorial forces were mobilised, family, friends, workmates etc.
would, by preference, enlist in the local territorial unit, reinforcing such
allegiances as were already there, especially in the highland regiments with
their old clan loyalties.
Far from suffering at the hands of Kitchener, his disregard for the Territorial
Force helped it to perform the one function for which it was ideally suited.
With its call for localised defence and home service the Territorial Force
provided Scotland with those recruits who, in all probability, would not have
enlisted so readily in the regular army; it gave an extra incentive. In certain
ways the Territorial Force was the natural vehicle for the raising of extra
manpower. The Yeomanry and Volunteer Associations had provided the
temporary increase required for the Boer War, thus setting a precedent for
temporary military service. To some the regular army held an air of
permanence, even with a wartime-only commitment. On the other hand the
Territorial Force gave the illusion of a temporary commitment, it represented
the civilian in war - an important psychological point and a major factor in
stimulating Territorial recruiting.
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The use of separate recruiting organisations for the Territorial Force and the
regular army served in some areas to promote the Territorial Force as the
main arm of choice. For a great number of the population the only contact
with the military was through the local drill hail and it was there that they
automatically went to enlist. While the regular army had been limiting the
number of recruiting offices to the larger towns, the Territorial Force had been
increasing its network of drill halls throughout the country. 2 In the first few
weeks of the war the Territorial Force was able to capitalise on this lack of
foresight and its separate recruiting system was vigorously defended by the
Territorial Associations in the face of regular army requests that there should
be a common recruiting programme. it was seen as a sign of their
individuality and their civilian ties, and became another major reason for the
mistrust between the Territorial Associations and the War Office.
There is no doubt that the use of two different and distinct recruiting bodies
did cause confusion among recruits and thus recruiting for both bodies
suffered. But they were also a means by which the Territorial Force could
circumvent the rules of recruiting, especially those dictating the policy of no
recruiting outwith the district. One of the associations most closely linked with
recruiting 'irregularities' was that of the 6th Battalion Black Watch. On 25
January 1915 the association received a letter from Headquarters Scottish
Command, regarding recruiting for the battalion in the North of Ireland, and
enclosing a copy of a advertisement stating that a recruiting office had been
542 Appendix I
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opened in the Grand Hotel, Belfast. 3 A reply was sent on 27 January 1915
stating that 'although the association knew that recruits were coming from
North of Ireland they had no knowledge of the publication or recruiting
literature or establishment of an office in Ireland and had not authorised
same'.
This seemed to satisfy Scottish Command for nothing further was heard
about the matter. However, on 19 March 1915 the association agreed to pay
an expenses claim forwarded by the officer commanding 2/6th battalion in
connection with running a recruiting office in Belfast.' 5 That the association
saw no wrong in this matter is explained by the presence, in the pre-war
battalion, of an 'Irish' company, raised and based in Ireland. These Irishmen
formed a self-contained company and journeyed over to attend the annual
training camps in Scotland. The company managed to assemble, make the
journey from Ireland, and present itself at the Perth Barracks only two days
after war was declared. This unauthorised recruiting in Ireland was a part of
the localisation concept; the battalion was only recruiting in its 'home
territory', relying on regimental loyalty to bring in recruits, recruits which it felt
were its own, regardless of nationality.
The 6th battalion, Black Watch was not the only Scottish Territorial battalion
to try to recruit outwith its home regimental recruiting area. By April 1915,
preparations were in hand allowing the Recruiting Committee of the Territorial
Minute Book of Forfar County Association, #1, 1908-1915. 25 January 1915.
511 Minute Book of Forfar County Association, #1, 1908-1915. 27 January 1915.
Minute BookofForfarCountyAssociation, #1, 1908-1915. 19 March 1915.
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Force Association of the County of Aberdeen to recruit men of Scothsh
descent in Middlesex for the 5th, 6th and 7th Gordon Highlanders. Approval
had been given by the chairman of the County of Middlesex Territorial Force
Association for the Rev Thomas Scott, Laurencekirk, chaplain to 7th battalion,
Gordon Highlanders, to open a recruiting office in Middlesex. However before
the scheme was fully up and running the 5th and 7th Gordon Highlanders,
with the Rev T. Scott, were posted overseas. The project was shelved in
the meantime but not scrapped; it was occasionally dusted off and reviewed
but conscription rendered the scheme redundant.
Throughout Scotland the Territorial Force was using the local drill halls as
recruiting centres while the regular army was forced to go elsewhere for
premises, usually in out of the way offices on loan. Local units thereby
developed the greater profile. Far from being sidelined as Kitchener had
intended, the Territorial Force in Scotland fulfilled a major rote, recruiting
57,490 men between August and December 1914, quite an achievement
when the army in Scotland recruited only 104,392 in the same period and
35.5 per cent of the total number of recruits in Scotland for the first five
months of the war. It was also an increase of 137 per cent over the immediate
pre-war Scottish territorial strength of 41,746. In the twelve months of 1915
the Territorial Force in Scotland recruited 58,046 men, 41.5 per cent of a
Scottish total for the period of 1 39,872. The difference in Scottish Territorial
recruitment between the five month period in 1914 and the twelve month
546 Minutes of the Recruiting Committee of the Territorial Force for the County of Aberdeen.
Scottish Record Office MD 4/63.
NATS 1/399.
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period of 1915 was not so wide as that of the army. There was less than I per
cent difference in the number of recruits raised: a mere 556 recruits,
representing 0.96 per cent of an increase in 1915. The total number of
recruits for the Territorial Force in Scotland during the seventeen month
voluntary period was 115,536. This represented a 276.7 per cent increase in
the strength of the Territorial Force in Scotland. 8 With the exemplary war
record of Scottish Territorial battalions it also casts a new light on Simkins's
assertion that any wholesale increase in Territorial strength would be
detrimental to efficiency. With such large numbers coming forward
recruitment in the Territorial Force would appear to have been limited only by
demand.
Initially at any rate the Territorial Associations could only, officially, recruit
some 12,961 men, the pre-war Territorial shortfall in Scotland. However, Ian
Beckett states that on 15 August 1914, Territorial Associations were
authorised to raise new units as replacements for those volunteering for
foreign service. On 21 August the order to raise 'second line' units regardless
of first line status was issued, repeated on 31 August and 21 September
1914. By November 1914 authorisation was given for the raising of a 'third
line' when first line units were sent overseas. By March 1915 the order had
been extended to cover all units regardless of status.9
518 NATS 1/399.
I. Becket, 'The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 132.
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Individual choice as to foreign service was always going to be a barrier to
effective use of Territorial manpower. On 10 August 1914 it was announced
that the War Office was willing to accept complete units for Imperial Service,
to relieve regular garrison units overseas and free them for active service in
Europe. By 21 August 1914 the War Office guidelines had been changed to
include units in which at least 80 per cent of the personnel had volunteered.
These units were then allowed to recruit the necessary extra men for foreign
service to bring them up to war establishment. More realistically units with
less than the required number couJd merge to produce foreign service units.
The order of 31 August 1914 allowed second line units to be raised where at
least 60 per cent of a unit had volunteered for foreign service. This allowed
those men who had opted for home service to form the basis of the second
line unit while the first line came up to strength for foreign service.
Unfortunately the competition between home and foreign service units for
men tended to slow down recruitment for foreign service. Second line units
were up to strength while first line units were still trying to attract recruits. The
ability to enlist in the Territorial Force for home service rather than foreign
service continued until March 1915, when all new Territorial recruits were
enlisted for general service.55°
As we have shown in Chapter Two, the various pre-war regional recruiting
figures bear out the idea that in Scotland the Territorial Force was the
localised unit of choice, when choice could be given. It is no surprise
therefore that wartime recruitment followed the same pattern. In rural areas
550 I. Becket, The Territorial Force' in Becket and Simpson. p. 135.
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such as Aberdeen, Forfar, and Inverness the figures show that recruitment for
the Territorial Force was higher than that for the regular army while in urban
or industrial areas with a high population density such as Glasgow the regular
army took the leading role in recruitment. The Territorial Force was a finite
body, expanded within tightly controlled perameters and limited in the number
of recruits it could absorb. This worked well in rural areas with relatively low
population densities and therefore relatively low recruitment numbers. In the
densely populated urban areas this inability to absorb large scale recruiting,
while not detracting from the primary importance of the Territorial Force, led
to the higher recruiting rates for the service battalions and for units other than
infantry.
In the County of Forfar, those enlisting for the local regiment, the Black
Watch, were joining the 5th battalion which was the local Territorial unit, while
those enlisting in the regular army (Kitchener) were joining regiments outwith
the local area. A high proportion of those from Forfar enlisting in the regular
army were enlisting in the higher paid technical branches such as the Royal
Engineers. This was due to Forfar being a one-industry town (textiles), where
a high number of men were skilled and suffering from short-time working due
to the war. In contrast, those from the surrounding county were mostly
agricultural workers who joined the lower paid infantry or yeomanry
regiments. Those who enlisted in regiments such as the Royal Engineers did
so mainly in the first few weeks of the war, before the local textile companies
secured lucrative army contracts which guaranteed employment for skilled
textile workers. Regular army recruiting offices enlisted men for other regional
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regiments to make up the shortfall in recruitment in other areas and Forfar
was a popular recruiting office for the Royal Scots, with small numbers of
recruits occasionally going to the Highland Light Infantry. This is an example
of how the regional Territorial battalion took on the mantle of the locally raised
unit, instilling regional loyalty, and to a certain extent explains why the 'Pals'
concept never really took off in Scotland; in another guise it was already
there. This 'localisation' had the same consequences that materialised with
the more popularised Pals battalions: casualty figures could devastate local
communities. Localised recruitment magnified the effects of battalion
casualties and highlighted the need for a centralised recruiting programme
which was not available until conscription.
By the end of December 1914 Forfar had provided 314 recruits for the regular
army while at the same time providing 673 recruits for the local Territorial
Force. 551 Meanwhile, between August 1914 and May 1915, the City of
Aberdeen had produced 4,982 recruits for the local Territorial Force but only
3,452 for the regular army, eventually producing some 6,502 recruits for the
Territorial Force by December 1915.552 From October 1914 to April 1915
there were 883 recruits for the Lovat Scouts but only 244 regular army
recruits in the same recruiting district. 553 On the other hand, over the same
period, the City of Glasgow produced 20,649 recruits for the regular army but
only 6,595 recruits for the Territorial Force. 5 By September 1915, prior to the
551 Minute Book of Forfar CountyAssociation. #1, 1908-1915. Nats 1/398.
552 City of Aberdeen. Territorial Force Minutes, November 1913-October 1917. PRO. Nats
1/398.
Minutes of the Territorial Force Association of the Counties of Inverness, Ross &
Cromarty, and Nairn, 16 March 1915. Nats 1/398
551 Minutes of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association, 1915-1918. Nats 1/398.
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end of direct Territorial recruitment, the City of Glasgow, with a male
population of 366,535, had produced 9,619 recruits for the Territorial Force, a
figure of 2.62 per cent of the male population.555 Lanark with a male
population of 354,834 had produced 4,262 recruits or 1.2 per cent.556
Inverness on the other hand with 1,411 had provided 3.3 per cent of the local
male population of 42,440 for the Lovat Scouts Yeomanry. 557 Aberdeen
provided 6,274 recruits, some 4.25 per cent of her 147,357 male
population. 558 Glasgow and Lanark, the two most industrialised areas in
Scotland and the most densely populated, continued their pie-war trend and
provided proportionally low numbers of recruits for the Territorial Force.559
Without the wholesale creation of new battalions, and in the process a dilution
of the Territorial ethos, the Territorial Associations would never have been
able to produce the numbers that the army required. It is reasonable to
assume that the ability of the new 'Service Battalions' to absorb recruits in
such large numbers would have been no different had those new battalions
been designated 'Territorial' rather than 'Service'. Territorial battalions which
were not raised as specific Pals units nonetheless became so with groups of
like-minded individuals enlisting en masse: the 7th battalion Black Watch,
recruited from the miners of Fife, is one such example. The recruiting was still
Minutes of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association. Scottish Record Office. MD 10/8.
556 Minute Book of the County Association of Lanark. Book #2. Scottish Record Office. MD
2/2.
Minutes of meetings of the Joint Committee of the Counties of Inverness, Ross &
Cromarty, and Sutherland, for the purpose of administering Lovat Scouts Yeomanry, various
dates 16 March —21 December 1915. Scottish Record Office. MD 8/38.
558 Records of the Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Aberdeen.
November 1913— October 1917. Scottish Record Office. MD 4/2
Nats 1/398.
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based on regional loyalty, although manifested in this instance through
regimental ties rather than the more localised company or battalion ties. In
this way the Pals concept was always present. The Territorial Force, as it
stood in August 1914, restricted by its inability to expand beyond its existing
perimeters, could never have coped with the initial flood of recruits, but it had
served its purpose of creating, and cementing regional loyalty.
On 4 August Dundee saw a crowd of men at the Bell Street Drill Hall but
recruiting was restricted, initially at any rate, to those men who had seen
previous service.° Edinburgh was no different, with enlistment in the local
territorial battalions also limited to those with previous service. As well as
fulfilling the requirements of previous service recruits were expected to enlist
for the normal pre-war period of four years. In Edinburgh large numbers of
recruits were being turned away due to lack of previous service: on 6 and 7
August the 6th battalion, Royal Scots accepted just twenty-five recruits while
turning away eighty others for that reason. 1 The requirement to sign up for
four years was a hindrance to initial territorial recruitment: the extent of new
manpower demands was not anticipated by local associations, at least in the
initial weeks. The Territorial Associations, while endeavouring to recruit up to
establishment, had no precedent as to the numbers required, or as to the
speed with which they would be needed: 'a difficulty which presented itself to
others, otherwise suitable, was the fact that enlistment for the full period of
four years was insisted upon'.2
° Dundee Advertiser, 4 August 1914.
561 The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
562 The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
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In Cupar, Fife, it was reported, as early as 7 August, that 'During the day
recruiting could have gone on briskly, but acting on orders from St Andrews,
the numbers were restricted, as it was not desired that the strength of the
company be exceeded.' 3 Elsewhere in the same county other units were not
so restrictive. As early as 10 August there were calls for employers to
encourage their workers to enlist in the Territorial Force:
The Territorial Force Association of the County of Perth have asked us
to appeal to all loyal subjects of King George to assist in filling the
ranks of the Perthshire Territorial units. Landed proprietors, employers
of labour, and others can render great service by making it easy for
those in their employment to volunteer for service.
The 7th (Territorial) battalion, The Black Watch, which was based and
recruited in Fife, had, by 7 August, when it reached its war station, gained
some 332 recruits. 'Recruiting was extremely brisk. Men flocked from all parts
of the county to join their local battalion, with the result that while the
marching-out state, on breaking camp at Monzie, showed a total strength of
570, the corresponding state on the morning after arrival at the war station
was 902.'
East of Fife Record, 7 August 1914.
56 Dundee advertiser, 10 August 1914.
5 A.G. Wauchope, A History of the Black Watch (Royal Highlanders) in the Great War 1914-
19 18, Volume Two: Territorial Force, p. 241.
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Throughout Fife large numbers of recruits were reporting to the drill halls.
Mostly from the East Weymss and Denbeath districts, the recruits were
mainly young miners. 6 On 13 September it was reported that in the previous
ten days 600 men had enlisted in the local Territorial battalion. However,
there was still a call for 400 men for foreign service. 567 By the second week of
war the stipulation for full time enrolment and previous service was rescinded,
and enlistment was open to all who were physically fit and under the
maximum age limit. Scenes at the recruiting stations were chaotic as men
were in some instances pressed into joining Territorial battalions under the
impression they had enlisted in the New Armies for short-term service.8
As late as 8 September only 60 per cent of the 6th battalion, Black Watch had
volunteered for foreign service. There seemed to be no difficulty in recruiting
for the various home service battalions but there were repeated calls for the
corresponding foreign service battalions. That the Territorial Force was seen
by many as a short term financial refuge is apparent in this reluctance by
many to sign up for foreign service. By 25 August the 4th and 5th battalions,
Royal Scots, were recruiting for foreign service only and this was followed on
29 August by the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry and on 4 September by the 6th
Battalion, Black Watch. By the end of September in Dundee it was noted that
recruits for the 2/4th Black Watch were coming in at approximately twenty-five
per day, while recruitment for the New Armies at the same time was
approximately four per day. 569 On 10 October the Dundee Advertiser noted
East of Fife Record, 14 August 1914.
567 Dundee Advertiser, 13 September 1914.
568 W. L. Andrews, The Haunting Years: The Commentaries of a War Territorial. p. 12-13.
569 Dundee Advertiser, 29 September 1914. PRO. Nats 1/398.
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that 'No branch of the army has proved a greater attraction to the young men
of Dundee and District than the 2nd Highland Brigade of the Royal Field
Artillery, and so great has been the response that for the present at any rate
recruiting has been suspended, both the ordinary and reserve brigades being
full up'.57°
In Glasgow the call on 7 September was for the 5th battalion, Highland Light
Infantry who required 'young men, between 19 and 35', but it was stressed
that 'only those willing to go on foreign service will be accepted'. Recruits
were advised to attend the Drill Hall, 24 Hill Street, Garnethill. 571 The same
newspaper also carried an advertisement for the 9th battalion, but gave a
differing age band for the recruits, 19 - 45, and stated the period of service as
one year or the duration of the war. 572 Although the Territorial Force did have
different criteria from the army as to the height, age and standard of recruits,
there was at times confusion between the various Territorial units as to what
was acceptable. This led to selectivity among the recruits, with the units
offering the most advantageous service conditions finding it relatively easy to
recruit up to establishment. On 10 September there was a call from the
Territorial Force Association of Glasgow for 2,000 recruits to make up the
numbers for foreign service, plus 240 officers and 7,400 men for reserve units
(second line). 573 By 10 October, Glasgow was in the throes of a renewed
recruitment campaign for the Territorial Force. This was being orchestrated by
the Magistrates and the Territorial Force Association, especially in Govan and
570 Dundee Advertiser, 10 October 1914.
571 Evening Citizen, 7 September 1914.
572 Evening Citizen, 7 September 1914.
Evening Citizen, 10 September 1914.
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Partick. Meetings addressed by Lord Strathclyde were arranged nightly for
every district in the city, in an effort to raise the thousands required to bring
the Glasgow Territorial Force up to the required strength. The recruiting drive
did have a positive effect:
There was a quiet day in the city yesterday at the general recruiting
offices, the numbers enlisting being 35. At the Territorial Headquarters
in the city, however, several hundreds have enrolled as a result of the
city recruiting meetings. To complete foreign service units about 650
men are required, while between five and six thousand men are
wanted for home service.574
Recruits were still needed for foreign service in -
5th Cameronians(Scothsh rifles) 251, Hill Street.
7th Cameronians, Coplaw Street.
8th Cameronians, 149 Cathedral Street.
5th H.L.l. 24 Hill Street, Garnethill.
6th H.L.I. 172 Yorkhill Street, Overnewton.
7th H.L.I. 69 Main Street, Bridgeton.575
By 4 November recruiting for the Territorial Force had slowed and the
Evening Citizen announced that 'with the prospect of immediate foreign
service in the Glasgow Territorial Battalions, officers are at a loss to account
for the slow rate of recruiting'. 576 Hindsight suggests that the reason was self-
Evening Citizen, 16 October 1914.
Evening Citizen, 20 October 1914.
576 Evening Times, 4 November 1914.
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evident. It was probably just as transparent in 1914, but in the climate of the
time it was seen as prudent not to acknowledge it.
By 16 October the total strength of the combined foreign and home service
units of the Glasgow Territorial Force was 14,467, but this still left a deficit of
some 4,663 places to be filled to complete the combined establishment. 577 By
19 November the strength had increased to 14,911, while the deficit had
fallen to 4,209.578 In the same edition there was a renewed call to the young
men of Glasgow to enlist in the Territorial Force 'for the honour of Glasgow'.
In conjunction with this, the political offices in Glasgow now for the first time
agreed to recruit for the Territorial Force as well as the other armed services;
hitherto the political offices had recruited for the service battalions only. By 14
November Glasgow had provided some 5,804 Territorials since mobilisation
and by mid-November 1914 approximately 450 recruits per week were
coming forward for the Territorial Force in Glasgow. Elsewhere, when the
10th battalion, Royal Scots, based in Linlithgow, commenced recruiting for
home service at the beginning of October 1914, it was reported that 600 men
were raised in only two days.579
Kitchener's alleged disregard of territorial troops, if it existed at all, went only
as far as practicality allowed and should be viewed purely as a tool of
expediency. The new Secretary of State for War, realising that Britain would
have to place millions of men in the field, used the best methods at hand;
Evening Times, 13 October 1914.
578 Evening Times, 19 November 1914.
Evening Citizen, 12 October 1914.
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whatever means would provide the best results. For the infantry, that meant
creating the service battalions and limiting the expansion of Territorial
battalions. For the cavalry however, Kitchener was quite prepared to utilise
the territorial movement by immediately expanding the Scottish Horse to
brigade strength. On 7 August, three days after the outbreak of war and only
one day after Kitchener's installation in the War Office, he sent for the
Marquis of Tullibardine (the future 8th Duke of Atholl). The Marquis, Chairman
of the Territorial Association of Perthshire, had served with Kitchener in South
Africa, and, after announcing Tullibardine's promotion to Brigadier-General,
Kitchener informed him that under his command 'The Scottish Horse was to
be expanded to form a full brigade and recruiting was to begin
immediately' 580
This involved raising two new first line regiments of Scottish Horse to train at
Blair Atholl with the nucleus of these two new regiments formed by volunteers
from the existing first and second regiments. There would also be, in tandem
with this, recruiting for second line regiments, four in all, raising the strength
of the Scottish Horse to eight regiments. This reliance on one individual to
raise six new regiments was not an ill-judged act by Kitchener. He was
placing his faith on a proven entity and not for the first time. As we have seen
in Chapter Two, this was the third time that Tullibardine had been asked to
raise regiments for the Scottish Horse, and it was on this record that
Kitchener was relying. Recruiting for the Scottish Horse before the war had
been confined primarily to the Highland District but it was now extended
° Hetherington, S. Katherine Atholl 1874-1960, Against the Tide. p 71.
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nation-wide. Recruiting for the Yeomanry was primarily rural following the pre-
war pattern.
In a series of advertisements the Marquis of Tullibardine announced the type
of recruits he required for the new Scottish Horse Brigade: 'I want only good
men, strong and healthy countrymen, who can ride a horse if possible, and if
they can both ride and shoot, so much the better.' 581 He went on to say that
only men 'who have lived a hard country life' were suitable material for the
Scottish Horse. 582 Such men, he felt, would be willing to enlist for the
duration only. In Dundee, where recruitment for the New Armies had been
relatively slow, it was found that 'Since it became known that Lord
Tullibardine was forming another regiment of the Scottish Horse a large
percentage of the recruits have evinced a desire to attach themselves to this
popular corps, but so great has been the rush on the Scottish Horse that
general recruiting has been stopped meantime'.583
This may have been the only true response to national pride. The rush to
enlist in the Scottish Horse could be seen as a call to nationalism and may
have been one of the reasons that this particular regiment was chosen over
the others with more locally orientated names: a response to country rather
than county. Traditionally the Scottish Horse recruited in Aberdeen, Argyll,
Elgin, and Perth; the Lothians and Border Horse in Edinburgh, Roxburgh and
Berwick; the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry in Dundee, Fife, and Forfarshire; while
581 Dundee Advertiser, 11 August 1914.
582 Dundee Advertiser, 13 August 1914.
Dundee Advertiser, 22 August 1914.
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the Lovat Scouts recruited in Inverness, Ross and Cromarty and Sutherland.
The noticeable difference in this recruiting pattern was the Lanarkshire
Yeomanry (including the Glasgow Yeomanry) which recruited in the industrial
heartland of Glasgow and Lanark. Dunbar, Scotland's only cavalry depot, was
inundated with recruits for the Scothsh Horse in answer to Tullibardine's call
for men.
The Evening Times of 5 September 1914 tells us that,
In the course of the past week over 1000 recruits drawn from all
quarters have presented themselves at the Cavalry Depot at Dunbar,
and still there is no indication of diminution in the numbers. Indeed, if
anything, they are on the increase. For some days the daily arrivals
have averaged about 200. Amongst the local men there has been a
very hearty response, and between 30 and 40 have enlisted during the
last day or two. Farm servants are also answering the call in large
numbers.5M
This is reflected in the various reports on the State of Employment in the
United Kingdom which highlight the reduction of ploughmen in the various
agricultural regions. These ploughmen, by nature trained horsemen, were
enlisting in the new regiments of the Scottish Horse in large numbers. The
rapid response to the call by Tullibardine led, in some areas, to a large-scale
shortage of such men. Recruiting was so brisk that the 3rd Scottish Horse
581 Evening Times, 5 September 1914.
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was raised in only one week. 585 Tullibardine was quick to point out that 'the
service abroad will not be immediate, and adequate time will be given to
afford the men the fullest training'. 5 Tullibardine took assistance wherever
he could find it and on 25 September in an advertisement in the Scottish
press he announced that he would like to 'take this opportunity of thanking the
Freemasons of Scotland for the assistance they have given me in many
directions'. 587 If, as we have seen in previous chapters, those Cameron
Highlander battalions raised in 1914 by Lochiel could be viewed as locally
raised and might conceivably fall under the umbrella of Pals' battalions, then
so too could those regiments of the Scottish Horse raised by Tullibardine.
By April 1915, when the third-line Yeomanry units were being formed
advertisements for recruits were announcing that no knowledge of riding was
now needed: the supply of trained horsemen was limited and slowing down.
The State of Employment report of April 1915 states that, within agriculture,
'the chief difficulty up to the present has been the supply of horsemen'. Those
counties which suffered most from this shortage were Inverness, Nairn,
Kincardine, Fife, Stirling, Edinburgh, Dumfries, and Ayr. In tandem with this
shortage of men, areas such as Roxburgh, Selkirk, and Peebles also
experienced a shortage of horses due to the War Office commandeering
them. This in turn led to the enlistment of those horsemen thrown out of work.
By July 1915 the shortage of horsemen had spread to Perth, Lanark, Elgin,
Banff, and Berwick, and by October 1915 was so severe that in many areas,
Dundee Advertiser, 2 September 1914.
586 Evening Times, 11 August 1914.
Dundee Advertiser, 25 September 1914.
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including Aberdeen, Elgin, and Nairn, farmers were unable to plough
sufficient land.
With the continuing manpower demands from the army, the reduced
enlistment rate after the highs of 1914, and the advent of static warfare, it was
decided that yeomanry regiments should be utilised for other roles. In 1915
the Ayrshire Yeomanry was dismounted and formed, along with the
Lanarkshire Yeomanry, into the 12th (Ayr & Lanark Yeomanry) battalion,
Royal Scots Fusiliers. At the same time the Lothians and Border Horse
Yeomanry were also dismounted and joined the 17th Royal Scots (this was a
Pals' bantam battalion) as infantry. The Queen's Own Royal Glasgow
Yeomanry assumed an infantry role as part of the Scottish Rifles
(Cameronians). In 1916 the first and second regiments of the Scottish Horse
dismounted and became 13th (Scottish Horse) battalion, The Black Watch,
while the third regiment of the Scottish Horse became two companies in the
Lovat Scouts battalion of the Cameron highlanders. At the same time the Fife
and Forfar Yeomanry converted to infantry as the 14th (Fife and Forfar
Yeomanry) battalion, The Black Watch and the Lovat Scouts were employed
in an infantry role as snipers and observers.
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Fig 7:1 Weekly Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland,
October 1914 —December 1915.
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Figure 7:1 shows the pattern of Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland from
the end of October 1914 until the end of December 1915, when direct
recruitment into the Territorial Force ended. It shows the distinctive
recruitment pattern of the agricultural hiring cycle. The week ending 11
November 1914, the period of the Scottish regional hiring fairs, shows a 60
per cent increase in Territorial recruitment over the previous week; 4,412
compared to 1,794. This was the highest weekly figure recorded for Scottish
Territorial recruitment. The week ending 2 June 1915, the next period when
agricultural contracts were up for renewal, produced the second highest
Scottish recruiting figure of 3,046 for the Territorial Force. By the week ending
3 November 1915 the figure was once again at a six month high of 2,218. The
figures were reduced each time for the simple reason that, with no economic
encouragement to recruit, it was only those agricultural workers who chose to
serve that came forward. With a finite number of workers within the military
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age group the pool of available, and more importantly, willing, agricultural
recruits continually reduced. This number would naturally decrease over time
as those replacement workers who entered agriculture were obviously not
inclined to enlist. The pattern of recruitment clearly shows that, for agricultural
workers at least, the unit of choice was the Territorial Force, and more
specifically the mounted Yeomanry. In support of the idea that the three
peaks of Territorial recruitment coincide with the agricultural cycle, the lowest
periods of recruitment come in the months prior to the hiring fairs; March and
September 1915.
We have seen in Chapter Two that the Territorial Force was the military arm
of choice in pre-war Scotland, and that rural Scotland produced a high
proportion of recruits. It should be no surprise therefore that Territorial
recruitment in Scotland in the voluntary period followed the same pattern.
Ninety-nine Territorial battalions were raised in Scotland from the outbreak of
war until direct recruitment for the Territorial Force was stopped in December
1915. Coupled with the pre-war Scottish Territorial short-fall of 12,961 men,
who were the Territorial Force's initial recruits, and the increase in the
Scottish Horse and the various Territorial support units, this gives a figure of
some 115,536 Territorial Force recruits for the seventeen-month period, or
some 38.2 per cent of all Scottish recruitment in this period and 15.9 per cent
of all United Kingdom Territorial recruitment. 588
 By 31 March 1915, Scotland's
Territorial Forces had enrolled 69,247 men out of a United Kingdom total of
421,207, 16.4 per cent. These figures rose by 30 June 1915 to 87,214
NATS 1/399.
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Scottish recruits, 15.6 per cent of the national figure of 557,462. By 4 August
1915, after one year of war, with a United Kingdom total of 585,957 recruits,
the Territorial Force in Scotland, with 91,960 recruits accounted for 15.6
percent of the national total.589
590FIG 7:2 2nd and 3rd line Territorial battalions raised in Scotland during the war.
Royal Scots - 14
Royal Scots Fusiliers - 6
Highland Light Infantry - 15
Cameron Highlanders - 3
Seaforth Highlanders - 9
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - 14
Gordon Highlanders— 13
Cameronians - 10
King's Own Scottish Borderers —4
The Black Watch - 11
589 NATS 1/399.
° NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
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FIG 7:3 Scottish monthly Territorial Recruitment August
1914 - December 191 5•591
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Scottish Monthly Temtorial Recruitment
Figure 7:3 displays the trend in monthly Territorial recruitment in Scotland for
the seventeen month voluntary period. It clearly shows the drop in recruitment
in late February and March 1915 when the terms of enlistment for the
Territorial Force were changed to reduce the number of men enlisting for
home service. From March 1915 all recruits for the Territorial Force were
enrolled for 'General Service' only. The chart also clearly shows the increase
in numbers in November 1914 and May 1915 when Scotland's agricultural
workers enlisted.
591 NATS 1/398. 1/399.
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Regimental Recruiting Areas
The Regimental Recruiting Areas corresponded to the thirteen pre-war
recruiting areas which comprised Scottish Command, as described in
Chapters Two and Five.
By the end of December 1914, 48 per cent of those enlisting in the Perth
recruiting area, 10,037, had done so in the Territorial Force. The figure
remained relatively steady for 1915 and by the end of the voluntary period
48.6 per cent of recruits in the area, 18,309 in all, had opted for the
Territorials. Fort George and Inverness had exceptionally high Territorial
figures for both 1914 and 1915. In 1914, 81 per cent of those enlisting in Fort
George, a total of 3,931, did so for the Territorial force and 78.8 per cent of
those enlisting in Inverness, 1,532, did so. The percentage figure for Fort
George stayed pretty much the same for 1915 with 8,016 recruits,
representing 80.4 per cent enlisting for the Territorials. Inverness increased to
83.2 per cent, 4,082 Territorial recruits for the entire voluntary period.
Aberdeen remained relatively constant with 6,109 recruits enlisting in the
Territorials in 1914, 63 per cent of those enlisting in the area. This increased
only slightly to 66.4 per cent by the end of the voluntary period, although the
number of Territorial recruits for the area had increased to 12,940. The
percentage of recruits in the Stirling recruiting area °Pting for the Territorial
Force remained constant throughout the voluntary periocJ593
NATS 1/399.
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In 1914 there were 6,145 recruits, 38.5 per cent of total regional recruitment,
and by the end of the voluntary period the proportion choosing the Territorials
stood at 38.8 per cent, 11,054 men in all. Dundee saw a reduction in the
percentage of recruits choosing the Territorial Force. In 1914 63.2 per cent of
regional recruits, 3,042 men, had chosen that branch but the proportion had
dropped to 50.7 per cent, 6,694 recruits, by December 1915. In 1914 17.2 per
cent of those enlisting in Glencorse, 1,125, chose to do so for the Territorials.
By December 1915 the figures stood at 2,080 recruits, 22 per cent. The
figures forAyr stood at 3,001 recruits, 38 per cent in 1914 and 4,972 recruits,
38 per cent by the end of 1915. Berwick stood at 1,998 recruits, 41 per cent,
by December 1914 and 3,250 recruits, 35.8 per cent, by December 1915.
14.5 per cent of those enlisting in Hamilton in 1914 chose to do so in the
Territorials. By December 1915 the figures for Hamilton stood at 4,669
recruits, 16.3 per cent. Glasgow provided 9,727 recruits for the Territorial
Force in 1914, 21.7 per cent of those enlisting in the area. By December 1915
the figures stood at 24,030 recruits, 28.8 per cent of the total recruitment
figure for the area. Edinburgh provided 8,261 recruits for the Territorials in
1914, 37.7 per cent of those who enlisted in the area. By the end of the
voluntary period the figures stood at 15,440 recruits, 34.6 per cent. In total
35.5 per cent of Scotland's recruits in 1914, 57,490 men, enlisted in the
Territorial Force. By December 1915 the figures for the Territorial Force stood
at 115,536 recruits, 38.2 per cent of the total who came forward to enlist in
Scotland.5'
NATS 1/399.
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The Perth recruiting area had, by December 1915, contributed 18,309
recruits, 31.3 per cent of the recruiting area male population, for the Territorial
force. Berwick contributed 3,250 which, although considerably lower than
Perth, was, never the less, 23 per cent of the male population. Stirling
contributed 11,054 recruits, 13.4 per cent of males; Inverness provided 4,082
recruits, 9.6 per cent; Aberdeen raised 12,940 recruits, 8.8 per cent;
Edinburgh contributed 15,440 recruits, 6.5 per cent; Dundee provided 6,694
men, 5.3 per cent; Ayr provided 4,972 recruits, 3.8 per cent, and Glasgow,
with the highest number of recruits for the Territorial Force 24,030 gave the
lowest proportion of the recruiting area male population, 3.3 per cent. This
followed the pre-war trend in Territorial recruitment as discussed in Chapter
Two. Proportionally the densely populated cities gave less than the
manpower-denuded rural hinterland. In the rural areas the Territorial Force
was still, despite the urgency of war, the military arm of choice.595
Figure 7:5 shows the cumulative monthly increase in recruitment from
Scotland while at the same time showing the reduction in the percentage
increase in monthly recruitment. It shows that recruitment dropped over time.
There was an increase of over 119 per cent between August and September
1914 but this had dropped to 3.87 per cent between November and
December 1915.
NATS 1/399.
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Fig 7:5 Decreasing monthly recruitment rate for Territorial Force in
Scotland August 1914 - December 191 5596
Cumulative Monthly
monthly	 percentage
increase	 increase
August	 12546
September	 27530	 119.43
October	 36863	 33.9
November	 47598
	
29.12
December	 57490
	
20.78
January	 63009	 9.59
February	 66039	 4.8
March
	
69247	 4.85
April	 73220	 5.73
May	 80313	 9.68
June	 86700	 7.95
July	 92057	 6.17
August	 97344	 5.74
September	 101930	 4.71
October	 106539	 4.52
November	 111230	 4.4
December	 115536	 3.87
Despite Kitcheners much publicised reluctance to use the Territorial Force for
the purpose intended by Haldane, to support and reinforce the Regular Army,
the Territorial Force nevertheless fulfilled a vital role in attracting those who,
for one reason or another, felt unable to enlist in the New Armies. It was able
to draw on the pre-war trend and provide an avenue for rural recruitment. By
focusing on regional and local loyalties, it was in its own way as much a 'Pals'
system as the civic raised units. The Territorial Force in Scotland, more than
any other branch of the armed services, truly represented the civilian in war.
NATS 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
353
CHAPTER 8
NAVAL RECRUITMENT
In 1914 Britain was the prime naval power, a position reflected in the test
mobilisation of the Home Fleet in the early days of July and the Royal Review
at Spithead. The trust placed in the strength of the Home Fleet was evident in
its size, some 493 ships of all classes. The list included 55 battleships, 20
armoured cruisers, 45 cruisers, 187 destroyers and 59 submarines. The
object of this test mobilisation was to determine the readiness of the fleet for
war and to this end every crew had been brought up to full strength. However
there was no sense of urgency in the exercise and no sense that the fleet was
expecting war with Germany in the immediate future. Indeed, sections of the
British fleet had left Kiel only on 30 June, while at the same time a British
squadron, led by Rear-Admiral Sir David Beatty, was visiting St Petersburg. In
July it was also reported that the Mediterranean Fleet was sailing for
Alexandretta, while by contrast German naval units were visiting the naval
base at Scapa Flow. However, despite the lack of apparent urgency, the navy
was still preparing for imminent war.
In 1913 there were some 17,968 recruits for the Royal Navy, 15,844 naval
ratings and 2,124 marines. The Royal Navy had not suffered from the
downturn in recruitment affecting the pre-war army, on the contrary recruiting
for the Royal Navy had increased by 27 per cent over the previous year.59° To
° Navy estimates, 1914-1 91 5. HMSO Cd 7302.
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some the thought of service in the navy was still more socially acceptable
than service in the army. The calling out of the Naval Reserve affected
nowhere as much as the islands of Scotland, with reports of 'much
commotion in Lewis' where approximately 2,000 fishermen, 'practically the
entire manhood of the island', was in the reserve. 591 In addition to those
islanders in the reserve, there were several hundred employed building the
new Rosyth Naval Base.592
As early as 5 August 1914 maps of the North Sea were printed in the regional
press in the expectation of a great naval battle which, it was confidently
predicted, would quickly end the war. Indeed, readers were told that 'There is
every likelihood that the North Sea will soon witness great naval battles'. 593
 It
was anticipated that the full might of the British Home Fleet would be the
decisive factor in bringing Germany to heel. The Dundee Advertiser on 4
August had declared 'Let us hasten to meet the fleet of the Emperor William
and pulverise it. If we manage to destroy the much vaunted battleships of the
Fatherland we shall have a chance of enjoying security and peace for the
next 50 years'.5
T. J. Macnamary, Secretary to the Admiralty, announced on 5 August 1914, in
the Navy Supplementary Estimate for 1914-15, that the navy would require an
additional 67,000 officers and men for the year ending 31 March 1915, giving
' Glasgow Herald, 3 August 1914.
592 Glasgow Herald. 3 August 1914.
Dundee Advertiser, 5 August 1914.
Dundee Advertiser, 4 August 1914.
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a revised total for the navy of 218,000. There was a call on 7 August for
additional men and on 8 August the supplementary naval estimates were
confirmed, placing the required number of officers and men at 218,00O.
The upper age limit for enlistment into the navy was changed on 12 August
when it was announced that re-enlistment would be open for those up to the
age of 55 if they had not been out of the service for more than five years and
if they were thought to be of 'good character'.5
On Monday 17 August, there appeared a list of the Royal Naval Offices in
Scotland which were open to receive recruits. These were at 392 Argyle
Street, Glasgow; 13 Watt Street, Greenock; 8 Johnston Terrace, Edinburgh;
25 Morgan Street, Dundee; 46 Marshall Street, Aberdeen; 15 Young Street,
Inverness; and 121 Queen Street, Dumfries. However, the following day, 18
August, the Royal Navy was turning away recruits, declaring that they were
only enlisting for the Royal Naval Light Infantry. As with recruiting for the New
Armies there appeared to be a certain amount of confusion regarding the
manpower needs of the service.
Scotland's fishermen were quick to enlist in the navy and stay as crew on
their own vessels and every vessel which was in an efficient and seaworthy
condition was taken over, in many cases with the whole of the crew. As early
as 4 August it was reported that no fewer that 65 trawlers from Aberdeen had
transferred fully manned to minesweeping or mine laying duties597
The Scotsman, 8 August 1914.
The Scotsman, 12 August 1914. p. 6.
Dundee Advertiser, 24 August 1914.
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The navy, unlike the army, was limited in the number of men that it could
absorb. It required men only as new ships entered service and those men
were already available in large numbers in the reserve forces, If a vessel was
sunk or damaged, in most cases the crew, those who remained or were
rescued, became surplus bodies, adding to the navy's pool of reserves. The
use of trawlers, on the other hand, utilised both the vessels and the crews.
This allowed the navy to gain experienced crews and the men to gain
employment, again not through choice but through economic necessity.598
The allowances for those choosing this course of action were greater than for
service in the army. Skippers would be paid 9/- per day plus a clothing
allowance, secondhands and enginemen would receive 6/- per day, and
deckhands would be paid 3/- 6d per day. 599 The collapse of the fishing
industry had a knock-on effect on recruitment. In Buckie, with the early
restrictions on fishing, Petty Officer Harper, by 19 October, secured 333
recruits for the navy, practically all the eligible young men in the town.60°
Hundreds of shore-based support workers were also now unemployed (net
makers, fish curers, etc.) but as 'landlubbers' they were more inclined to enlist
in the army and Territorial Force. It is estimated that by mid-November 1914
around 8,500 fishermen were serving aboard converted steam trawlers on
minesweeping duty, or in the navy itself.601
On 21 August 1914, Sir Ralph Anstruther published an article in the East of
598 D. Jones, Rural Scotland. p. 32-7.
The Evening Times, 21 August 1914.
600 Evening Citizen, 20 October 1914.
601 D. Jones, Rural Scotland. p. 5.
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Fife Record describing the benefits that fishermen could gain from this period
of enforced unemployment and reminding them that this was an ideal
opportunity to enlist in the Naval Reserve. 'It is very gratifying to learn that at
meetings of fishermen that were held on Monday, following those of Saturday,
quite a large number of lads and young men in Cellerdyke and St Monans
expressed their willingness to volunteer for the Royal Naval Reserve, so as to
get their period of training carried through during the present dislocation of the
fishing industry.'
Sir Ralph went on to explain that, 'Apart from the patriotic aspect of their
action, which is highly to be praised, there is the practical advantage of their
securing occupation, livelihood, and experience during this Autumn'. This was
a direct call to the practicalities of economic necessity. Sir Ralph continued,
Hitherto, the obstacle to our young fishermen joining the Royal Naval
Reserve has been the difficulty of giving up a period of three and a half
months on end for their first training. The present crisis seems to have
provided the opportunity for them to do this, as, whatever may be the
restrictions for the time being upon the operations of our fishing fleet, it
is quite clear that only a small proportion of the boats will be able to get
to the fishing regularly for at least several months.602
Sir Ralph was keen to stress that enlistment in the reserve would ease their
financial problems over the winter months, especially as the wages, at 115d
602 East of Fife Record. 21 August 1914.
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per day, were higher than those being offered for the infantry. His article went
on to explain that their future commitment would be for only twenty-eight days
every second year at a season to be chosen by the recruits themselves. Sir
Ralph was taking this opportunity to look to the long-term, beyond the war.
Service now would give fishermen a supplementary income in the future. The
war, he was implying, was an opportunity to take advantage of the initial
training period.
From 18 June to 8 July 1913, a battalion of Royal Marines underwent training
at Aldershot, attached to the 3rd Infantry Brigade, while in the same year a
combined force of army and Royal Marines took part in the naval
manoeuvres. The experience was seen to be of 'great value' and offered the
potential of future cross service co-operation.603
There was in existence a pre-war plan, prepared at the insistence of the
Committee of Imperial Defence, which called for the formation, on the
outbreak of war, of a force of Royal Marines to operate under the direction of
the Admiralty. This force was to be known as the Advanced Base Force, with
the objective being the 'seizure, fortification, or protection of any temporary
Naval Bases which might be necessary to the employment of the fleet, or the
provision of an army in the field'. 604 The force was to consist of a Royal
Navy Estimates, 1914-1915. HMSO Cd 7302.
Royal Naval Division. p. 2.
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Marine Brigade of four battalions, one from each of the existing Royal Marine
Light Infantry divisions and one from the depot of the Royal Marine Artillery.
On 16 August the Admiralty decided to strengthen the existing Advanced
Base Force by adding two brigades of Naval Reservists. To this effect it was
announced that 'In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval
reservists of different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres
of one marine and two naval brigades'. 605 It was intended as a stopgap, to
utilise the surplus reservists, but only as long as 'the needs arising out of the
military situation were more urgent than the requirements of the Fleet'. 606
 The
two naval brigades were to comprise four battalions each, 880 men per
battalion, organised into double companies of 220 men, It was decided that
the composition of each battalion should be 375 Royal Naval Volunteer
Reserve; 315 Royal Fleet Reserve; 190 Royal Naval Reserve (under thirty
years of age). The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would
therefore be 3,000 Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve; 2,500 Royal Fleet
Reserve; 1,300 Royal Naval Reserve. By late August the War Office was
'pressing the Admiralty to accept for service (in the Naval Brigades) some
thousands of the recruits whom the army could neither train or equip'. 607 With
the army recruiting offices overrun and unable to cope with the number of
recruits for Kitchener's New Armies the recruiting needs of the naval brigades
were seen as one way to reduce the overflow of army recruits. The make-up
605 Extracts from minutes of First Lord of the Admiralty, 16 August 1914, governing the
formation of the Royal Naval Division.
606 Royal Naval Division. p. 2.607 Royal Naval Division. P. 3.
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of the naval division changed after the debacle of Antwerp, when only five of
the eight naval battalions remained in various states. The depot at Crystal
Palace was expected to reinforce those battalions and at the same time
provide three new battalions and three reserve battalions. While the original
battalions had comprised, in the main, serving personnel of one type or
another, the new replacements were wartime volunteers.
On Thursday 24 September advertisements for the Royal Naval Brigade were
published, with the Scottish regional press announcing that 'Recruits are
wanted for the Naval Brigade which has been formed for service on the
continent in conjunction with Kitchener's army. No Sea Experience is
Necessary'.608
A meeting in Dundee at the end of September 1914 was addressed by the
Marquis of Graham, Commander RNVR, in his capacity as the Officer
Commanding, the Scottish Division of the Royal Naval Reserve, at which he
stated that 'so far as the navy was concerned, their men-of-war were fully
commissioned, while in their naval dockyards and naval barracks there were
thousands of seamen and gunners who had been trained as reserves to
make good any loss or wastage of men in battle groups. There was therefore
no necessity for more men to serve in the fleet'. 609 He went on to say that a
Naval Brigade should be raised for service in Europe. Lieutenant Godfrey P.
Collins, M.P. appealed at the same meeting for a company of men to be
608 Dundee Advertiser, 24 September 1914.
609 Dundee Advertiser, 28 September 1914.
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raised for the Naval Brigade. Six new district companies, one each in
Aberdeen, Dundee, Clyde and Edinburgh and two in the Moray Firth, the
latter designed to capitalise on the slackness of the fishing industry in that
region, were to be formed. 6'° On 30 September 174 men left Dundee for the
Crystal Palace and the Naval Brigade, with another 48 following on 8
October.611
On 19 October a request for recruits for the Naval Brigade placed the age
limit as 18-40, thereby taking recruits who were too young and too old for the
New Armies. The chest measurement was placed at 34" , pretty much in line
with army requirements, while the height limit was set at 5' 3", taking
advantage of the fluctuating army height limits. Thus the Naval Brigade
widened the scope for potential recruits and to a certain extent avoided
encroaching on military territory by taking those recruits unsuitable for the
army. It is conceivable that this low height requirement served to restrict the
number of recruits available for the bantam battalions in Scotland in 1915. At
the same time it was also announced that 'during the past 18 days hundreds
of recruits have left Scotland to join the Naval Brigade at the Crystal Palace
depot'.612 In tandem with this The Scotsman announced that '700 recruits, of
whom several hundreds are from the north, have been dispatched from
Scotland to join the Naval Brigade'. 6 ' 3 It was subsequently decided to
610 The Scotsman, 6 October 1914.
611 Dundee Advertiser, 1 October 1914. 8 October 1914.
612 Evening Times, 19 October 1914.
613 The Scotsman, 19 October 1914.
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increase the recruiting effort for the brigade, and to try and 'raise fully 2,000
recruits in Glasgow and district'.614
In an effort to provide these recruits Lieutenant Collins M.P. addressed a
lunchtime meeting in the Singer Factory at Clydebank. He reminded the
employees that 'They had lived together and had worked together, and why
not join together and serve together'. 615 There was an attempt in the following
week to raise over 2,000 men in the Glasgow district alone and it was a
nightly sight to see small groups of men leaving for the Crystal Palace.
The Naval Brigade continued its direct approach to recruitment when
Lieutenant Collins MP, held recruiting rallies outside the Clydeside shipyards
as the workers finished their shift, or, if that was not enough, inside the
shipyards during meal breaks. As part of his recruitment drive the Marquis of
Graham spoke in Glasgow at the end of October and told the assembled
crowd that the war would last for one or two years, and would 'certainly go on
longer than some people thought'.616
 Recruits for the brigade were coming in
fast, and in the third week of October some 200 joined in Glasgow and 150
from the Moray Firth and the East Coast towns. By 24 October 1,500 men
had enlisted in Glasgow for the Naval Brigade but more were required to
reach the proposed level of 2,100
614 The Scotsman, 19 October 1914.
615 Evening Times, 21 October 1914.
616 Evening Times, 21 October 1914.
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FIG 8:1 1915 recruiting poster for the Royal Naval Division, outlining
the terms and conditions..
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The Glasgow Joint Political Recruiting Committee organised a series of
meetings and rallies to increase recruiting and the last in the series was held
on 31 October 1914. By this time Scotland as a whole had provided over
2,000 recruits for the Naval Brigade. Recruits for the Naval Brigade were also
for the first time being enrolled in Glasgow at the political offices, previously
the sole domain of the army. 617 By 4 November recruitment had widened to
all Scottish political offices, not just those in Glasgow. On 17 November a
detachment of recruits for the Naval Brigade left Aberdeen for London,
bringing the total from that city to date to 600 from the start of recruitment.
These men were accompanied by another 45 from the Moray Forth ports,
with the local press announcing that 'much of the strength of Mr Churchill's
Naval Brigade has been drawn from the ranks of the sturdy fishermen on the
Moray Firth.618
In early January 1915 the majority of the recruits from Aberdeen were
choosing the Naval Brigade. For the first six days of 1915, Aberdeen
produced 150 men for the brigade, thirty-five for the army and only thirty for
the Territorial Force. 619 By May 1915, recruitment for the Naval Brigade was
highly organised and aimed at Scotland's smaller towns and rural
communities: areas with no direct connection with the sea and where recruits
might be enticed by the adventure of the unknown. Scotland's Music Halls
showed a selection of films on Royal Naval Division training, accompanied
with speeches and music. By this time (May 1915) over 5,000 men had been
611 Evening Times, 31 October 1914.
615 Dundee Advertiser, 17 November 1914.
619 Dundee Advertiser, 7 January 1915.
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sent from Scotland. The rates of pay were higher than the infantry, for what
was essentially an infantry job, and this was incentive enough for many.
Recruits were paid is 3d per day on enlistment, is 8d after three months
training, and 6d extra field money. Wives received 6s per week, 4s for the first
child, 3s for the second, and 2s for the third.62°
Figures for naval recruitment for the duration of the war :-
England	 58,643
Scotland	 5,653
Ireland'	 1,152
Wales	 3,654
Total	 68,643 621
Of those recruited into the Royal Navy during the war, 8.2 per cent enlisted in
Scotland, 5,653 men out of a total of 68,643. The Royal Navy did not suffer,
and was not hampered by, the type of manpower shortages affecting the
army. The Royal Navy entered the war with a manpower surplus and the only
need for recruits was for the newly created Naval Brigade, an extension of the
pre-war Naval Light Infantry. In August 1914 the navy was at full strength with
full reserves and, more importantly, once engaged in wartime service did not
suffer the same scale of manpower losses as the army, it did not have a high
rate of manpower wastage, and consequently recruitment rates reflect this.
620 Forfar Herald and Kirriemuir Advertiser, 7 May 1915.
621 Nats 1/401.
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CHAPTER 9
RECRUITMENT (Overview)
In chapters five, six, and seven we have looked at recruiting as it relates to
individual groups or branches of the military: New Armies, Territorial Force,
and Pals' Battalions. This section brings them together and presents
recruitment in Scotland as a total package; combining and comparing
Territorial and Army recruitment in order to give a general overview.
In the seventeen month voluntary period the manpower contributions from the
thirteen Scottish regimental recruiting areas varied widely. As could be
expected Glasgow, with its high reserves of industrial manpower, provided
the highest percentage of Scottish recruitment, 83,318 recruits, 26.6 per cent
of the national total. Edinburgh, providing 44,559 recruits, 14.76 per cent, was
closely followed by Perth with 37,628 recruits, 12.47 per cent of the Scottish
total. Hamilton, with two regimental recruiting areas, provided 28,627 recruits,
9.48 per cent; Stirling 28,452 recruits, 9.42 per cent: Aberdeen 19,480
recruits, 6.45 per cent; Dundee 13,199 recruits, 4.37 per cent. Ayr provided
13,044 recruits, 4.32 per cent; Fort George 9,962 recruits, 3.3 per cent:
Glencorse 9,503 recruits, 3.15 per cent; Berwick 9,079 recruits, 3 per cent;
and Inverness with 4,903 recruits, 1.62 per cent of the Scottish total.
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Industrial Areas	 Recruits
Glasgow	 83318
Edinburgh	 44559
Hamilton	 28627
Total	 156504
51.8%
Rural Areas
Berwick
Fort George
Inverness
Total
Recru its
9079
9962
4903
23944
7.93%
With a total recruitment figure of 301 ,754 recruits in Scotland in the seventeen
months of the voluntary period, table 9:1 shows us that there were 22,010
more recruits in the five months of 1914 than in the twelve months of 1915,
15.73 per cent higher. This higher level of recruitment in the relatively shorter
period of war in 1914 serves to confirm the opinion in Chapter Five ( boom
and bust) that Scotland's manpower contribution was significantly greater in
the initial months than in the longer term.
FIG 9:2 Industrial and agricultural recruitment.623
Table 9:2 is a comparison of the different recruitment levels between the
three Regimental Recruiting Areas which constituted the main Scottish
industrial regions and the three recruiting areas which comprise those
Scottish regions which are most recognised as primarily agricultural. The
figures support the conclusions in Chapter Three that Scotland's industrial
workforce provided a disproportionate level of manpower for the armed forces
which in turn supports the conclusion that economic factors, while not the only
623 NATS 1/399.
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motivating factor, were still the principal incentive for Scotland's working
classes. Table 9:2 shows that only three industrial regions provided over 50
per cent of Scotland's recruits while the three regions most closely associated
with agriculture provided less than 8 per cent.
FIG 9:3 East I West comparison.624
East Coast
Perth
Edinburgh
Aberdeen
Dundee
Inverness
Bervvick
Glencorse
Total
Recru its
37628
44559
19480
13199
4903
9079
9503
138351
45.8%
West Coast
Glasgow
Stirling
Fort George
Ayr
Hamilton
Total
Recruits
83318
22452
9962
13044
28627
163403
54.1%
The geographical divide between east and west produced a difference of 8.3
per cent to overall recruitment levels over the seventeen month period and
this is shown in table 9:3. Those recruiting areas which could be described as
west coast provided 54.1 per cent of the total, while the east coast areas
provided 45.8 per cent. This disparity in recruitment is to be expected with the
west coast areas, due to their industrial base, having the greater male
population. Again this is an indication that Scotland's industrial base was
responsible for the majority of Scotland's manpower contribution. What
arguably is of greater interest and, by definition, importance, is the differing
624 NATS 1/399.
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levels of recruitment for the Army and the Territorial Force from each
Regimental Recruiting Area (table 9:4).
Table 9:4 shows the numbers of recruits for each Regimental Recruiting Area
and the percentage of recruits for each service, It clearly demonstrates which
areas gave priority to the Army or the Territorial Force.
FIG 9:4 The percentage of Army and Territorial recruits for each
Regimental Recruiting Area: August 1914 - December 1915.625
Territorial	 Percentage	 Army	 Percentage	 Total
Perth
Fort George
Inverness
Aberdeen
Stirling
Dundee
Glencorse
Ayr
Berwick
Hamilton
Glasgow
Edinburgh
18309
8016
4082
12940
11054
6694
2080
4972
3250
4669
24030
15440
115536
48.65
80.5
83.3
66.42
38.9
50.7
21.9
38.1
35.8
16.3
28.8
34.65
19319
1946
821
6540
17398
6505
7423
8072
9079
23958
59288
29119
186218
51.35
19.5
16.7
33.58
61.1
49.3
78.1
61.9
64.2
83.7
71.2
65.35
37628
9962
4903
19480
28452
13199
9503
13044
9079
28627
83318
44559
301754
War-time recruitment clearly followed the pre-war pattern with agricultural
areas giving a greater proportion of their recruits to the Territorial Force.
Inverness raised 83.3 per cent of recruits for the Territorial Force with the
remainder, 16.7 per cent, going to the army. Fort George provided 80.5 per
cent for the Territorial Force with 19.5 for the army, and Aberdeen gave 66.42
and 33.58 per cent respectively. In common with the pre-war pattern the
625 NATS 1/399, 1/400. 1/401.
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industrialised urban areas followed the opposite tack. While 83.7 per cent of
the recruits from Hamilton were for the army only 16.3 per cent were for the
Territorial Force. In Glasgow, 71.2 per cent chose the army, leaving 28.8 per
cent for the Territorial Force. In Edinburgh, 65.3 per cent enlisted in the army
with 34.6 per cent choosing the Territorial Force. Those areas with the
highest available manpower reserves constantly chose the army as the
preferred military arm, to the extent that Territorial units within those areas
suffered continually from a shortage of manpower. In urban areas the
Territorial Force did not have the same pull on the population. As we have
already seen the rural areas had greater contact with the Territorial Force due
to the composition of the Associations and larger number of drill stations.
FIG 9:5 Total Scottish monthly recruitment626
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Chart 9:5 displays the four main peaks affecting recruitment in Scotland. The
first was the initial peak of August/September 1914, the second was in
November 1914 with the enlistment of agricultural workers. The third and
fourth, May and November 1915, aswe have already seen, were also a direct
result of agricultural enlistment. Also shown is the gradual but steady
reduction in recruitment levels over time after the initial peak period of August
- September 1914: once again emphasising that Scotland's greatest
manpower contribution in the voluntary period was in the five month period of
1914.
FIG 9:6 Comparison of Scottish monthly Army and Territorial
recruitment August 1914 - December 191 5627
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Chart 9:6 shows that, outwith the obvious difference in numerical terms, Army
and Territorial Force recruitment in Scotland followed much the same path,
627 NATS 1/399.
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both suffering from a gradual reduction in recruits with the obvious difference
being the army's ability to absorb greater numbers of recruits.
Figures 9:7 and 9:8 support the findings that recruitment patterns in the
voluntary period closely followed those of pre-war Scotland. They show the
patterns of recruitment for the Army and Territorial Force in both industrial
and agricultural areas. We can see from figure 9:7 the difference between the
recruitment rate for both branches from those recruiting areas which can be
claimed as industrial. It is apparent that the army was the military arm of
choice for Scotland's industrial workforce. It clearly shows that while the army
was inundated with recruits in the peak August - September period, the
Territorial Force, with recruiting restrictions in place, made very little impact in
this period. Only later, as army recruitment levelled out, did the percentage of
Territorial recruitment reach significant levels. Territorial recruitment from
industrial recruiting areas was always lower than recruitment for the army.
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FIG 9:7 Monthly recruitment for Scottish industrial areas.628
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Scotland's agricultural regions also clearly followed the pre-war recruitment
pattern. It can clearly be seen from figure 9:8 that the Territorial Force was
the organisation of choice for Scotland's agricultural workforce. What is clear
is that, although relatively small in number, there was a discernible
recruitment surge in Territorial recruitment in August and September 1914,
mainly from agriculture which brought the strength up to its pre-war
complement. However, with the restrictions on Territorial recruitment, the vast
majority of those agricultural workers enlisting in November 1914, at the end
of the hiring cycle, were forced to do so in the army. We can see that at the
end of the next hiring cycle, May 1915, with recruits needed for second and
third line units, Scotland's agricultural workforce was able to enlist in the
Territorial Force. By November 1915 recruitment was shared between both
628 NATS 1/399.
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military arms. With Territorial recruitment for general service only and direct
recruitment to the Territorial Force ending in December 1915, Territorial
recruitment was not so attractive to some.
FIG 9:8 Monthly recruitment for Scottish agricultural areas.629
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FIG 9:9 Comparison of Scottish recruitment August 1914 - December 1915630
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Figure 9:9 compares in relatively simplistic terms the monthly recruitment
levels of the army and Territorial Force in relation to total Scottish recruitment
for each month and allows for direct comparison. Figure 9:10 shows, in
numerical terms, the cumulative monthly increase of recruits in Scotland
alongside the monthly increase presented as a percentage. It shows the
steady decrease in monthly recruitment after January 1915. In tandem with
this, figure 9:11 clearly shows that the speed of recruitment slowed down over
time; after January 1915 recruitment maintained a steadily reducing level until
the end of the voluntary recruiting period.
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Fig 9:10 Cumulative monthly increase of recruits in Scotland.
Cumulative	 Monthly
monthly	 percentage
recruitment	 increase
August	 40138
September	 98393	 145.13
October	 118141	 20.07
November	 143247
	
21.25
December	 161882
	
13
January	 179735	 11.02
February	 188232
	
4.72
March
	
199671	 6.07
April
	
210409	 5.37
May	 226188	 7.49
June	 240575
	
6.36
July	 251534	 4.55
August	 263554	 4.77
September	 271772	 3.11
October	 281681	 3.64
November	 294771	 4.64
December	 301754
	
2.36
Fig 9:11 Slowdown of recruitment over time.
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The graph shows that there were three distinctly different periods of
recruitment: the period to mid September 1914 provided the highest
concentration of recruits, while the period from mid September until January
1915, although a reduced level, was still high enough to cope with the
demands of military expansion. The third period, from January 1915 until the
end of the voluntary period (December 1915), was a period which displayed a
steady decline in the rate at which the recruits came forward.
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CONCLUSION
We have investigated the role played by economics and industry in the
raising of recruits. It would, however, be irresponsible to assume that
those were the only factors which influenced or promoted recruitment in
Scotland. There were other motives leading to enlistment, which,
although secondary in terms of numbers, were nevertheless important in
their own right. Any issue which provided recruits had its own relative
importance.
A peculiarity of voluntary enlistment is that the recruit is, in most cases,
the one who decides which branch or unit of the armed services he will
join. The army is therefore, in most instances, unable to channel
manpower where it is needed. This is not an efficient method of military
expansion but, without the wholesale introduction of conscription, the
army must work within this constraint.
In 1914 the manpower needs of the army coincided with the immediate
short-term needs of those workers affected by the contraction of Scottish
industry. The stigma of military service was cancelled out by the needs of
the country. Direct appeals allowed the men to believe that they were
wanted as individuals and it was only by approaching them as individuals,
albeit on a mass scale, that any aversion to military service was
overcome.
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There was a reduction in recruits from the four home countries but there
was a wide spread between the countries. Recruitment from Wales
dropped by 55 per cent, Scotland as we have seen by 30 per cent,
Ireland by 20 per cent and the English contribution had reduced by only
12 per cent. The pre-war British army was becoming more representative
of England and less of the United Kingdom. In the pre-war years Scotland
had a clearly defined pattern of recruitment. While the cities produced the
highest number of recruits for the regular army, it was the rural areas
which produced the highest proportion of recruits relative to male
population.
While the Victorian army might have been viewed as a last desperate
refuge, the Boer War served to initiate a change in the public's perception
of temporary military service. It created a precedent which made short-
term voluntary service, in time of national crisis, socially acceptable.
There was, however, still within the country at large, the social and moral
stigma attached to service in the regular army. Regular soldiers were still
shunned in public, they were refused access to theatres and public
houses, could not travel on trains other than in third class compartments,
and were frequently refused access to other forms of public transport.
The link which was formed by the Boer War extended only to the
Volunteer and Yeomanry regiments, the units which had provided the
extra manpower for foreign service in South Africa. The perception was
that of the 'civilian soldier' entering into short-term service 'with' but not
'in' the army. For the average citizen there was something romantic, if not
382
Arthurian, in the image of the citizenry rising to the defence of the nation.
The Territorial Force, successor to the Volunteer movement, was
embraced in rural Scotland as a social entity as much as a military force.
The concept of a 'Generation of 1914', the spontaneous rallying of a
nation's youth and the laying down of their lives for King and country,
was, in Scotland at least, a myth. We have seen that Scottish recruitment
was driven by tertiary reasons and that group parameters, such as height
and age, were decided by the military establishment. The sudden
collapse of Scottish industry provided the major prompt for the majority of
recruits in the first few months of the war. The initial short-term collapse
of Scotland's heavy engineering industries was caused by economic
uncertainty, while the contraction of the coal industry was created by the
loss of crucial foreign export markets. Those industries provided high
numbers of recruits in the initial period. Industrial contraction in Scotland
was not a product of popular recruitment as has often been portrayed.
The reverse was the case, with recruitment being driven by the initial
economic uncertainties of industry.
Scottish industry provided the majority of recruits in the first year of the
war, with an initially low response from Scottish agriculture. Early
recruitment in Scotland was dependent on wages and employment
conditions but not in the way proposed by Peter Dewey. His conclusion
that economics played only a secondary role in the promotion of
recruitment cannot be substantiated in the light of Scottish employment
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and recruitment figures. Similarly, his further conclusion, that 'neither
activity levels nor wages' explained the recruiting differences between
industries is questionable, at least in relation to Scotland. Those
industries most immediately effected by the outbreak of war produced a
higher proportion of recruits in the initial months while those employed
elsewhere were more constant, producing smaller numbers over longer
periods.
The east coast coalfields suffered an immediate collapse due to the loss
of their export markets in Germany and the Baltic, and at the same time
the Admiralty assumed control of the Forth coal ports. This in effect
ended any remaining hope of export and forced owners to stop
production and lay off their workers, in many instances before war was
declared. By October 1914 some 18,441 miners, 14 per cent of the
industry, had enlisted, rising to 35,680 or 27 per cent by August 1915.
Peter Dewey concluded that, since highly paid miners were willing to
leave a highly paid industry, this was evidence that factors other than
economics were the prime movers in enlistment from this industry.
However, reality shows us that no matter how highly paid the industry
was, in Scotland, if miners were thrown out of work by the closure of the
mines then they clearly had no wages at all. Those who were lucky
enough to be placed on short-time rather than total unemployment, some
20 per cent at the outset, were in reality no better off. Unemployed or on
short-time, miners still had to pay rent and provide for their families.
Those on short-time and reduced wages, although still earning, would
384
end up penniless. Enlistment, however distasteful, would ensure that, in
most cases, accommodation would be free and that wives and families
would at least receive separation allowances. Miners who were not in
receipt of wages were making no financial sacrifice in enlisting.
Unemployment alone was, in many cases, not a strong enough push to
enlist but, when coupled with other, secondary, motives became the
catalyst which served to stimulate recruitment in Scotland. With no
precedent as to how long the industrial contraction would last, the
working class had to seek some other form of support. The call for
recruits emphasised that they would be discharged as soon as possible
at the end of the war, which it was hoped would coincide with the
regeneration of Scottish industry.
In 1914 Scotland had an economy in which the eight main staple
industries produced 60 per cent of its output. By September 1914
Scottish industry had contracted by 9 per cent, by October that
contraction stood at 11 per cent, and steadied off at that level by
December of that year. In the first three months of the war Scottish
industry alone accounted for 109,714 recruits, 13.5 per cent of the United
Kingdom total and over 94 per cent of Scottish recruits to that time. We
can see that J. Winter's supposition that 'the higher up in the social scale
a man was, the greater were the chances that he would serve from early
385
in the war and be fit enough to be placed in a combat Unit',630 does not
stand up as regards voluntary recruitment in Scotland
Large numbers of Irish immigrants living in Scotland took the opportunity
to enlist. They did so for a variety of reasons. Political - in support of
John Redmond's appeal to aid the British Government in the belief that
such aid would ease the transition into Home Rule in Ireland. Social -
many believed that by contributing to Scottish society in this way, the Irish
immigrant would be more readily accepted into a post-war Scottish
society. Economic - the Irish, used to unskilled and temporary
employment, viewed short-term enlistment as just another means of
employment when faced with the economic uncertainties caused by such
large-scale unemployment.
The rise in recruitment numbers from mid-August to early September
1914 has been seen as a recruitment boom in its own right, a surge of
patriotism. However, in Scotland it was only an escalation of the original
recruiting surge, an increase in scale as the numbers became available.
This period can be split into two distinct periods. The first is the initial
period, lasting from 4 August until 22 August 1914. Initial recruiting was
relatively low, due in part to the inability of the recruiting offices to cope
and the restrictions placed on the recruits. On 10 August recruiting offices
began turning away skilled men, accepting recruits for the infantry only.
Scottish recruitment dropped by 24 per cent as a result. On 15 August
630 J• M. Winter, The Great War and the British People. p. 25.
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the political offices opened as auxiliary recruiting offices. These political
offices placed no restrictions on recruits and recruitment numbers soared.
On 22 August the political offices were closed and recruitment was
restricted to clear the backlog of recruits at regimental depots across the
country. The backlog was cleared within three days and the political
offices reopened on 25 August. This was the beginning of the second
period in recruitment. On 28 August the upper age limit for recruits was
raised from 30 to 35 years of age. The combination of the relaxed
recruitment policy in the political offices, the need of those who had been
made unemployed, and the new upper age limit created a second wave
of recruitment in Scotland. However, the problems associated with the
first period soon reappeared, and on 8 September Scothsh Military
Headquarters issued instructions that recruits were to be engaged for the
infantry only. Scotland had two periods of increased recruitment in the
first two months of the war and these were clearly influenced by the
ability of the recruiting mechanism to absorb such large numbers, and
specifically by the recruiting restrictions of 22 August and 8 September
1914. The rush to enlist which created the recruitment 'boom' of late
August - early September 1914 was not the result of 'spontaneous
patriotism'. The deficiencies of the overworked and overwhelmed
recruitment system held recruitment rates in check until civilian agencies
came to the fore and took over the burden of recruitment, so soaking up
the excess manpower.
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On 7 August 1914 the Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, issued
his appeal for the first 100,000 recruits for his new army. In Scotland this
meant that each of the existing regiments would have to raise a new
'service' battalion of approximately 1,000 men. The call for a second new
army came at the end of August 1914 and a third new army in the second
week of September. By the end of October, when the manpower surplus
had been absorbed, the number of men recruited into Scottish regiments
had reached 37,000, and by the end of December 1914 had risen to
47,000. However in the same period Scotland produced some 104,392
recruits for the New Armies. This meant that some 45 per cent of Scottish
recruits enlisted in units that had no direct Scottish link, in the technical
branches, artillery or service corps. To put this in context, Glasgow and
Hamilton, the two most industrialised recruiting areas in Scotland, with
the Highland Light Infantry and the Cameronians, provided approximately
12 service battalions in 1914, some 12,000 men. In the same period they
raised 48,000 recruits, providing a regional surplus of 35,000 men. It
would appear that Glasgow and Hamilton alone provided enough men to
fulfil the needs of Scotland's contribution to the new armies of 1914.
Locally raised battalions, or Pals battalions as they became known, were
a predominantly English phenomenon. Scotland raised only 5 per cent of
the total number of such battalions raised. Of the seven first line infantry
battalions raised in this manner in Scotland, three were raised in
Edinburgh and four in Glasgow. In Glasgow there was the 15th Highland
Light Infantry, raised in the main from the employees of the Glasgow
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Tramways Department, the 16th Highland Light Infantry which was to a
large extent made up from serving and past officers and men from the
Boys' Brigade, and the 17th Highland Light Infantry which was raised and
funded by the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. In Edinburgh, the 15th
Royal Scots was raised by the City Council but contained large groups of
men from Manchester, while the 16th Royal Scots was raised by Sir
George McCrae, the City Treasurer. The battalion of 1,550 men was
raised in only twelve days. Pals battalions were not a part of Scottish
society. Indeed, with the exception of the 16th battalion Royal Scots,
Scotland's locally raised battalions struggled to attract enough recruits to
fill their needs. Unfortunately, in Scotland, the concept of the Pals
battalions has reached mythological proportions. Wild claims have been
constantly made as to the recruiting response to these battalions and
their position within Scottish society. Over the years public expectation
has been allowed to become the perceived reality. It has become more
acceptable to perpetuate the myth than to pursue reality.
It is not the purpose nor is it the intention of this thesis to imply that
patriotism did not exist. In truth the concept of patriotism fulfilled a
function in providing recruits, although they were mainly for the officer
class. There can be no doubt that for a specific social group patriotism,
as they understood it, was the sole motivating factor in their 'rush' to
enlist. Peter Simkins supports the belief that there were some volunteers
who 'were motivated by straightforward patriotic ideals' .631 But those few
631 P. Simkins, Kitchener's Army. p. 165-8.
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were the ones who understood or accepted the true concept of
patriotism. For the majority of men who alluded to enlisting for such
reasons the term 'patriotism' should be taken to mean 'enthusiasm'.
Enthusiasm for war, enthusiasm to support their country, enthusiasm for
change, albeit short term, but not the unconscious willingness for self-
sacrifice which distinguishes patriotism from other similar emotions. In
truth a working class man with little or no higher education could not have
the same concept of 'patriotism' as the educated, landed, or moneyed
classes.
Major John Ewing, in his history of the war-time Royal Scots, contended
that there were two distinct groups of Scottish recruits, and two distinct
reasons for enlistment. 'The heady wine of youth scorns sober caution
and young men in thousands flocked to the Colours. To them the war
was mainly an adventure'. 632
 He saw the younger men as motivated by a
desire for change and the opportunity for a period of excitement.
However, this would not have been, on its own, enough of a stimulus,
but, when combined with the loss of employment or the uncertainty of
continuing wages, it served in many instances to tip the scales in favour
of enlistment. The second group envisaged by Ewing was the older men
with responsibilities to families:
There were many, too, of more mature age who, stirred by a
profound sense of duty, offered themselves for service. Their
632 J• Ewing, The Royal Scots 1914-1919. p. 6.
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sacrifice was great; for they were detaching themselves from the
anchorage of what had promised to be a settled and contented life,
to drift deliberately into unknown and turbulent waters. To such the
war was an ordeal rather than an adventure.633
Major Ewing was correct in his appraisal of the sense of 'duty' felt by the
older family men, but he was wrong in believing that the sense of duty
was directed to Scotland or in a wider sense to Britain. The sense of duty
evident in these men was focused firmly on the need to support a family
or dependants at a time of economic uncertainty. It was not an easy
decision, on the part of the men, to commit themselves to military service
and it is clear that for many 'duty smothered every personal and selfish
consideration'. 6
 It is to be expected that Major Ewing, a member of that
part of Scottish society which had aligned itself with Imperial England,
should relate duty to empire, while the working classes of Scotland, in a
more insular fashion, saw their first duty to family and self.
A direct comparison can be made between Army recruitment and
Territorial Force enlistment. Voluntary recruitment for both services
covered the same period: from the outbreak of war until December 1915,
when voluntary service and direct enlistment into the Territorial Force
ended. In this period some 204,147 men enlisted in the army while
116,446 chose the Territorial Force as the service of choice. With a total
633 J• Ewing, The Royal Scots. p. 7.
634 j • Ewing, The Royal Scots. p. 7.
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figure for Scotland of 320,589 voluntary recruits some 63.6 per cent
enlisted in the army, while 36.3 per cent enrolled in the Territorial Force.
The New Armies raised sixty-three battalions in Scotland while the
number of Territorial battalions increased from the pre-war figure of thirty-
seven to a figure of ninety-nine. Some 61 per cent of all Scottish
battalions raised in the voluntary period were Territorial, leaving 38.8 per
cent for the New Armies. With the high number of Scottish army recruits
and the low number of New Army battalions, at least 50 per cent of those
joining the army were doing so in units that were not Scottish, and were
not infantry.
Scotland was only able to provide a large, disproportionate number of
recruits in the early months because there was in place a 'pool' of readily
available spare bodies which could provide the necessary manpower
without undue stress to the country as a whole. This pool contained the
annual, natural wastage of Scottish manpower, mainly through emigration
and migration, and those caught up in the collapse of Scottish industry at
the outbreak of war. As such the effect on the country was not as severe
as might at first be thought. There are various figures for Scotland's war
dead, ranging from a low of 80,000 to a high of 147,000, which includes
all those Scotsmen who were resident abroad and who fought in
Commonwealth units; Australian, South African, Canadian and New
Zealand.635 However, Scotland lost more men in the years 1910-14
through emigration and disease than to the First World War and while the
635 SpierS, E. M. The Scottish Soldier. p. 314.
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suffering caused to individual families was immense the loss to Scotland
the country was minimal.
During the voluntary period there was a higher percentage of recruits
from Scotland than any of the other three home countries. This was not
fuelled by patriotism but, initially at least, by the economic needs of
Scotland's working classes, followed later by the pressure brought to
bear on the middle class and those in commerce. Recruits fell into two
main categories, those who were directly affected by the onset of war and
those who were able to maintain 'business as usual'. Many, although
deeply supportive of their country and proud of Britain's imperial power,
were not prepared to enlist leaving all behind; there had to be other
external pressures at work. Unemployment, short-term working,
economic hardship, peer pressure, political identity, whatever the reason
there were many forces pushing the new recruits. For the ordinary man
the concept of 'voluntary' enlistment in the period August 1914 -
December 1915 did not exist except in a very few rare cases. There was
always some form of external force exerting an influence on the individual
recruit.
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APPENDIX i'
SCOTTISH YEOMANRY AND TERRITORIAL INFANTRY BATTALIONS
HEADQUARTERS AND DRILL STATIONS
Ayrs hire (Earl of Carrick's Own) Yeomanry.
H. Q. and A Squadron - Ayr; B Squadron - Cumnock; C Squadron -
Kilmarnock; D Squadron - Beith.
Fife and Forfar Yeomanry.
H. 0. - Kirkcaldy; A Squadron - Cupar, with drill stations at Kirkcaldy,
Ladybank and St Andrews; B Squadron - Dumfermline, with drill stations at
Balfron, Stirling, Kippen, Ketty, Kinross and Alloa; C Squadron - Dundee; D
Squadron - Forfar, with drill stations at Arbroath, Edzell, Montrose and
Laurencekirk.
Lanarkshire Yeomanry.
H. Q. - Lanark; A Squadron - Douglas, with drill stations at Auchinheath,
Lesmahagow, Douglas Water and Coalburn; B Squadron - Lanark, and drill
stations at Carluke, Carstairs, Wishaw, Peebles and Biggar; C Squadron -
Coatbridge, with a drill station at Glasgow; D Squadron - Dumfries, with drill
stations at Lockerbie, Langholm, Annan, Moffat, Thornhill and Sanquhar.
1 R. Westlake, The Territorial Force 1914. p. 1-138. These details were collated from
locations throughout this book which is a detailed record of drill stations throughout the
United kingdom.
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Lanarkshire (Queen's Own Royal Glasgow) Yeomanry.
H. Q., A and B Squadron - Glasgow; C Squadron - Paisley, with a drill station
at Greenock; D Squadron - Glasgow.
Lothian and Borders Horse.
H. Q. - Edinburgh; A Squadron - Dunbar with drill stations at Earlston,
Greenlaw, North Berwjck, Musselburgh, Lauder, Kelso, Berwick, Haddington,
Tranent, East Linton, Duns and Coldstream; B Squadron - Edinburgh, with
drill stations at Musselburgh, Dalkeith or Eskbank, Penicuik, Gorebridge,
Lasswade and Loanhead; C Squadron - Hawick, with drill stations at
Galashiels, Jedburgh, Innerleithen, Kelso, Melrose, Newcastleton, Peebles,
Selkirk, Stow, Yetholm and St Boswells; D Squadron - Edinburgh, with drill
stations at Linhithgow, Bathgate, Broxburn, Hopetown, Mid - Calder, South
Queensferry, Ratho and Winchburgh.
1st Lovat Scouts.
H. Q. - Beaully; A Squadron - Roy Bridge, with drill stations at Fort Augustus,
Lock Laggan, Spean Bridge, Glenfinnan, Sheil Bridge and Fort William; B
Squadron - Lochmaddy (North Uist), with drill stations at Bayhead, Sollas,
Craeagorry, Clachan, Torlam and Daliburgh; C Squadron - Skeabost (Skye),
with drill stations at Uig, Portree, Duntulm, Staffin, Glendale, Waternish,
Dunvegan and Braes; D squadron - Beaully, with drill stations at Stuy,
Convinth, Cluness, Beaufort, Doress, Errogie, Whitebridge and Glenurquhart.
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2nd Lovat Scouts.
H. Q. - Beaully; E Squadron - Kyle of Lochalsh, with drill stations at Armadale,
Aultbea, Gleseig, Strathcarron, Dundonnell, Strathcannaird, Ullapool,
Achiltibuie and Achnasheen; F Squadron - Dornoch, with drill stations at
Brora, Helmsdale, Scourie, Tongue, Melness, Bettyhill, Dunbeath, Latheron,
and Berniedale; G Squadron - Alness, with drill stations at Bonar Bridge,
Lairg, Ardgay, Rosehall, Fearn, Edderton, Tam and Contin; H Squadron -
Inverness, with drill stations at Nairn, Laggan Bridge, Aviemore, Nethy Bridge,
Munlochy, Cawdor, Glenferness and Tomatin.
1st Scottish Horse.
H. Q. - Dunkeld; A Squadron - Blair Atholl, with drill stations at Ballinluig,
Pitlochrie, Kirkmichael and Kinloch Rannoch; B Squadron - Dunkeld, with drill
stations at Murthly, Bankfoot, Dupplin, Perth, Cluny and Aberfeldy; C
Squadron - Coupar Angus, with drill stations at Blairgowrie, Alyth and
lnvergowrie; D Squadron - Dunbiane, with drill stations at Crieff, Comrie,
Lochearnhead, Auchterarder, Muthill, Dunning and Methven.
2rC Scottish Horse.
H. Q. - Aberdeen; E Squadron - Elgin, with drill stations at Pluscarden,
Craigellachie, Cullen, Dallas, Dufftown, Forres, Keith and Archiestown; F
Squadron - Kintore, with drill stations at Peterhead, Fraserburgh, Ellon,
Huntly, lnsch, Inverurie, Monymusk, Cluny, Alford, Turriff, Fyvie, Rothie -
Norman, Maud, Mintlaw, Newmacher and Bucksburn; C Squadron -
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Aberdeen, with drill stations at Torphins, Aboyne, Tarland, Ballater and
Braemar; H squadron - Connell (Argyll), with drill stations at Kilchrenan,
Appin, Easdale, Ardishaig, Taynuilt, Calgary, Tiree, Craignure, Campbeltown,
Burnessan, Torloisk, Port Ellen, Port Charlotte, Bowmore and Bridgend.
Royal Scots.
4th Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Forrest Hill)
5th Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Forrest Hill)
6th Royal Scots - Edinburgh (Gilmore Place)
7th Royal Scots - A -G companies - Dalmeny Street Leith; H - company
Mussel burgh
8th Royal Scots - H. Q. - Haddington; A company - Haddington, with drill
stations at Aberlady, Gifford and Pencaitland; B company - Tranent, with drill
stations at Ormiston, Elphinstone and Macmerry; C company - Prestonpans
and Cockenzie; D company - North Berwick, with drill stations at East Linton,
Dunbar and Gullane; E company - Dalkeith, with drill stations at Bonnyrigg,
Pathhead and Gorebridge; F company - Loanhead, with a drill station at
Penicuik; G company - Peebles; H company - Innerleithen, with a drill station
at Walkerburn
9th Royal Scots - Edinburgh (East Claremont Street)
10th Royal Scots - H. Q. and A company - Linlithgow, with a drill station at
Philipstown; B company - Bo'ness, with a drill station at Carriden; C company
- Armadale, with drill stations at Whitburn, Pumpherston and Blackridge; D
company - Bathgate; E company - Uphall, with drill stations at Broxburn and
Livingstone; F company - Fauldhouse, with a drill station at Harthill; G
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company - West Calder, with a drill station at Addiewell; H company -
Kirkliston, with drill stations at Dalmeny, Winchburgh and Newbridge
Royal Scots Fusiliers.
4th Royal Scots Fusiliers - H. Q. and A company - Kilmarnock; B company -
Irvine, with a drill station at Kilwinning; C company - Stewarton, with a drill
station at Kilmaurs; D company - Beith, with drill stations at Glengarnock and
Lochwinnoch; E company - Saltcoats; F company - Dairy, with a drill station at
Kilbirnie; G company - Darvel, with drill stations at Galston and Newmiins; H
company - Kilmarnock
5th Royal Scots fusiliers - H. Q. and A company - Ayr; B company - Catrine,
with a drill station at Darnconnar; C company - Maybole, with a drill station at
Girvan; D company - Stranraer, with drill stations at Portpatrick and Castle
Kennedy; E company - Cumnock, with a drill station at New Cumnock; F
company - Troon; G company - Muirkirk, with a drill station at Glenbuck; H
company - Dalmellington, with a drill station at Rankinston
The Ardeer Company - H. Q. - Ardeer (Attached to 4th royal Scots Fusiliers)
King's Own Scottish Borderers.
4th King's Own Scottish Borderers - H. Q. - Galashiels; A company - Keiso,
with a drill station at Jedburgh; B company - Hawick; C company - Hawick,
with a drill station at Newcastleton; D company - Duns, with drill stations at
Greenlaw, Lauder and Earlston; E company - Coldstream, with drill stations at
Ayton, Eyemouth, Chirnside, Swinton and Coldingham; F and G companies -
Galashiels; H company - Selkirk, with drill stations at Melrose and St Boswells
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5th King's Own Scottish Borderers - H. Q. - Dumfries; A company - Dumfries,
with a drill station at Moniaive; B company - Annan, with drill stations at
Langholm and Canonbie; C company - Lockerbie, with drill stations at
Ecclefechan and Moffat; D company - Sanquhar, with drill stations at Thornhill
and Kirkconnel; E company - Maxwell Town; F company - Dalbeattie; G
company - Castle Douglas, with drill stations at Corsock, Gatehouse and
Kirkcudbright; H company - Newton Stewart, with drill stations at Wigtown,
Creetown, Kirkcowan, Whithorn and Garlieston
Scottish Rifles.
5th Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Princes Street)
6th Scottish Rifles - H. Q., A and B companies - Hamilton; C company -
Uddingston; D company - Larkhall, with a drill station at Strathaven; E
company - Bothwell, with a drill station at Palace Colliery; F company -
Blantyre; G and H company - Motherwell
7th Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Victoria Road)
8th Scottish Rifles - Glasgow (Cathedral Street)
Black Watch (Royal Highianders).
4th Black Watch - Dundee
5th Black Watch - H. Q. Arbroath; A company - Kirriemuir, with drill stations at
Glamis and Newtyle; B company - Forfar; C company - Montrose, with a drill
station at Craigo; D company - Brechin, with a drill station at Edzell; E
company - Arbroath, with a drill station at Friockheiss; F company - Arbroath,
with drill stations at Carnoustie and Monifieth; G and H companies - Dundee
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6" Black Watch - H. Q. , A and B companies - Perth; C company - Dunblane,
with drill stations at Bridge of Allan, Doune and Callander; D company - Crieff,
with a drill station at Comrie; E company - Blairgowrie, with drill stations at
Coupar Angus and Alyth; F company - Auchterarder, with drill stations at
Blackford and Dunning; G company - Birnam, with drill stations at Pitlochry,
Ballinluig, Stanley, Luncarty and Blair Atholl; H company - Aberfeldy, with drill
stations at Kenmore, Fortingall, Grandtully and Killin
7th Black Watch - H. Q. - St Andrews; A company - Dunfermline; B company -
Lochgelly; C company - Kirkcaldy; D company - Cowdenbeath; E company -
Cupar, with drill stations at Newburgh, Auchtermuchty and Abernethy; F
company - Leven, with drill stations at Colinsburgh and Largoward; G
company - St Andrews, with drill stations at Guardbridge, Anstruther and
Crail; H company - Leslie, with drill stations at Markinch and Thornton
Highland Light Infantry.
5th Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Hill Street)
6111 Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Yorkhill Street)
7th Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Main Street, Bridgeton)
8th Highland Light Infantry - H. Q. - Lanark; A company - Lesmahagow, with
drill stations at Stonehouse, Coalburn and Blackwood; B company - Lanark,
with drill stations at Biggar, Ponfeigh and Douglas; C company - Shafts, with
drill stations at Cleland, Salisburgh and Harthill; D company - Carluke; E
company - Forth, with a drill station at Tarbrax; F company - Law, with a drill
station at Overtown; G company - Newmains; H company - Wishaw
gth Highland Light Infantry - Glasgow (Greendyke Street)
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Seaforth Highlanders.
4th Seaforth Highlanders - H. Q. - Dingwall; A company - Tam, with drill
stations at Nigg, Fearn, Edderton and Portmahomack; B company - Dingwall;
C company - Muntochy, with drill stations at Avoch, Rosemarkie, Culbokie,
Muir of Ord and Fortrose; D company - Gairloch, with drill stations at Opisan,
Poolewe, Kinlochewe and Torridon; E company - Ullapool, with drill stations
at Ciogach and Braemore; F company - Invergordon, with a drill station at
Kildary; C company - Alness, with a drill station at Evanton; H company -
Maryburgh, with drill stations at Strathpeffer, Carve, Strathconon and Fairburn
5th Seaforth Highlanders - H. Q. - Golspie; A company - Golspie, with drill
stations at Melvich and Bettyhill; B company - Dornoch, with a drill station at
Rogart; C company - Bonar Bridge, with drill stations at Lairg, Lochinver and
Elphine; D company - Brora, with drill stations at Helmsdale, Kildonan and
Kinbrace; E company - Thurso, with a drill station at Reay; F company - Wick,
with a drill station at Lybster; G company - Halkirk, with drill stations at Watten
and Wesifield; H company - Castletown, with drill stations at Dunnet, May and
Bower Madden
6th Seaforth Highianders - H. Q. - Elgin; A company - Forres, with a drill
station at Altyre; B company - Elgin, with drill stations at Lossiemouth and
Pluscarden; C company - Elgin, with a drill station at Lossiemouth; D
company - Rothes, with a drill station at Archiestown; E company -
Fochabers, with a drill station at Bogmuir; F company - Grantown, with drill
stations at Nethy Bridge and Carr Bridge; C company - Garmouth, with a drill
station at Lhanbryde; H company - Lossiemouth, with drill stations at
Hopeman and Burghead
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Gordon Highianders.
4th Gordon Highianders - Aberdeen
5th Gordon Highlanders - H. Q. Peterhead; A company - Strichen, with drill
stations at New Pitsligo, New Aberdour, New Dear and Maud; B company -
Peterhead, with drill stations at Longside and St Fergus; C company -
Peterhead, with drill stations at Bodden and Hatton; D company - Turriff, with
drill stations at Fyvie and Cuminestown; E company - Ellon, with drill stations
at Auchnagatt, Methlick, Skilmafilly and Newburgh; F company - Old
Meldrum, with drill stations at Tarves, Newmacher and Pitmedden; G
company - Fraserburgh, with a drill station at Rosehearty; F company -
Fraserburgh, with a drill station at Lonmay
6" Gordon Highlanders - H. Q. - Keith; A company - Banif, with drill stations
at Aberchirder, Cornhill and Portsoy; B company - Dufflown, with drill stations
at Aberlour, Chapelton, Glenrinnes and Minmore; C company - Keith, with a
drill station at Grange; D company - Buckie, with drill stations at Findochty
and Cullen; E company - Inverurie, with a drill station at Pitcaple; F company -
Alford, with drill stations at Cushnie, Lumsden, Glenbuckat, Strathdon,
Corgarif and Towie; G company - Bucksburn, with a drill station at Dyce; H
company - Huntly, with drill stations at lnsch and Rhynie
7th Gordon Highianders - H. Q. - Banchory; A company - Banchory, with drill
stations at Durris and Torphins; B company - Portlethen; C company -
Stonehaven; C company - Stonehaven; D company - Laurencekirk, with drill
stations at Auchenblae, Bervie, Fetterecairn, Fordown and Marykirk; E
company - Ballater, with drill stations at Crathie and Braemar; F company -
Aboyne, with drill stations at Tarland, Finzean and Logie Coldstone; G
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company - Kemney, with drill stations at Skene, Blackburn, Monymusk and
Echt; H company - Peterculter, with a drill station at Countesswells
The Shetland Companies - H. Q. and A company - Lerwick; B company -
Lerwick and Scallowag. Affiliated to Gordon Highianders.
Queen's Own Cameron Highianders.
4th Queen's Own Cameron Highianders - H. Q. and A company - Inverness; B
company - Nairn, with drill stations at Cawdor, Ardersier, Auldearn, Croy and
Petty; C company - Inverness, with a drill station at Moy; D company -
Broadford, with drill stations at Torrin, Elgol and Raasay; E company - Fort
William, with drill stations at Corpach, Fort Augustus and Invergary; F
company - Kingussie, with drill stations at Dalwhinnie, Newtonmore, Kincraig
or lnsch, Aviemore and Ardverikie; G company - Beauly, with drill stations at
Struy, Kiltarlity, Balnain, lnchmore and Drumnadrochit; H company - Portree,
with drill stations at Glenmore, Bernisdale, Edinbane, Sconser, Tarbert,
Kilmuir and Lochmaddy
Argyll and Sutherland Hightanders.
5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. 0. , A, B, C and D companies -
Greenock; E company - Port Glasgow; F and G companies - Greenock;
Gourock, with a drill station at Inverkip
6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. 0., A, B and C companies -
Paisley; D company - Renfrew; E company - Johnstone; F company -
Thornliebank; C company - Barrhead; H company - Pollockshaws
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7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Stirling; A company - Stirling,
with a drill station at Bridge of Allan; B company - Stenhousemuir, with a drill
station at Denny; C company - Falkirk, with a drill station at Bonnybridge; D
company - Lennoxtown, with a drill station at Kilsyth; E company - Alloa; F
company - Alva, with drill stations at Dollar, Tillicoultry and Menstrie; C
company - Kinross, with a drill station at Kelty; H company - Alloa, with drill
stations at Sauchie and Clackmannan
8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Dunoon; A company -
Inveraray, with drill stations at Lochgoilhead, Auchnagoul, Dalmally, Furnace,
Cairndow, Strachur and Kilchrenan; B company - Campbeltown; C company -
Southend, with drill stations at Campbeltown, Kelkenzie, Glenbarr, Tayinloan,
Stewarton and Drumlemble; D company - Dunoon, with a drill station at
Sandbank; E company - Lochgilphead, with drill stations at Kilmartin,
Tighnabruaich, Glendarvel, Ardrishaig and Tayvallich; F company -
Ballachulish, with drill stations at Ardgour, Kinlochleven and Duror; G
company - Bowmore, with drill stations at Jura, Port Ellen, Bridgend and
Ballygrant; H company - Easdale, with drill stations at Clachan, Oban,
Cullipool, Toberonochy, Benderloch and Ardchattan
9th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders - H. Q. - Dumbarton; A company -
Helensburgh, with a drill station at Cardross; B company - Kirkintilloch with
drill stations at Cumbernauld and Lenzie; C company - Dumbarton; D
company - Milngavie; E company - Jamestown, with a drill station at Bonhill; F
company - Alexandria, with a drill station at Renton; G and H company -
Clydebank
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Highland Cyclist Battalion (unattached in Scottish command).
Highland Cyclist Battalion - H. Q. and A company - Kirkcaldy; B company -
Cowie; C company - Tayport; D company - Forfar; E company - Dunfermllne;
F company - New Scone; G company - East Wemyss; H company -
Bannockburn
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APPENDIX ii'
1914 : AUGUST - DECEMBER
RECRUITING OFFICE
WEEKLY TOTALS
PERCENT SCOTTISH AND BRITISH TOTALS
1 PRO NATS 1/398. 1/399. 1/400. 1/401.
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